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;•;•;•' •-.;*••• •;.;'••••-•.This dissertation challenges at least two important threads of economics which are widely accepted by various
streams of the economic profession.
a. I believe that the concept of "efficiency" has been ill-defined and therefore misunderstood and
inappropriately used by virtually every economist concerned with law and economics and public choice.
b. With the important addition of the concept of what 1 call a "national economic style." 1 question
whether most of the accepted theory of the firm analysis is universal and therefore valid. One
key clement on the national economic style is to bring together the corresponding inverse
relationship between contracting casts and monitoring costs.
In the concluding chapters, this dissertation includes several challenges for governments and the legal profession.
Even within a "Single European Market." countries are competing fiercely with each other for scarce investment
capital, tax revenues and incorporations. Governments will use three instruments to help themselves compete for
these scarce resources: investment incentives (subsidies): tax breaks: or more liberal company laws. This
governmental competition is not mere conjecture; as one member of the European Commission told me privately:
"each Member Stale is trying to become a tax haven from the other eleven Member Slates." International
investors are playing one country off against another for subsidies which come in various forms and tax benefits.
This dissertation will maintain that the underlying tax and company laws which were mostly formulated for
national domestic reasons, are increasingly under competitive pressure from the laws of neighbouring countries.
For countries the stakes are large. The winners receive and retain investments, tax revenues and corporate
charters; the losers will lose them and force further competition for these scarce resources. Where the equilibrium
point ends up cannot yet be foreseen, but it is unlikely that government will be able to tax corporations or the
ownership of capital in the foreseeable future.
The underlying philosophy taken is that countries have a strong incentive to pass the most efficient organizational
forms as possible in order to maximize the amount of economic activity which occurs in their jurisdiction. The
fact that all countries have not adopted the same means does not necessarily mean that one or more laws arc not
efficient. 1 believe that any talk regarding movement toward a "European Union" with harmonized law in most
areas for the purpose of creating a European Utopia is naive. No country is altruistic. Every country only agrees
to progress on harmonization if (he proposed movement is regarded to be in its interest. The combination of these
premises leads me to the result that many current laws which facilitate transactions and trade might well be
efficient and that total harmonization will only take place if and when national interests coincide.
This thesis will be driven by a belief that markets work in ways where economic actors respond to opportunities
which present themselves. It will be divided into two sections. The first part will outline my overall approach
to the field of law and economics. This part is comprised of four chapters which all centre on efficiency, it is
my contention that all laws should promote efficiency and values. It is also my contention that inefficient laws
will inhibit efficient markets. What makes my arguments distinctive is that I find most economist's definitions
of efficiency to be inappropriate for law and economics or public choice purposes. I contend that both inputs and
outputs are usually ill-measured. A proper definition of efficiency must take into account all inputs (which
includes the conditions under which the market operates) and insure that the inputs arc properly priced. My
definition of output is not confined to a measurement of profits or physical output. The output of an efficient
market should maximize the aggregate amount of satisfaction of a society.
The first chapter of this dissertation is entitled "Laws, Markets and Efficiency." It spells out the proposition that
markets are based on a set of legal norms (sometimes referred to as market conditions) and defines what efficient
markets and efficient legal norms are. Efficient market conditions will beget efficient markets.
The second chapter of this thesis is entitled "Efficient Domestic Background Law." In order for commercial
transactions to efficiently take place, a legal infrastructure must be in place which minimizes uncertainty and risk
as well as transaction and agency costs. In this chapter, I try to debunk some of the speculation that an implied
contract theory is efficient. In doing so I recognize that company laws have been formulated to address (hesometimes competing interests of five economic aclors who have the greatest concern over company law:
investors; creditors; managers; employees and Ihe government. Their various interests are outlined. The
conclusion is thai efficient domestic background law must balance competing interests and create adequate
minimum standards.
The third chapter is entitled "National Economic Styles." Various countries have their own experiences, laws and
institutions. Together they create a spirit and general consensus which transcends a political spectrum.
The fourth chapter is entitled "National Economic Styles and Efficiency." The idea of a national economic style
and efficiency is predicated on the question; Can two different markeLs be based on different market conditions
and each be efficient? This question arose after I had been to a few conferences in which various problems were
discussed. 1 noticed thai virtually every speaker used his country's experience to indicate how and why certain
common problems should be handled in one way or another. I also noticed that most listeners would roll their
eyes when this solution was proposed and then go on to explain why their countries' responses were the correct
solution In the common problem. By implication mosl people fell that a proper solution to a common problem
must be universal. I came tn the conclusion that each solution might be efficient when: (1) the solution properly
reflected Ihe collective values of the society and (2) national institutions and laws are correctly structured to
rcflccl these values. Collectively I refer in Ihe collective nalional values and institutions as "the national economic
style." In these chapters I come lo Ihe conclusion thai each nalional economic style imposes its own distinctive
Iransactions cost, monitoring costs and agency costs which may mandate differcnl efficient solutions and laws
to commonly shared problems. By doing this I will maintain thai various laws pertaining to a single issue can
be simultaneously efficient.
By maintaining thai more than one type of public company or company law may be efficient and indeed
appropriate for different countries, I will directly contest most of contemporary theories regarding the nature of
the firm. My work will be mostly descriptive: 1 will maintain lhal much of current theory is prescriptive. While
Ihcrc is mulling inherently wrong with being prescriptive, it is wrong when the proclaimed mandate one universal
orgmii/iilionnl form or company. These commentators err because they do not take into account differences in
economic styles which can lead lo radically different values, transactions costs, agency costs and monitoring
costs. These differences may have a profound economic effect.
The second part of the thesis centres on how technology has changed Ihe equation of efficient domestic law. It
builds on builds on the view expressed in the first part regarding the relationship between laws, markets,
efficiency and national economic styles.
It begins with a transitional chapter entitled "The Brave New World of Intergovernmental Competition: Efficiency
m an Inlrmalinnal Selling." Technology has made travel and communication relatively fast and inexpensive. As
a result boih linns and individuals have greater choice over who they do business with and which laws lo use.
This chapter ailcnip[.\ lo explain how Ihc world has changed over (he last generation and why, as well as the
consequences of I hose changes.
The major consequences of these changes are outlined in chapters 6 and 7, "Supply-Side Law" and "Supply-Side
Tax Policies," Because of increased global consumer choice and the necessity to pay for social spending,
govcmmcnLS arc competing to attract internationally mobile investment in order to attract jobs and increase
revenue. Since international investors seek Ihe highest return possible at a given level of risk, governments have
had lo compete against each other to enact attractive laws and tax policies to create jobs and much-needed
revenue.
Chapter 6 describes over twenty types of supply-side laws. These are laws which are supplied by governments
lo promote economic activities and tax revenues.
Chapter 7 concludes that Ihc current regimes have strong negative economic and fiscal consequences and that
international investors (primarily corporations) will probably not be taxed in the near future.
The final chapter, "The Proper Source of Efficient Commercial Law in an International Environment: Company
Law and Capital Markets." asks where efficient law should come from. In a world where individuals and firmshave a choice of picking the laws under which they operate, greater thought musl he given to the proper souac
of efficient law. Law which is efficient in this context must be based on the subsidiarily principle: laws should
be passed at the lowest level practicable. "Hie proper source and form of efficient laws will depend on the law's
purpose and the nature of the market which is meant to he regulated. Toward this end, this chapter will go into
some detail regarding the future of laws regulating capital markets, currencies and the operations of companies.
In the past, all were formerly regulated at the national or more local level, but there is an increasing shift to the
international or pan-national level. This chapter asks, at a time when money, capital markets and the structures
of firms are increasingly becoming international in nature, which of these should be regulated by national, by
regional and by international laws. This chapter argues that the international level is appropriate lor capital
markets, that currencies are best regulated at the point where economies become integrated, and that the national
level is more appropriate for company laws. This is because the capital markets, in which capital seeks the
highest rale of return for a given level of risk, arc international. Company law. on the other hand, seeks in
regulate the relationships of people and groups by either suggesting or imposing governance structures. Tlic
appropriateness of any given operating structure is determined by the working relationships, level of trust and
national economic style of a company's stakeholders.
When I began working on this dissertation 1 intended to state the reasons why company law harmonization would
occur and what the economic effects of a single European company law would be. Alter giving the matter further
consideration I concluded that meaningful harmonization would not occur in the foreseeable future. Instead of
abandoning the project. I decided to use an Occam's Razor which is a principle proposed to guide academic
inquiry. It stipulates that simple explanations should be preferred to complex ones mid that complexities should
only be introduced when simple explanations prove inadequate. In doing this. 1 tliought an equally important and
interesting study would be to determine why harmonization does not take place, even though some people might
believe that harmonization is preferable. Treading on this side of the Razor requires using a form of backwards
logic. Once one accepts the possibility that governments might know what they are doing and may already be
acting in their own best interest for economic reasons that can be clearly articulated, the explanation becomes
simpler. This realization requires two other perplexing questions to be answered: Can two different solutions to
the same problem be equally efficient when the inputs are essentially equivalent? II there can be two equally
efficient solutions to the same problem given essentially equivalent inputs, what other factors are at work? Only
after these questions were fully understood and were properly answered in my mind did all of the disparate parts
become clear. I hope that through this dissertation, I can make my understanding of economics and efficient law
in an international setting equally lucid.Abstract
In this chapter ii will be argued that laws, markets and
efficiency should be considered simultaneously, as there is a
natural reciprocal relationship between them. Markets operate
according to the constraints placed upon them by the customs
rules and enforcement provisions which regulate markets. These
legal norms arc the basis upon which goods and services are
priced (or not priced). The only legitimate goal of public policy
should be to create efficient markets. This chapter defines
efficiency as the use of available resources in ways which bring
about the maximum satisfaction possible, given the available
technology. Efficient markets will price all scarce resources in
such a way that will maximize the satisfaction of the entire
society. This can only occur when markets operate under the
guidance of an efficient set of laws and regulations which are
consistently and effectively enforced, One aspect why authors
in the fields of law and economics, iasiitulional economics and
public choice have not always been able to make this natural
connection between law. markets and efficiency is that they
take a narrower view of the term "efficiency." It is argued that
efficiency has often been ill-defined and improperly used
because inputs and outputs have also largely been improperly
measured. Based on the integration of laws, markets and
efficiency, this chapter concludes by outlining when government
activities can be seen as being both efficient and legitimatei: Laws, A/arJtete
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Rules and their enforcement will determine how markets operate. The rules under which markets operate will
determine many things including the supply, demand and price of labour, capital, property, goods and services.
The price which the market sets will help determine whether market participants will choose to buy, sell or not
participate in the market: save, spend or invest; or work, remain idle or enjoy leisure.
Markets will and do work. When markets are said to be "failing" or working "badly" it is not because the markets
themselves "fail" or are "bad;" negative results occur when the set of rules under which the markets operate are
either inherently inadequate, property rights arc unclear or Ihe rules may be adequate but improperly enforced.
Fortunately, in many instances bad. inefficient or ineffective rules and inadequate enforcement can be overcome.
Societies organize themselves with governments which generally have the power both to make or amend rules
which come in Ihe form of laws and regulations, and to enforce these laws and regulations through a system of
courts and administrative bodies. "Bad" market rules can and should be overcome by effective public policy. The
goal of public policy should be to create efficient rules (in Ihe form of laws and regulations and their
enforcement). It is ihe provision of efficient taws which will provide the remedy lo markets which arc said lo
"fail" or are "bad."
The question that should then arise is; what are efficient laws, effective public policies, and useful government
actions? That is what this chapter shall attempt lo address, in order lo aaswer these questions, a determination
what the relationship is; (1) between laws and markets; (2) between markets and efficiency; and finally (3)
between laws and efficiency, is appropriate.
Secft'on 7: Laws a/w/ Marfcete
Markets are arrangements in which providers and consumers of capital, goods and services interact lo determine
the prices and the available quantities of capital, goods and services. Markets operate according lo a sel of legal
norms. Legal norms are market rules and enforceable property rights which have been developed through laws,
constitutions, regulations, tax policies, trade practices, culture, religion and customs. Together these sources of
legal norms determine Ihe form and the structure of the market.
Changes in the law or Ihe manner in which it is enforced necessarily affect the form and the structure of the
market. There is no excuse for those in the public choice or law economics fields not lo centre their analysis on
the relationship between laws and markets. Since these fields are concerned with legal (including governmental)
institutions and the creation and the enforcemenl of law and regulations, they should certainly realize that any
change in the law or its enforcement is intended to affect individual, governmental or firm behaviour. Any change
in behaviour will necessary affect one or more markets. Markets will respond by changing supply and demand
' J.M. Buchanan. "What Can Economics Contribute to its Neighbours?", in S.R. Krupp (ed.). The
Structure of Economic Science (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1986) pp. 8-24 at 8.
^ A.A. Schmid presents this concept in a slightly different way: "Law is a function of the economy and
Ihe economy is a function of the law. and this constitutes Ihe legal-economic nexus." "Institutional Law
and Economics: A Survey". Slaff Paper No. 91-27. Michigan State University (April 1991) at 2.patterns for at least one good or service (considering criminal acts to be a type of service). The change in one
market will affect other markets since consumers' income or other preferences will also have changed.
The cost of establishing and enforcing property rights will affect market operations and may have a dramatic
effect on the supply, demand and cost of the product or service in the market. While laws and markets should
always be considered simultaneously, they often are not. This is unfortunate since legal norms can radically affect
market operations.
I. How Laws Affect Markets - Two Kxamptes
To illustrate how legal norms can affect markets in different ways let us take two examples of markets; labour
and real estate. Even given similar skill levels in their labour force and similar functions for real estate, one often
finds vastly different prices and patterns of usage in different countries and localities. Markets may function
differently and produce different results because the legal norms under which they are fonned and operate may
lead in radically different patterns of both supply and demand. The legal norms which affect the demand and
supply of labour and of real estate will be discussed separately.
a. The Labour Market
National laws, regulations and tax policies, as well as culture, religion and customs, greatly influence the supply
and the cost of labour. The supply of labour is directly influenced by factors such as individual income tax rates,
the wx'ial security structure, the cost and availability of transportation, retirement ages and pension benefits, the
availability of child care, acceptance of women and minorities into the work force, the amount of training and
the regulation of operating hours. The demand for labour is influenced by factors such as minimum wages, social
security payments, labour regulations, the education level of the work force, the cost and availability of training,
the cost of capital and the structure and financing of the health care system.
If it were possible to equal™ these factors, it is reasonable to assume that the witnessed differences in labour
participation rules and unemployment rales between countries would narrow. Participation rates (particularly of
women) may be low in some countries due to high income tax rates and social security conlributioas. high
unemployment and social security benefits, the unavailability of child care, a low acceptance of women and
mmonlres into the work lorce, highly regulated working hours or cultural factors. Unemployment rales may be
higher in countries in which unemployment insurance is generous, laying off or firing people is expensive, or
minimum wage rales, social security, health care and pension fund contributions are high.
b. The Real Estate Market
Culture and governmental laws, regulations and tax policies greatly influence the supply and the cost of real
estate. The supply of property is directly influenced by tax laws, zoning laws, tenant rights, rent controls, building
codes, and the cultural importance of land ownership. The demand for real estate is influenced by these same
factors as well as wealth, income and the cost and availability of credit.
For example, on a purely economic basis, one would have great difficulty explaining why, according to prices
paid in 1<>89. the whole of Japan (,nx,(XH) square kilometres) was valued at more than the whole of the United
States (9,4 million square kilometres). The relative land values are even more startling when one considers that
Japan has fewer buildings, lower per capita income and relatively fewer natural resources and less arable land
It may be useful to think of a black market in this context. The black market price is a true free market
price. It is more efficient than the "official price." The black market price should better mirror supply
ami demand conditions. The black market price should be influenced by the official' price of the good,
the risk in selling it illicitly and the amount of time which one has to queue for the product if it could
be had legally.
* "Growth's Dead Weight", The Economist (June 15. 1991) p. 13.than the Uniled Stales. Only when the differences in supply and demand factors mentioned above are considered
can one begin to attempt to provide some son of explanation for the extraordinary difference in land values.
2. Different Legal Norms, Different Markets
If the definition of a market is an arrangement where buyers am) sellers can interact to determine the prices and
(he available quantities of goods or services, it must be asked why different markets for simiUu goods and
services determine different quantities and prices for these goods and services. One reason may be thai the
underlying legal norms of the markets may be completely different Since virtually every country has its own
distinctive legal system pertaining to real estate and labour (products which are either not transportable or
necessarily mobile), comparing markets on a country by country basis may be like comparing apples and oranges.
Whether the national markets for these economic goods are efficient is a different issue.
2.- Marfofj and £/77ci>ncy
In order to determine whether markets are truly efficient, it must be asked what cuaslituies an efficient market
and efficiency must be properly defined. A definition of efficiency which differs from the definitions which have
been most commonly employed will he used and applied to the definition of an efficient market (based on
outcome) and an efficient legal system.
1. Towards a Correct Definition of Efficiency
The concept of efficiency, although at the core of economic analysis, is less precise and less valid than one would
expect. Even within neoclassical economic theory it does not always mean the same thing to every economist.
Although there is general agreement that efficiency is centred on measures which cither lead to some type of
maximization or optimization, many of Ihe concepts of efficiency used by economists arc inappropriate for either
public choice and law and economics purposes. A critique of how the public choice, law and economics or
institutional law and economics fields have treated the term "efficiency" is covered in the Appendix to this
chapter.
In economic terms, efficiency is determined by only two factors: (I) the level of inputs and (2) (he amount of
output which results. It is in the measurement and determination of inputs and outputs that many concepts of
efficiency are inadequate for both public choice and law and economics purposes. As a result, there are problems
with both the commonly understood microeconomic and the macroeconomic definitions of efficiency.
a. A Correct Measurement of Inputs
In economic theory, inputs are usually confined to three variables: natural resources, capital and labour. This is
insufficient. Markets rest on a set of legal rules. Variations in these rules present different opportunity costs.
Government actions including law-making, taxation, regulation and bureaucracy may seriously enhance or delrxt
from every element of an efficient market. These government actions will almost necessarily affect the supply
or demand found in a market. These changes in supply and demand will be reflected in the price of a commodity,
good or service. As with the supply and demand of natural resources, capital and labour, market rules can be
changed. Since market rules can alter Ihe patterns of both the supply and demand for natural resources, capital
and labour, o«rf arc nw/yufd, market rules should be seen as an input. The exclusion or lack of understanding
of the role which govemmenls and legal systems play in Ihe market place may produce markets which are not
economically efficient. It may also lead to erroneous economic theory, bad legislation or faulty economic policy.
This will be further discussed below.
Economists may ask what production function can the law have? The answer is thai Ihe law should
be treated as an input.8
b. A Correct Measurement of Outputs
temul-h ST e"^ '"n ™^T™""/ '***"' '""*" "P"** * P™^ "•easuremen, of output should
be much broader • especially when considenng public cho.ee or law and economics issues OutputVhould be
measured « the .o.al amoun. of satisfaction (.his is more commonly referred ,o as "utility-) »K ftS
the use of .he input, The correct measurement of outputs by authors in the fields of pub.* clEc?2
When considenng satisfaction, one starts with an egalitarian premise: every person and every person's satisfaction
has to be treated equally. If every person., satisfaction ,s deemed to rTofequal valueT^L.TsS
satisfaction should be a simple aggregate total of the individual satisfaction factions. TraL" iT
necessary s.nce virtually every law or other action will make some individuals worse^T Wta
This may be difficult, since the absolute number of individuals helped and harmed by any law or policy should
m,, be based an a simple head count. The intensity of feeling is more importan, If relaUvebfcw peoXs
marginally hiumed by the action (and would not vote for the action if a poll were to be taken).
For example, let's imagine a relatively peaceful island with a reasonable standard of living and no gov
sponsored scKialaxunty programme. A natural disaster hits making a sizable minority homeless and a ve
number of people permanently disabled. Local chanty, insurance proceeds and international aid *
to rebuild the los. !><*,,« and .0 care for the ma,med. The local politicians decide to pass an unde local politicians decide to pass an undefined
r I'^I r\ "^ """' """ **' •"* ^ "« ** *«"" ** ™1"« f"" of *« tax. While everyone may
^ 1, tL rt?,i "'" T^^""" " P""""^ * "*"»«' ""« "* «^"- •"« Vnial point of this
^,,,, ,h , " »*V"'^ " ""^'"' ••"""""' "' *"**"°" « f""^ '" »8h. of the crcumsunces
l)epcm ,ng on the feelings of the populauon .he optimal point will range somewhere between totally rebuilding
he de.stn.yed houses ,0 their former standard to putting up only enough money ,0 build temporary shacks Tne
pSattffi """ """" *™^" "^™* " """""" ^^" <^"8 ^ ^^ o?.he?care .0
Since measurement and aggregation arc not simple to determine in this or any other instance
designates agents .0 do this for them. The.se agents are commonly called •public .servanT"" T
TeT'^ 1" °°"* ""' *" ""*"' "" "^ "*" «""«* "^ ^ Po'i-cans
^vH ,h ' •**".,?,•*" *•*"" ""= ™>*"y *'" WP *e minoriiy. the issue is how much above
level Uie Uupayers will lose more satisfaction than the minority recipients gain Finding the poimof
satisfaction is a political question which must be left ,0 trusted public servant^l cXta a




f •**".,?,•*" *•*"" ""= ™>*"y *'" WP *e minoriiy. the issue is how much above
ers will lose more satfti h h inority recipients gain Fi
,0 trusted public servant
*• Mancingrf compeung i
!!"* T '"""^' "'.'" ^"* ^*'^ ^* *"* "«« °"*"' ^ ""« ^^ <««• ^ indirect effects
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«Annc. Efficiency aod Adam Smith
Adam Smilh was concerned with the concept of efficiency when he wrote The Wealth erf Nations,^ but his
definition of efficiency is not entirely applicable, because he was interested in national wealth ralher than
•attraction. Nevertheless, the mechanism which can lead to maximization is the same in both cases.
Smith uses the concept of the invisible hand to demonstrate the process which approaches ihe production
possibility curve (denned solely in terms of national wealth). The invisible hand works when individuals attempt
to maximize their own satisfaction (not necessarily wealth). Out of all of thus self-interest efficiency is achieved.
Resources are scarce and therefore must be allocated. The market mechanism ensures thai each individual places
his own value on these scarce resources and Ihe resources end up in the hands of the persons who place the
highest value on them. If the value is high enough, others will devote resources from other sources to produce
more of Ihe scarce resource (if possible). This process is dynamic. If the markets arc all efficient, meaning thai
information is widely available and transaction costs are low. ihe wealth of nations will be maximized. J.
Bonner puts it well when he states that: "Markets arc a device for making social decisions in Ihe economic
sphere. They determine H'toif is to be produced. Aim it is to be produced, and by H'Aom H is to hi' consumed,
without recourse to physical force or central direction.
2. A Correct Definition of Efficiency
After it is understood how both inputs and output should be measured, a correct definition of efficiency becomes
simple: efficiency is the use of available resources in ways which bring ahoul the maximum overall satisfaction
possible, given the available technology. This definition does not accept existing market rules when the rules
themselves do not lead to a maximization of satisfaction.
Within this definition, output is measured in terms of satisfaction, not physical output. A maximum satisfaction
curve might well allocate resources in manners thai would lie (considerably) below a society's production
possibility curve since a society which seeks to maximize satisfaction may well allocate resources in a different
way than would be expected if only individual utility curves and the production possibility curve are
considered."
An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776). Reprint (Clarendon: Oxford,
1976).
Both A. Rees in "Compensating Wage Differentials", in Essays on Adam Smith. A. Skinner and T.
Wilson (eds.) (Oxford: Clarendon. 1976) at 93-112 and E.G. West. Adam Smith and Modern Economics
(Aldershol and Brookfield. VT: Edward Elgar. 1990) point out that Smilh listed five factors which
constituted the non-monetary advantages and disadvantages of employment. They argue that these listed
factors show that Smith was interested in maximizing satisfaction.
While a free flow of information and low transaction costs are prerequisites for an efficient market, they
are not necessarily sufficient conditions for an efficient market. Both conditions are often present in
stock markets, but when one notes thai on October 19th 1987 the Dow Jones Industrial Index was worth
23% less than it was on its previous trading day (October I6th), one is left with the question whether
the New York Stock Exchange operated in an "efficient" manner.
'^ J. Bonner, Politics, Economics & Welfare (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1986) at 111.
The majority position of the economics profession is that satisfaction cannot be aggregated. There is
however, a long-standing minority position. See A. Bergson, "Reformulation of Certain Aspects of
Welfare Economics". 2 Quarterly Journal of Economics 310-334 (1938). Reprinted in K. Arrow and
P. Scitovsky (eds.). Readings in Certain Aspects of Welfare Economics (Irwin: Homewood 111.. 1969)
pp. 7-25; and B.M.S. van Praag, Individual Welfare functions and Consumer Behaviour (Amsterdam:
North Holland. 1968).10
For example, one can argue (hat in overall terms. France maximiiies its satisfaction by sponsoring the French
language, French music, French television and cinema, French art. French fashion. French automobiles. French
wine and French food. The French do this even though it might be cheaper and more technically efficient to use
German where practical, listen to English music, import American movies and television shows, view Spanish
an, drink Portuguese wine, wear Italian fashion, drive Japanese automobiles and eat food imported from eastern
Europe. If France became more technically efficient by adopting foreign culture and consumption habits, a large
segment <>l the population might enjoy listening to more English language music, watching more American
movies and television shows, driving Japanese automobiles and eating cheaper food.
Becoming more technically efficient, however, has its own costs. Should Frenchmen decide that it is worthwhile
to incur these additional costs, the French economy cannot sit on the perimeter of us production possibility curve.
Sitting on the outskirts of Ihe nation's production possibility curve is no panacea: many French men and women
receive great satisfaction in Ihe promotion of frcnch food and culture. While economic theory might demonstrate
lh.il considerable trade benefits would be reaped, for instance, by switching to the German language, undergoing
this change would almost certainly dilute Ihe population's satisfaction derived from being "French." The costs
would he so great that it is impossible to envision how these archetypical changes could increase French societal
salisf action.
Maximizing satisfaction should be considered on a societal basis, because it is the society which makes many
of the laws which are an integral part of Ihe market rules. As this definition of efficiency is different to the most
commonly used definitions of Ihe term by the microeconomics, macroeconomics, public choice and law and
economics professions, a brief overview on how many economists lend to use Ihe term "efficiency" is given and
then the shortcomings of these definitions arc pointed out. The difference between the j(a/«i ^uo and
efficient law wilt be pointed oul in later chapters.
3. Problems With the Mkroeconomic Definition
a, Efficiency of Allocation
At the iniiroeconomic level, efficiency is reached when all resources are allocated optimally. The microeconomic
definition usually derives from a definition of allocalivc or "Pareto" efficiency. This type of "efficiency" occurs
when there is no other reorganization of production or consumption that will increase the satisfaction of one
person without reducing the satisfaction of another person. This definition suffers from an inadequate
measurement of both inputs and outputs. It is inappropriate for our purposes because it (1) takes the market as
it finds it (there is no assumption th;it the market itself is either efficient or inefficient or can be changed); and
(2) this definition docs not assume that societal satisfaction is maximized.
b. Efficiency of Distribution
The use of Parelo efficiency is a mistake since it does not always lead to resource allocation which maximizes
societal satisfaction. As A.K. Sen stresses. Pareto efficiency in itself is not "a momentous achievement from the
point of view of social welfare. A person who starts off ill-endowed may slay poor and deprived even
after...|tr.u)ing| and if ...jefficiency is all that is on offer], Ihe propcrtyless may be forgiven for not regarding the
achievement us a big deal.'" As an example, let us take a society of 100.000 people with an aggregate
wc;il(h of 100 million units. In this society there is one happy, but greedy individual who owns almost all of the
l *
For an excellent review of the historical debate regarding efficiency see D.W. Bromley, "The Ideology
of Efficiency: Searching for a Theory of Policy Analysis". 19 Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management 86-107 (1990).
'•' P.A. Samuelson and W.D. Nordhaus. Economics, Thirteenth Edition, (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1989)
at 747.
'* A.K. Sen, "Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioural Foundations of Economic Theory", 6
Philosophy and Public Affairs 317-344 (Wr^H) at .120.wealth. Hie other 99.W9 people are destitute. This one wealthy individual has a perverse utility curve in which
he decides to spend his entire wealth on buying toxic waste from around the world and spreading it liberally
throughout the entire country. Few people would argue that this is an efficient society. It would, however, be
considered Pareto inefficient if he were required to stop spreading toxic waste. Even if spillover effects are
eliminated from Pareto efficient analysis, it would also be Pareto inefficient to merely impose a lax on his wealth,
giving him an incentive to invest instead of consuming or to redistribute any of his income. This is true even if
society's needs and desires would be greatly served by such actions. One could imagine that societal satisfaction
might well be augmented if some type of redistribution system were put in place where, through a small transfer
payment, the richer person's satisfaction were marginally reduced while the starving people's satisfaction was
greatly enhanced. This outcome would not he Pareto efficient (because the wealthy man is subjectively worse
off), but it should be seen to be efficient from a law and economics or public choice perspective. As
Samuels wrote, "the [Pareto] law is willy nilly wealth maximizing whichever or whosoever's interests it
protects."""
Daniel Bromley delivers a harsh broadside at Parelo efficiency. It is one which has great merit.
The potential Pareto improvement criterion and other measures of economic efficiency do not
pass the test of consistency and coherence within economic theory, nor do such measures
accord with what public decision makers seek in policy advice from economists.... On
surveying this (welfare economics] literature one is reassured that (1) efficiency, via the Pareto
lest, lends itself to rather precise measurement; and (2) economic efficiency seems to require
the fewest value judgements' on the part of the researcher. Less reassuring arc (1) the
persistent debate over which welfare criterion Is appropriate - Kaldor. Hicks. Scilovsky, Little.
Mishan. or various combinations thereof; and (2) the Boadway Paradox, in which the ability
of the gainers to compensate the losers does mx lead to an unambiguous improvement of socinl
welfare. More seriously, in all this prodigious elegance, rarely is there recognition that the
Parelo test remains what it has always been - an analytical construct (inconsistent and
incoherent at that) with no special claim to legitimacy beyond the tautological domain out of
which it arose."
Efficiency of distribution requires that all trades that can make both parties simultaneously better off ore carried
out. This definition not only suffers from the problems outlined above, but also fails to take into account Ihe
effects that transaction costs or taxes may have on possible transactions.
As an illustration, let us take two individuals, one of whom owns a house while the other owns shares in a listed
company. Both Ihe house and the shares were bought for 50,000 units and both have a fair market value of
100.000 units. Leaving aside transaction costs and taxes, they would both like to exchange their assets. This
simple trade cannot be conducted in this manner. Stock market rules require that shares be traded on the exchange
and that the shares be registered in the name of the new owner. Most countries have one or more property
registration bureaus where changes in property ownership are recorded. Thus two 'sales' must be made, as
opposed to a single trade. Neither of these changes in registration are costless.
The effect that taxes have on this transaction varies from country to country. Let me concentrate on two types
of taxes which may alter the post-sale price: sales or value added (axes and capital gains or income taxes. Some
countries may require that sales or value added taxes are paid on one or both of the transactions. This will lower
the after tax net price received. Some countries also may tax the 50,000 unit capital gain made by either or both
of the parties (the realized price minus the original purchase price). Regardless of the amount of Ihe taxes, this
will distort the amount of afler tax units held by each of the parties and may prevent the parlies from completing
" A.C. Pigou came up with a similar example in The Economics of Welfare. Fifth Edition, (London:
Macmillan. 1952) at 332.
WJ. Samuels, "Maximization of Wealth as Justice: an Essay on Posnarian Law and Economics as
Policy Analysis". 60 Texas Law Review 147-172 (1981) at 148.
" Bromley, supra note 12 at 86 and 96.12
Die trade. For example, let us ray thai the former shareholder paid transaction costs and capital gains taxes of
25,000 units. This means that he is now left with only 75,000 units. For 75,000 units he probably cannot buy a
house with a fair market value of 100,000 units. On the other hand let us suppose that the former home owner
received the entire 100,000 units, but had to pay transaction costs and sales taxes equal to 10.000 units. This
means that he can only buy 90,000 units worth of shares. This trade may no longer be attractive or possible for
him eilber.
3. Problems with In* Macroeconomic Definition
At Ihe matroeconomic level, efficiency is often deemed to be reached when an economy's current output reaches
the production (not satisfaction) possibility frontier. The macroeconomic definition usually derives from a
definition of technical efficiency. This type of "efficiency" occurs when inputs (usually confined to natural
resources, labour and capital) are used in the manner which maximizes output given the technology available.
The criticism of this definition is similar to the criticism of the microeconomic definition: it does not attempt to
measure satisfaction, nor does it consider whether the market itself is efficient.
Efficiency in production is said to be assured if all firms are producing at the point where price equals marginal
cost: the place where competitive films maximize profits. There are two problems with this contention, both
having to do with the improper or inadequate measurement of outputs. (1) A worker may be most productive as
a physicist, but he finds that he hales mathematics and wants to promote cold fusion by being a welder in Siberia.
This change in employment may reduce productive capacity, but it will increase his utility. (2) Because the legal
system is not considered to he an input, externalities are not necessarily measured either in terms of production
or by productive capacity. This was and is one of Ihe key reasons why Eastern Europe is so polluted. Pollution
was not implicily or explicitly counted as a by-product of "efficient production." In this situation, even assuming
that each factor of production was used in its most productive capacity, producing at the production possibility
curve cannot be considered to be an efficient outcome, because output was not fully measured.
4. What U an Efficient Market?
"To ik-tueve static and dynamic efficiency a market system must be characterized by competition in all relevant
markets and hy the equality of private and social costs and benefits."''' A truly efficient market will
accomplish this by providing efficient laws and efficient legal structures. Efficiency occurs when the aggregate
amount of satisfaction is maximized with the available inputs mid technology.
With this in mind, it seems logical to return to (he question of whether two different markets, the labour and the
real estate market can both simultaneously be efficient even if they are radically different. The answer must be
yes if societal satisfaction is maximized in each country. An efficient market will be based on a system of
efficient laws. If two radically different markets for the same product or service can be simultaneously efficient,
the legal norms under which the markets operate must also be efficient since they produce markets which
maximize satisfaction in the various societies. This concept will be further developed in Chapter 3: National
Economic Styles and Efficiency.
Section 3." Law
As discussed above, markets exist within a framework of legal norms. The efficiency of a market is determined
by the laws which provide its framework. This analysis differs profoundly from that of many lawyers,
economists, and government officials. For instance. Kenneth Arrow denies in Ihe very first sentence of his famous
book "Social Choice and Individual Values," Ihe interrelationship of laws, markets and efficiency. "In a capitalist
democracy there arc essentially two methods by which social choice can be made: voting, typically used to make
One should note that this example conforms to a Pareto analysts.
C.G. Wihlbuig and P.M. Wijkman, "Outer Space Resources in Efficient and Equitable Use; New
Frontiers and Old Principles". 24 Journal of Law and Economics 23-W (1981) at 29.13
•political' decisions, and the market mechanism, typically used to make 'economic' decisions." By divorcing
the interconnection of laws, markets and efficiency. Arrow shows a lack ol^ appreciation of how 'political'
decisions can directly influence "economic' decisions. This is not uncommon."
Once one accepts thai markets operate on a set of legal norms, it seems logical to ask the questions: Which legal
norms will promote efficiency and what steps can he taken to build efficient markets? To do this one must
answer ihe question of how legal norms can he established in onlcr to establish clficicnl markets. The analysis
contained in this section shall be expanded upon in Chapter 2: Efficient Domestic Laws.
1. The Underlying Role of Legal Norms: Knforcement and Creation
As slated above, economic theory, and therefore efficiency, rests on the assumption of operational markets.
Markets rest on a set of legal rules. The formation of efficient legal rules requires an efficient enforcement of
ihe rules. Since govemmenis which are hound by constitutional constraints generally have the ultimate final say
over the creation and the enforcement of legal norms, they necessarily play a large role in determining whether
efficiency can or will be achieved.
a. The Role of Contract Law
Markets are almost always based on a scries of bilateral contracts. Contract law plays an important role in
determining how the owners of property engage in mutually advantageous trade. Contracting involves an
exchange of promises for either services or property rights. The most common exchange is where each party to
Ihe contract trades something of value in exchange for something else which has value, In Posner's view contract
law has three functions. First, it maintains proper incentives for exchange, protecting the contracting panics from
nonperformance and fraud. Second, through the establishment of a system of rules, it reduces complexities and
transaction costs. Third, it helps the parties engage in more trade in the future, because a learning process lakes
place as people become more familiar with the rules and the procedure.
b. Enforcement of Legal Norms
Relative certainty is a prerequisite for an efficient market. Underlying all contractual arrangements is Ihe notion
that the promises which have been exchanged can somehow be ultimately enforced. Enforcement can take
many forms and does not even have to be certain for the market to operate. If enforcement is uncertain, this
uncertainty must be considered a market risk. Even allowing thai some uncertainly of enforcement is present in
virtually every contract (the death or bankruptcy of one of the contracting parties or an act of God may prevenl
performance), an efficient market will be one in which the risk of nonperformance is minimized.
One way to lower uncertainly is by having an efficient enforcement mechanism. Enforcement mechanisms
can come in various forms. In addition to government sponsored court systems, enforcement can take place via
private courts, arbitration or tribunal, social stigma or even the possibility of physical intimidation.
KJ. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1951) at 1.
Other examples of this omission and its consequence to the economics, public choice and law and
economics fields are noted in the Appendix to this chapter.
R.A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law. Third Edition. (Boston and Toronto: Liltle. Brown and
Company, 1986),
For a general discussion on the enforceahilily of contracts see R.A. Posner. Ibid, at 79-85, § 4.1; and
G. Tullock, The Logic of Ihe Law (New York: Basic Books. 1971) at 35-47.
H. Demsetz. "The Exchange and Enforcement of Property Rights" in Efficiency. Competition and
Policy: The Organization of Economic Activity Volume I (Oxford and Cambridge. MA: Basil
Blackwell. 1990) 31-46.14
The market for loan sharking (private loans at usurious rales) works despite the knowledge that the courts will
(KM enforce contracts which are against public policy. The incidence of nonpayment may be very low. even
without the ultimate protection of the courts, if the non-payer is relatively certain to be physically harmed. As
there u reasonable certainly of enforcement, risk of non-repayment is low.
Physical intimidation may not even be necessary for a relative certainty of enforcement: the possibility of social
sligma may be enough. Private gambling is a good example. If a bet between friends is made on a football match
(a promise to pay by each party based on a condition), courts again will not enforce the contract if gambling is
deemed to be against public policy. If being known as a "welsher" creates enough of a social stigma, the bet will
usually be paid by the loser, the market will be relatively certain and efficient with corresponding low transaction
costs.
Private courts, arbitrator!) and tribunals act on a different basis. Parties contract to use these alternatives to the
court systems because they may be thought of as being cheaper, more certain or as having more expertise (all
attributes of efficiency)/- Underlying their effectiveness is the court system which will ultimately back the
decisions of these alternatives, as long xs this arrangement was bargained for in good faith and the alternative
dispute resolution system followed its own legal procedures.
2. Kfficifnl Knforcement and Creation of Legal Norms
Efficient enforcement of legal norms resti on having well defined and certain property rights. Certain and clear
rights can be cheaply, quickly and consistently protected and enforced by the courts. This is a necessary
precondition for having the lowest possible contracting and transaction cosls.^
a. Oration or Legal Norms
Governmental actions which include law making, taxation (a subset of law making), regulation. law and
regulation enforcement and bureaucracy may seriously enhance or detract from every clement of virtually any
market. Governments therefore may cither promote or detract from economic efficiency since their actions or
inactions may directly or indirectly afreet contracting, monitoring, transaction, agency and opportunity costs.
b. What is Efficient Law?
Efficient law is a set of legal norms which create markets that maximize satisfaction. Efficient law must, among
other (lungs, create conditions under which choices can be made rationally. Rational decision making is based
on markets in which cither the eventual outcome is certain or risk can he properly measured. An efficient legal
system mast then-tore uphold the principles of certainty of outcome or certainly of risk in order to maximize
satisfaction. As legal norms affect markets (and vice versa), only laws which will efficiently facilitate markets
can be viewed as proper. Using this criterion the types of government action which can be viewed as proper are
severely limited by some rational constraints. From these constraints, the circumstances under which governments
should become involved in the market place can be limited. The creation of efficient law is somewhat separate
from the issue of when governments should become involved in the market, for reasons which shall later become
apparent. The creation of efficient domestic laws will be more fully discussed in Chapter 2; efficient laws in an
international context are the focus of the second p;ui of this book.
This will be further discussed in Chapter 6.
For a discussion of this ^ee MA, Crew and C. Twight, "On the Efficiency of Law: A Public Choice
Perspective". 66 Public Choice 1S-36 (1990).Secrion 4: Lan's, Marias anrf EjOtfciVncy: WAf it govermncufs .Y/JOHM
in
Laws can make markets more efficient. 1990 Nobel Prize Laureate Harry Markowil/ recently explained why laws
may be necessary to make markets more efficient: "[One] nuiy think thai markets can run themselves. This is
not the case. Laws and law enforcement arc needed to assure me thai ihe meal I buy is not poisoned and the
airplane Ihal I fly on is well maintained: thai (hose who manufacture Ihings tor my use pay their lull costs,
including the cost of cleaning up the mess ihcy make: that il I deposit money with a hank or pay a premium to
an insurance company Ihe banker or the insurer will not go to Las Vegas to gamble with my money."
1991 Nobel Prize Laureate Ronald Coase outlined how and why the government is important to the market place.
"The government is, in a sense, a super-firm (but of a very special kind) since il is able to influence Ihe
use of the factors of production by administrative decision. But the ordinary firm is subject (o checks
in its operations because of Ihc competition of other firms which might administer Ihc same activities
at lower cost, and also because there is Ihe alternative of market transactions against organization within
the firm if the administrative costs become lo great. The government is able, if il wishes, lo avoid ihc
market altogether, which a firm can never do. The firm has lo make agreements with Ihe owners of the
factors of production thai H uses. Just as the government can conscript or seize property, so it can decree
that factors of production should only be used in such-and-such a way Such authoh/jilion methods save
a lot of trouble (for those doing the organizing). Furthermore, the government has at its disposal the
police and the other law enforcement agencies to make sure that ils regulations arc earned out,"
Because the government can and often does act as a monopoly supplier of market rules, alt of its actions will
have an effect on satisfaction. Not all government actions will maximize satisfaction. As a result, sonic kinds of
constraints must be placed on government actions. This section shall lay out precisely which types of
governmental actions and expenditures can enhance efficiency. Every proposed government action or expenditure
should be argued lo have al least one of Ihc purposes outlined below.
Since governments can cither enhance or detract from market efficiency, Ihc following question arises: When
should governments become involved in markets'? The usual answer, as in the examples given by Markowitz, is
when markets fail or have the potential to fail.
Markets can fail in many ways. Each failure presents an opportunity for governments lo facilitate and augment
the market process. In the event of a market failure, the case for government intervention is strong in theory.
Great care must, however, be taken that the cost of Ihc intervention (either direct or indirect) is less than Ihe
amount of the benefit. As Coase stated: "All solutions have costs and there is no reason to suppose Ihal
government regulation is called for simply because the problem is nol well handled by the market or Ihe
firm.' Although this is difficult to measure, there are only three instances in which it is efficient for the
government lo attempt to facilitate markets.
1. When ihe tax base is increased by more than the cosi of the action.
2. When resources are inadequately priced by markets and the benefits from reallocating
underpriced resources arc greater than the cosl of the action.
3. When societal satisfaction is increased more than the cost of the action.
H.M. Markowitz. "Markets and Morality or Arbitragers Get No Respect". Wall Street Journal Europe
(May 15. 1991) p. 8.
TO
R.H. Coase. "The Problem of Social Cost" (1961). Reprinted in The Law, The Market and The Firm
(Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1988). pp. 95-156 at 117.
•*' Ibid, at 118.16
1. Increasing The Tax Bast
The efficiency criterion will be satisfied if the size of Ihe tax base is increased by more than the cost of the
action. The tax base is not defined as what the government actually collects. It is the rapac/ry of the govemmeni
to lax if it needs or chooses to do so. The growth of the tax base does not have to he direct or even immediate
to be efficient. When discussing a future government's need or desire to spend tax revenues, the issue of whether
lax revenues are ever collected from the tax base is not important: only the option to do so is.
The reason why the amount of the increase in the tax base is an appropriate measurement of efficiency is that
some types of government actions should be thought of as investments. An investment can only be justified if
the investment is considered to have a positive net present value. Provided investments have a positive value they
can be "cashed in" in Ihe future, when or if needed. The decision to cash in on the investment is an issue separate
to whether the investment should be made.
Of course, the efficiency of each particular expenditure must still be proven, and it must be shown that, in the
absence of govemmeni action, non-govemmcntal investment would be inadequate. Govemmeni expenditures for
education, research and development and infrastructure are types of government expenditures which might be
considered to be efficient under these criteria.
u, Kducation
Government expenditure for education would be efficient if the total amount of Ihe following three potential
revenue sources was directly or indirectly increased by more than the cost of the govemmeni expenditure. These
potential revenue sources include; (I) Ihe earning capacity of the student's; (2) Ihe value of the intellectual
propcny developed; and (?) the dircci and the indirect expansion of the earning capacity of the capital invested
within the government's jurisdiction as a result of the students' additional knowledge and earning capacity.
•" The Laffcr curve presents an interesting illustration of the difference between the tax base and the
government's ability to collect tax revenue.
On the graph there ;irc three possible points at which the government may choose to tax. Obviously
taxing at rate C makes little sense, as the govemmeni collects less revenue and alienates a number of
potential taxpayers. The options are now narrowed to rales A or B. 1 would argue that taxing at rate
A is almost always more appropriate than taxing at rate B. The reason for this is that at rate B Ihe
govemmeni is already collecting as much tax revenue as it possibly can. This leaves Ihe government
with no future option to raise additional revenue in case of a recession or national emergency. Since
having a certain amount of flexibility is always important, rate A is more appropriate than rate B. This
is why developing a tax base and collecting tax revenue should be thought of separately.17
b. Research and Development
Government expenditure for research and development would be efficient if. as a result of the expenditure, the
value of the research developed, the increased earning power of the scientists participating or benefiting from the
research, and the earning capacity of the capital attracted as a result of the expenditure exceeded the net present
value of the cost.
c. Infrastructure
Government expenditure for infrastructure is more complicated and contains more potential (and indirect) benefit*.
First, as infrastructure generally involves capital items, governments often have a belter ability to either charge
for usage or to sell (privatize) them. This alone may make investment in infrastructure efficient. Second,
investment in infrastructure enhances the earning power of workers and capital. Third, investment 111 infrastructure
may help attract or maintain investment. Fourth, investment in infrastructure may help augment another lax
base. For example, the provision of roads, will help stimulate the demand for automobile ownership and
usage. An investment in roads may therefore increase revenues in the form of road taxes, licence fees and
gasoline taxes. If the collective earning capacity of all of these items exceeds the net present value ol the cost
of the infrastructure investment, the investment will be efficient. -
2. Nonexclusive Resources and Negative Kxternalitles
When the use of resources is nonexclusive or when negative externalities are present and uncompensalcd for.
government action will be efficient when the benefits from government action exceeds its costs. There are at least
three different categories of government actions which may be efficient under these circumstances These include
regulating or taxing the use of: (1) nonexclusive scarce resources, such as mods.• • radio frequencies, fishing
rights and the use of the skies by airplanes: (2) unpriced resources which are difficult to define, such as a "clean*
environment; and (3) unpriced or undcrpriced actions or resources. Underpriccd actions or resources are gcxxls
or activities where the market price does not reflect the entire cost of the resource or activity. Examples of
unpriced or underpriccd activities or resources include the environment, the creation of garbage and the use of
tobacco and alcohol. Most types of government regulation, such as environmental controls, health and safety
regulations, consumer protection and antitrust policies, attempt to address negalive externalities and the
underpncing of resources.
" Robert Reich indicates the difficulty in measuring benefits. While not assessing whether any
government expenditures arc efficient, he does point out that investment in education and infrastructure
is a dynamic process when he refers to Ihc "spillovers" which occur as a result of corporate investment.
He indicates that "spillovers might include the jobs that result from having sophisticated factories,
laboratories, and equipment in the United States, whose high wages multiply throughout the economy,
raising other incomes. Good jobs generate higher tax receipts, which permit governments to invest in
public facilities such as improved schools and transportation and also care for the elderly and the
disadvantaged in society. Moreover, on-the-job training and the resulting technical know-how enables
Americans to innovate and thus generate more wealth for the United States in the years to come." R.B.
Reich, "Who is Them?" 69 Harvard Business Review 77-88 (March/April 1991) at 83.
The'pollution caused by cars ought to be taxed separately in order to ensure that the creation of the
pollution (and cither negative externalities such as noise) are fully levied. This is further discussed
below.
Scarce road space will be increasingly priced as technology makes it more feasible. Following the lead
of Hong Kong (a plan which was later abandoned) and Singapore, the London borough of Richmond
will be experimenting with an electronic pay-as-you-go system to see whether road pricing relieves
traffic congestion. Initially only the 100 council owned automobiles will be monitored. R. Tomkins.
"London to Test System for Pay-As-You-Drive Roads", Financial Times (September 18, 1991) p. 16.
Also see R. Tomkins, "Clocking Up the Miles", Financial Times (September 18. 1991) p. 10.18
a. Nonexclusive Resources
For some resources, in the absence of government regulation, markets will not necessarily allocate the resources
optimally. This might happen when the use of the resources is nonexclusive.
Since usage is nonexclusive, everyone may use the scarce resources free of charge. This may lead to over-use
lo the extent (hat the value of the resource eventually is worth little lo anyone. For example, if waters are over-
fishcd (since the right to fish is not regulated) individually rationaJ fishermen may fish during spawning season
and will deplete the number of fish in Ihc waters to the overall long-term detriment of society (and perhaps the
fishermen themselves). Individual rationality without cooperation or collective action may lead to diminished
long-term societal satisfaction. Since nonexclusive common property resources are difficult to allocate, some type
of collective action is required both to define the rights and to maximize their long term value. The Coase
Theorem states that by attaching property rights lo resources they become more valuable.-'-' If regulation
increases the value of the resource by more than the cost of the action, government intervention is efficient. *"
b. Negative Kxternulities
Certain activities and products have negative externalities or spillover effects. An externality exists when the
producer or consumer of a good or service passes on uncompensaied costs or benenis to others. If activities have
u negative effect on others and those effected have little or no practical recourse to slop or be compensated for
such actions, the products or activities arc undcrpriccd by the market (the externalities are not internalized).
c. The Environment
The environment is the classic example of an underpriced asset. A clean environment is a scarce resource. As
nu individual "owns" the environment, it can be used ul virtually no cost. This leads to overproduction of
polluting activities. Overproduction is due lo insufficient pricing. Therefore, in order to maximize societal
satisfaction, government action may be necessary.-" If regulation decreases the value of the harm caused to
Ilic environment by mine than the cost of ihc action, government intervention is efficient. Taxes can also be used
These are referred to as collective goods or common properly resources. Since usage is non-exclusive,
economists predict that there will be difficulty in collecting tax revenue for the use of collective goods
since people have an incentive lo sit back and let others pay for the public goods, while they enjoy Ihc
benefits without charge. Non-payers arc referred to as "free riders " As a rule, the smaller the group
benefiting from a public good the easier it is to organize a group lo provide the service. The logic
behind the government providing public services is that the government has the ability to tax and the
power lo coerce payment of taxes. M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1971).
•" Supra note 28.
For an excellent discussion of non-exclusive resources and common property see; Wihlburg and
Wijkman, supra note 19. For a background and an explanation of the Coase Theorem see J .L. Coleman,
"The Economic Analysis of the Law" in Ethics, Economics, and the Law, J.R. Pennock and J.W.
Chapman (eds,), (New York and London: New York University Press, 1982) at 83-103.
For an excellent discussion on the economics of consumer protection sre H. Beales, R. Craswell and
S.C. Salop. "The Efficient Regulation of Consumer Information", 24 Journal of Law and Economics
491-544(1981).
R.D. Morganslern makes this point well in Towards a Comprehensive Approach to Global Climate
Change Mitigation." "The goal of policy nuking is to design an efficient climate change mitigation
Strategy that maximizes (under uncertainly) overall welfare, including measured GDP and the value of
nonniarket goods and services ("Green GNP')." 81 American Economic Review 140-145 (1991) at p
140. ..19
either 10 more fully cosi output through an effluent charge levy, or for activity prevention purposes. In various
countries one sees the use of taxes, such as deposit charges for bottles, cans, cars ami hallcrws. to discourage or
mure fully cost a wide variety of activities.
d. Tobacco, Alcohol and Health and Safety
Individual use and abuse of tobacco and alcohol, as well as endangering ones own health and solely, increases
society's medical costs. This increased cost is reflected in insurance costs or in government health spending,
depending on how the health care system is organized and financed. Individual assumptions ot known risks
should be considered negative externalities since the people who did not use the alcohol or tobacco and those
who were more careful bear at least pan of the resulting cost of the actions. This feature of cxicmalilies makes
them candidates for government regulation and taxation. Government action is efficient it the cost of the
action is less than the societal cost.
On the basis of social costs, one can argue that motorists should use seal bells, motorcyclists wear helmets,
smokers slop smoking, and that people not dnnk excessively, drink and dnw. or have uasale sex. Mosl people
assume that only the victim is hurt in the event of an accident or an individually preventable illness. This is
clearly mistaken. As long as there is a shared insurance pool or national health insurance. Ilic costs of treatment
and hospilalizauon are largely borne by the "non-victims. Since they bear a larger pan of Ihc medical costs,
the taxpayers or insurance pool should have the nghl to impose measures which may lower their own taxes or
premiums. Those who prefer to engage in individually dangerous behaviour may be allowed to do so. but only
upon posting a bond which is considered large enough to cover Ihc full additional costs of their behaviour. This
could come in Ihe form of additional insurance coverage.
3. Cast and Satisfaction
Efficiency will occur if satisfaction is increased by more than Ihe cost of Ihe action. This final category is perhap*
overly broad, but the types of government actions which fall under this category can he limited lo the provision
of defence, policing, justice, social security, health care and income redistribution.
a. Defence, Policing and Justice
Defence, policing and a system of justice are necessary to insure peace of mind and a sense of order. All three
could have been considered above as a form of "infrastructure." in Ihe sense thai tliey collectively reduce risk
and may have a large and potential quantifiable effect on whether investment is made or maintained within a
jurisdiction. They are listed separately since a large part of their benefit is derived from community satisfaction,
which cannot be directly quantified. All three should be provided to the point at which Ihe marginal amount of
aggregate satisfaction provided exceeds the marginal cost.
The head of the German Doctors' Association has indicated that obese people should carry the full
weight of their health costs by paying a "kilogram premium" for every kilogram of excess weight that
they carry. Karsten Vilmar staled: "I don't see why some people can behave unreasonably without
thought of the consequences and then burden the community with the results." His proposed remedy
is to levy some special taxes on sweets, tobacco and alcohol to discourage consumption and to help pay
for the medical consequences of their abuse. "Obese Should Cany Weight of Health Cosls, Official
Says", Wall Street Journal Europe (July 18, 1991) p. 2.
When Ihe costs of one's actions are largely imposed on others, this is referred to as a "moral hazard."
Given the common perception that public goods must be provided for by government, it may come as
some surprise that a group of 2,550 downtown Philadelphia property owners, have been able to organize
and maintain their own private government.' The private government' provides sanitation, security
and other public services. There is an 80 square block area where public streets had been ill-kept and
dangerous. This under-provision of "public services" in "Fillhadclphia" had the effect of significantly
lowering property values. Many former customers had abandoned downtown shopping in favour of20
b. Income Redistribution, Social Security and Health Care
Programs which redistribute income, provide pensions and mandate the provision of health care may increase
KKieul satisfaction. As all three programmes necessarily take money away from people who would not
voluntarily contribute to the funding of the programmes, they are not Pareto efficient. The provision of these
programmes is only efficient to the extent thai satisfaction is maximized.
Sfcfion 5: CO«C/MSIO/»
Markets are based on legal norms. Markets may or may not be efficient. Laws can either promote or detract from
efficiency. Efficient law begets efficient markets. The circle is complete. While laws, markets and efficiency
should he thought of simultaneously they rarely arc. If one accepts that laws effect markets and (hat the goal of
public policy should be to maximize societal satisfaction, one must also accept that efficient laws and public
policy can only be those which make markets more efficient. This understanding of a market of something
constructed within a set of laws contrasts with the models used in most economic analyses.
Politicians and other public servants understand that public policy is mostly about changing the underlying market
conditions: cither reallocating economic opportunities or redistributing economic advantage. • Changing
underlying market conditions cannot be a legitimate end in itself The self-interest of politicians and bureaucrats
and rent-seeking cannot generally be viewed as efficient.** If government actions cannot he justified on one
of the three grounds outlined above the proposed government action cannot be judged to he efficient. Inefficient
cleaner and safer suburban malls. Appeals to the city for better services were unheeded because of a
budgetary crisis. The downtown property owners decided to form their own "government." They hired
more than I(K) street cleaners and forty "community service representatives", who have duties similar
lo policemen, namely to patrol the streets. The property owners, who arc already heavily taxed by the
city, |Niy money into their district 'government' which answers lo the property owners, not lo voters or
residents. Unlike live city government, Ihe ilismct 'government has liau no pronicm collecting taxes.
More American districts arc currently providing or considering providing public goods on Ihe same
basis, D. Russakoff. "In Philadelphia, a Private Government Cleans Up*. International Herald Tribune
(September 20. 1991) p. I. The property owners have undoubtedly undertaken this action because the
benefits of providing sanitation and additional policing outweigh the costs. One would expect that
property values ;ind rents have been increased by more than the net present value of the tax levied to
finance the additional services.
*^ Some people in some places may suffer using this calculation. The better examples may come from
the field of health care. Under this criterion, health care rationing is optimal if the cost of a procedure
is greater than the aggregate benefit. For example, if a heart transplant operation would marginally
benefit Ihe recipient, but cost the rest of society a great deal of money, overall satisfaction might well
be reduced if the operation took place. But a full calculation would also have to consider Ihe
satisfaction of knowing - through one's life - that if a heart transplant offered even marginal benefits,
it would be available. This satisfaction gained from the provision of general security may be more
significant than the benefits of the procedure itself.
' D.W, Bromley. Economic Interests and Institutions: The Conceptual Foundations of Public Policy
(Oxford; Basil Blackwell. 1989).
^ An exception may lie when special interests are trying to obtain valuable property rights. For example:
(1) Drug manufacturers who lobby the government for better or longer patent protection in order lo
legally enforce their monopoly position will have a greater incentive lo invest in the development of
valuable medicines; (2) The granting of prestigious honours and titles to individuals who act in the
public interest will give individuals the incentive to take actions which help others or enrich society.21
government action decreases satisfaction. A decrease in satisfaction occurs only because the markets are made
inefficient by creating non-optimal opportunity costs.
The field of law and economics should clearly and directly focus on the interrelationship between laws. maffcM
and efficiency. If one recognizes from the outset that the goal of government should be to op"""" sHJActiojl,
an emphasis on this interrelationship might lead to a proper discussion of the imiwrtancc which laws have on
markets. This approach should lead to a measurement of the true costs and benefits which a proposed law may
impose. The manner in which satisfaction is optimized should be the locus of public choice: the drafting of the
results of this public choice question should be in the realm ol law and economics. Another circle is completed,
Pigou perhaps understood this relationship berween laws, markets and efficiency best. He slated that the goal
should be "to ascertain how far the free play of self-interest, acting under the existing legal system, tends to
distribute the country's resources in the way most favorable to the production of a large national dividend, and
how far it is feasible for State action to improve upon natural' tendencies.
Supra note 15 at 183.22
Appendix; C'onse^ue/ices o/ E/jficJency /teing /
Efficiency has often been ill-defined in the fields of law and economics, institutional law and economics and
public choice. The reason for this is that there has not been a fundamental understanding of how laws, markets
and efficiency interrelate. This has had negative effects on ihe reasoning given by many prominent lawyers,
economists and political scientists. Since legislators, regulators, judges and bureaucrats all have the power to
change market conditions and institutions through laws, regulations, interpretations and actions or inaction, it is
somewhat surprising how often this relationship is misunderstood. The following paragraphs will briefly discuss
how the concept of "efficiency" has been misused in these fields, and why this usage was incorrect
I. Law and Economics
Mercuro said thai efficiency is "the cornerstone of law and economics." The Chicago-Virginia school of law and
economics uses economic efficiency as the primary or only criterion to analyze political, legal and economic
issues in order to formulaic legal and economic policy. While this notion is fundamentally correct, it only
makes sense to use efficiency criteria if efficiency is properly defined. A Posnerian view of efficiency relies
heavily on Parelo efficiency. Posncr, in addition to using Pareto criteria as a basis for efficiency criteria, also uses
efficiency and 'wealth maximization' criteria interchangeably. More importantly for this book's purposes
he seems to divide law into (I) what the courts do in enforcing law and (2) what public institutions do in making
law. Power believes that practitioners, through their attempts to determine which legal structures arc correct,
engage in an efficiency enhancing process. Efficient political and legal institutions are believed to emerge, out
of theie attempts. This is an inadequate definition of efficiency for the reasons given in Chapter 1.
Posner concedes that using efficiency as a synonym for wealth maximization is insufficient. He states that "more
efficient is not a synonym for "better and recognizes that this notion of efficiency is "a theory that the law
•ecki to optimize Ihe use and exchange of whatever rights people start out with." In Economic Analysis of
Ihe Law. Posncr, in discussing why restrictive covenants (i.e. prohibiting the sale of property to persons of a
certain race or religion) arc not legally enforceable, states that: "The legal source of Ihe policy against private
racial discrimination. (is| a policy founded on distributive rather than efficiency notions." He goes on to say:
The major ethical approach posed by an efficiency approach to the common law is not the
occasional discrepancy between an economically derived ethical scheme and the traditional
ethics of an everyday life, but the discrepancy between efficiency maximization and notions of
the just distribution of wealth. In a markcl economy where Ihe role of law. and of government
generally, is just to control externalities and reduce transaction costs - which is basically all Ihe
law and government that economic efficiency requires - differences in people's tastes, abilities,
and luck may generate substantial inequalities in Ihe distribution of income and wealth....[The]
law is, for the most part, distributivcly neutral....Even a thoroughgoing utilitarian, however,
might approve a division of labor in government whereby the courts in elaborating common
N, Mercuro, "Toward a Comparative Institutional Approach lo the Study of Law and Economics", in
N. Mercuro (cd.). Law and Economics (Boston: Kluwer. 1989) at 18-22.
R.A, Posner, The Economics of Justice (Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 1981) at vii and 88.
Sec R.A. Posncr, Economic Analysis of Law, Third Edilion, (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and
Company, 1986): R.A. Posner. The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press. 1985); and R.A. Posner, "The Law and Economics Movement", 76 American Economic Review
1-13(1986).
*' R.A. Posner. "Economic Justice and the Economist", 33 Public [merest 109-113 (1982) at 113.
•" R.A. Posner. "Utilitarianism. Economics, and Legal Theory". 8 Journal of Legal Studies 103-140(1980)
at lOg.2)
Law principles confined their attention lo efficiency, while taxing and spending branches of
government, with their greater capacity for redistributing wealth cheaply and effectively,
concentrated on redistribution.
A proper definition of efficiency inherently includes notions of distribution and. what is more important, it sees
a greater role for regulators and legislatures to enact efficient laws. The courts should merely interpret Ihc laws.
Societies pay regulators and legislatures lo make distributional and economic decisions. It is also difficult to sec
how Footer can ignore the effect which the act of taxation has on income distribution and efficiency.
One should also note that laws which prohibit the sale of property lo certain classes of people have an effect on
the market (which is negative overall). One could argue on pure Pareto efficiency grounds that a prohibition of
Pareto exchanges, which leaves both the buyer and the seller worse off for mil having made trades, that they
would have made if the bw did not exist, is by definition Parelo inefficient.
Posner's approach towards efficiency is questioned elsewhere. As Burrows and Veljanovski state, the aim of
wealth maximization misses a major point: "A disappointing feature of the economic approach lo the law today
has been the tendency of many studies to ignore (ho relationship between .KM 111/ rtfinrnrv and the distribution
of wealth and income."' ~ The limitations of Parelo efficiency as used by Ihc Chicago-Virginia school air best
explained by Mercuro. Rowley and Ukn. Mercuro stales that: "Such attempts are extremely useful in describing
the efficiency of resource allocation generated through Pareto-struciured institutions, in ihc sense ol logical
positivism. However, there is no basis lo claim ttt.it such institutions are appropriate. ... much ol ihc Chicago-
Virginia literature appears purposely narrow (some mighi say conservative) both in lonn and substance.... much
of the Chicago-Virginia approach is less open, less realistic, and consequently less informative."
Rowley, while criticizing Posner's approach to efficiency, does not define efficiency himself, "Though Posner
is forceful in projecting the efficiency hypothesis, he is less forthright in explaining the mechanism through which
common law efficiency emerges, relying instead upon the as it methodology of the Chicago school. Although
judges, in his analysis, are perceived lo be independent from the legislature, this docs not explain why they
should show special malleability when confronted with arguments for efficiency."-
The consequences of not having a proper definition of efficiency are illustrated by lllen, when he discusses what
arc settled issues and open questions for law and economics.
"One topic in law and economics about which we should suspend debate and simply agree lo
disagree is the controversy about whelher the law is or should be concerned principally with
economic efficiency or with justice. The law. like many of us. can serve two functions
simultaneously and well: it can promote the efficient use of resources while at the same lime
serving to do justice. There is no necessary mutual exclusivity between these goals. And,
happily, efficiency and justice frequently argue for the same legal rule. For example, I believe
that specific performance is not only the fairest remedy for breach of contract but is also the
most efficient. Similarly, comparative negligence is not only fair; it is also efficient. I am not
suggesting the Pollyana-ish conclusion that there arc no rcai conflicts between efficiency and
fairness. In fact, there are: lo take an example, consider product liability. There. I believe, an
attempt to be fair to victims of product-related harms has led lo a great deal of inefficiency (in
•*" Ibid, at 240-241.
P. Burrows and C.G. Veljanovski, The Economic Approach lo Law (London: Butterworths, 1981) p.
12.
-^ Supra note 1 at 18-19.
C.K.Rowley, "Public Choice and Economic Analysis of Law" in N. Mercuro (ed.). Law and Economics
(Boston: Kluwer. 1989). pp. 132-148 at 138. Rowley at 132 also points out that Posner uses the word
efficiency to indicate wealth maximization.24
the sense that several valuable and safe products are in short supply, unavailable, or excessively
expensive). In that area, as well as others in which efficiency and fairness are at odds, a trade-
off u called for. The most an economist can do in that situation is point out the qjpewncy and.
where economic analysis allows, the r^w/y consequences of different legal rules, and then let
political pressures and judgements decide what to do. (How those trade-offs are resolved is part
political science, part public choice economics, and part critical legal studies.)""
This shows that Ulcn. while correct in his dismissal of Posner, as well as many of the others engaged in Law
and Economics, does not seem to understand the relationship between laws, markets and efficiency. In an efficient
market no good would be either in "short supply, unavailable or excessively expensive": it would be properly
priced to reflect its full cost. When the market is indeed efficient, satisfaction will be maximized and the market
will always be properly supplied.'* If the market is efficient, efficiency (as described by Ulen) and justice will
always occur simultaneously.
Warren Samuels, when discussing the interrelationship between the legal and economic processes, focuses on
relative right* and power in the law-making process and in the market. He does not however impose his own
value judgements by using value-laden terms such as "justice" nor does he use terms like "efficiency." to
demonstrate that the golden rule often applies to both the economic and legal process: He who has the gold
makes the rules. If the golden rule applies, those who have the gold will work either to maximize their position,
or if they arc risk averse, to preserve their advantage. Whether this process is efficient is a separate issue.
The process should he evaluated to determine whether aggregate satisfaction is optimized. This will be discussed
more fully below.
II. Institutional Law and Economics
In a survey of institutional law and economics (ILE), Schmid stales: "Efficiency for whom is a central question
for ILE."-™ This question is fundamentally incorrect. The response demonstrates that the questioner does not
understand the difference between efficiency and personal or group maximization.
The concept of efficiency has three elements: the end goal of an efficient system, the process of achieving
efficiency, and the starting point. Life is not fair. Since the starting point is constantly changing, one should not
assume that the starting point itself is (or necessarily should be) efficient. From an inefficient starting point, an
efficient market must have measures which create an efficient process and ending point. As Rowley states: "as
Paretian welfare economics indicates, there is an infinite number of efficiency outcomes, each related to a specific
prior distribution." An efficient process will correctly price resources and an efficient ending point will be
where societal satisfaction is maximized. Even if the available goods and services remain static, over time
individuals change how they subjectively value scarce resources.
T,S, Ulen. "Law and Economics: Settled Issues and Open Questions", in N. Mercuro (ed.). Law and
Economics (Boston: Kluwer, 1989) pp. 219-248 at 223.
Efficient legal structures are described in Section 3.1 of Chapter 1.
WJ. Samuels. "Interrelations Between Legal and Economic Processes", 14 Journal of Law and
Economics 435-450 (1971).
If the political machinery were to be used either to maximize or preserve wealth, this would be
considered to be "rent-seeking."
A.A. Schmid, "Institutional Law and Economics: A Survey", Staff Paper No. 91-27. Michigan State
University (April 1991) at 3. This definition is also used by U. Pagano. "Property Rights Equilibrium
and Institutional Stability", in J. Backhaus led.). Svstemwandel und Reform in Ostlichen Winschaften
(Marburg: Metropolis, 1991). pp. 185-224 at 185-6.
. • t. i.- • • •' '•'• .-';
Supra note 9 at 132. • * •"-•'' ' '• 'If resources arc scarce and have value, most individuals will want more of them If and when scarce resources
end up in the hands of the persons who place the highest value on them, one should not say that the market is
inefficient for those who did not value them so highly Assuming thai this process was fair tcllk ion!! and Ihe
goods were properly priced, one should note thai each individual did not necessarily "win" at the expense of
another. The process could not have been "efficient" for only a limned number of panics, li was efficient for
everybody: the market worked. While everyone would like lo have an unlimited amount of resources at his
disposal. Ihe fact remains that resources are scarce and need to be allocated.
If Schmid had staled that jo whom (as opposed to for whom) efficiency is a central question for H.E.' he would
be standing on firmer ground. The lo whom question logically seems lo be a pure public choice question. While
one cannot dispute that properly priced resources should be the goal of laws and markets, one can certainly
disagree as to what prices will lead to optimal allocation and which distribution will nmimi/c societal
satisfaction. In a democracy, politicians, regulators and bureaucrats arc hired to determine this, or more precisely.
to determine the market rules which will ensure this outcome. Ideally if they do not do this they should he fired
or replaced. The fact that they are rarely replaced and do not always lead markets to properly price scarce
resources docs not mean that they were not hired in order to have been engaged in this process.
The use of efficiency-based analytical concepts will necessarily have a winner and one or nxvre losers. It U
therefore difficult lo see how efficient institutions could ever he lormed. except by luck or accident. A more
useful suggestion is that over lime, democratic societies should enact laws and market rules wheic exchanges take
plate and tax policies arc enacted where the amount ol satisfaction accruing lo Ihe "winners" would greatly
outweigh the satisfaction lost by the "losers." Moreover, if the rules and policies arc impartial, through hard work
or superior skills, today's "losers" will have real chances at becoming tomorrow's "winners" and today's
"winners" will become tomorrow's "losers" if they are lazy or careless.
III. Public Choice
"Public choice applies economics' methods to politics, and. in particular, to two central problems: the collective
action problem and the particular problem of aggregating preferences. * "The encroachment of economic*
upon politics is not difficult lo understand. Being political is viewed by experts as bad. while being economical
is acclaimed as good. This book's definition of efficiency covers both of the central public choice problems:
collective action (in the form of correctly pricing inputs and outputs) and aggregating preferences (maximizing
societal satisfaction). It is curious that the profession does not address the issue of efficiency in this context.
As stated above, the question of "efficient lo whom" is the most valid question lacing public choice economists.
Unfortunately, since few public choice economists analyze the efficiency (in the way it was defined in Chapter
1) of markets to see whether inputs are properly priced or whether public satisfaction is maximized, Ihi.s question
is rarely discussed. Since public choice does not view efficiency in this way, the pricing of resources seems to
Not every economist would agree with this assertion. The Marxist economist Allen Buchanan also uses
Pareto Efficiency as his standard. He argues that economists assume that Pareto Optimality and Parelo
Superiority are either morally neutral or based on utilitarianism as Ihe correct moral theory. He believes
that this is a mistake. See Ethics. Efficiency and the Market (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985) at 13.
^ I. McLean, Public Choice: An Introduction. (Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell. 1987) at 9.
McLean oddly enough does not use any concept or definition of efficiency in this volume. Moreover
He states at page 18 that "The market is a residual category".
^ A. Wildavsky, "The Political Economy of Efficiency", 8 Public Interest 30-48 (1967) at 48.
R.B. Morton comes the closest. In "An Analysis of Legislative Inefficiency and Ideological Behaviour",
69 Public Choice 211-222 (1991), she defines "legislative inefficiency." "Legislative inefficiency occurs
when the level of representation provided to a district does not maximize the social welfare of all
constituents within the district." 1 would argue that while she is fundamentally correct, it would be belter
if legislators were to work toward maximizing more than a single district's social welfare.26
be almost entirely in the realm of public finance and increasingly in the domain of environmental, mmsportation.
health care and agricultural economics. The goal of maximizing utility seems to be concentrated in welfare and
labour economies'^ This seems 10 be an anomaly: by definition it should be at the centre of public choice
analysis.
Even where efficiency is used to explain markets in a social welfare context, the efficiency described is often
Pareto efficiency.'*'' Other public choice theorists use different definitions of efficiency. For example. Scully
uses a Pareto definition along with a macrocconomic definition of efficiency when a broader definition is more
appropriate. Pclzman asks whether all available information is in the marketplace."** Lee. Pasour. Wyckoff
and Formby, Keeler and Thistle all define efficiency as allocative or X-< inefficiency."^
The other common public choice definition of efficiency stems from a cost-benefit approach to public choice.
There is nothing inherently wrong wilh this approach if both (full) costs and benefits (in terms of optimizing
•ociclal satisfaction) are taken into account. This is rarely done. More commonly efficiency is thought of
in the term enunciated by Tullock: efficient rent-seeking. In determining what is efficient rent-seeking,
Tullock measures whether ihc level of economic rents outweighs the costs of obtaining them. He in no way
advocates that this process is efficient for the economy as a whole. Schwartz-Shea and Simmons, however,
discuss the conflict between rent-seeking and macro-efficiency.^
J.W. Chapman and JR. Pennock. Markets and Justice (New York: New York University Press. 1989),
is an example of a txx* which applies a narrow definition of efficiency which would fundamentally
have lo change its analysis and targets when discussing inequity, if my definition of efficiency were
wed.
J Runner. Politics. Economics & Welfare (Brighton: Whcatsheaf. 1986).
For a Piircto definition «c G.W. Scully. "Rights. Equity and Economic Efficiency". 68 Public Choice
195-215 (1991). Earlier, however. Scully used technical efficiency as a yardstick in "The Size of the
Slate. Economic Growth and the Efficient Utilization of National Resources". 63 Public Choice 149-164
(1989). In (his article at 154-55. his defence of transfer payments merits notice: "Too much income
inequality may create incentives for Ihe low income types to seek another sixial order. Redistributions
mny reduce work incentives, but may be an inexpensive (efficient) means of preserving Ihe social
order".
S. Pelzman. "How Efficient is the Voting Market?" 33 Journal of Law and Economics 27-44 (1990).
D.R. Lee, "The Trade-off Between Equality and Efficiency: Short-Run Politics and Long-Run Realities".
53 Public Choice 149-165 (1987); E.C. Pasour. Jr. "Non-Conventional Costs of Rent-Seeking: X-
Incrficiency in Ihe Political Process", 63 Public Choice 87-92 (1989); P.G. Wyckoff. "Bureaucracy.
Inefficiency, and Time". 67 Public Choice 169-179 (1990): and J.P. Formby. J.P. Keeler and P.D.
Thistle. "X-Efficiency, Rent-Seeking and Social Costs". 57 Public Choice 115-126 (1988).
A recent exception can be found in A.A. Schmid. Benefit-Cost Analysis. A Political Economy Approach
(Boulder: Wcslview Press, 1989).
0. Tullock. "Efficient Rent-Seeking", in J. Buchanan. R. Tollison and G. Tullock (Eds.). Toward a
Theory of Ihc Rent-Seeking Society (College Station: Texas ASM Press, 1980) pp. 97-112. This idea
has been ihc inspiration to numerous papers, most recently: E.L. Millncr and M.D. Pratt. "An
Experimental Investigation of Efficient Rent-Seeking". 69 Public Choice 69-80 (1991); C. Paul and A.
Wihite. 'Efficient Rent-Seeking Under Varying Cost Structures". 64 Public Choice 279-290 (1990); and
J.F. Shogren and K.H. Baik, "Recxamining Efficient Rent-Seeking in Laboratory Markets". 69 Public
Choice 69-80 (1991).
P. Schwartz-Shea and R.T. Simmons. "The Layered Prisoners' Dilemma: In Group Versus Macro-
Efficiency". 65 Public Choice 61-83 (1990).2:
Abstract
Efficient law is a set of legal norms whkh create markets that
maximize satisfaction. Efficient law must create condition!!
under which rational choices can he made. Totally rational
decision making is based on markets in which either Ihc
eventual oulcome is certain or where nsk can he properly
measured. An efficient legal system must Ihereforc offer
certainty of outcome or certainly of risk in order 10 maximize
satisfaction. This chapter divides law inio two categories; laws
which directly involve Ihc govcmmcnl and laws which apply to
Ihc citizenry. The laws which apply to the citizenry will be
called background law. As virtually all commercial law falls
under this category, Ihui chapter explores which types of
commercial laws will he efficient. Efficient commercial laws
are (hose which fulfil certain necessary conditions namely:
transaction and agency costs minimization, surety of oulcome
and aggregate satisfaction maximization.28
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If the end of efficient law is clearly 10 maximize satisfaction, the means to achieve efficiency arc a little less
clear. The most fundamental means is to create markets where rational choices can be made. Rational decisions
can only be made in markets where either the eventual outcome is certain or where risk can be properly
measured. An efficient legal system must therefore provide certainty of outcome or reasonable certainty of risk
measurement.
Besides creating a system in which risk can be measured with some degree of accuracy, efficient laws must also
minimize transaction and agency costs. In purely economic terms, minimization of transaction and agency costs
and maximization of the certainty of outcome may be thought of as the only goals to be considered in evaluating
what types of laws are efficient. This is insufficient. Minimizing transaction and agency costs may conflict with
the goal of maximizing aggregate satisfaction. An efficient law in a purely domestic context must have the sole
goal of maximizing societal satisfaction.
This chapter aims to discuss in general terms how to ascertain what is efficient domestic commercial law. More
specific details as 10 how each country may achieve the ends outlined in this chapter will be developed in
chapters 1 and 4. when the concept of a national economic style is developed. Chapters S, 6 and 7 will extend
the concept of efficient domestic commercial law to the international arena.
Since the difference between efficient domestic law and efficient law in an international context may not be clear,
an example of the differences is in order before expanding upon the elements of efficient domestic law.
With North Korea, Kampuchea, Albania and Myanmar (Burma) having rejoined the international community to
various extents, no country attempts to be entirely self-sufficient. What these countries may be finding is that for
all the benefits of openness there arc some costs. International competitive pressures sometimes conflict with the
domestic goal of maximizing domestic aggregate satisfaction. Countries should acquiesce to international pressure
if the benefits of compliance arc greater than the costs (in terms of aggregate satisfaction).
As an example, let us analyze an example of one international trade conflict: the Japanese distribution system.
Japan has a retail distribution system which by consensus does not produce the lowest possible agency or
transaction costs. This distribution system leads to less consumer choice, higher consumer prices and very small
stores.
This is not to say that the system does not maximize aggregate satisfaction. It may. This is possible because these
liny neighbourhood stores provide customers with family owned stores offering continuity, excellent customer
service, a place 10 keep up with the neighbourhood gossip, and credit facilities. In limes of sickness or disability
they will provide delivery; in times of family joy or tragedy there are always gifts; in times of hardship there is
long-term unsecured credit. If this distributional coalition were to be broken up. a very large number of these
stores would be forced to close, as some customers would want to shop for at least some of their requirements
at large stores with lower prices. The new larger stores would be unlikely to provide the same degree or range
of customer services. This loss of customer service may adversely effect a large number of people. Despite the
high costs of mainlining this system, the present system would be efficient if there was no possible market
structure which provided higher net aggregate benefits.
This system has the additional consequence of making it exceedingly difficult for new products to be introduced
to these small stores. Many of Japan's trading partners run large trade deficits with Japan. Many foreign
companies would like to sell their consumer products in Japan's small stores. This is difficult because of the
stores' small size and because the established distribution system is largely tied to large Japanese manufacturers.
" R.B. Reich. The Work of Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf) at 24.1.29
The introduction of a product in japan by a new market parocipani requires thai the participant either build his
own dcstnbuuon system or form a jomt venture with a compam wiih an established distribution system.
Should Foreign and Trade Ministries ol various countries, in acting as champions (or their domestic companies,
inform the Japanese government, that if the dismbuuon system is not changed and opened u)> lor IIHK direct
foreign competition, the export o( Japanese consumer goods into their countries will be limned, the Japanese
government would be faced with a difficult public choice. Assuming that the established system is efficient. Japan
must now weigh losing efficiency in the retail sector against losing exports. Maximizing aggregate
satisfaction in this context calls for a trade-off. Japan will now enter into negotiations. An efficient outcome for
Japan will be live combination of results which lead to sacrificing the least amount of aggregate satisfaction
lending up with the highest amount of aggregate satisfaction possible). This may be the reason why bilateral
negotiations with the Untied Stales or ihe European Community have led to elimination of "trade homers" only
at the margins of the market. They have not yet lead to a complete overhaul ol (he system, even though some
economists and poliliciansnroclaun that Japanese (technical) efficiency and productivity would he improved by
the market liberalization. The international aspects of competition and efficiency will be elaborated cm further
in the second pan of this book.
This chapter divides law into two categories: laws which directly involve the government and laws which apply
to ihe citizenry. The laws which apply to Ihe citizenry shall he called "background law" lot this book's
purpose. The final section describes ways of measuring whether laws are efficient. Laws will be deemed efficient
if they maximize satisfaction and minimize transaction and agency costs. As virtually all commercial laws are
types of background law. this chapter explores which types of commercial laws will he efficient.
Naohiro Amaya. a former senior official al the Japanese Ministry of International Trade nnd Industry,
expresses this trade-off well (in a slightly different conlexl) in D. Halherslnm. The Reckoning (New
York: William Morrow and Co.. 1986) al 33. "If Japan pushed even harder with exports, then it was
likely lo cross the line belwcen what was healthy for Japan economically and what was dangerous for
Japan politically."
T. Sakaiva. "...While Japanese Consumers Pay the Price", Wall Slreet Journal Europe (October .3. 1991)
p. 6.
The term "background law" comes from F.I. Michelman, "Constitutions, Statutes, and Ihe Theory of
Efficient Adjudication", 9 Journal of Legal Studies 431-461 (1980). In Ihe article he divides law into
three categories which operate at two levels. Al Ihe ground or constitutive level arc institutional rules
which frame two categories of law making activity at Ihe second or regulatory level. In Ihe foreground
are statutory deal law which is worked out periodically between interest groups and legislatures and
later applied by common law judges. In the background are residual regulatory laws passed by Ihe
legislature, which arc continually and incrementally adjusted by common law judges. On theoretical
ground, I accept this division of laws. In my analysis, it makes little difference whether deal law is
made by judges, legislatures or regulators who develop the law or make the law more efficient. In the
context of Michelman, I have merged background law and statutory deal law together. In my scheme
of the law, the first level is ihe constilulion which sets out the limits of governmental, individual or
group power. At the second level, there are legitimate laws and regulations, including stalulory deals,
which help lo efficiently regulate the market. If these laws are both legitimate and necessary, the law*
are efficient. As slated in Chapter 1. laws which reduce satisfaction, including most laws passed for
rent-seeking reasons, are not justifiable. One should note, however, that all statutory deals arc not
created solely as the result of rent-seeking. Statutory deals in the fields of technical or environmental
standards may be necessary when virtually all of Ihe technical information needed to establish efficient
standards and regulation are in the hands of the industry being regulated. For an interesting discussion
over the provision of technical standards sec W.S. Peirce. "Innovation and Diffusion in a Single Europe:
Institutional Structures and Industrial Prospects for the European Communities" in N. Nakiccnov<! and
A. Griibler (eds.). Diffusion of Technologies and Social Behavior (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1991) pp.
37-51.JO
Section /: Laws Wn/cn Direcf/y /nvo/ve 7"«e Governwienf
As discussed in Chapter 1. governments alter production, distribution and wealth creation decisions in various
ways, A government action may or may nol add to efficiency. The issue lo be determined is which actions can
and do lead to efficiency. A list of potentially efficient government actions and expenditures was set out in
Chapter I. This listing, however, was only the beginning of the analysis of what constitutes efficient law and
efficient law making.
Besides providing services (including justice, defence, policing, health care and education), building infrastructure
ami redistributing income, governments supply two categories of law. While there is some overlap between the
two categories of law, one can talk in terms of (I) laws which involve government actions and (2) laws which
apply to firms, groups and individuals. As mentioned above, the first two sections of this chapter define these
two categories of law. The third section asks how to determine when law is efficient.
Governments influence economic decisions in many ways. The most common way is through law making
(taxation being an important subset of law making) and law enforcement. Law making is a broad category. It
covers property rights (which often contain a tax element), and government regulation and legislation. Most of
the power of government consists of four specific powers which will be addressed separately: the limits of power
granted to the government by the constitution, the power to regulate, the power lo tax and the power to both
create and enforce property rights.
Virtually all government actions (or inactions) can and do effect economic behaviour. If economic behaviour has
been altered, we should be able lo determine, at least in a theoretical manner, whether economic behaviour has
led to improved or diminished efficiency. As this is loo difficult (and also too costly) to do at the time when each
individual economic decision is made, it is useful to look at the institutional framework of government and the
various laws and regulations which are enacted and enforced lo determine whether efficiency has been enhanced
or diminished. This will require a theoretical model of efficient government action. The government can use its
powers to make and administer laws to change market behaviour. An efficient use of these powers must provide
laws which regulate, lax, and enforce property rights in ways which will tend lo maximize national satisfaction
at the lowest cost.
The primary reason for all of the laws which involve the government is to define what role government shall take
in the mummy. Once the rule ol the government is established, other laws are needed to enforce government
actions ami decrees. lax laws are necessary for governments both to regulate economic behaviour and to raise
money for the government to operate (but primarily to raise revenue). Governmental law-making and regulatory
power are subject to the constraints set out by the constitution.
1. The Constitution
H.C. Black defines a constitution as: "The organic and fundamental law of a nation or stale, which may be
written or unwritten, establishing the character and conception of its government, laying the basic principles to
which its internal life is lo be conformed, organizing the government, and regulating, distributing, and limiting
the functions of its various departments, and prescribing the extent and manner of the exercise of its sovereign
powers." Because of its breadth and overriding importance, a discussion over how governments operate and
influence economic decisions must begin with the national constitution.
The constitution lays out how the government can involve itself in the life of its citizens and other governmental
entities (for example, agencies, other branches of government, states, provinces or municipalities). The
constitution should, at least implicitly, lay out a nation's most elementary set of beliefs. It does this by being the
institutional framework which defines the relationship between the government and the governed. A state's
constitution (actual or do facto) defines the limits of the slate's powers. In setting the limits of government power,
it delineates the discretion which is given to the government to control the activities of its citizens. While many
H.C. Black. Black's Law Dictionary. Fifth Edition. (Si. Paul: West Publishing. 1979) at 282.11
of the limits contained in a constitution apply to personal privacy, freedom and liberty, constitutions also have
to conon provisions which set out the limn to which governments may interfere with private property. Private
property ts protected by constitutions which set limns to a government's power to nationalize industries and
confiscate personal and real property, lo tax and lo regulate. A constitution also sets up a dispute resolution
mechanism. The dispute resolution mechanism sets out how intergovernmental disputes are adjudicated and how
in individual citizen can get redress in disputes which involve either Ihe government or other parties.
The constitution is the broadest instrument for regulating how the government influences economic behaviour
because it sets out the limits of the powers of the stale. Any action breaching these limits is. hy definition,
unconstitutional. An economic analysis of the constitution can thus he used to demonstrate whether one type of
constitution may be more efficient than another. It is also a natural starting point in determining what kinds of
domestic laws will be efficient. The measurement of the value ol post-constitutiona.1 and prc-consutuuona]
decisions will be the focus of Section 111 of this chapter.
2. Stale Regulatory Powtr
At the outset, one would expect economic actors to adjust their behaviour according to the slate's ability lo
interfere with individual activities. In considering the limits of the state's power one should consider not only
the powers which the stale has exercised in Ihe past, hut also powers which the state potentially possesses hul
has not yet chosen to exercise.
The most important actual and latent slate power is Ihe right to regulate (a regulation is considered a type of law
for the purposes of this discussion). Governments make regulations which alter how scarce resources (including
a clean environment) are allocated or how ihey may be used. This is often done at Ihe request of an industry. "
As discussed in Chapter 1. the decisions taken can radically affect [Kites and markets which leads lo changes
in investment, consumption and distribution patterns. Regulation can be used to alter property rights, such a*
regulations which cither create or destroy stale or private monopolies, or grant or deny the right lo pollute.
Types of laws which fall under this category include: monopoly law. administrative law. environmental Inw. and
health and safety law.*'
See e.g. G.J. Stigler, "A Theory of Regulation". 2 Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science
3-21 (1971).
In "The Welfare Cost of Tariffs. Monopolies and Theft", 5 Western Economic Journal 224-32 (1967)
Gordon Tullock points out that monopolies rarely arise spontaneously. They have to be first created and
second defended against competitive pressures that attempt to break Ihem. Both efforts involve the use
of scarce resources.
c.R. Sunstein in "Paradoxes of the Regulatory Stale". 57 University of Chicago Law Review 407-441
(1990) points out that regulation has to be carefully drafted. He asserts that one of Ihe paradoxes of the
regulatory state is that some strategies intended to achieve certain ends have precisely Ihe opposite
effect to the one intended. Another paradox is that sometimes, when the effects of regulation will be
known, the public argument made promoting the regulation will be opposite of the intended effect, since
these arguments are the only winning ones. He gives various examples of regulatory paradoxes: (I)
aggressive statutory controls frequently produce too little regulation of the private market: (2) slringenl
regulation of new risks can increase aggregate risk levels; (3) some federal environmental law thai
requires the best available technology has the effect of retarding technological development; (4)
redistribute regulation harms those at the bottom of the socioeconomic ladder. (5) disclosure
requirements may make people less informed; (6) independent agencies are not independent; and (7)
restrictions on the availability of abortion, defended as a means of protecting human life, have resulted
in the deaths of many women.32
3, Tax Laws
Tax laws arc used lo raise revenue. Taxes are generally directly tied lo property rights. Most types of taxes
are imposed on the basis of income, property, wealth, possessions or usage. They also can radically change
investment, consumption and distribution patterns since they impose costs on economic actors. The changes may
be cither intentional or unintentional, from the governments point of view. As indicated in Chapter 1. taxes are
sometimes seen as an alternative lo certain types of regulations. Even though the primary purpose of taxation may
be lo raise revenue, the following types of laxes are sometimes seen as ways to promote changes in personal or
firm behaviour driving fines, petroleum (axes, alcohol taxes, tobacco taxes, environmental taxes and tax
incentive!.
4. Property Rights
The final category of legal power which involves the government is somewhat different in purpose and scope.
While Ihe issue of property rights may well involve a dispute with the government, this is not the general case.
The manner in which resources are used depends on Ihe property rights which are attached lo them. Property
rights refers to the bundle of entitlements defining Ihe owner's rights, privileges and limitations for Ihe use of
properly. Some forms of property rights can be traded or donated, others are available strictly lo Iheir current
holders, still oihcrs go with the tide or Ihe position which one holds. Many constitutions contain provisions over
properly rights and may set out the degree of control that the slate has over ihem. •* The degree to which
properly rights ore enjoyed and are tradable will also influence investment, consumption and distribution
patterns.
In order to have value, property rights must be enforceable. While property rights can be granted through law.
practice, custom, regulation of court decisions, ultimately it is the government which is almost always responsible
for Iheir enforcement. The government's involvement with property rights is often conditional. It enters the
dispute upon being asked to adjudicate disputes or to sanction alternative dispute resolution procedures.
Government protection of property nghls come from policing and Ihe administration of justice. The categories
of law which ore peculiar to the administration of justice are procedural law. administrative law and evidence
law.
The policing element is interesting, as Ihe state plays at least three different, bul separate roles. First, if property
ia stolen, one generally goes lo the police to find the criminal and lo retrieve the stolen properly. Second, Ihefl
is considered lo be an offence against ihe stale, noi against the person from whom Ihe properly was stolen. The
slate prosecutor or magistrate then takes over and presents the case to a stale appointed and paid judge or
magistrate. Third, if the criminal is found guilty, the suite is now responsible for the criminal's incarceration,
parole conditions aiul administration and rehabilitation. This entire process is done both lo punish the guilty and
lo create a deterrent against future Ihcfi.
A poll lax which is collected regardless of income, property, wealth, possessions, rights, usage,
profession, licence or where one lives would be a notable exception.
A property right can be denned as the enforceable privilege to own, use. exploil or enjoy a specific item
of property or any aspect of Ihe property whether it be real property or personal properly, tangible or
intangible, or transferable or non-transferable. This right by its very nature has a value which others
(including the owner of the property right) may or may not benefit from or even prize.
"• See T. Anderson and PJ. Hill. "Constitutional Constraints. Entrepreneurship, and the Evolution of
Property Rights", in J.D. Gwartney and R.E. Wagner (eds.). Public Choice and Constitutional
Economics (Greenwich. Conn.: JA1 Press. 1988) PP. 207-28, . -., . ......
For a further discussion of property rights and property rights enforcement see Chapter 1. Section HI.J3
In addition to die criminal administration of justice there cs also a civil justice system. The civil court system
u almost entirely devoted to the definition and enforcement of property rights. In this process the state only
provides the judicial bureaucracv The sen ices of the court are generally provided free or ai u nominal
charge to the litigants The stale treasury absorbs most of the costs of the civil court system. What benefits does
the state get out of providing below cost civil adjudication?
While the stale is not a pamcipanl in most civil actions, it does have an important slake in the system. How
property rights are enforced will directly affect the sue of the tax base. If property rights arc enforceable and
certain, more trade will occur. Increased trade means increased economic activity. Since virtually all uues
are directly tied ID economic activity, the enforcement of property rights affects the sue of the tax base.
Section 2.- Laws WAicA Wrrcf/v App/v To TA* Citizenry.- Jtadtgrowmf /^iw
The purpose of this section 15 to discuss the type of laws which form the basis of civil administration This type
of law will be called "background law " It is important 10 realize that all background law is based 011 regulating
various forms of property rights and that the government has an important stake in the creation and enforcement
of property rights. As Jurgen Backhaus puts it. the government has an interest in background law because it
'broadens the lax base and increases its fertility by expanding the production possibility frontier of the
economy.""*
1. Definition
Background laws are the laws which work in the background of contractual relations. Chapter I. in trying to
express the relationship between laws and markets, outlined the ways in which labour laws and real estate lawf
could affect markets. The purpose of this was to illustrate that differences in background laws will create different
markets. To the extent that these background laws regulate the markets in ways which rnaximire satisfaction they
are efficient. They may be doubly efficient since in addition to regulating an efficient outcome, they uvc on
transaction costs. Certain terms regarding contractual relations between certain parties do not have to be
negotiated: they are already included in the background law and the lime needed to negotiate theve issues is
saved.
Background law comes in the form of codes and regulations in pure civil law countries: in common taw countriea
it derives from judge-made law. statutes, codes and regulations. Background law imiudrv cmmnnl law (to
*" Slander and libel actions may be considered an exception. Slander and libel actions, however, involve
the value of one's "good name." A "good name" is a scarce resource, personal in nature, and has some
value. While it cannot usually be traded, it could still be thought of as a property right.
^ Violations of court orders are considered to be criminal offenses.
°' E.C. and LP, Banfield describe the extreme example of an Italian village where trust was absent and
property rights were enforced by might. As a result trade declined, and in time almost ceased. The
village remained very poor while the rest of the country became much richer. Moral Basis of a
Backwards Society (New York: The Free Press, 1958).
°° J. Backhaus, "Efficient Statute Law" in M. Faure and R. van den Bergh (eds.). Essays in Law and
Economics: Corporations, Accident Prevention and Compensation for Losses. (Antwerp, Apeldom:
Maklu, 1989) pp- 23-32 at 29.
There has been a spirited debate in the literature over the issue of whether common law or civil law
produces better background law. For an overview of this debate see Backhaus. Ibid. In our theoretical
discussion, the source of the law is unimportant since one can certainly point out examples of holh
common law and statute law which lend to increase efficiency.34
a certain extent), contract law. finance law. bankruptcy law. labour law. landlord-tenant law, agency law. debtor-
creditor law, domestic relation law, insurance law, partnership law, real and personal property law, commercial
law, ton law, wills and trust law and company law.
2. Standard Form Contracts
In discussing efficient background law it is useful to begin with a discussion of standard form contracts. Standard
form contracts have received a great deal of negative attention but can greatly add to efficient outcomes.
They may be more prevalent than many people realize. "Standard form contracts probably account for more than
ninety-five percent of all contracts now made. Most persons have difficulty remembering the last time they
contracted other than by standard form; except for casual oral arrangements, they probably never have. But if
they are active, they contract by standard form several limes a day. Parking lot and theatre tickets, package
receipts, department store charge slips, and gas station credit card purchase sups are all standard form
contracts."
Unlike Ihc standard form contract individuals have to accepi the operating paramelers set by background laws.
While one may choose to park his car elsewhere, he can never avoid death, and il is difficult lo avoid owning
or renting property, paying taxes, or working.
Si;ui<laril form contracts are useful because they make the cost of negotiating very low. If each party had to
negotiate all the conditions and the warranties of a contract individually, it would be impossible to issue credit
cards, it w<mld be impossible lo receive packages and il would be difficult lo leave clothes at the laundry. The
negative side is that il is difficult not to accepi the conditions pre-written on the form. Standard form contracts
are not always enforced by courts. Courts may object lo standard form contracts if their terms contradict
background law (i.e. the uniform commercial code) or public policy. Additionally, the terms of the contract may
mil iilwuys be terms which would be accepted if the parties had equal negotiating power or access to similar
relevant information. If the terms are onerous the courts have often failed lo recognize them.
3. Relation to Background Laws
Background laws work in a similar manner. Like standard form contracts, they preset the conditions under which
transactions are made. In standard form contracts, one party, usually the merchant, provides the terms of the
contract on a monopoly basis. Although the merchant is a monopoly provider of the terms of the contract, the
customer is free lo search out stores who offer less onerous conditions.
If the terms are one-sided, they cannot be efficient, even if they are not enforced. They may well save on
transaction costs, but Ihc outcome will almost certainly be viewed as being inequitable. Background laws. loo.
c;ui be equitable or inequitable. II they are lo be considered efficient they must both be equitable and lower
transaction costs.
4. Transaction Costs
Transaction costs occur in market exchanges. They are a cost of doing business. They include the time and costs
which arc necessary to do research; search for parties lo exchange with: to reach agreements, and lo monitor the
performance of the contract. There are transaction costs not only when buying goods, but also when consuming
00
™ M.J. Trebilcock and D.N. Dewees. "Judicial Control of Standard Form Contracts" in P. Burrows and
C.G. Velianovski. The Economic Approach to Law (London: Butterworths. 1981).
'' W.D. SUiwson, "Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power". 84 Harvard
Law Review 529-566 (1975).services or tumg employees or agents.*'* How technology has effected these transaction costs and the
significance of these cost changes will he extensively explored in Chapter 5.
5. Importance of Background Laws
Background law is unpurtant because it sets parameters for individual behaviour. Background law is impoitMH
for the same reason constitutions are imporunt: thc\ provide the limits ol pcnuuisabto actions." They often
also set out guidelines or contain provisions for dispute resolution.
Background law is virtually indispensable tor most types of commercial transactions. Background law sets out
the rules and the parameters under which commercial transactions may take place. In Chapter 1, market
enforcemeni conditions for loan sharking and tor personal belting were set out. These, while drmonsmung that
transactions can occur without background law, are exceptions. The purpose of these examples was to show that
various types of coercion can efficiently enforce the performance of private contracts. It is unlikely that an
acceptable modem international trading system could be built on this basis ** It is even more unlikely that a
firm could operate efficiently if all its work and all relationships were based on coercion.
t. How Background Ijrw Works: Coat met. Within Firms
Contracts are transactions in which parties exchange promises of value, for their mutual benefit Since there
seems to be some confusion • over the types of contracts which exist in a firm, each group ol stakeholder!
(the creditors, shareholders, managers, and employees) will be discussed in turn.
But first it will he useful to discuss why firms develop. In "The Nature of the Firm." Ronald Coose argued that
firms enisi to reduce transaction costs. Since gathering information, contracting and monitoring can be expensive,
a firm may be able to achieve economies of scale in these areas. To the extent that firms lire able to do Ihu at
lower cost than individuals, they will be efficient and cost effective. In the firm, the time-consuming bargaining
process can be minimized through the development of hierarchical structures, skill specialization ami by issuing
orders to the economic actors through a series of general commands I hi- commands through Ihr hierarchical
structure reduce transaction costs.
For an excellent discourse on transactions costs and their effect on contractual relationships see O.E.
Williamson. Economic Organization (Brighton: Wheatshcaf Books. 1986) at 101-130 and 174-191.
The concept of minimally acceptable standards also applies lo constitutional law - many constitutions
have human rights clauses (including /lafcfflj COT/MM), limitations on slalc-of-cmcrgency powers, etc.
which set minimum standards for government behaviour and for its agents (the police, judges and other
government officials).
International drug smuggling is a notable exception. In footnote 15.1 provided an example of the Italian
village where a lack of trust and consistent legal enforcement caused trade lo virtually cease over time.
This illustrates that while il is possible for criminals lo provide efficienl enforcemeni for certain limiled
activities, a comprehensive trading system can probably not be built on such a basis.
' See_ A. Shleifer and L.H. Summers. "Breach of Trust in Hostile Takeovers", in A. Auerbxh (ed.).
Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences. (Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 1988)
pp. 33-56; S. Rosen. "Implicit Contracts: A Survey". 23 Journal of Economic Literature 1144-1175
(1985): W.A. Law. "A Corporation is More than Stock". 64 Harvard Business Review 80-83 (May-June.
1986): and "Economic Focus: Do Poison Pills Make You Strong?" The Economist (June 29, 1991) p.
63. In a private correspondence, I learned that "Economic Focus" was written by Matthew Bishop, an
economics correspondent.
^ R.H. Coase, "The Nature of the Firm." 4 Economica 386 (1937) in R.H. Coase. The Firm, the Market
and the Law (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1988).36
The firm is based on a series of voluntary contracts between the firm itself and various interested parties.^
Some of these contracts are explicit and some are implicit. Not all contracts are explicit because the future is
uncertain, and the cost of negotiating and developing explicit contracts for each and every contingency would
be excessive. Some matters which arc left implicit are explicitly covered by background law. The areas of
background law which cover contracts between the firm itself and various interested parties include: labour law.
contract law, landlord-tenant law. agency law. debtor-creditor law. insurance law, property law. company law.
finance law and bankruptcy taw.
Background law in the lirm works in two ways. The first is that it sets minimally acceptable standards. Second,
it fills in at least some of the gaps in the contract.
Ax an example, let us consider bankruptcy law to demonstrate how background law may fill in gaps and create
minimal standards. A firm is engaged in the provision of services. It rents a building and leases the office
equipment (furniture and computers). There is a contract between the firm and a bank which suites that in the
event of bankruptcy, the bank has an absolute first claim to the proceeds of the liquidation. The employee's
labour contracts do not discuss the possibility of bankruptcy. The cash flow of the firm becomes negative and
it files for bankruptcy on the 27th of the month. Workers arc paid at (he end of the monlh. The assets of the firm
are not sufficient to fully cover either the voluntary creditor (the bank) or the involuntary creditors (the workers).
The issue is which creditors have a priority claim to the remaining funds held by the firm: (he bank or the former
employees?
Under ordinary contract law, the express terms of the contract would prevail. Since the bank had a contractual
priority lo the proceeds of the liquidation, they would get the funds. This is not the outcome in at least some
countries. In at least some countries, the workers would get the money. The bankruptcy laws accomplish two
things. First they fill in the terms of the employment contract by giving workers a preferential claim to the
remaining money. Second, the bankruptcy laws set out minimum standards of public acceptability which may
well lay down that involuntary creditors (in this case the workers) have a priority over voluntary ones (like the
bunk), even if the contract slates otherwise. One should note that, as a matter of public policy in at least
•ome countries, an express provision in the employment contract which staled thai in the eveni of bankruptcy,
workers arc to he considered unsecured creditors (wnli .1 claim junior to the secured senior creditors) would not
be enforced. The bankruptcy code standard thai workers are entitled lo a position senior to hunks for previously
earned income would still apply.
Other types of background laws work in similar fashions.
7. The Parlies Involved in Contracts Within Firms
In the words of Jensen and Mcckling: "Contractual relations arc the essence of the firm, not only with the
employees but with suppliers, customers, creditors, etc. ...The private corporation or firm is simply one form of
legal fiction which serves as a nexus for contracting relationships. "Since contractual relations arc al the
core of the analysis, il is useful to sec what types of contracts exist between the firm and interested parties. In
relation to these contracts, the areas of applicable background law which protect ihc contracting parties will be
pointed out.
B.D. Baysingcr and H.N. Butler. "The Role of Corporate Law in the Theory of the Firm", 28 Journal
of Law and Economics 179-191 (1985) at 179.
go
S.J. Grossman and O.D. Hart, "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral
Integration", 94 Journal of Political Economy 691-719 (1986).
R.A. Posner. Economic Analysis of Law. Third Edition, (Boston and Toronto: Little. Brown and
Company. 1986) p. 372.
'"" M.C. Jensen and W.H. Mcckling. "Theory of the Firm: Management Behavior, Agency Cost and
Ownership Structure". 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305-360 (1976) at 310-11.J7
a. Stakriwkkrc
Stakeholders (creditors, customers, suppliers, employees, managers and shareholders* MIKT than shareholders want
a relatively nsk-free fixed mum. agreed in in advance. Shareholders wiih tunned liability take Ihr residual ml
in mum for the residual gams. The amount ol risk which each erf the panics takes is itself a legal matter, which
derives from debtor-creditor law. the bankruptcy code and the explicit contract itself
b. Creditors aad Suppliers
Since shseholders have obtained limned liability status for the firm through incorpnralton (for which company
law provides the background law), few suppliers and other creditors supply goods, financing or services on the
basis of trust alone if they can help it. Most creditors try to get some kind ol security before extending
credit. Security can come in the form of a lien, a letter of credit, a retainer, a prepayment or another type of
secured interest. Those thai do not obtain a secured interest extend credit knowing thai their final hope of getting
paid is in the bankruptcy court. Unsecured creditors rarely get paid in full when bankruptcy occurs. Hor this
reason, if a company is seen or even rumoured to he in trouble, creditors demand greater assurance ol being paid.
Creditors who extend credit without security should receive some form of nsk premium in the lomi ol higher
prices or fees. The amount of the nsk premium should negatively correspond with the chance of being paid This
may help explain why creditors in different countries pay different real interest rates *
Since bankruptcy laws differ from country to country, credit is extended on different terms in diflerent places.
For example. America's Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection gives better protection to those creditor* who extend
credit after Chapter 11 us declared than to previous unsecured creditors. This gives creditors an incentive to
provide additional credit for firms which are reorganizing. The rationale behind this policy is thai conlmucd
trading coupled with a subsequent reorganization may be in the overall best interest of the creditors whose claim
was established before bankruptcy was filed.
e. Castoawrs
Even in the simplest contract, customers are usually protected by background bws: liirt law, environmental laws,
health and safety regulations, regulations against lalse claims and advertising and lite commercial code. All set
up minimum standards. Ion law. environmental laws, and health and salcly regulations help ensure thai product*
are safe and that the processes under which they were manufactured were relatively environmentally friendly.
The commercial code provides certain warranties for goods which are sold by firms, such as that goods arc suited
for the use for which Ihey are intended. While certain warranties can be waived, most of these protections can
be enforced despite the specific words of the contract. Customers who do not receive such comprehensive
protection should pay less for the goods or services.
d. Shareholders
Shareholders have a package of rights. The mosl important of these rights (in most countries, under most
circumstances) are the rights to receive dividends and the residual value of the company in the event of
bankruptcy or liquidation: the right to transfer shares, through sale, gift or inheritance: and the right lo vole at
shareholders meetings. While shareholders do not have the right to hire or fire managers, Ihey do have the right
to vote for some, if not all, of the directors. They appoint managers by electing the directors who appoint the
managers. Directors are elected according to the provisions contained in the statutes and by-laws of the company.
Subject to the constraints of company law. these statutes and by-laws are a form of contract and shareholders may
vote to change them.
Posner points out that the practical effect of limited liability shifts some of the risks of default from the
shareholder lo the creditor. Supra note 27 at 370.
For an excellent analysis of the real cost of borrowing money and how bankruptcy laws can influence
costs se£ "International Finance: The Ebb Tide", Economist Survey (April 27. 1991).38
e, Kmptoyees
Employees are hired on fixed terms. Labour law sets out minimum lerms and conditions for employment
contracts, such as the number of hours worked, paid holidays, sickness benefits, maternity leave and redundancy
lerms. Employees are generally given the right, under labour law. to organize and join unions and to bargain for
wages and benefits collectively.
d. Managers and Directors
Managers and directors are hired by the firm to run the company in the best interest of the shareholders (in some
counlrie.t Ihe stakeholders). The conditions and terms of employment of managers and directors are also covered
by labour law. Managers and directors generally act as agents of the firm. As agents of the firm, they hold the
position of fiduciary. As fiduciaries, they owe loyally to Ihe firm itself, even if this at times means falling on their
own swords; Hie problems begin when they do not act in this fashion."" In return for their faithfulness,
managers and directors generally get a fixed term contract whose terms may entitle them to a share of the profits
or revenues.
H. Hostile Takeover*: Are Poison Pills Healthy?
The notion ol background law is important since background law protects all the interested parties of a firm.
There is one argument which is particularly perplexing. Andrei Shleifer and Lawrence Summers advocate that
under the threat of a hostile takeover, extending the contract terms of employees and using "poison pills""**
may be good (or the firm and society. ' They argue that explicit contract terms, negotiated in good faith,
providing lerms which are mutually beneficial should be unilaterally extended in some cases. Although a
discussion of poison pills may seem out of place here, a critique of their argument shows how efficient
background laws should operate and how the minimum standards provided by background laws should not. as
a general rule, be used lo supersede explicit contract lerms.
a. Short-Term Detriment - I.ong-Term Benefit
A unilateral addition to the lerms of an employment contract, granted by managers who face losing their jobs,
in order lo thwart a hostile takeover is. with certain limited exceptions, lo the detriment of the shareholders. In
arguing that this may be beneficial, Shleifer and Summers assume that those attempting lo make hostile takeovers
do not know how to act in their own and Ihe other shareholders' best interest. Shleifer and Summers' also assert
thai post-takeover cost-culling may lead lo an anti-egalitarian redistribution from workers to shareholders. To
Shleifer and Summers ihis redistribution comes in ;n least some cases in the form of higher share prices to
• The need for managers and directors to work as fiduciaries is a relatively recent phenomenon. It derives
from Ihe separation of ownership and control in the modern publicly held corporation. Freeing the
management from the effective day-to-day control of Ihe owners (the shareholders), may free them to
pursue their own ends and objectives. Shareholders needed the legal device of the "fiduciary." Being
a fiduciary means that the managers, directors and controlling shareholders must put Ihe interests of the
firm above their personal ambitions. The duties of a fiduciary therefore are a duty of care and a duty
of loyally. Enforcement of fiduciary responsibilities comes from a "derivative suit" brought by one or
more shareholders on behalf of Ihe firm. A.A. Berle and G.C. Means, The Modem Corporation and
Private Property! 1932). Revised edition (Buffalo: William Hein 1982). In 1932. in response to Berle,
W.S. Dodd asked: "For Whom Arc Corporate Managers Trustees?" 45 Harvard Law Review 1145-1162
(1932). jjec also Posner. Supra mile 27 al 389-90.
'** Poison pills arc a weapon to help fight hostile takeover bids. Their purpose is to make hostile takeovers
more expensive, thus more difficult lo swallow.
* - . •.••-:., . > - • . r
"•" Supra note 23. - ••v.,,.,,,...^.-.--^..- ,,• '< •>•• «ss,-«M the expense of employees and "shut down factories that dominate ihe economies of several small
towns. A$ a consequence numerous local gores, restaurants, and bars go bankrupt.'"*
What Shleifer and Summers do not seem to realize is that the cutbacks which caused so much hardship were
probably long overdue. If the cuts are not made Ihe entire company wilt prohanh eventually go bankrupt. This
will make all of the company's employees redundant. The critical issue is not whether the former employees and
small towns will be hurt by the actions. Ihe issue is when, who and how many will he affected. It it takes cutting
off a leg to save the body, this may be belter lor aociety than letting the body die.
In the long-run, in a competitive market, firms cannot he over-staffed or pa> employees mure than their marginal
value. Relatively inefficient firms in competitive markets eventually go out of business '^' Moreover
shareholders arc entitled lo profits. Without profits no one will invest in shares It makes Intlc sense lot a
shareholder to bear most of the residual risks and receive little or none ol ihc residual gains in return If
shareholders are required to retain their investment in (inns which are uncompeiitive, eventually more than the
few towns and employees which Shleifer and Summers mention will be affected by Ihc cost-culling. Investment
will flow to places which arc more hospitable This capital flight and Ihe competitive environment for investment
capital will be Ihe focus of the second part of Ihis hook. But if laws are passed which make it tlillHiilt l«
shareholders lo retain the residual value of their investment, first all ol the stakeholders and ultimaii-ls the
communities where ihe firms operate will be adversely allecled. If the hostile takeover is allowed to succeed.
Ihe resulting body may have lo limp or hobble for a while, but at least Ihc body will have a chance to recover.
b. Terms of Explicit CoMncts
Employees are free to contract for as long an employment term as they desire. Regardless of the length of the
contract, all employees take the nsk thai they will not he retained al the end of Ihe contract period. II Ihey elect
10 contract foe shorter periods, one would expect that Ihey take on some additional risk. Workers arc however
entitled lo contract for longer periods of lime. This means ih.il the employees tor managers) take less nsk. (me
would expect that those who lake less nsk would also receive less rewards, in the lorm of lower pay or benefits.
The level of redundancy pay which an employee will receive is a mailer which u initially covered by local labour
law. but may he augmented by the terms of the contract.
The action advocated by Shleifer and Summers to unilaterally increase employment terms is not bargained for.
Workers receive all of the benefits and bear none of the costs. If the extension of contractual terms was bargained
for, one would have expected the employees to take lower pay in return. Once one can gel over the genuine grief
which compassionate people feel for those losing their job due to little fault of their own. it is untenable how
Shleifer and Summers can make an economic argument that actions which one group receives aji of the direct
and indirect benefits of contractual relations and bears none of the risk or the cost can be considered beneficial
to the firm or society. The activities of Robin Hood (stealing from the rich and giving to the poor) create
applause in the short term: but it eventually creates a strong disincentive to stay and create wealth in Sherwood
Forest.
c. Who Determines the Value of Trust?
What those contemplating hostile takeovers are saying is that they know better than the managers (or the market)
what value is contained in the firm. One of Ihe major sources of value is locked up in Ihc existing contracts and
the trust developed between the firm and its customers, suppliers, managers and employees. Those contemplating
hostile takeovers know full well that if they gain control over the firm, they cannot abrogate the terms contained
in the existing contracts between the firm and its stakeholders; if they could, then those who are agaiast hostile
takeovers would have a point. But a contract between the firm and another parly survives after new owners and
managers take over.
' Ibid, at 35.
For a slightly different perspective on the likelihood of bankruptcy for inefficient firms see R. Nelson
and S. Winter. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (Cambridge: Be be nap Press, 1982).40
AJ Shleifer and Summers point out, destroying this trus) (which they say is pan of the implicit contracts) may
also have negative ramifications. Rational owners will certainly not do this. The new owners will make the
determination of the value of trust ex posi, Shleifer and Summers seem to want non-owners to determine the
value of trust ex ante. It is reasonable to assume that those contemplating a hostile takeover have reasonable
grounds to pay shareholders more than Ihe current market value for their shares.'"°It is not reasonable to
assume that rational investors would do anything to jeopardize relationships between themselves and valued
customers, suppliers, managers or workers. If they did. the firm would not be as valuable to them.
Changing the contractual provisions between the firm and the stakeholders, without getting something of at least
equal value in return, smacks of mismanagement and might be considered a breach of fiduciary responsibility.
d. Renegotiated Contracts
Thu u not to tay Ihal additional secunty and trust should be offered by the new owners of the firm. It may be
mutually beneficial for ihe new owners and the stakeholders to renegotiate a contract for the benefit of both
parties in the light of the change in circumstances. A renegotiation of explicit contracts may rebuild the valuable
trust which Shleifer and Summers indicate may be lost when a takeover lakes place. Managers who may lose
Ihcir job if the hostile takeover is successful, however, have no right to unilaterally give away valuable rights
which belong to the shareholders, especially when Ihe primary beneficiary of this action is Ihe managers
themselves, not Ihe present or future shareholders.
There is a fundamental flaw in Ihe theory of implicit contracts. The theory is that certain terms which were not
discussed in a contract should be recognized by courts. If this theory is brought into practice, different courts,
without the benefit of background law or explicit contract terms, will almost necessarily read the terms and the
fads differently. This means that there is more risk in signing explicit conlracls (at least on one side). One can
surmise that higher risks will mean Ihal fewer otherwise beneficial transactions will ensue.
The alternative is for courts to rely on Ihe explicit contract terms and Ihe provisions of background law for
guidance. This approach will lake the role of guessing what Ihe intentions of Ihe parties were or might have been
away from judges; at Ihe same time Ihe parties are protected by the minimum safeguards set out by background
law. This will creale some certainly amongst the contracting parties as to what Ihcir rights and obligations will
be in the evenl thai some incident which is nol covered by an explicit contract term transpires. If the background
luw does not prove lo be sufficient, then Ihe parlies are free to explicitly contract for higher protections. If
reasonable background laws are in place, an express recognition of implicit contract terms will be inefficient law.
B. Holinsirum. "Comment" in A. Auerbach (ed.), Corporate Takeovers: Causes and Consequences
(Chicago arid London: Chicago University Press. 1988) pp. 56-61.
The point of who should value trust can also be illustrated by a non-hostile takeover. In December,
1990 Nationalc Nederlanden, ihe largest Dutch insurance company, merged with NMB Postbank Groep
NV, the third largest Dutch bank (which was formed by a 1989 merger between the Poslbank, which
was exclusively a retail bank, and Ncderlanschc Middenstande Bank, a commercial bank). After the
merger was announced, Ihe insurance industry and insurance brokers decried that Ihe newly merged firm
would work outside the established insurance network and that this action would lower iheir
profitability. They then threatened nol lo sell Nationale Nederlanden products through iheir network,
as they regarded Ihe merger as a breach of Ihcir implicit contract with the firm. This was an attempt
lo scuttle the then proposed merger. One would expect lhat potential loss of Nalionale-Nederlanden's
distribution system would have an adverse effect on the share prices of one or both of Ihe merging
firms. Overall, private and institutional investors thought otherwise; ihe share price of the two
companies outperformed Ihe market by an average of about 14 per cent. One of ihe reasons for the
merger was to use outlets of NMB Poslbank as a distribution network. R. Cremers and A. Tourani Rad,
Ecu Empirish Ondereoek Naar de Gcvolgen van Fusie Tussen Nationalc Nederlanden en NMB-Posthank
Grocn. Research Memorandum RM 91 -015. University of Limburg (1991). The Dutch insurance brokers
ended their boycott nine momhs later. "For Ihe Record", International Herald Tribune (September 2.
WDp. II.41
However, if ShJeifer and Summers and timers advocating the imfOxii theory of contracts"^ want to argue
thai one or more national labour laws are inefficient, in that it does no< maximire societal satisfaction, this is an
entirely different issue On Bus issue they may be cornel • this is and should he seen as a political, not a legal,
determination. But their claim, that a breach of trust has occurred when all ol s contract's terms have been lived
up lo. shows both a complete misunderstanding of both contract law and what is in the best interests of the firm
The place to go m the advent of insufficient protections is not the courts, but the legislature Should (he
legislature pass or amend background laws, the changes in the legal atmosphere * ill be initially and continuously
transparent to all potential contracting parties (or at least their lawyers); ad hoc court decisions will not provide
either transparency, clarity or consistency - all elements of efficient law. This transparency and clarity will allow
panics to know the rules of the game and lo play the game accordingly.
9. TV Goal of Background Law
The concept of background law should now he clearer. Background laws should he seen as types of default
mechanisms. If they are commonly agreed upon and are in fact efficient (see chapter I) and have not been formed
in order lo promote the interests and rights ol certain groups at the cost of others, these laws can lead lo high
levels of savings since they will necessarily lower transaction costs. Using this as a Ihettrelical basis, the aim ol
efficient background taw should be both to minimi/e the costs of making pre-contractual decisions and to
maximize the value of post-contractual decisions. This calk for some measurement. Section 111 will discuss how
these measurements should be made.
Sec/ion 3; Won- 7O Affaiurr WArfArr Aa*> /S f?
Chapter 1 outlined the types of government actions which would be efficient. The objective of efficient
background law is to minimize the social costs of an activity. This is a two step process. Ciuido Calahresi'i
analysis of accident law can be used as a model "The principal function of accident law is to reduce the turn
of the cost of the accidents and the cost of avoiding accidents"'" This section adopts this framework for
determining how to measure efficient background law. Efficient background law will lower ri«k and uncertainly
and minimize the cents of doing business.
1. Lowering Risk and Uncertainty: Constitutions
While, as Hayek suggests, the consideration of general constitutional rules cannot be undertaken with particular
cases in mind, constitutional rules can help enhance decision making. At this point the lerm "constitution"
should be redefined. Previously, a constitution was shorthand for a national constitution. At this point, an
alternative (first) definition is taken from the American College Dictionary. Under this definition a "constitution"
is the way in which anything is formed, composed or made-up."-' Chapter 1 set out how laws and markets
interact: markets arc constituted on a set of legal norms. In this section, the term constitution, except where a
national constitution is indicated, will refer to the set of legal norms which operate lo create a functional market.
For example a set of company laws provides the framework constituting a working market. For example, Hans
^ For an overview of those advocating recognizing implicit contracts see Rosen, supra note 23.
G. Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1970) at 42.
'" F.A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1960), p. 210.
' '"^ The American College Dictionary. C.L. Bamhert (ed.), (New York, Random House. 1966).42
Tietmeyer, Vice-PresidenI of the Bundesbank, calls the Bundesbank Chatter "one of the most successful and best
monetary constitutions m the world."
si. Buchanan and Tullock
In The Calculus of Consent. Buchanan and Tullock set out what the "ideal organization" of a national constitution
should accomplish. While not prescribing any particular constitution, they implicitly use an efficiency analysis
to assess what type of constitution should be adopted. They assert that constitutions should be designed to
maximize the value of post-constitutional decisions. Buchanan and Tullock asserted that the rote of the
constitution is to set up a system of constraints which should act to limit the ability of individuals and coalitions
to impose internal costs on others.
This analysis is helpful, but it only takes us part way in describing what an efficient constitution should do.
Tullock and Buchanan, as suggested by their own and their followers' writings, are very concerned with private
groups and other individuals hijacking the offices and law making and law enforcement powers of government
officials. They suggest that the use of public offices for private gains ("rent-seeking") is inefficient. It is only
natural that their concern centres on creating safeguards against this process. To nip this type of action ("rent-
seeking") in the bud, the constitution, a document which sets the limits of government powers, seems to be the
most elementary starting point. As described above, the national constitution should inherently lay out the most
elementary beliefs of a nation. Tullock and Buchanan's assertion, that the role of the constitution is to set up a
system of constraints which should act to limit the ability of individuals and coalitions to impose internal costs
on otters, while it does give one specific good which a constitution should provide. ° does not give any
clues on how to maximize the value of post-constitutional decisions or to limit the cost of maximizing the
outcome.
However, by not describing what maximal post-constitutional decisions should look like, one can assume that
Buchanan and Tullock arc implicitly stating that each society places different values on post-constitutional
decisions und that each country may have different internal costs. If this is true, one could conclude that there
is mi universally ideal constitution or organizational structure since an efficient constitution (one that maximizes
the value of post-constitutional decisions) will take into account the internal cost and value differences. The
different values which different countries place on post-constitutional decisions shall be one of the focuses of
Chapter 4.
Quoted in D. Marsh. "Germany Gets the Monetary Jitters". Financial Times (August 6. 1991) p. 16.
Tietmeycr is referring to the economic, not the legal constitution of the Bundesbank. The Bundesbank
is chartered by the flKnrfMfrfWutjsi'.vf/; which is not governed by the German constitution. The charter
can be amended by a simple majority of the lower house of parliament and provides the finance
minister with ample room for intervention. Nevertheless, as this intervention is currently almost
unthinkable, the economic constitution of the Bundesbank is strong.
J.M Buchanan and G. Tullock. The Calculus of Consent. (1962) Reprint (Ann Arbor: University of
Michigan Press. I'M) at 289-91.
" Buchanan makes this point elsewhere with Geoffrey Brennan in The Power to Tax: Analytical
Foundations of a Fiscal Constitution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1980): and The Reason
for Rules: Constitutional Political Economy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1985).
In The Calculus of Consent. Buchanan and Tullock lay out a generalized economic theory of
constitutions. In Chapter 6. they state that different organizations impose different costs. They approach
this from the viewpoint of individual choice among collective decision-making rules. In contrast, the
present discussion is somewhat broader since its theory of constitutions constraints itself to a discussion
of establishing institutions which maximize satisfaction at the lowest possible costs. Collective actions
should be analyzed in terms of the analysis set out in Chapter 1. Ibid, at 63-84.Him tken can ihe government promote effiaeacy? As with consacunons. government actions, taws and
regulations should work ex ante to maximize htnh government and im4> IJM<I/ decisions ex Pt^st- This can he done
through ihe provision of laws and regulations which mmimm internal costs and maximue satisfaction. This
involves t»o separate and inherently different processes which are important tor reasons which nuy not he
obvious: minimizing the cost of pre-constitutional decisions and maximizing Ihe value ot post-cimsutulional
decisions. Toward these ends institutions can he set up which minimize the need lor parties to has? disputes
regarding their relative legal positions. II persons know what Ihcw relative legal positions arc lhe\ will he able
lo contract with one another with a more certain outcome, and to insure Ihe outcome through third parties at a
low cost.
b. Prt-C o»Mituliomil and Pott-l'tMstifulkxuil Decisions
in The Calculus ot Consent. Buchanan and Tultock do not discuss minimum)) the costs of pre-constitutional
decisions.' While one could deduce thai any value maximizing decision inherently involves cost
minimization, Ihe processes for analyzing each port of Ihe process, in determining whether a law is eIlictcnl. are
somewhat different.
An efficient constitution or legal structure must perform three operations as far as economic decisions un-
concerned. First, the constitution or legal structure must set up a framework for Ihe decision process. The
framework for the decision process works c» ante (before decisions are actually made). Second. (he constitution
or legal structure acts during the decision making process hy helping shape supply and demand luuclion* (both
of which are a function of the framework). Third, the constitution of legal sin*, lure must act alter ihr decision
making process has been used. The thud operation was partially described in Chapter 1 as the cflnienl
enforcement of legal norms. These two operations work c> post (after a decisum lo cnict the market was made).
i. Miainiixiag UK Costs of Prr-Cwutitutioiul Dccisiom
Chapter 1 described what an efficient market would look like. An efficient market prices goods ao that exchanges
can he made which maximize satisfaction, lust as proper pricing is necessary in order in pnee goods and iervk.es
at a level which maximize satisfaction, efficient legal norms and their enforcement will abn include a pricing
mechanism. The pacing mechanism of efficient laws will minimize internal coiu to others. To achieve thu. the
laws should be clear and consistent.
Clarity, consistency and transparency arc three elements which can minimize Ihe cosl of pre-constitulional
decisions, but these conditions alone do not guarantee efficiency. Take for example, a well publicized, strictly
enforced law which guaranteed death by firing squad for persons who resold tickets to a World Cup football final
for more than the face value. Let us now assume thai all 100 people who were caught violating this law were
summarily executed. The law which was applied was unusually clear, consistent and transparent. This type of
law probably added little to efficiency. One could argue thai the 100 deaths occurred because the market was
inefficient. Tickets were scarce because demand exceeded supply al the price for which the tickets were initially
sold. The victims of this were acting as entrepreneurs who chose to accept at leasl two market risks. The first
risk was that they would be able to sell the tickets for more than they paid for them. The second was that they
would not be caught. Clarity and consistency alone did not lead to proper pricing either in terms of creating an
efficient cost structure or minimizing internal costs.
° They do, however discuss this matter separately elsewhere. Buchanan in The Limits of Liberty: Between
Anarchy and Leviathan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 1975): and Tullock in Private Wants,
Public Means: An Economic Analysis of the Desirable Scope of Government (New York: Basic Books,
1970).44
tt. Maximizing the Value of Post-Constitutional Decisions
Buchanan and Tullock as well as Williamson "^ argue thai many constitutions and institutions should be
designed to minimize the problems associated with opportunistic behaviour where contracts are implicit.
Constitutions to be efficient over the long term must set up a system of constraints which should act to limit the
ability of individuals and coalitions to impose internal costs on others.
This alone is also insufficient. Safeguards against opportunistic behaviour alone do not indicate that the structure
agreed to was efficient in the first place. Even if the structure was indeed efficicni in the first place, one should
of course recognize lhal a delicate balance must be struck. If prohibitions against opportunistic behaviour are
overly stringent the constitution may not have sufficient adaptability to cope in a rapidly changing world. If one
is truly interested in maximizing the value of post-constitutional decisions, the framework must be efficient to
begin with and be sufficiently flexible to take into account the volatility of both conditions and attitudes.
c. Williamson
Oliver Williamson argues lhal governance structures, including but not restricted to legal structures (which are
types of constitutions), "need to be matched to transactions in a discriminating way if efficient and viable
contractual relations arc to occur. ™
Williamson also gives us a theoretical background indicating the conditions and the proper dimensions for
efficicni background low. He describes the critical dimensions for assigning some transactions to markets and
others to internal organizations. The dimensions are:
1I) the degree of uncertainly;
(2) the frequency with which the transactions reoccur, and
(.1) the degree to which durable transaction-specific investments are required to realize least-cost
supply.'-"
His analysis also tells us under which conditions contractual provisions should be assigned to background law
rather than individually negotiated. This outline is also the basis upon which the final part of this section builds.
2. Minimi/inn thr Cost of Doing Business: Transaction and Agency Costs
Once the structure is in place which will tend to maximize satisfaction, a focus can be placed on minimizing the
cost of achieving this outcome. Under the Williamson scheme, it will be more efficient to provide background
law when uncertainty is low (events arc likely to happen), transactions occur frequently and if the agency cost
of renegotiating each time is high. -^ Under this set of circumstances the provision of a background law
which provides certainly tif outcome at low cost with a result which maximizes societal satisfaction will lead to
lower transaction costs, lower risk, and greater certainty of outcome on a basis which is mutually desirable.
a. Coase
Ronald Coase. when discussing the market mechanism and the firm, might have used a similar explanation to
analyze (he notion of efficient background law. In The Nature of the Firm." Coase stated that: "The cost of
'" O.E. Williamson. The Institutions of American Capitalism (New York: Bask Books 1985).
*" O.E. Williamson, "Contract Analysis: The Transaction Cost Approach", in P. Burrows and C.G.
Veljanovski (eds.). The Economic Approach to Law (London: Buttcrworths. 1981) p. 39.
O.E. Williamson, "Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations". 22 Journal
of Law and Economics 2J.V261 (1979).
Under background laws, the cost of negotiating is amortized over a large number of transactions.45
negotiating and concluding separate contracts for each exchange transaction wtech lakes place on .1 market must
also be taken into account... A factor of production tor ihe owner thereof) does nol have 10 make a series of
cuntracls with ihe taclors with whom he is co-operating *ilhin the firm, as would be necessars. ol course, il this
co-operation were a ckreel result of the working of the pnee mechanism. For this series of contracts is substituted
one." The ante analysis can be applied 10 efficient background laws Although Ooase did not use the
term, he was explaining that a firm can minimise transaction costs. Efficient background law should do the same
Hung. Instead of having 10 renegotiate the same contract terms over and over one is substituted
"The mam reason why it is profitable to establish a firm would seem In he that there is a cast
of using the price mechanism. The most obvious cost of "organizing" production thnnigih Ihe
once mechanism is that of discovering what the relevant prices are. This cost may be reduced
but will not he eliminated by the emergence of specialists who sell this information. The cosis
of negotiating and concluding a separate contract for each exchange transaction which lakes
place on a market must also be taken into account Again, in certain markets, e.g. produce
exchanges, a technique is devised for minimizing these contract costs: bul they are mil
eliminated. It is true dial contracts are not eliminated when there is a firm, but they are greatly
reduced."'-*
The COM of using the price mechanism is a transaction cost. The cost of negotiating and concluding a separate
contract for each exchange transaction which takes place is one type of agency cost (contracting) There remains
another cost, namely monitoring performance. Akhmn ami IVmset/ refer u> this "agency cost" as "the metering
problem." The firm has Ihe problem of metering productivity and metering individual employees Jensen
and Mecklmg discuss Ihe role of monitoring and harmonmng Ihe interests ol managers with the interests of Ihe
firm in order 10 reduce agency costs. One way in reduce monitoring cost is through efficient contractual
provisions which provide both monitoring and sanctions against shirking.
Another way of reducing these costs is through the provision of efficient background laws. Efficient background
laws would be able to lower both Ihe transaclion and agency costs Transaction costs could be lowered by
standardizing certain contractual terms thus lowering Ihe cost of negotiating a lower limn on contractual lermi.
Agency costs could he lowered if these some provisions made 11 unnecessary to hire specialists (1 e lawyer*) to
handle simple or standard contracts through the creation of forms, under which the terms were inherently fair
(fairness being a condition of efficient background law). Jensen and Mcckling lornlude that Ihe "level ol agency
costs depends among other things on statutory and common law and human ingenuity in devising
contracts."
b. Posncr
Richard Posner states that one function of contract law (and other categories of background law) is to "economize
on transaction costs by supplying standard contract terms that the parties would otherwise adopt by express
agreement; it should be clear by now that the same is true with corporation law." In the area of company law
Posner gives some examples of terms which lower transaclion costs. These include: limiting the payments of
'23 Supra note 24 at 38-39.
'*• Ibid, at 33-56 and 38-39.
'^ A.A. Alchian and H. Demsetz. "Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization", 62
American Economic Review 777-795 (1972) at 778.
° M.C. Jensen and W.H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Management Behavior, Agency Cost and
Ownership Structure". 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305-360 (1976) at 323.
'^7 Ibid, at 357.46
dividend to Ihe amount of the earned surplus; granting limited liability to every corporation; minimum shareholder
voting rights; and stipulating how Ihe board of directors is to be elected.
Posner, along with Anthony Kronman indirectly points out thai background law has one serious negative effect
By setting up minimum standards, it restricts Die right of individuals to contract freely. Many of the restrictions
have a rationale which is hard to refute. These include: not enforcing contracts where one of the parties agreed
to the contract with a gun pointed at his head (I will make him an offer that he cannot refuse); not enforcing
contracts made by children or incompetents: contracts in the restraint of trade (attempts to monopolize); contracts
involving slaves; contracts to commit a crime; or contracts which alter Ihe accepted rales of evidence or
procedure.
They Ihcn ask whether Ihe purpose of restrictive laws is to promote paternalism. "(Al limitation on an individual's
freedom of contract is paternalistic if the sole purpose of imposing it is to promote or protect the individual's
own welfare (or happiness or good). If a particular limitation is imposed in order to reduce Ihe costs of the
bargaining process (for example, by insuring ils procedural propriety), or lo protect the interests of third parties,
it con be justified on non-paternalistic grounds."
The difference between efficient background law and paternalism can be a thin one. The only way societies can
strike an efficient balance between these two conflicting and competing outcomes is through democratic
rqiresentajive government. This is the only forum in which this type of trade-off can reasonably be
decided.™
3. Striking A Difficult Balance
The creation of efficient laws requires striking a difficult balance: on one hand, there is (he theoretical desire 10
allow every contracting party lo negotiate for whatever he subjectively feels is in his own best interest; on the
other there is Ihe necessity to minimize Ihe cost of achieving these goals. To Ihe extent that certain outcomes ore
provided by background law which would have been arrived ai by freely contracting parties, background law will
always he efficient as transaction costs are minimized: lo the extent that background laws lead to agreements
which (rcely contracting parties would not agree lo Ihey are inefficient, unless there is some absolutely
compelling public policy concern which overrides Ihe legitimate concerns of the contracting parties.
Overriding public policy concerns can occur in several instances. In each of these three instances, background
law simply provides a set of constraining parameters.'- (I) Chapter I outlined that efficient law would
'** Supra note 27 at 372 and 384.
* AT. Kronman and R.A. Posner. The Economics of Contract Law (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown
and Company, 1979) at 253-254.
A referendum of course couid also be used. The number of persons who had a direct stake in the
outcome of Ihe referendum on a background law might however he few and Ihe issues involved might
be highly technical, lo the extent that voters might not care enough or have enough technical
information lo be able to weigh the arguments for each position properly.
" Some of the parameters which public policy sets out can become outdated either through changes in
morality or technology. Many years ago the Commonwealth of Massachusetts enacted a law which
prohibited Ihe lending of money for gambling purposes. The law was supposed lo be used against loan
sharks (See Chapter 1). In 1987. a Massachusetts resident went to Atlantic City to gamble. He lost
J8,(XK) - all of which had been advanced lo him on his credit card through automatic teller machines
(ATM) which the house had conveniently placed in easy to find places around the casino. When the
gambler found thai lie could not repay the money he had lost, he sued his bank on the basis of Ihe law
which prohibited lending money for the purpose of gambling. This time lady luck was on his side.
He won. The case is currently under appeal. If this case is upheld, for a while everyone with a credit
card can go to the casino and play heads 1 win, tails you lose. "Plastic Losses" Newsweek (September47
ensure thai resources are fully coned Since certain resources ait not necessarily properly priced t>y Ihc market,
government iniervenuon can he efficient, if ihe cost of government acuon is lev. than ihc benefits of the
govcnuneni action. (2) Government intervention could also he efficient if. as a result of the contract, negative
externalities appear Zoning law ts a type of background bw which may help pecvem builders or operators using
land in ways which interfere with the rights i>f others to enjoy their property. (M Finally, there art public policy
concerns that certain parties have access to mote information or have more market power than the other
contracting parties In this instance the goal of background law is to narrow the information and power gap in
order to ensure that parties arc signing contracts similar to Ihe ones thes would sign il they had access to similar
information or had similar bargaining strength This use of background laws is a rejection, or at least a limitation,
to (he principle of caveat cmwor.
The purpose of this chapter was to point out lhal certain types of domestic laws i an be more elf K K-III than others.
Certain types of laws can by themselves create conditions under which Ihe rights ol various parties can be
determined in advance. This leads to certainly and nsk mimmiuilion. II Ihc parties' rights ore set out in ways
which maximize aggregate satisfaction these laws are efficient. Bflicicm laws will also limn the likelihood ol
opportunistic behaviour (one group or individual heneliling at the expense ol lowering societal s,-ilislaclton).
Finally efficient law will lower the levels of transaction and agency costs. Lowering agency and transactions costs
in various countries will be taken up again in Chapter 4.
23, 1991) p. 3.3:
Abstract
In the past many discussions on the differences between
national approaches have centred on differences over political
philosophy. This certainly has been true in the European
Economic Community, a group of 12 democratic, neighbouring
countries who share a basic commitment lo the paternalistic
state based on market principles yet approach problems and
issues from many different directions. Differences in political
philosophy are therefore nol usable indicators in predicting how
member suites will react lo European Commission proposals. A
heller explanation will be based on a discussion of the
importance of national economic styles. This chapter defines
what constitutes a national economic style and points oul its
importance. In doing so u down-plays the economic relevance
of the active debate over political and economic philosophy.
The chapter argues thai although many past differences between
member stales have been discussed in the context of a political
spectrum, a belter analysis of the different approaches toward
the community would be in Ihc content of differences in
national economic styles. The main purpose of this chapter is
to lay the groundwork for Chapter 4. on national economic
styles and efficiency, and Chapter 8. on the conditions when
laws should be harmonized. The introduction of the concept of
a national economic slyle is crucial lo understanding why
countries act in various fashions IO achieve similar ends. It will
be argued Ihal different national economic styles create different
national satisfactions, and costs and benefits. If the purpose of
an action is lo achieve efficiency, differeni means (in the form
of markets and legal norms) will have to be used, in order lo
account for differeni national economic styles.J; /Va/iona/ Economic
"Europe (before 15001 had antuvj been politically fragmented, despite the best efforts of the Romans, who had
not managed to conquer much fanner north of the Rhine and the Danube, and for a thousand year* alter the (all
of Rome, the has*, pouucal power unit had been small and localized, in contrast to the steady expansion of the
Christian religion and culture ...For this political diversity Europe had largely to thank its geography For a Mart,
it both made difficult the establishment ot unified control, even by a powerful and determined war lord, and
minimized the possibility that the continent could he overran....Conversely, this variegated l-iiklv .4*- encouraged
the growth, and continued existence, of dcientnilucd power, with local kingdoms and marvhci lordships and
highland clam and lowland town confederations making the political map of Europe drawn at am time atlci the
fmll of Rome look like a patchwork quilt The patterns on the quilt might van from century to century, hut no
single color could ever denote a unified empire. .The political and social consequences of this decentralization,
largely unsupervised growth of commerce and mervhant and ports and markets were ol the greatest
significance....If Ipost-Worid War III Europe rnu to have a leader and spokesman. France wits .1 HHHT obvious
candidate than the isolationist British or the subdued Germans Furthermore, successive French udminislralKins
quickly recognized that their country's modest real power could be buttressed by persuading the Common Market
to adopt a narticular line |n|one of this restrained France from unilateral actions when the occasion seemed to
merit it."' -
Chapter 1 focused on the natural relationship between laws, markets and efficiency in a theoretical manner l-.vcn
though limitations were placed on what could he seen to he legitimate government behaviour or expenditure, mi
specific proposals for an efficient market or an efficient law were made. Chapter 2 described whai etficicni
domestic laws should try to accomplish. The reason why no particular law was described is thai any attempt In
draw specific conclusions on efficiency calls for measurements which are not universal. Measures which would
optimize satisfaction are necessarily individual or societal.
There is considerable dispute on a country to country basis as to what policy objectives laws should attempt 10
realize The following appraisal demonstrates lhal. at least among lawyers, there is little comprehension <>f the
relationship of law and policy, let alone the connection between taws, markets and efficiency L-vcn amongst
people who understand the connection between law and policy, few understand that issues must be appro* hed
in different manners and may require different solutions on the part of different countries.
"[Many] lawyers still react with uncase or even distaste when invited to view the law as an
instrument of policy, and even ihose who find nothing strange about the notion will readily
admit that the relationship between law and policy remains a problematical one. What problems
lawyers perceive seems to depend a lot on where they come from. For the English - to start at
home - the main problem is of the law's use as a vehicle of arbitrary power, or of policy
without law.' The Germans - or some of them - worry about Vcnreehtlichung', and assume thai
everyone else does too. Among Francophones, one's allegiance as a public or private lawyer
appears to be an important factor while public lawyers are concerned about the law's
inefficiency as a control mechanism, private lawyers are more inclined 10 fear 'legislative
inflation' or the decline of 'droit' in Ihe face of 'loi': a decline which appears to correspond
to Weber's 'materialization of law." American concerns focus on the regulatory process, which
some hold 10 be in 'crisis' and others would restrict or dismantle, though there remain voices
asking for more extended legal ordering of governmental action....(This may] suggest the
existence of a series of different national sets ofproblems with the law/policy relationship, and
the futility of grand generalisation about it.'
'-^ p. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Vintage Books. 1989) at 17-19 and
428.
'" T. Dainith. "Law as a Policy Instrument: Comparative Perspective", in T. Diunilh (ed.). Law as an
Instrument of Economic Policy: Comparative and Critical Approaches (Berlin and New York: Walter
de Gruyter, 1988) pp. 3-55 at 4-5.50
This chapter intends to focus on why different countries often approach common matters differently. The first
section of this chapter points out the importance of national borders and demonstrates how governments influence
economic decisions. The collective effect of these influences will be defined in terms of a national economic
style. The second section focuses on the economic relevance of the debate over political philosophy The chapter
concludes with a discussion of the limitations of traditional political and economic philosophy when discussing
why countries have different responses to common issues, especially to European Community policy proposals.
Section 7: /Variona/ Economic
Since the concept of a national economic style is not self-apparent, it has to be developed. Before defining the
term, this section will show the importance of national style differences, outline how governments influence
economic decisions, and finally define a national economic style in terms of both inputs and outputs.
I. National Style Differences
To illustrate how important national borders are to economic policy, this chapter will begin by diagnosing a field
of .science which is not generally considered to be economically based: health care. Many people perceive medical
practice to he a science which operates on the cutting edge of technology. Information regarding new treatments,
cures, medicines and techniques flow quickly over the enure globe, relatively oblivious to national boundaries.
One would expect, even if health care were financed in different manners, that the provision and the amount of
hcallh care would not differ greatly. But it docs, and not necessarily due to a lack of information, a lack of
money or because of the inertia in the health care system alone. Surprisingly to a casual observer, the amount,
manner and form of health care which one receives even in the richest countries differs widely.
"Even the styles and fashions of medical practice observe national boundaries. Organ
transplants are all but unknown in Japan: births by cacsarean section are as common as natural
Childbirth in Los Angeles: what is a pill in Britain is often a suppository in Belgium. But the
biggest difference between countries lie in the way that care is delivered and financed. In
Britain, for instance, it is mostly paid for out of taxes and provided for in state-run institutions
by salaried staff, In America it is usually paid for by private insurance and delivered in private
institutions by fee-earning staff. Other countries have J7 confusing varieties of taxes, social
insurance, patient charges, private insurance, public and private hospitals, doctors who work
for. work in or even own clinics."
If services such as health care, which one would expect to be dominated by medical fact and technical
possibilities rather than local custom, are delivered in different and conflicting manners, it seems reasonable to
ask whether diHcrcni approaches to common issues faced by various governments can be equally efficient. If two
or more approaches can be deemed to be equally efficient, this should effectively refute any ideas regarding a
universal standard of efficiency. The issue of efficiency in this context will be extensively analyzed in Chapter
4.
However, a preliminary answer to the question of whether two different solutions to common problems can be
simultaneously efficient is derived from the analysis contained in Chapter 1. "|V]arietics of taxes, social
insurance, patient charges, private insurance, public and private hospitals, doctors who work for. work in or even
own clinics" are all differences in legal norms which can and do create radically different markets. Any and all
ol the various markets may he efficient if these differences in legal norms maximize aggregate satisfaction. As
a result, it is argued that the seemingly neutral concept of efficiency is not a universal standard. The concept of
• J. Peel, "Surgery Needed: A Survey of Health Care", Economist Survey (July 6. 1991) at 3-4.efficiency should he judged at a national ior a more regional) level Various surveys ot cultural differences have
come lo similar conclusions ' -
For the purposes o( this discussion ri is enough lo recognue thai, as the health care example points out. vinous
countries have devised different approaches, styles and institutions which may create varying solutions to similar
issues. These national approaches, styles and institutions help create radically dillerem individual utility curves
which create then own sets of transaction and agency costs. Collectively these dillcrences will compel various
countries to devise different approaches and solutions to problems they have in common. Whether these solutions
are efficient is a separate issue. An efficient solution to the issue of health care mu<i. however, lake into acctHint
the preferences of the patients, the health care providers and those who pay lot the health care. Since each
country's approach, style and institutions have an obvious economic effect, they collectively lumi the hosts ol
a "national economic style." The concept of a national economic style will he developed m the rest of this section
beginning with an analysis of how governments influence economic decisions
2. Determinate of a National Kctmotaic Style
a. Output: National Policies and Institutions
With different approaches towards constitutional issues, slate regulation, law making, property rights and Uulkm.
each country will necessarily affect economic decisions in distinct ways In most Western countries, these
approaches and policies arc largely noncomroversial. While national political panic* have different mrihtxls and
means of achieving theu political ends. mosl Western countries have come to substantial agreement in vinoallv
every major policy area. The resulting policy agreements must he considered outputs These outputs arr imporuinl
since they will affect market conditions (allocation and prices). They also indicate, in some respect* whether the
government or private groups iw individuals are responsible for various actions. Collectively these altexl
individual and firm behaviour.'
b. Where Comcmtn has Bnn Reached
In which policy areas has consensus been reached'.' One could argue that mml Western countries have a broad
national agreement on Iheir basic constitution and structure of government, national defense issues, overall foreign
policy, levels of social security, taxation policy, the method of the provision of health care, the educational
system, the basic economic structure of the country and the provision of organizational structures. Together these
policies form a coherent economic system which collectively creates a national fabric (and perhaps even a
national identity) which forms the basis for a "national economic style."
'•" SeeR.M. Kanter, "The Boundaries of Business". Harvard Business Review 151-164 (May-June 1991).
The Harvard Business Review in conjunction with 24 other publications polled 12,000 managers in 25
countries on 91 issues. The aggregate responses of managers of various nationalities were markedly
different on virtually every question. The survey found that business leaders, long considered the chief
proponents of free trade, cannot be counted on lo oppose protectionism. While most managers in richer
countries favoured free trade and thought they should be free to move facilities anywhere around the
globe, many were even more adamant in supporting an active role for government in protecting their
own interests. Most American. British and French managers advocated government help for domestic
businessmen. Japanese businessmen, on the other hand, claimed to be strongly committed lo free trade.
South Korean and Indian executives arc unabashed advocates of government coddling and local content
rules. Only German managers rejected most forms of government protection.
For an interesting discussion of how different countries provide different approaches toward the
regulation of common problems and institutions and how individual and firm behaviour is affected set;
D. Vogel. National Styles of Regulation (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1986).52
c. How to Measure Input*
A simple definition of a national economic style is difficult. But since outputs were measured in terms of policies
and institutions, we should also be able to measure the inputs. At the broadest level anything and everything
which could possibly affect policy, institutions or thinking can be included. At the narrowest level, one must
remember that nations are comprised of individuals and that individuals have varying and changing interests,
tastes, values and preferences. By taking into account both the broadest and the narrowest levels, one could argue
that the inputs are the aggregate interests, tastes, values and preferences of a society.
People of course also make a large difference. There are some "style makers" or "fashion leaders" who have a
greater effect on public tastes, values and preferences than others. As politicians are supposed to simultaneously
lead and follow national opinion, their relative effectiveness can be measured in terms of their ability to influence
and reflect public opinion. People of different countries tend to reflect their national economic style - this
influences how they view others. For example, unlike American managers, managers from Germany, Japan.
Sweden, Italy and South Korea "seem curiously uninterested in leaching the world to emulate their practices. One
reason is that these managers are usually more interested in emphasizing their uniqueness than in claiming the
universality of (heir cultural perspective.
3. A Definition of a National Economic Style
Aggregate interests, tastes, values and preferences slwpe national institutions and policies. National institutions
and policies in mm shape aggregate interests, tastes, values and preferences. A national economic style can thus
be defined as the combination and interaction of interests, tastes, values, preferences, institutions and policies
which have a substantial and measurable economic effect on a nation's conduct and behaviour."
Although there is some overlapping, the notion of a national economic style is quite different from national taste,
culture or language. A cultural preference for cither pills or suppositories; beer or wine; dubbed foreign television
programmes or suhtiilcd; one type of cheese over another; weak government or strong government: centralization
or decentralization; or books traaslaled into ones mother tongue or left in its original language, while possibly
related to language or culture, will only affect the national economic style if they have a measurable economic
effect.
Michael Porter illustrates why differences in national economic style are important and how they lead to
misunderstanding. "The Italian success results from the match between a nation's unique environment and the
source of competitive advantage in panicular industries. The Italian success in fragmented industries and in
conipcling with highly focused strategics, for example, draws on unique attributes of the Italian environment.
Most commentators on the Italian economy persistently underestimated Italy, because they have applied
• C. Hampden-Turner. "The Boundaries of Business: The Cross-Cullural Quagmire". 69 Harvard Business
Review 94-% (September-October 1991) at 94-95.
• One should note that this definition of a national economic style differs substantially from both the old
and the new German concept and definitions of a Wirf.vrA<i/(.«»7. In the old concept it was used by
Schmoller. Sombart, Spicthoff and Schumpeler to indicate a term of economic sociology. Sre G.
Schmoller. Grundriss dor Allgcmoincn Volkswinschaftslehre 1 & II (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot.
1923); W. Sombart. Per Modcrnc Kapitalismus l-lll (Leipzig: Duncker & Humblot, 1916/1927): A.
SpieiholT. "Die Allgemeine Volkswirtxchaftslehrc als Geschichtliche Theorie: Die Wirtschafisstile" in
A. Spiethoff (cd), Fcstgabe fur Werner Somhan zur Siehenzigstcn Wiederkehr Seines Gehurtslages.
Neun/fhnltT Jitnncr 19.13 (Munich: Dunker& Humblot. 1933) pp. 51-84; and J.A. Schumpeter. History
ol Economic Analysis (New York: Oxford University Press. 1954). A newer interpretation, one which
is heavily influenced by the definitions given by Sombart and Spiethoff. uses the term to help explain
alternative economic conduct. See B. Schelold. "Die beiden Wege" in K. Meircr-Abich and B. Schefold.
Wie Mochtcn Wir in Zukunft Lehen'.' Per "Harte" und der "Sanfte" W'eg., (Munich: Beck. 1981) at 133-
162 and J. Backhaus. "Financing the Alternative Economy." 61 Annals of Public and Cooperative
Economics 6-16 (1990).American. German, or Japanese norms to an economy with a very different structure. National difterences (in
demand, skills, suppliers, and fields of educational excellence) air valuable. SIXTH- ol the consetjuences
of the differences created by a national economic style will be elaborated upon both beto* and in Chapter 4.
Section 2.- /"o/irica/ PAi/osopAv Vrrew
Economic 5(y{f x
Mast Western countries have a broad national consensus on their bos*.' constitution and structure of government,
national defense issues, overall foreign policy levels of social security, taxation policy the method of the
provision of health care, the educational system, the ram economic structure of the country .uul the provision
of organizational structures. Opposition ponies, while generally thouiihi of beini! eilhei to the "lelt" or "nghl,"
tend to focus on issues of relatively marginal importance in terms ol political philosophy The oppivsition rarely
fundamentally questions what the government IN doing, it merely discusses mundane mallei* such as the
distribution of costs and benefits, alternative linancmg methods, or minor changes in Ihe degree ol novrmmenl
intervention. Fundamental shifts in the degree or nalurc of governmental inlcrvcmum arc rarely ilixusscvl
Since Ihe political analysis considers the distribution of costs and benefits to he marginal to the 'real' issue of
Ihe extent of government involvement, the conclusion is drawn that contemporary political discussion reduces
around Ihe dividing of Ihe spoils of government power, both political and financial. If allocation is made on the
basis of power or political spoils (a type of bribery or pay-off), rather than ideological grounds, the cflctis should
be viewed as pure "rent-seeking." Rent seeking is the process of parties lobbying the government in the quest
for special favours called economic rents.
1. Wester* Europe
With the notable exception of Greece (and perhaps .Sweden), we have seen a vast narrowing of difference
between the right and Ihe left among the various Western European countries and between member Mala'
political parties. Often it is difficult to articulate the basic difference in Ihe political ends of the majoi parties in
terms of a political spectrum. This is especially true in the most fundamental categories of national policies
This raises an important problem for conventional economic analysis. First, if countries, individuals and political
parties can be placed somewhere along a political-economic spectrum, it is logical to expect that similar political
parties and individuals from different countries would hold similar views on similar issues and therefore
recommend similar types of solutions to similar problems. Even amongst opposition parties, there is lillle
enthusiasm in France for adopting German positions, in Spain for adopting Portuguese positions, in Ireland for
adopting British positions, or in Belgium for adopting Dutch positions, or vice versa, in any of these major policy
areas. This is true even if one does not agree that national consensuses truly exist. Even if Ihe Greeks do strive
for the higher Danish standard of living, one sees little enthusiasm for adopting any of their economic
institutions.
M.E. Porter, The Competitive Advantage of Nations (London and Basingstoke: Macmilbn Press, 1990)
p. 623.
For a good overview of the ever growing field of rent seeking see C.K. Rowley. R.D. Tollison and G.
Tullock (eds.). The Political Economy of Rent-Seeking (Boston, Dordrecht and Lancaster: Kluwer
Academic Publisher. 1988). Note that rcnl-sceking rarely maximizes aggregate satisfaction. As a result,
it cannot be considered to be efficienl.
The Italian (and to a lesser-extent the Belgian) position is different in important respects. While it is
true that there are no loud voices calling for the adoption of Ihe French or Ihe German style, the Italians
have become the most consistent and articulate voice calling for much deeper European unity. Ii has
been argued that the reason is that the Italian government (as well as its society in general) would like
a future European government to impose (he type of governmental discipline and style which the
Italians have either been unwilling or unable to impose on themselves, despite perceiving the need forFurthermore, if political philosophy was the only determinant of government policy, one would expect to see
governments with similar political philosophies recommending similar solutions to common problems. As
mentioned in Section 1. countries cannot even agree on politically neutral questions such as how to deliver
children or which medicines to lake, conditions for providing health care, let alone on the size and the form of
the social welfare system. Since a commitment to a paternalistic state based on capitalism has been more or less
universally agreed to. one must look for a more complex reason to explain why countries analyze problems
differently and often provide distinctive responses.
How then does one explain the European debate over a possible federal future, the powers of the Commission
and the Parliament, subsidiarity, immigration, or a single European Currency? In these and other matters, it is
necessary to rethink the relevance of the notion of a political spectrum and come up with an alternative
explanation.
2. An Alternative Explanation: National Economic Styles
If neither national nor international debates focus on the role of the state in economic decision making, this focus
does not explain fundamentally different approaches to common problems. A suitable explanation can be found
in differences in the various national economic styles.
At the national level, once the national economic style has been fully developed, debate can and should centre
on which mixture of policies and expenditures will maximize societal satisfaction. One can place this within the
previous discussion of efficiency. Since there can he no certainty over which measures will maximize satisfaction,
it is up to politicians to take measures which will tend to maximize it. In contrast to rent-seeking behaviour, this
is a legitimate and necessary political action.
At the international level, when countries gel together to discuss common problems they are often discussing
apples versus oranges, as the health care example indicates. Countries, knowing what their national economic
styles mundatc. will generally only seriously discuss matters if there is no conflict between form (national
economic style) and substance. Ideology usually plays little role in this exchange.
Se-crio/i 3: Conclusion
DiMgfWnW»nt« h#tw**n W«l*m «*niinlrio« hnv<* he«n mnetly viawod in tortns of political philosophy. Tlib Iwis
been a mistake since this explanation fails to predict how countries will react to various international proposals.
While there are certainly some cases where political philosophy is important in the European Community context
(with Margaret Thatcher being the ideological odd-woman out in the 1980s), most of the disagreements between
Euro|>eaii Community member states should be analyzed in terms of differences in national economic styles.
When differences are analyzed in terms of national economic styles, attempts to harmonize European Community
activities will be seen in a different light. An analysis in terms of a North-South split within the Community, in
it. It is curious that despite the impression that European control over their central governments will be
a panacea, they arc among the slowest implementors, and the most frequent violators, of European law.
A. Martino. "Italy Moves No Closer to EMU" Wall Street Journal Europe (February 17, 1991) p. 8.the coalitions for and against various proposals, pobcies. regulations and directives, is often fruitful.''*- There
are of course many exceptions. The split hinges more often on style than philosophy.
The differences in national econonuc styles have widespread economic cllecis us well "It is not only thai thr
diverse peoples of Europe speak different languages, that there are almost no hooks in common on their national
best-seller lists, that cultural differences make pan-European advertising a flop More than that, Kuropcan nations
have irreconcilable atutudes toward power, whether to gel it. how hi use it. They are divided by their
histories-" •' Chapter 4 will discuss why countries have different approaches u> common ptuMems and why
differences in national economic styles may mandate different efficient solutions.
The north is generally thought of as being comprised of Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The south is usually thought of being comprised of the other
seven member states. The divide is not totally geographic. Belgium and Ireland are further north than
most of Germany, as is a large portion of France. Whelhcr Austria and Ihc Scandinavian stales would
act more like northern stales or southern states is unclear. Even though these countries have strong
socialist tendencies one should lake into account Ihat they would all be net contributors to the
Community budget. Moreover, they rely largely on exports and support liberalized trade and have
applied for membership at least partially in order to liberalize their own economies. This, plus their
geographical location may in the end make them act more northern than southern.




This chapter will argue that the concept of efficiency in the
field of law and economics is not a universal standard, but
should be judged at a national (or even a more regional) level.
Various countries have different national economic styles (as
defined in Chapter 3) which create various solutions to similar
questions. These solutions may well be efficient (as defined in
Chapter 1) if they tend to maximize aggregate satisfaction.
National economic styles help create radically different
individual satisfaction curves and different transaction cost
configurations and agency cost structures. Collectively these
differences may actually compel countries to devise different
efficient approaches and solutions to problems Ihey have in
common. In many instances the solution to common issues will
not be harmonization, but diversity.
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"MoM countries art dealing with health care reform as if each was on Mars. Few has-e tried
lo Icam from others Many who are e»pert in the poblics and economics ot their o»n country's
health systems know little about now things work neu door ...This indifference to the
international face of doclonng is a huge mistake This is nol only because any one country has
miraculously solved all of its problems, or hecause (say) Bnuin would do hener 10 scrap its
beloved health service and replace it with (say) Germany's. It is jusi that there arc lessons K>
be learned from looking at differem ways of paying for and delivering the goods. Instead of
each country trymg out its own experiments, they should he studying each other's for ideas and
pitfalls."'•"
Chapter .1 developed the concept of a national economic style A national economic style was defined as the
combination and interaction of interests, sentiments, values, preferences, institutions ;ind policies which haw n
substantial and measurable economic eflcct on a nation's conduct and behaviour These given II.UHMI.II economic
styles help create radically differenl individual satisfaction curves ami dillerent uan.saction CIRI Iondgurolions
and agency cost structures. In Chapter I efficiency was defined as the use ol the available resources in ways
which bring about the maximum satisfaction possible, given the available technology. This chapter hnngi fl»e»t
two concepts together and is the central argument of this book. The second part of the hook discusnc* how
competition for investment and lax revenues may change the way of how nationi sdtould view what i« efficient
law.
The first section of this chapter focuses on national economic styles and ducu.sscs how these function* may add
to or detract from national efficiency and why countries may have different solutions lo problem* they have in
common. The second section discusses the relevance of national economic styles by demonstrating that each
country has its own national satisfaction function, cost of inputs, equilibrium .uid transaction mul agency uwls
and relates these functions lo a concept of efficiency. The third section sets out an example of how different
national economic styles can create different efficient solutions through an analysis of the market lot investment
in general and company laws in particular. The final section challenges the current properly rights analysis by
refuting the notion of a universal efficiency standard and sets out the proposition that varying notional economic
styles will create different efficient solutions which are only relevant on a national (or more regional) scale.
Section /: A'aft'ona/ Economic Sfy/es and Efficiency
The analysis of Chapter 3 showed that countries with similar ideological backgrounds can and often do have quite
different approxhes toward fundamenlal policy issues. The concept of a national economic style helps explain
why neighbouring countries with seemingly similar political philosophies often reach different broad national
policy consensus. Neither ideological spectrum nor the idea that nations are pragmatically approximating a
common ideal of efficient governance can explain these differences. If there was a universal efficiency standard,
it would be reasonable lo conclude that discussions over similar issues would be based on similar arguments. This
is not often the case. This is not to say that national debates are not coherent. They almost always are. It is
simply that the arguments which are raging at the national level in any given country only make sense within
the context of its national economic styles. As efficiency realization is often given as the final goal of policy
arguments, it is important to analyze the national policy debates on a national subjective basis, not on an
international objective basis. As Victor Goldberg stated: "Efficiency is contextual."'''-
'** J. Peet, "Surgery Needed: A Survey of Health Care" Economist Survey (July 6. 1991) at 3-4.
'•" V.P. Goldberg, "Relational Exchange: Economics and Complex Contracts", 23 American Behavioral
Scientist 337-352 (1984) at 342.58
Why is efficiency contextual? Countries have reacted differently to similar problems for three reasons:
1. Countries have gone through different historical experiences and have reacted to these problems
in different ways. Correspondingly, institutions have been initialed in various countries at
different times, under different conditions. When this is considered it is not surprising that
different countries have varying styles of institutions.
2. Institutions are rarely completely overthrown or completely overhauled. Most institutions are
formed by a gradual evolutionary building process over long periods. Changes are both
incidental and incremental and are usually enacted to remedy some perceived failure. Even if
the initial reaction of two countries to a shared problem was similar, it is unlikely that
subsequent reform measures would consistently address similar problems in standard
ways.
3. As economies are internally balanced and a change in one area will have ripple-effects on
other, often seemingly unrelated areas, most governments' policies end up being internally
consistent over time. Even if the resulting institutions cannot reasonably be regarded as
"efficient." the cost of reforming them may be far greater than the cost of retaining them,
especially in the short term. This excessive cost may arise from how the reform would disrupt
other seemingly unrelated areas, rather than the cost of reforming the "inefficient" institution
under consideration.
One may argue thai the maintenance of and building upon established institutions and practices merely
demonstrates an acceptance of the status quo, but to state that issues of a national economic 5iv/f can be
explained by culture misses an important point: cultural differences will have an important economic effect.
Different national economic styles will also dictate that efficient public policies vary on a country by country
basis.
Section 2: 7"Ae Rt/evance o/ a /Vafiona/ Economic
a. National Satisfaction
Each country has a particular nafiona/ economic jrvd- which has developed according to the ideals and goals of
its people and the accidents of history. In pure economic terms, a national economic style might be defined in
terms of a collective national satisfaction. In a democratic country, this satisfaction is somehow mirrored, however
imprecisely, through the elective and public choice process. Collective national satisfaction expressed in terms
of efficiency is different and more fundamental than most public choice research indicates.
Most public choice research focuses on how decisions are reached in different countries or why certain public
expenditures arc made. For the purpose of this analysis, it is taken as a given that people already have certain
values and that these values are reflected, even if imperfectly, in their choice of elected representatives and their
institutional and public spending preferences. It is also assumed (even though experience often proves otherwise)
that public policy seeks to optimize national satisfaction, given the society's collective notion regarding optimalily
of production, distribution and wealth. If these values are correctly reflected in a country's constitution, laws and
This can broadly explain why former colonies often have different national solutions, but similar basic
institutions as their former rulers/occupiers. • r. H
The issue of internal consistency can exptoin why. when people of different countries meet to discuss
a single problem, they instinctively use their own country's experience to illustrate why their country
handles the issue in a proper manner. They conclude by mentioning that because it works in their
country it should work everywhere. It should come as no surprise that people of other countries rarely
reach the same conclusion as the speaker. Most listeners just smile and roll their eyes and later go on
to use their country's example to illustrate a better way to approach the problem. This offers a fine
example of why economic analysts is usually belter when it is descriptive as opposed to prescriptive.regulations, they will promote national efficiency. By definition. U they arc not reflective of the collective
precepts of production, distribution and wealth, the aggregate collective satisfaction cannot possibly he achieved,
b. Costs of laputs
Countries will achieve efficiency in different ways because the costs of their input* are often radically diffmM.
Efficient government policies will atso reflect these costs. To simplify matters, lias iHir—iirm will he luniHd ID
the inputs of labour, capital, national infrastructure, and natural resources (including Ac environment).
Laws, regulation* and tax policies greatly influence the supply and the cost at lahour. The supply til labour Is
directly influenced by such factors as the levels ol indiMdual income lax. «vial secunty payments and
comnbulions. Ihe cost and availability of transportation, retirement ages and pension hcnefils. Ihc availability of
child care. Ihc amount of training and ihe regulation of operating hours The demand lot labour it intluenced by
such factors as minimum wages, social security contributions, various labour regulations, the education level of
the work force, the cost of training. Ihe cost of capital and the health insurance scheme.
The cost of capital will depend on factors such as Ihe sue of the government deficit, the efficiency of die capital
markets, governmental monetary policy and taxation policy. Taxation policy includes individual ami corporate
lax rales, the deductibiliiy of interest and dividend payments, depreciation poddes and investment incentives.
The availability of national infrastructure and resources will affect and should be reflected in the cost structure
As governments either own. operate, maintain or regulate virtually every type ol infrastructure it clearly has an
effect on the availability and degree of its supply and cost. Governments generally lax. own and regulnte national
resources. They alto have the power to tax and regulate Ihc usage of the environment. This overall taxation and
regulatory power is used by governments to foster different policies. These policies will determine the COM and
the availabUily of both the inputs and Ihc outputs ol a society. Proper pricing can fmilikue optimal resource
allocation.
c. Kquilibrium
Most governments' policies end up being internally consistent over tune All ihc varying costs as outlined above
will create different cost structures The given cost structures may effect the u\age ;ind availability ol resources.
These cosi struclurcs are not static. These costs will radically affeel both supply and demand conditions. Overall
this leads different countries toward different equilibria.
In this context one should think in terms of a national internally balanced economy where a change in one law
or institution will have a dynamic rippling effect on other, often seemingly unrelated areas.'''" If (he premise
that a nation's economic style creates internally consistent policies and institutions is correct, one can think of
the resulting balance as a full equilibrium. II is important to understand that few economies have created
institutions and policies in a vacuum. They have a dependence and an impact on other institutions and policies.
If one major policy is disrupted, it will necessarily have an effect on others. If Ihe disturbance is too large, it is
possible lhat the proposed change may not be efficient, even if this change would in another country help bring
about efficiency.
Often a change in one institution is proposed in order to lake care of more than one problem. This solution often
demands a counter-balance. For example, if there is high unemployment and societal and financial costs from
having an abundance of idle 17 year old school leavers, a government may increase ihe minimum school leaving
Jagdish Bhagwati makes this point in a different way in stating that even whal he calls directly
unproductive behaviour can sometimes be productive in counties with severe and widespread price
distortions. In other words, some economies are so distorted that it can make scase to throw resources
away as the alternative might be to use ihem in an even more damaging way. This type of efficient
behaviour is not (and probably cannot be) expressed in any universally acceptable concepi of efficiency.
"Directly Unproductive. Profil-Seeking (DUP) Activities." 90 Journal of Political Economy 98K-I002
(1982).60
age to 18. This one action has many consequences. The obvious effect of this action is thai national spending
for education must be increased. This increased spending will increase the need for teaching staff, administration
and school space. It will also initially decrease spending power, social security and income tax revenue as fewer
17 year olds will be working, decrease the crime rale as fewer people are idle all the time, alter property costs
and property tax revenues, and remove the teachers and administrators from alternative activities. In the long run
it may also increase the tax base by increasing the potential lifetime earning ability of the students. The issue of
the resulting cost to the social security system depends on the rules of the system itself. In some countries a
person has to have actually worked lo be eligible for benefits. In others he is unconditionally entitled to social
security benefits. Each of these results has economic and societal consequences. Each of these changes will
initially affect the microeconomic climate to some degree and create a disequilibrium. These changes alter the
economic balance and a new societal equilibrium will eventually be achieved.
d. Transaction and Agency Costs
As Kenneth Arrow put it. transaction costs are the "costs of running the economic system.... [Such costs] impede
and in particular cases completely block the formation of markets."'^" As far back as 1934. John R.
Commons recognized that although conflicting interests among parties to a transaction were assumed lo be
natural, the transactions were not taken as fixed. To the contrary, the object was lo devise institutions that served
lo harmonize interests or at least U> achieve order where otherwise there would have been conflict."
Different countries have different national economic styles. As a result of these style differences there are
dillcrent transaction costs and structures. As Commons said, transaction costs are not fixed. Different national
economic styles impose different transaction costs. Alternative systems and structures may be necessary to lake
into account these differences. If Ihc institutions are lo be efficient, different structures may even be mandated.
Attention is thus focused less on technology, which today flows relatively easily across borders, than on the
comparative costs of planning, adopting and monitoring task completion under alternative forms of
contracting.
1. Taxes
Taxes impose varying levels of transaction costs, Whether a certain type of tax is efficient is a function of the
perceived merits of the lax, the propensity of people to avoid paying the tax and the taxes' cost of collection.
Even though, in principle most people agree on the need for environmental taxes, petroleum taxes and excise
taxes on alcohol and tobacco, different countries tax these goods at a wide range of rales (if at all). Countries
will also have different collection methods which vary according to the cost of collection and the propensity lo
avoid payment. These various methods rellect the differences in agency and transaction costs. Depending on the
national economic style, each of these taxation systems may only be efficient within its own context.
2. Governance Structures . . .
Williamson helps m;ike a critical link in his analysis of governance structures. Williamson treats all people
makina exchanges in a market place not as individual exchangers, but as if they were a single maximizing
unit. • *• Since all citizens of a country live under a system of national laws and. as indicated in Chapter 1,
laws :ire the basis upon which markets are created, the Williamson approach can be used by saying that all
'*' KJ. Arrow. Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing (Chicago: Markham Press. 1969) at 48.
'• 0 J.R. Commons. Institutional Economics (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 1934).
• O.E. Williamson, "Contract Analysis: The Transaction Cost Approach." in P. Burrows and C.G.
Vcljanovski, The Economic Approach lo Law (London: Butterworths. 1981) at 40. One should note that
Ihesc are all functions of management.
• * O.E. Williamson. Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations" 22 Journal
of Law and Economics 233-261 (1979).61
citizens of a country make exchanges in a common marketplace. The cituenry can be thought of as a single unit,
since in democratic countries Ihev hire agents dim.lt> teleilcd i>llicials) oc indirectly (regulators and civil
servants) to Creole the rules of the marketplace The issue now boils down to discovering now a single
maximizing group organizes itself efficiently.
3. Societal Trust
Another element reflected in a nation's enmomn- uv/c is the degree of trust and the amount »l consultation
needed U) promote societal harmony. The embodiment of social honnon> will dillci Ironi country to
country since the wants and needs of individuals, labour, industry, government, religious groups, and interest
groups may differ dramatically. As groups will diller according to the level ol trust, coherence and the general
temperament of their members, the amount of consultation required to achieve .1 decision will vary. I he* costs
will be reflected as contracting costs when agreements arc hctng tunned and formalized and as agency cusUs when
the panics determine whether the other contracting panes are living up to their agreements. * The
interrelationship between the contracting cost and the monitoring cost will determine whether certain political,
comultive or monitoring institutions are economically efficient.
The lack of a universal transaction and agency cost structure can he illustrated by three eumpfca.
d. Kuan pie I: Centralized versus DweatraNitd IfcreiMon Making
In the Netherlands, decisions are often not taken until anyone and everyone who might conceivably be affected
by a decision has had the opportunity to be heard. The decisions taken are lormed by a general consensus. Ai
a result the decisions taken are often very narrow and conservative. In France, decisions are olten token only by
the pcrson(s) at the very lop of an organization As a result the decisions taken can be brood and daring.
Since this analysis is concerned with the relationship between the con of contracting and the cost of monitoring,
it would not be surprising if the cost of contracting will be higher in the Netherlands and lower in France. The
reason why this can be predicted ts that while fast and clear decisions can. at least theoretically, be taken in
France, the time and the number o( people involved to lake decisions in the Netherlands will theoretically be
higher. The costs of contracting will usually be higher in countries where group decisions are required than in
those where power is placed in relatively few hands.
Correspondingly, the amount of monitoring or agency costs will usually be higher in those countries where power
is placed in relatively few hands. Since everyone in the Netherlands should feel that he had the opportunity to
be heard, and at least tactically agreed with the decision taken, it is unlikely that anyone will try to scuttle the
agreement after it has been made. Moreover the opportunity for any small group or individual to unduly profit
from the agreement without the consent of the others is limited. As a result, monitoring costs should be low in
the Netherlands. In France on the other hand, the narrow group of decision makers had the opportunity to cut
a deal which benefited either themselves or others who they favoured. Additionally, if the decision was bold it
may have created discord amongst the people whose cooperation is necessary to implement the decision. As a
result a great deal of monitoring may be necessary in France.
It should not be surprising then that the Netherlands, where widespread consulting is done before a decision is
taken, will have different types of institutions and structures than France where decisions are made by smaller
'^ Regulators and civil servants are either directly appointed by direct agents or hired according to the civil
service regulations promulgated by regulators or elected officials.
Kenneth J. Arrow stressed the role which tnist plays in a successful economy in The Limits of
Organization (New York: WAV. Norton, 1974).
The relationship between contracting and monitoring was made by Ronald Coase in "The Problem of
Social Cost" (1961). Reprinted in The Law, The Market and The Firm (Chicago and London: University
of Chicago Press, 1988) at 114. ......62
groups. The efficient structures in the Netherlands will concenlrate on the decision making process; while
corresponding efficient structures in France will attempt lo provide adequate monitoring.'""
f. Kxample 2: Litigious versus Non-Litigious
In the United States, working relationships arc only formed after formal contracts have been negotiated. In Saudi
Arabia, working relationships arc formed through the development of friendship. Written contracts are rarely
necessary, as a man's word binds him. and a piece of paper is after all only a piece of paper.
One would expect that widely different transaction (and agency) costs will be reflected in the cost of drawing
up a contract, the risk and cost of legal proceeding and the steps necessary to monitor and enforce the contract.
II Ihe risks and cusls of law suit in America are high relative lo Saudi Arabia, individuals and firms will be more
insistent (hat contracts are explicit and well defined with every 't' crossed and "i" dotted."'' As a result the
cost of contracting will be relatively high in America. If Ihe risk in Saudi Arabia is low. contracts will not have
to be explicit and a simple handshake might do in some instances. If (he relationship is strong enough often such
important matters as price, quantity and time and place of delivery may not even be discussed.
Correspondingly, while it takes a great deal of lime, energy and money lo contract in Ihe United States relative
to Saudi Arabia, the cosl in lime and energy lo fill in the details and make sure that the terms of the agreement
are carried out should be higher in Saudi Arabia than in Ihe United Slates. The level of agency costs required
to monitor ihe contract will usually be higher in places where the terms of the contract are not explicit.
Additionally, ihere is less need to monitor an explicitly drawn up contract where Ihe cosl of noncompliancc is
high than is the case where certain terms were left ambiguous and the penally for perceived noncompliance is
low. The chances of ensuring that the terms of Ihe contract are lived up to should correspond to the cost of not
adhering lo the terms of ihe contract.
It should not be surprising lhal there are strong economic reasons (stemming from differences in the national
economic style) for having different institutions and working protocols in the United States than in Saudi Arabia.
Efficiency criteria will compel different countries to have alternative types of consultation structures and
monitoring arrangements which clearly reflect these relationships.
f. Kxample 3: Long-Term versus Shorl-Term Contracting
In Germany, companies tend lo engage in long-term contracting with employees, shareholders, banks, customers
and suppliers. In Great Britain, companies tend to engage in shorter term relationships. As a result. German
companies will he able to adopt a strategy with a longer lime-horizon and pay-back period than a British
company. The length and type of contracts will have an effect on the type of risks which each firm and its
contracting party will be willing to take. The longer the term of the contract Ihe greater Ihe level of planning,
risk and investment which can be undertaken. Firms with a longer term outlook and a secure line of credit from
n hank or a group of companies which owns a large portion of its shares and has a position of prominence on
Ihe Board of Directors should he better able lo hedge and diversify since the presence of longer term contracts
acts as a form of insurance: the position on the board allows the bank or the group to monitor the performance
of the firm. " The shorter the term of the contracts, the greater the inability lo hedge on risks. The lack of
a long-term supply of credit provides its own monitoring function: if the firm is unable to adapt quickly it will
In a similar vein. P. D'Irbame has noted the importance of well-defined roles and responsibilities in
French versus Dutch factories. La Logiauc de I'Honneur (Paris: Seuil. 1989).
'• One additional contracting cast can be the cosl of procuring insurance which may come in various
forms, i.e. performance bonds, surely bonds or litigation insurance.
1 S8
R. Jankowski, "Preference Aggregation in Firms and Corporatist Organizations: The Enterprise Group
as a Cellular Encompassing Organization", .13 American Journal of Political Science 973-96 (1989).w
have extreme difficulty m securing (mure credit and suppliers.' Thts creates great pressure on managers
lo succeed.
The type of contracting and of momlonng may well be different in firms in each country. Each would result in
a characteristic cost structure. One would expect the German companies to be party lo fewer contracts over time.
Since the contracts are for longer terms, the terms ot the contract will have to be more flexible than in the British
case, m order to take into account changes in circumstances which arise over HUH- The type »t monitoring
required lo oversee long term contracts with flexible provisions is different u> the monitoring required lor shorter
term specific contracts. Shorter term specific contracts should require a great deal less monitoring As turns are
formed precisely on the basis of these types of contracts (for the reasons covered in Chapter 2). one would expect
lo see different types of corporate structures both lo engage in contacting and to provide the monitoring in each
country.
g. Kxaaipte 4: Working to l.iv* versa* Living to Work
In Israel, people generally work lo live. In Japan, people generally live to work. In Israel, workera m l*f*iy
independent contractors who show up for work lor their pay check and will almost certainly leave for a bettor
job or opportunity. The company will be quick to lay oil workers ul it can) in (he event of an ccinnmic slow
down. In Japan, the workers' lives are organized around the firm and their co-workers. Workers are hired in the
expectation thai they nave been found their life's work. The company which they work for it paternalistic. As
firm-specific investments are high, fellow workers will exert enough peer pressure to lower monitoring cent*. In
Israel, as loyalty is not mutual, monitoring costs are higher.
Section 3: 7"/ie- Mart*/ For /nws/m^nf; <4 Caw .S'fudy
As will be seen in the second pan (it this book, governments are engaged in an international market for
investment. Most governments try lo provide an attractive climate for investment. This is true for both foreign
and domestic investment. In the absence of capital controls, investment will be made in the place where it will
make the greatest return, at a given risk level.
Notwithstanding attempts to seek and obtain economic rent, democratic governments will usually attempt (if not
always successfully) to act in ways which further their national economic interests. Even if they do not on their
own do this, it is certain that if entrepreneurs sec opportunities to help their own competitive position, assuming
low transaction costs, they will try to exploit them. If organizational laws are viewed to be inadequate,
entrepreneurs should ask governments to provide them with ways in which they can compete with both domestic
and foreign competitors. Institutions exist to make the transaction costs for doing so low.
S.C. Schneider and A. De Meyer, "Interpreting and Responding to Strategic Issues: The Impact of
National Culture", 12 Strategic Management Review 307-320 (1991) at 309-10.
°^ The existence of Chambers of Commerce and the possibility of cost spreading through the Chamber
should allow transaction costs to be amortized over a large number of firms making them very low,
especially if membership dues have already been paid. This means that the costs of obtaining suitable
operating structures should be fairly low.a. Company Law
Take lor example the institution of company laws. Company law may be thought of as a special case from a
public choice point of view because it is one area of law where nations are especially constricted on how they
may regulate firms, since they know that the provision of company forms (and other types of background law)
may affecl Ihcir abilily to attract and maintain investment in an international market for investment. If one accepts
this premise, each country in this international competitive market has a vested interest in creating company and
other background laws which facilitate an "optimal" allocation of labour and capital.
Whiii is striking is lhal even in this international market for investment, each country has adopted its own. often
fundamentally different, company law. To analyze these laws adequately, one should at least start with the
assumption thai these different company laws seek to achieve optimal resource allocation. Optimal resource
allocation, taking into account all the laws and regulations which alter the supply and demand for capital and
labour outlined above.
In establishing a company law, government institutions should consider all the groups with a specific interest in
the regulation of a company. These groups include managers, shareholders, employees, creditors and the
government itself. If any of these interests has been given undue consideration efficiency will surely not be
obtained. Therefore, governmental institutions should take great care to provide operating structures which
promote efficiency within their borders.""' In doing this they have to maximize societal satisfaction and
permit firms to organize in manners which not only promote the micro-economic idea of economic efficiency
in resource allocation and the macro-economic objective of maximising a country's potential output, but also to
minimize transaction and agency costs. As demonstrated above, transaction and agency costs may vary on a
country by country basis. This may help explain why laws are different: if they were not. these laws might not
be efficient.
What one can conclude from this is that most, if nut all. countries have enacted laws which they perceive to be
economically efficient. If these laws are not economically efficient, legislators have acted in a manner which is
contrary to (heir own best interests • which is to promote efficiency and increase the tax base. The fact that such
a great deal of diversity is found could logically lead one to the conclusion lhal efficiency has. notwithstanding
universal economic theory, been reflected and codified in national constitutional structures which were formulated
in order to minimize aggregate transaction and agency costs and maximize overall satisfaction. If this is indeed
what has been accomplished, one can conclude thai efficiency standards and transaction and agency cost levels
are not universal.
The lack of activity and change in company laws should be contrasted with the last decade's worldwide
downward spiral in corporate income tax rates. This worldwide drop in corporate tax rates demonstrates that
governments react to international competitive pressure to both attract and keep investment capital. Competitive
pressure for lax revenues in an internationally competitive market will be the focus of Chapters 6 and 7. But if
countries engage in this competitive process for lax revenues, it is reasonable to conclude that they also try to
compete in the areas of law which involve investments. The resulting plethora of company laws and
company structures should demonstrate that various countries may well have good and sound reasons for adopting
their own version of a company law with different operating structures. If one accepts that this process might
happen in the real world there are some serious problems with the current structure of the firm analysis.
J. Rackhaus. "Efficient Statute Law" in M. Faun" and R. van den Bergh (eds). Essays in Law and
Economics: Corporations. Accident Prevention and Compensation for Losses (Antwerp. Apcldoom:
Maklu. 1989) at 23-32.
Romano outlines how the American State of Delaware supplies company law on a competitive basis
in Romano, R., "Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle". 1 Journal of Law.
Economics & Organization 225-53 (1985), J «:, ,,,u- •;•.«,.-,-.•,••b. Cm-rat Ltfal Structure of tb* Kirm Analysis
Building on the wort.of Klein. Crawford, and Akrhjan.'^ Williamson."** Prcscotl and Visseher.
Grossman and Han."* Milgrom"" and Furuhotn.'™ Clifford huih a theory of the firm in which
contracting u costly and rhe participants in the firm make firm-specific (or at least partially nonsalva*eable)
investments. He then builds on the assumptions in the theories of Prescotl and Visscher' . and
Milgrom' which stale that contracts within a rum are interdependent A firm is not just a collection >>f
bilateral contracts: it consists of individuals hound together by interdependent kHig-ierm contracts These
interdependent contracts are designed to protect Ihe investment of the members i4 the firm
Thu type of analysis could be extrapolated to slate that memhm of • society are aim linked by long-term
contracts. These long-term contracts are linked and have an internal consistency expressed in the national
economic style. Individual members of society invest in this internal consistency and build up YiHimry-specifk"
investments which take mm account a country's way of doing things. This "country specificity" must he taken
into account when trying to creaie efficient structures and procedures because many of Ihe costly contractual
relationships are only relevant m their societal context. In the content of Efficient Law. this extrapolation leads
to conclusions which are quite different to those of Clifford and Furuholn.
Gifford states that "|t|he constitution can be thought of as a set of interdependent explicit and implicit contract*
between the owner of the firm and its various members, as well as the mechanism for monitoring ami rnfi»ving
these relationships" ^ Notwithstanding his apparent misunderstanding of the mlc which background law
plays in a firm's contractual relations (as described in Chapter 2). taking Clifford's observation (derived from
Furuholn) regarding firm-specific investments to its logical conclusion, one wouki expect thai each firm
should develop its own mdependenlly determined constitution ki formalize Ihe relalmnthipv He make no such
argument. He could also come to a similarly logical conclusion that firms in the same mdusiiv (rcgardlm of
nationality) might have similar relationships,, requiring similai constitutions. Again, lie docs not make this
argument. Some commentators. Furubotn in particular, take Gifford's argument in order to reach conclusions on
the type of constitution that firms should have.
- B. Klein. R.G. Crawford and A.A. Alchian. "Vertical Integration. Appropriable Rents, and the
Competitive Contracting Process", 21 Journal of Law and Economics 297-326 (1978).
Supra note 9.
• E.C. Prescott and M. Visscher. "Organizational Capital". 88 Journal of Political Economy 446-461
(1980).
'°" S.J. Grossman and O.D. Hart, "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership", 94 Journal of Political Economy
691-719 (1986).
P.R. Milgrom. "Employment Contracts, Influence Activities, and Efficienl Organization Design". 96
Journal of Political Economy 42-60 (1988).
°° E.G. Furubotn, "Codeterminalion and the Modem Theory of the Firm". 61 Journal of Business 165-181
(1988).
'® A. Gifford. Jr. "A Constitutional Interpretation of the Firm". 68 Public Choice pp. 91-106 (1991).
"0 Supra note 22.
'" Supra note 24.
'^ Supra note 26 at 104. ••
'^ Supra note 25.66
Furubotn uses the same type of argument which Gifford makes and comes to the conclusion that a type of
governance structure implemented through amendments to company laws known as co-determination (which is
mandated for large German companies) is preferable. Under German co-delerminalion there are two boards. At
the highest level, there is the board of directors. Its mandate is to create policy objectives in order to enhance
the long-term interest of the company. It is comprised of representatives of the shareholders and representatives
of the workers. Depending on the type of company workers representatives comprise from one-third to one-haJf
of the members of the board of directors. The employee representatives may not be trade union leaders.
The second board is the board of management. The board of management is responsible for the day-to-day
management of the company. The members of the board of management arc selected by the board of directors.
The theory goes that since the employees have a say in selecting managers, they will only approve managers who
take into consideration the welfare of the workers. This process, along with works councils, in turn helps facilitate
communication which benefits the management of the company. Furubotn argues that this type of company tends
to formalize the commitment of the company to the workers whose market value is at least partially comprised
of firm-specific skills which have been derived from their firm-specific investments.
Those who advocate this type of corporate structure must answer this question: If this structure is so efficient,
why have firms not unilaterally adopted co-determination in other countries? Why is that many German
companies have operating structures which arc designed to avoid co-determination?'^-" And specifically in
the case of a German investor, why is there no clamour amongst German investors in Spain to adopt the German
corporate structure given (heir first-hand knowledge of the alleged efficiency of co-determination.
d. Capital Markets
Before olfermg an alternative explanation regarding the current theory of the firm, it is interesting to consider
the role thin capital markets may play in this process. In the trade-off regarding the interrelationship between the
various stakeholders in the firm as described in Chapter 2. we would expect share prices to be highest in the
instances where shareholders have the greatest amount of control over the company, all other things being equal.
Share price is not only a concern to shareholders, it is also of importance to the other corporate "stakeholders."
Higher share prices mean that investment capital in the form of equity can be raised at a lower cost. Higher
umounls of equity lowers the amount of risk to lenders. Lower risk means lower interest payments. A lower cost
of capital means that more investments will have a positive net present value. This in turn means that more
investments will be made. These investments create economic activity, wealth and jobs. In order to overcome
this strong argument for shareholder rights one must conclude that the advantages of passing control from the
shareholders to other stakeholders must outweigh these benefits. In an international capital market the benefits
must come either in the form of higher profits or substantially reduced risk.'^
'** Trade unions arc in part interested in the short-lerm interests of the workers and try to maximize the
amount of salary and benefits which they can obtain at the expense of the shareholders. As members
of the board of directors, the employee representatives are interested in the long-term best interests of
(he company. As these two principles may bring about a conflict of interest, employee representatives
may not be trade union leaders.
• B. Nagel. "Erosion der Mitbestimmung und EG-KommissKmsentwiirfe zur Europa-AG". 7 Arbeit und
Rccht 205-14 (1990).
For an interesting discussion on the international competition for scarce capital see C.Y. Baldwin. "The
Capital Factor; Competing for Capital in a Global Market", in M.E. Porter (ed.). Competition in Global
Industries (Boston; Harvard Business School Press. 1986) pp. 185-223.67
c. A* AU*rmali>« Explication
For some commentators the theory of the firm works well in practice, but dues it »ori in theory'.' The answer
is no. While Gifford, Furuhotn. and Hodgson and Jones, may prefer to have tirms which have certain
characteristics, their preferred forms may not be appropriate when taking into account divrtyent national
economic styles. As a result, the following interpretation ul the relationship between the various stakeholders of
the firm is quite different from those ol the authors mentioned above. It is one which works both in practice and
in theory.
As people and rums must somehow interrelate with each other, some kind of constitution must exist to regulate
this inlcrrcUtHmsiup. From a Public Choice point of view, the following conclusions can be reached: (I)
Governments share a common purpose in providing an efficient array ot organizational furms in order to crcoto
a system where firms can organize in manners which promote economic CIIICICTK v .mil minimi/r II.WVKIIKI and
agency costs: and (2) Compwy laws (a type of constitution) are enacted in the spirit of this societal balance. The
national value system and economic style reflect ihc deisrec ol trust and Ihc amount ol itamillnlum needed to
promote harmony in companies. Creditors', managers', shareholders,' and employees" needs diller snonling to
their level o( trust and general temperament. Should this general level ol irusl and temperament ililler. agency
and transaction costs will be different. Therelore. countries should have different structures which clearly reflect
these relationships. These relationships alone will determine whether co-determination w any other form l»
economically efficient In this respect, economic analysis is beltei when il is descriptive us <>j>|ioscJ lo
prescriptive.
While not discounting that there are some firm-specific investments which workers make, the type and the value
of this investment will vary according to the national economic style under which this investment is undertaken.
Perhaps more importantly, the degree of loyally which employees arc willing to provide to the linn and the firm
is willing to provide to the employees is at least partially a function of national economic style. Each national
economic style will be reflected in the relationships between groups in the firm which will result in different
types and levels of cost in motivating employees to perform optimally; in order to perform optimally, there is
little question that, because of differences in national economic styles. Israeli and Japanese employees need to
be motivated and monitored in different manners.
The four examples of varying style characteristics found in different countries outlined above can serve to
illustrate how different levels of contracting and agency costs will require different structures to elicit efficiency.
As pointed out in the first example, France and the Netherlands will require different monitoring and decision-
making structures to account for their tendency for centralized/decentralized decision-taking styles in order to
elicit efficiency.
In the second example one could reason that Ihc most important difference between Saudi Arabia and the United
Slates is that in Saudi Arabia the relationship to the parties is often more important that Ihc contract itself, while
in the United States the contract itself is often more important lhan the panics. As a result one could
imagine that organizational structures and the nature of work might be much more informal in Saudi Arabia than
in the United Stales.
In the third example, the length of the contracting period, particularly in the area of financing, will cast different
risk and time projections on the company's management. As a result different types of contracting will be done
and different types of monitoring will be required. Because of differences in time horizons in the area of
financing one would expect German companies to be belter able to engage in a diversified pool of risks through
internal hedging and to be able to invest in projects with a longer pay-back period than in Great Britain, One
G.M. Hodgson and D.C. Jones, "Codelermination: A Partial Review of Theory and Evidence". 3 Annals
of Public and Cooperative Economics 329-340 (1989).
* The American affinity for written documents, stems back at least to the Revolutionary War period when
Thomas Jefferson took exception to the whims of King George III by staling that the United States was
"a nation of laws not of men."should also not be surprised, due to the length and riskiness of the contract, to find that those providing the
longer-term financing (usually, but not always banks) would require membership on the board of directors to
advise on policy and to monitor risks.
In the final example, it was mentioned that Japanese workers' lives are organized around the firm and their co-
workers. As firm-specific investments are high, fellow workers will exert enough peer pressure to lower
monitoring costs. In Israel, workers were largely independent contractors who show up for work for their pay
check. As loyalty is not mutual monitoring costs are higher.
Given these differences in national economic style, the quality of work done by civil servants with similar
employment condiuons might be higher in Japan than in Israel.'™ As Michael Porter points out. emulating
another nations model for national advantage may not be efficient. The task for any government is to understand
(he principles of national advantage and translate them into policy initiatives that reflect the nation's particular
circumstances. Good policies in one nation may well be bad policies in another."'""
One of the main purposes of Chapter 2 was to demonstrate that certain types of background laws may be efficient
• but only in a particular context. If efficient background law is the aim of each country, one would expect that
because of divergent national economic styles, each country should have its own company law. One should also
expect that in order to obtain efficiency, different countries may enact different organizational forms.
This analysis will come as a surprise to many persons advocating various corporate structures for universal use.
It calls into question the European Commission's attempt to mandate a certain organizational structure for
EurnDCiin companies. This effort was initiated in the draft Fifth Directive on the Harmonization of Company
Law. which was later the subject of a 1975 green paper'"' and later revised in 1983'"" and
amended in 1990. The first two papers, based on the German system of codelermination. mandated a two-
Itcr system of management with a board of supervisors and a board of directors. The board of directors were
chosen by the board of supervisors. Two-thirds of the members of the hoard of supervisors were to be selected
by the shareholders of ihc firm and the other one-third by the employees of the firm. The final two revisions
abandon the requirement for a two-licr hoard, but retain the requirement that workers are represented in some
type ol lormal structure.
One should note that the Commission's position on both the two-lier structure and worker representation are
minority positions as fewer than half of (he member slates have provisions for either in their own national
company laws. One should also note that none of the member states have changed their company laws to adopt
the Commission's proposals on cither the structure of the company or worker representation, and there is no
immediate likelihixxi that any will. As noted above and in Chapter 2, countries have a strong motivation to adopt
efficient background laws, particularly in an international market for investment. Given this set of circumstances,
it is unlikely that the Commission's proposals for harmonization will promote efficiency.
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This point is made by M.E. Porter. The Competitive Advantage of Nations (London and Basingstoke-
Macmillan Press. 1990) at 808. footnote 5.
'"" Ibid at 623-24. . •
"" OJ 1972 C 131/44.
'** BuU. EC 1975 Supplement 8/75. ;
'^QjCMOfl 9.9.1983. , . „.„.„„, ,» ?,t
'**OJC 7/4 11.1.91. * " * ' 7' "In principle many people analyzing codetermmalion (including Furubotn and others)'"- minhi prefer the
system because they have noted that in Germany and Japan their are measurable advantage* in terms of
productivity by having patemalisoc companies which have a kmg-term commitment m employees and where
employees feel a commitment lo the long-term success of the firm. These commitments are pan ol Germany and
Japan's national economic style. As in most instances, these measurable benefits have costs These costs are a
lanmuon on perceived personal freedoms, opportunities, and personal expression. One would also expect lo find
ten entrepreneurship as there is a certain amount of nsk aversion which is inherent in a culture ot conformity.
Even within Japan and Germany, individual citi/cns w ill almost certainly value these principles ilitlcrently. Tom
Peters staled what is wrong with adimnng the former West Germany's success with co-delcrminalion and trying
to spread it to other European countries. "National differences don't translate easily into am best' or 'wont'
strategies. There u no one best way' of doing business, practised by any one nation, and worth mindless copying
by HI.'*
One of the reason why codetcrmmaoon is espoused, is that the expansion of the production possibility frontier
occurs when workers maximize their firm-specific investments: deeper involvement in the firm will give a better
incentive for workers lo invest m firm-specific skills and lo help monitor other employees As has been
demonstrated, different countries have different contracting and monitoring costs These dilfrrem.es require
different types of structures. Which structure will hnng about the happy end ol increased productivity at the
lowest cost will almost certainly depend on the cost structures lound within the national economic style.
As the examples above indicate, national differences in transaction and agency cons nlrnont ensure that Ihu u
true. The national economic styles of Japan and Israel arc so different that any type ol externally mandated
structure would he unlikely lo work. An imported structure would almost certainly add lo transaction or
monitoring costs. What might be nice in an ideal world is unlikely lo work in the real world The cost of even
trying might be excessive. Instead of dreaming, a belter approach (or these theoreticians would be lo try to locate
instances where monitoring costs or transaction costs could be lowered.
Akhian and Demsetz better address what should he done in countries like Israel Alchion and Demxel/ rrckon
that at the core of the problem of team production is measuring the productivity of individual workers in team
efforts. They ask: "What forms of organizing team production will lower the cost of detecting 'performance.'"
Their answer is market competition. Markel compelilion will force corporations and businesses lo instill
a spirit of loyalty.'^ If they are unable to do this, productivity and quality control will suffer. This problem
is further addressed in Chapter 5.
Section 4.- Conclusion
One must ask why various countries have different (efficient) solutions lo problems they have in common and
how each of these laws may be efficient in its own specific context. Various countries have al limes enacted
company laws, labour laws, tax laws and regulations which have inhibited or promoted particular organizational
forms in particular sectors without regard to their efficiency. This outcome is unfortunate. Efficient
outcomes would have taken into account the country's (or region's) national economic style and built upon it.
• 85 for further information on codetermination. see H.G. Nutzinger and J. Backhaus (eds.),
Codetermination: A Discussion of Different Approaches (Berlin and New York: Springer. 1989).
186 -p pliers «-r/he Boundaries of Business: Partners - The Rhetoric and Reality". 69 Harvard Business
Review 97-99 (September-October 1991) at 99.
^ A.A. Alchian and H. Demsetz, "Production. Information Costs, and Economic Organization", 62
American Economic Review 777-795 (1972) at 779-81.
'88 Ibid, at 791.
'8' H. Hansmann, "Ownership in the Firm", 4 Journal of Law. Economics & Organization 267-304 (1988),70
Efficient law might demand different national or regional solutions. Each country has its own institutions which
are based on its national character. These institutions evolve over a long period of time and result in a certain
national balance. Company laws should be enacted in the spirit of this societal balance. Two important aspects
of the national economic «>•/« are the degree of trust and the amount of consultation needed to promote harmony
in companies. Creditors, managers, shareholders and employees' needs differ according to their level of trust and
general temperament. International differences in these cultural factors could mean that agency and transaction
costs will be different. It should therefore come as no surprise that different organizational institutions have been
developed in order to address these varying costs. If these costs arc different, different forms of institutions will
be more efficient. This analysis not only explains why different countries have different organizational forms,
but also why small firms need a different operational form than larger ones and why more than one organizational
form or even set of forms is necessary.
This analysis can also go a long way toward describing the apparent failure of the European Commission's effort
to harmonize European company law. There is the enigma that neither convergence of the economies of the
member slates through market forces nor harmonization through European Community Directives and Regulations
will bring about a single set of organizational structures which will be used in the Community in the foreseeable
future, despite the hcsl efforts of the Commission. To the contrary, the Commission, by developing a European
Company Law and the European Economic Interest Grouping, has increased the number of organizational forms
available to European businesses. This is not to say that (he Commission's efforts should be considered as either
inadequate or as a lailurc. since the availability of additional forms, especially in the multinational context, may
promote organizational efficiency.
It is apparent that, there will not be a single, all-encompassing European company law which is consistently
"PP'ied '« all the member slates. The goal of certain integralionists is to create a single European company
law. Some claim lhal a single European company law and organizational form is necessary to promote
"a level playing field." Whal the inlegrationists often fail to address is the queslion of whether their concept of
a level playing field is economically efficient. An efficient law analysis notes that various countries have different
ways of doing things and that one universal European company law could not be efficient. The case for the
efficiency of harmonization requires a complete and convincing explanation of why the company laws of at least
11 countries arc inefficient in their own context.'"'
Karl (jlcichmunn, who used to work in the company law area at Ihe European Commission, keenly sums up the
problems of trying lo adapt alien organizational forms:
"Industrial relations arc determined by deeply-rooted conceptions of the respective social roles
of workers and management. They are therefore very different from one member state lo
another. They have evolved over many years. To attempt to change them by decree from above
is hardly likely lo succeed. The systems can be made to converge, but must be allowed time.
Mentalities • highly subjective attitudes of mind • play a major part in them. Certainly, such
processes can be encouraged and nurtured. But problems are likely with attempts to transplant
the fruits of one country's experience inlo other countries with a different background.
Therefore, the proposal in Ihe 1472 draft for a Fifth Directive was probably fundamentally
flawed and politically unrealistic. It attempted to export' a system of employee participation
too
The Commission's harmonization approach is based upon the Treaty of Rome articles 52 et sea, which
establish a "freedom of establishment." Those who argue for complete harmonization base their
argument of their interpretation of the wording of Article 54(3)(g) which states that the Community
should: "coonlinal|e| safeguards ... for the protection of the interests of members and others [which are)
required by Member States or companies or firms ... with a view lo making such safeguards equivalent
throughout Ihe Community."
I'M
More than a uniform company law is necessary to achieve a totally level playing field. A totally level
playing field would also require either adapting a common law system in which rulings of Ihe European
Court were binding on national courts, or alternatively removing all company law matters from the
jurisdiction of national courts to a European court.71
that had evolved over $0 yean (employee representation on a lower-uer supervisory hoard had
ciisted tn Germany since 1922V It ignored the (act that one of the main conditions (or
employee panicipalion in decision-making • consensus - was lacking. To try to impose it on
them against their wiU was as unrealistic as it was futile How sensitive this area is. is clear
from tiK attempt lo introduce legislation to promote closer industrial relations in France in
1986. - This example shows how far apart even the Continental Member Slates are on
this issue Even for countries that do rave a basic consensus between management and labour
in industry, like the Netherlands and German', it is hard to imagine an exchange ol their
systems. I<1 (he past it has been difficult enough to gain recognition ol the equivalence ol the
systems,""*
Perhaps De Atessi and Staaf best sum up the dilemma facing the European Economic Community as it deddM
whether to pass a uniform set of European company laws and. one hopes, considers the relationship hetwaw
efficiency and national economic styles, when they wrote that "Efficiency may be defined as the solution to *
constrained rruuimization problem Thus, given a set ol institutions, the resulting solution ol the economic
problem is efficient Institutions with different legal structures typically yield different efficient solutions, and
which institution is adopted depends on the rules for choosing institutions. Economics is a powerful tool lor
analyzing the consequences of alternative institutions and. given an understanding »f Hie effective constraints,
for explaining (predicting) the evolution and adaption of competing institutions Wrmh institutions ought to he
adopted, and whether or not they are more efficient in some sense, ultimately is a normative issue, and economici
cannot provide the answer."
"^ Ordonnance du 21.10.1986 No 86.1134 relative a rinteressement et a la participation des salaries aux
requitals de rentreprise et a ractionnarial des salaries. Revue des Socidles 1986, p. 644.
K. Gleichmann. "Perspectives on European Company Law", Forum Internationale (October 1989) pp.
8-9.
L. De Alessi and RJ. Staaf, "Property Rights and Choice", in N. Mercuro (ed.). Law and Economics
(Boston: Kluwer 1989) at 184.72






After setting out the conditions for legal efficiency in a
domestic setting in Ihc first four chapters of this book, this
chapter asks why domestic efficiency in a closed national
market is not Ihc same thing as efficiency in an international
selling. Moreover, what was efficient ten years ago in an
international setting has been almost revolutionized with the
advent and diffusion of (he microchip, fibre optic cable, satellite
communication, the fax machine and belter and cheaper
international transport and communications. This chapter puts
the changes of Ihc lasl few years in an historical setting;
discusses why the world is changing and the role of technology
in the change: updates Coase's theory of the firm in the light of
Ihese changes: and concludes by discussing what implications
the changing nature of the firm has for firms govemmenLs and
the law.5; T/ie firave New WorW o//n/er-
in fl/i
"We are living through a transformation thai will rearrange the politics and economics o( the coming century.
There will he no ru/i<»u/ products or technologies, no national corporations, no national industries There will
no longer he national economies, at least a» we have come to understand that concept. All that will miuun united
within national borders arc the people who comprise a nation Each nation's primary asset will he Us mucus'
skills and insights Each nation s primary political task will he to cope with the centrifugal (ones ol the global
economy which tear at the ties binding its citiiem together - bestowing ever greater wealth on the most skilled
and insightful, while consigning the less skilled to a declining standard of living As borders become ever more
meaningless in economic terms, those cilxens best positioned to thrive in the world market are templed to slip
the bonds of national allegiance, and by so doing disengage themselves from their less lavorrd Iclkiws •
The purpose of die first four chapters of this book was to examine what was clltcicnl law and efficient
government policy in a domestic setting. International competition in general, and intergovernmental lompciituxi
(or investment and taxes in particular, changes the efficiency equation to at least some degree This concept was
initially illustrated in Chapter 2 when the reason why trade homers, small stores and higher prices might be
etficieni for Japan was explained. Borders, however, have become of decreasing importance ui economic terms.
As a result, as the same example illustrated, iniernaiitinal intergovernmental competition will almost neccuanly
lead to a decrease in the degree to which governments can become involved in and protect markets As a result,
efficiency will take less notice of maximizing aggregate satisfaction and take maximizing physical output into
greater consideration. The first part of this book was about domestic efficiency in the context ol the national
economic style. The second pan a about how international competition and technological changes have nfleclcd
national governments.
In Chapter 1, the case for a different standard of efficiency - maximizing aggregate national .satisfaction - was
made. There are serious drawbacks to this approach in an internationally competitive economy, because
governments face both a supply and demand constraint. "The major difference between government and the
private firm is that, in the case of government, the relevant demand for government is the willingness and ability
of residents to live and earn Iheir incomes (from which governments extract tax revenues) in a given
jurisdiction."''" High taxes and intense regulation tend to push capital and people outside the jurisdiction.
Social security, unemployment compensation and the availability of retirement income all create disincentives
to work. The effect of these programmes on government coffers are larger than many people assume: not only
do people receive benefits from the system - they also no longer contribute to the programme's financing.
Moreover, the average recipient receives an amount many times what he would contribute if he were paying in
and every new recipient puts an even greater pressure on those who continue to pay in.
The measurement of inputs as described in Chapter 1 remains unchanged. The purpose of Chapters 3 and 4 was
to point out that national economic styles will necessitate different laws (considered to be inputs) to maximize
both satisfaction and output. In the international equation, the measurement of output changes from attempting
to maximize aggregate satisfaction to maximizing physical output. The purpose of this chapter is to indicate what
pressures history and technology are placing on the national efficiency equation. Chapter 6 will point out why
governments are under increased pressure to supply efficient regulatory climates in the form of background laws
(Chapter 2) in general and company laws in particular. Chapter 7 will analyze the reasons why govemmenLs are
under increased pressure to provide hospitable tax climates.
R.B. Reich, The Work of Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991) p. 3.
R.B. McKenzie and D.R. Lee, Quicksilver Capital (New York: The Free Press, 1991) at 89.74
As described in Chapter I, markets arc based on a set of legal norms. An efficient market will be based on a
system of efficient laws. If national economic styles are radically different, two radically different sets of market
conditions for the same product or service can be simultaneously efficient. In most cases, it can be argued that,
for markets in differing countries lo be efficient, laws should and must be different.
As described in Chapter 4, markets can only be efficient if the legal norms which regulate the market properly
reflect the national economic style. Markets arc efficient when the combination and interaction of national
interests, tastes, values, preferences, institutions and policies arc properly taken into account and reflected by the
market conditions. Only under this condition can markets be developed which maximize societal satisfaction in
particular countries.
How the markets themselves operate will have a profound effect on the creation of a national economic style.
For example, an efficient solution for a country which favoured relative income equality might be to have high
and progressive personal and social security contributions, high minimum wage levels, an extensive social security
system and a national health service. In economics, just as Sir Isaac Newton predicted for physics, for every
action there is an equal and opposite reaction. Such income difference neutralizing policies will have other
perhaps unintended consequences, such as reducing Ihc incentive both lo employ workers and 10 work. First, on
the supply side, higher laxes will reduce Ihc marginal inccniive to work (at the very least the number of hours
which workers are willing lo work). Second, on Ihc demand side, higher than market wage levels (which include
employer contributions lo health care and social security) will reduce the marginal incentive to employ workers
and lead lo unemployment
The resulting unemployment and tax burden might provoke another response: resenlmenl. This resentment will
encourage current tax-paying citi/.cn eiihcr to work oulside of the lax system or to emigrate to places where their
efforts :irc belter compensated, on an after lax basis. High laxes, uncompelilive regulation and uncompetilive high
wage levels, will send investment capital scampering ;ieross borders to other countries at the speed of light at the
mere push of a bulton. While money today can be moved al Ihc speed of light through fibre optic cables, physical
plant ami equipment cannot. The flows of capital which are transferred are enormous: in the range of 30 to 50
limes that of world trade. Since invcsimcnl usually follows monetary flows, one way to measure the
competitiveness of an economy is to measure how much capital is flowing in versus how much is going out. If
money is fleeing, longer lemi prospects for the economy arc weak, if money is coming in the outlook is strong.
This is Irue because there is a direct relationship beiwecn investment and future productivity, and increased
productivity leads lo affluence. An efficient response lo capital outflow might be to cut back on at least some
of the previously enacted measures which were formerly efficient, but no longer are. In this regard, national
economic styles will necessarily change over lime. Pressures on governments to change their ways can be put
in a historical perspective.
Secfl'on 2; //is/orica/ Perspective
History repeats itself. The relative balance of power has shifted throughout history from the people to the
sovereign and back again. From Ihc earliest days of man when people first handed together lo give a larger share
of decision-making to a smaller group of decision-takers, shifts of power have gone back and forth between the
sovereign and the ruled. When the power of the sovereign became too great and self-serving, people have always
revolted. When there was a perception of insufficient administration, governments became more powerful. Shifts
in the relative balance have seemed lo come in certain waves.
The Reformation came in reaction to the stmiij;, centralized Catholic Chuah of the Sixteenth Century. The
parallel iron-fisled and often corrupt rule of national governments lasted into the Seventeenth and Eighteenth
Centuries when revolts and civil wars loosened government control. This period of overly strong government rule
provoked the writings of what are still considered the greatest political thinkers since the ancient Greeks: Burke.
W.B. Wriston. "On Track wilh the Deficit", Wall Street Journal (January 6, 1989) p. A10.Humboldl. Votaure. Hume. Locie. Smith. Madison. Jefferson and Mill. This new era corresponded w«h the
industrial revolution. Mercantilism and Imur: /u«<- became the en ol the ne» era.' A new elite wat
formed: the industrialists. When the pendulum arguably swung loo fir in this direction there was another reaction
in the form of condemnation from such diverse sources as Karl Man. EmUe Zola. Sinclair Lewis. Charles
Dickens. Thomas Carlyle' and Teddy Roosevelt. A reaction to the perceived insufficient administration
led lo. among other dungs. Ihe evolution of the trade union movement The socialisitwed trade union movement
was the forerunner of the development of social welfare systems beginning in the late Nineteenth Century, and
of communism in the Twentieth Century.
A cradteto-gravc social welfare system of course has to be paid for. This fiscal reality resulted n.H only in direct
taxation and transfer payments lo Ihe people, but also lo increased regulation. Al least some ol this regulation
has been created to shift the cost of some national social welfare measures to business. ' Regulation aim
has a measurable cost.
The state, in at least some countries, look a role which was too ulopun and ovcriy iiuerveniionui. There were
good reasons for ihis. After Ihe depression of the 14 Ws. ihere was the Inumph ol Kcynesmn inlcrvenuoniam;
in the aftermath of World War 11. there was ihe triumph of the Marshall Plan. Both strengthened public faith in
Ihe visible hand of government to the «I0H In* even Ihc World Bank and Ihe United Stales urged Third World
governments to draw up five-year plans. A belief in Ihe power of government to solve economic pmhlemi
led lo economic nationalism becoming Ihe order of the day, not only in communist countries, but also in thoae
of Latin Amenta. Africa and Asia
The response in ihe Western democracies was lo form various social security systenu baled on a pyramid
scheme. As wiih all pyramid schemes, one initially starts wiih a large number of contributors and a small number
of takers. As more people become takers, the base of Ihe pyramid has lu grow or Ihe base nf ihe pyramid will
not be large enough to support the structure. After the depression of Ihc |u«h. and especially alia World War
II. Western economics grew at almost historically unprecedented rates People were having txihicv ll aremed M
if prosperity would never end. In the 1960s and 1970s, however, two dramatic events occurred which shrunk Ihe
base of these pyramids. First, effective and reliable forms of birth control had a dramatic effect on birth rates.
Second, economic growth began to level off especially wiih Ihe two worldwide oil shocks. As a result Ihe
pyramids could not be sustained, as many of the assumptions upon which they were formed did not come lo pass.
Once the bubble began to burst, blame began lo be allocated. In the most highly taxed and highly regulated
Western economies the excess was referred to as a type of sickness, which in Europe was called
"Eurosclerosis." " The over-extension of government gave prominence to a new group of both economic
and political thinkers: Buchanan. Hayek, Friedman. Mises. Simons and Rfipke. The reaction lo over-extension
f go
"° For an excellent overview of this period see F. Braudel, Civilization and Capitalism. 15th-18lh Centuries
(New York: Harper and Row, 1984).
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Today Carlyle is mostly remembered for calling economics "Ihe dismal science." Carlyle, however was
an idol of Joseph Schumpeler. Schumpeter described Carlyle in almost epic-like prose: "For economists
he is one of Ihe most important and most characteristic figures in the cultural panorama of Ihc epoch -
standing in heroic pose, hurling scorn at Ihe materialistic littleness of his age, cracking a whip with
which to flay, among other things, our Dismal Science." J.A. Schumpeter. History of Economic
Analysis (1914) Reprint (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954) pp. 409-10.
°" E.g., legislation which requires business to provide health insurance to both employees and their
families; mandatory pension funds; unemployment insurance: and regulation of paid holidays.
*"' B. Jalan, India's Economic Crisis: The Way Ahead (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1991) at 8-11.
For a good overview of some of the causes of Eurosclerosis see P.R. Krugman, "Slow Growth in
Europe: Conceptual Issues", in R.Z. Lawrence and C.L. Schultze (eds.), Barriers to European Growth
(Washington: The Brookings Institution. 1987).76
can be seen in Western countries in an almost universal fall in personal and corporate tax rates and increasing
tax revolts. Excessive regulation and its cost led to the European Community member states' adoption
of the Single European Act, something that was unthinkable only a few years earlier. The reaction in the
rest of the world led to something even more astonishing: the dramatic overthrow of communism, the opening
up of formerly closed economies and the emergence of democratization. The reason why this has happened will
be outlined in the following section.
Sf'crion J; WAy /fce WorW is Changing
Dramatic changes in national economic styles were apparent in the 1980s. Until the 1980s the watchwords of the
government were embedded in the words "state action" and "regulation." The invention of the microchip and the
invention and diffusion of the personal computer and fibre optic cable changed how knowledge and information
is disseminated and transmitted. This coincided with the almost revolutionary political leadership of Ronald
Reagan, Margaret Thatcher and Mikhail Gorbachev. These leaders all questioned whether the role of the state
needed to be so large. They all took measures to stop and in some cases reduce the growth of government. They
all attempted to shift at least some of the burden for which the government was formerly responsible back to
individuals. While their policies had varying and debatable degrees of success, (he political position which they
articulated struck a cord with a large number of people throughout the world: individuals, not government, should
have more control over daily life and decision-making. A new revolutionary war was happening. The war was
fought with n minimum of bloodshed. History was repeating itself - but the revolution was fought with ideas, not
builds.
Other events occurred during the 1980s: Japan became the world's largest creditor; worldwide trade exploded;
a worldwide debt crisis hit; the Berlin Wall fell. The internal fall of the Soviet Empire occurred soon after in
I'WI. In 19K.V the European Community adopted the White Paper which called for a Single European Market
by 1992 which required breaking down national barriers. Arguably, the strategy for the Single Market was
a mere catching up exercise: breaking down technical and physical borders, cutting red-tape, codifying and putting
into law rules that European businessmen need to conduct their increasingly cross-border activities. A single
European currency seems to be a short step in this process.
The new worldwide catchwords became deregulation (except where the environment is concerned) and
privatization. Together these events have changed the context of the debate regarding efficiency, which in turn
in some respects has influenced the national economic styles of many countries.
In the context of international competition: "Government leaders have increasingly had to think more like
executives caught up in competition for consumer's dollars. They have had to think more in terms of cutting the
'prices' - that is, the taxes and regulatory costs - they charge their citizens and in terms of providing greater value
for the tax dollars they collect. More and more, they have had to respond to the demands of political interests
groups for special privileges and protection with the lament that the government's fiscal and regulatory hands
are lied and that it must keep the nation's policies competitive with those of other countries."
Chapters I and 2 pointed out that governments have extensive powers to tax, make laws and regulate. The only
constraint mentioned was the constitution. This lack of constraint is of course only relative - both in domestic
Sec generally J.A. Pechman (ed.). World Tax Reform: A Progress Report (Washington: Brookings
Institution Press. 1988).
This process should be seen in the same terms as the fall of communism. The Single European Act
allowed national economics to deregulate and expand, as opposed to keeping the status quo and
preventing growth. Supra note 2 at 64.
*M Completing the Internal Market (Com(85) ? 10).
"* Supra note 2 at 12.T7
and intemuiafuJ terms Bui government polioes which mijihl he efficient in the sense described in Itiapter I.
lannol neccssanlv be maintained in an intcnutiorullv competitive environment F.ven it high Lives high
regulation and high government control leads to maximum aggregate satisfaction, the persons and tirms that dt)
not like this set of policies may move themselves and their capital lo jurisdictions which are less encompassing,
especially if they have to pay for inefficient policies II enough people move, disinvest <» simplv do not reinvest
their profits in the jurisdiction, in the long term the burden becomes greater on those who elect lo remain. This
increased burden will make the marginal burden higher and governments progressively weaker As Norman
Macrae wrote: "Areas which vole lo have high Cues will be residually inhabited mainly by dummies: People who
vote to have tax money spent on themselves, without actually earning enough money lo be taxed "*^
The emigration of highly skilled workers in reaction lo high taxes is not mere conjecture. The "hram drain" from
egalitarian Europe to less egalitarian America offers at least some evidence lor this phenomena Obviously
the loss of these highly educated, highly skilled and high income individuals has added to the tax burden ol the
remaining individuals and firms.
Modem technology has already eroded governments' ability to work in a vacuum without regard lo wh.n mhei
countries around the globe are dang. Since inlormaiton and money can circulate around the globe through
satellites and fibre opuc cables literally at the speed of light, the ability of governments to keep money inside
their borders and information out of the country has been almost entirely eroded, The days which border guards
could be used lo perform these duties is over In the final years of the Her I in Wall, the wall ilsell was more
psychologically symbolic than real. West German radio and television kept East (ierman citi/ens apprised ol
ideas, policies, freedom, wealth and possibilities In retrospect, one should no< be very surprised that the corrupt
East German state fell so quickly: it was evident that most East German citizens had nothing but conteni|M lor
their stale. Given the advances in technology, it is almost inconceivable that (he benclit ol effectively sealing off
borders would be greater than the cost. As a result the importance ol national bordets has decreased dramatically
Ovcr-rcgulauon and taxation eventually lead to a good deal of movement or disinvestment Except by competing
with other governments, governments have little power lo stop it Over the past lew years, we have »een the
plight of large numbers of unwanted refugees attempting to move lo more liberal junsdiclioni. Along border arew
many people are living in low tax jurisdictions while working in highei tax jurisdiction*. Thud World counlnei,
Germany" and Sweden"'® have seen large amounts of money, owned by then nationals. How ui place*
where the propensity to make profits is greater and taxation is lower. The focus of the remainder of this chapter
is on why governments are losing their ability to do what they would like, and what effect domestic policies have
on a country's international position.
^ N. Macrae, "The Next Ages of Man". Economist Survey (December 24. 1988) at 8-10.
"° V.B. Agarwal and D.R. Winkler, "Migration of Professional Manpower to the United States", 50
Southern Economic Journal 814-30 (1984); and W. Huang, "A Pooled Cross-Section and Time Series
Study of Professional Indirect Immigration to the United States", 54 Southern Economic Journal 95-109
(1987).
"* German businesses invested DM 30bn outside of Germany in 1990. while non-German businesses
invested only DM 3bn in western Germany according to a report from the IDW economic institute in
Cologne. D. Goodhart, "Germans Concerned at Poor Foreign Investment". Financial Times (August 17,
1991) p. 2.
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•"" Swedish investors are engaging in more and more direct foreign investment. In 1989. Swedes invested
six times as much in new investment outside of Sweden than inside Sweden. P. Woodall, "The Swedish
Economy", Economist Survey (March 3, 1990) at 21.78
Secfton 4; 77te /f ofe
In an imponani and enlightening new book. Quicksilver Capilal. Richard McKenzie and Dwighl Lee eloquenlly
argue thai technology is changing governments' ability to make inefficient policy decisions.
"Until recently, Ihe prospects that people mighl move their capital or themselves in response
to taxes did not have to be given much thought by political leaders, simply because people
could not move except at great expense. People and capital were largely captive of the political
decisions made with great deliberaiion in the halls of the world's legislatures or parliaments.
The politics of lax decisions had to be considered carefully, but the economics of tax decisions
could be ignored. Today, technology permits people and their capital to be far more fugitive,
far more capable of bounding over government borders - far more like quicksilver - slippery,
elusive, and hard to contain and control. As never before, political leaders must be concerned
that Ihcir efforts to raise lax rates in their own jurisdictions will mean dial other leaders in
adjoining or even far-flung government, who have not touched their rates, will enjoy revenue
increases....The evidence continues to mount thai people, capilal. jobs, and incomes gravitate
toward government jurisdictions with Ihc most favorable fiscal and regulatory environments.
Much has been wntten and said about the 'competitiveness' of business....|bul] little has been
made about the 'competitiveness' of governments....This growth in business competitiveness
has necessarily forced governments into a competitive struggle for the world's human and
physical capital base....World governments have had to compete against one another by seeking
more efficient policies in order to lure and retain the physical and human capital lhat is now
so crucial jo modem production processes and lo the lax bases on which governments
depend.-^''
McKcnzic and Lee illustrate that iherc iire three factors in analyzing the role of technology: what technology can
do. its diffusion and Ihc cost of using what has been developed.
a. Technul»|ticiil Capabilities, Cost and Diffusion
We truly live in Ihe information age. Technological improvements have led to faster travel and communications
at a fraclion of the cosl of yesteryear. This has dramatically reduced the size of the world. While it has long been
said lhal "il is a small world" - at least since Ihe time when Stanley ran in to Livingstone - the practical truth of
this must be considered by measuring both Ihe lime lhal it lakes to travel and communicate and the COSL
b. Telephones
Over Ihe last ,U) years. Ihe ability lo communicate quickly and efficiently has almost gone beyond the science
fiction promulgated less than 25 years earlier. While Ihe telephone was invented in 1877. until relatively recently
il has been far too expensive to be used in poorer countries and over longer distances. As a result, international
telephone calls were relatively rare. Technological advances have made il cheaper and cheaper to call greater and
greater distances. The drop in costs differs significantly from country lo country depending on how much
international calls arc "taxed" by (he state-run monopolies who still control most telephone companies. Increased
privatization and competition through the,brcak-up of monopoly statuses should in the future make international
calls much cheaper in many countries." Modern technology has made the cost of switching an international
Supra note 2 at x-xi.
* In order to overcome state telecommunications monopolies, an increasing number of multinational firms
have built iheir own telephone networks. In IW1. $2.8 billion was spent renting lines and running
private telecommunications networks. This amount has been rising at a rate of 20 percent per year. This
figure may increase, since foreign direct investment has been growing at a rale of 30 percent per year.
One of the reasons is that international telephone calls arc the most profitable part of telephone
companies. In Great Britain, which has a minimal amount of competitive competition and by no means79
directly dulled call to about 3 American cents; this is not significantly more than the cost of a hval domestic
telephone call.
The increase in Ihe number of international telephone calls is nothing shod of staggering. In l>**0, M million
international telephone calls were made; hy 1070 Ihe number increased sevenfold to 2'.4 million, m 1080 100.6
million calls were made; and in 1086 the number rose to 478 million Throughout the 108(>s the number of
international telephone circuits continued to increase by 40 percent each war and Ihe transmission capacity of
Trans-Atlanuc fibre-optic cable doubled every year. Line charges are expected to drop by 22 to 40 percent by
19%.-"
c. Trfecunnuaicitioa
The telephone line ts no longer limited to the transmission of voice communication The telephone jack has
become an outlet to the world of images, computers and fax machines through a telephone line mte can speak
or send television images, pictures or data in Ihc form of numbers, graph* oi words As a result people no longer
need to be in close proximity in order to conduct business Throughout much ul the Western wmlil JIHI even in
third world capitals, telecommunication allow s one to almost instantaneously communicate with someone on the
other side of Ihe glohc. About Ihe only thing that one as yet cannot do i\ to shake hands And il one does have
lo conduct business in person, one can now go virtually anywhere in the work) irom any other point in 24 noun
or less at a greatly decreased cost*
d. Computing Power
Telephone lines are increasingly connected lo computers and computer data bases as the cost of doing «> hoCOMH
increasingly cheaper. Between I960 and 1990 Ihe price of computing power in America shrank in teal term* by
a factor of 6.000. This drop of 25 to K) percent per year is si ill continuing. Even though the world ha* wilne»»Ml
a dramatic drop in the price of compuung equipment, the amount spent on computers huis shot up dramatically.
In 1970. information processing equipment amounts lo 11 percent ol all American mm (arm durable equipment
investment: by 1989 the figure was 51 percent. This figure docs not include individual ctpcndiluici on personal
computers. This obviously shows that the amount of computing power which came to Ihc market increased
exponentially,
e. Travel
The increased speed of transport and a drastic reduction in the cost of international travel has greatly added to
man's ability lo communicate long distances. The average speed of air travel increased from 149 miles (238.4
kilometres) per hour in 1944 to 493 miles (788.8 kilometres) per hour in 1986. In 1937, the cost of an airplane
ticket from Los Angeles to Tokyo was $12,725 (measured in 1986 dollars). By 1973 Ihe cost of a flight of a
similar distance was down to $1,860. By 1985 the cost had dropped another 50 percent lo $930. Between 1937
and 1984, the price of a transatlantic flight fell from more than 300 percent to less than 8 percent of American
annual per capita disposable income. This dramatic decrease in price has led to greatly increased international
has the highest international rates in either Europe or the rest of the world, international rails account
for 5% of the traffic, yet provide 30% of the profits. "Telecoms: Trail Blazer". The Economist
(September 21. 1991) pp. 82-83.
2'3 Supra note 2 at 47-48 and 73.
This has led to a great increase in demand for telephone lines. During 1990 and 1991 alone. Ihe author
has been confronted with new dialling codes in the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands
and France for city or area codes which he used to dial with different and often shorter dialling codes.
2" "Too Many Computers Spoil the Broth", The Economist (August 24, 1991) p. 30.80
air travel. From a negligible base in the 1930s, international travel took off to 27.6 billion passenger miles in
1970 and more than doubled to 64.4 billion passenger miles in 1986. These trends are continuing.
f. Kleclronic Immigration
As a result of these changes the world is indeed becoming smaller. Computers and telecommunications facilities
allow instantaneous links which easily cross borders. The cost of this communication is so low and is so easy
lo accomplish that an increasing number of Amencan firms are doing jobs ranging from simple data entry to
accounting, credit card processing, medical and insurance transcription, telemarketing, and technological support
for products over loll-free numbers lo English-speaking countries with lower wage levels. The countries which
arc primarily benefiting from this technological breakthrough arc Barbados. Jamaica, the Philippines. Singapore
and Ireland. One of the advantages for Amencan companies who use Ireland, the Philippines and Singapore is
that, because of the different time zones, they use the mainframe computer located in the United States at off-
peak hours when the computer tends lo be under-utilized. The workers who benefit from this technology
have been called "electronic immigrants" lo the United States.
Section 5: 77ie 77r«ory o/ f/»<> Firm l/p</aterf
This change in technology has had a dramatic effect on how the world operates. In addition to having
extraordinary ramifications for governments, technology has also had a marked effect on firms.
As indicated in Chapter 2, in a seminal article. "The Nature of the Firm." Ronald Coase argued that firms exist
to reduce transaction costs. Since gathering information, contracting and monitoring can be expensive, a firm may
be able lo achieve economies of scale in these areas. To the extent that firms are able lo do this at lower costs
than individuals they will be efficient and cost effeclive. In the firm, the time-consuming bargaining process can
be minimized through the development of hierarchical structures and skill specialization and by issuing
orders to the economic actors through a series of commands. The hierarchical structure and the commands reduce
transaction costs.
We saw lhat firms arc based on a series or "nexus" of contracts. These contracts require some further elaboration
at this point. There arc four basic steps toward forming an enforceable contract. The first is gathering information
to determine what is needed and what must be contracted for. Second, one must find someone to contract with.
Third, a contract must be negotiated and formed. Finally, the contract must be monitored to determine whether
the terms of the contract have been adhered to.
Since the article was published in 1937. technology (especially since (he development and increasingly wide-
spread diffusion of the microchip) has made many changes to economic life. In Quicksilver Capital. McKenzie
and Lee point out that information costs and bargaining costs have been lowered with the advent of the microchip
and nuxlern telecommunications. An increasing number of jobs have lo do with processing and creating
information; fewer involve working with one's hands. One can infer from this discussion that there is a
^"" Supra note 2 at 7.1.
B. Wysocki. Jr.. "Overseas Calling: American Firms Send Office Work Abroad to Use Cheap Labor",
Wall Street Journal Europe (August 23, 1991)p. 1. The article notes that electronic scanning of printed
material will supplant many of these jobs in the near future.
2'8 Supra note 2 at 232.
A.A. Alchian calls specialization "asset-specificity" in "Specificity. Specialization and Coalition", 140
Journal of Economic Theory and Institutions 34-39 (1978).
^" R.H. Coasc. "The Nature of the Firm". 4 Economica 386-412 (1937). Reprinted in R.H. Coase. The
Firm, the Market and the Law (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. 1988).II
worldwide change m the costs and the nature of the few shove mentioned contract steps. This will he more
extensively discussed below. But in order to understand the contest, it is important to discuss what has happened
over ihe past few decades
Cast of Gathering IaforBalioa:
Inlurmalion has gone Irom being something that was relatively difficult lo obtain and to collate, to something
that is relatively easy to obtain. It has reached the point that some managers no* feel ihey get tot> much
information.— ' In IWI. European offices produced V5 billion sheets of file paper every da> This amounts
to 45 sheets for each office worker. This figure docs not include a daily output of Silt) million sheets of computer
printouts. 300 million photocopies or 4ft.,'00 million letters written and sent out. These figures make a mockery
of ihe concept of the papertes office. *
Data which used to have to be published now goes directly to a data hase^ which can he accessed immediately.
Raw data can he manipulated in quick order for virtually any purpose."- Through computer modems, one
can reach data bases which exist throughout the world. If information can not be obtained in this manner one
can aimosi universally (at least in countries with a modem telephone system I directly dial almost every telephone
in the world, without the necessity of going through an operator In order lit find nut who In telephone, one can
access an aimosi mind-boggling number of guides or lists of people to contact ti* aimosi any purpose. If the
information cannot be found through modems, information can be obtained through Ihe me of a telephone (voice
transmission), telex, fax. overnight mail, regular post, satellite or courier
Another technological advance has led to the development of low cost desktop publishing over the last decade.
As a result, the number of magazines, newsletters and specialist trade publications has skyrocketed and reams
of general and specialist information can he found quickly at relatively low cost. The wide teak availabtlilv trf
(his information means that there is less need for in-house researchers and a greater need for journalists ***
The complaint of one manager is enlightening "Someone asks if I can give them Ihe name of the
winning horses at nexl week's races, and I say yes' of course Give mo the names of all of Ihe
starters." I will give back a pile of paper as high as the Eiffel Tower, which will include the winning
combination but will be worth nothing because nobody will be able to find it. What he wants is the
winning combination, which is not a piece of information but a tip. Like that lip, most essential business
information can usually be expressed in very few words and cannot be stored in a data base." B. James,
"Turn Off the Computer and Give Me the Facts", International Herald Tribune (September 19, 1991)
pp. 11-12 at 11; also see J.S. Hirsch, "Managers Seek to Bail Out From Flood of Information". The
Wall Street Journal Europe (August 20, 1991) p. 9.
D. Bradshaw, "Office Technologies: Need for an Overall Plan", Financial Times (October 8. 1991) p.
HI/1.
• As Will Rodgcrs, a famous American wit of the first third of the twentieth century said: "There are lies;
there are damn lies: and there are statistics."
The economics of this shift in employment is interesting. First, assuming similar work is both required
and realized, economies of scale can be reached since there is less duplication of effort and the cost of
subscribing to a specialist information service will almost certainly be less than hiring researchers in-
house. Second, there is less risk involved. In-house researchers take vacations, may not be properly
motivated or instructed, gel ill. or may not be competent. Since service can easily be cancelled at
virtually no cost, it is less likely that quality service will be interrupted if one uses specialist
publications. Finally, if there is competition for providing information, should quality or service suffer,
ones "research staff' can be changed without training costs. If the supply of a certain type of
information is valuable, one would expect that various publications or subscriber services would be
formed to compete with each other to provide information and analysis. This competition for profits and
market share might well improve market information since the cost of doing inferior work will be
reflected in a loss of customers.82
Another consequence of desktop publishing and an increased number of specialist publications, is that businesses
(junk mailers) have the ability to target their advertising to specific customers on a worldwide basis.
Tbc Cost of Finding Contracting Partners
This same information-gathering process can be used to find contracting partners. When information was more
difficult and costly to obtain, businesses and individuals were limited to a relatively restricted geographical area.
As a result markets tended to be more local or regional.
As the cost of communication drops, it becomes increasingly feasible to get price quotes and do business with
firms from around the globe. One can telephone or fax virtually every business in the world to see whether they
arc willing or able to supply any type of good or service. The decreasing cost in both time and money to travel
around the world makes it more and more advantageous to do so.
This change in the cost structure has increasingly led to the search for business partners over a larger and larger
sphere. The cost of .1 European finding a business partner in Asia would have been almost prohibitive for most
transactions: only the very largest ones could be justified. Today, if one can figure out the difference in lime (due
10 the various lime rones), he thinks little of calling someone in Asia. If the initial telephone call or fax proves
to be promising, one thinks little of hopping on an airplane to gather more information. Technology has
dramatically decreased the difference in the marginal cost of gathering information regarding a potential supplier
or customer: whether the client is 500 kilometres away or 5.000 kilometres away the difference in the time
and the cost of a business trip is relatively small. As a result, the likelihood of doing business with firms further
away increase.
The Cost of Negotiating a Contract
Of the three stages of contracting, it is the negotiation stage for which it is most difficult to determine whether
costs have fallen or risen. Costing is difficult because in at least some respects, business relationships are more
complex than ever. While rccogni/.ing that to a certain extent contracts have become more complicated, one can
also look at sonic factors which have made it easier to negotiate and form a binding contract. In this area there
have been many technological advances which have permitted negotiations to be carried out less expensively. The
degree of the cost reduction varies but in at least some cases the savings can be large.
The first and foremost reason for a reduction in negotiation costs lies in the increasing acceptance of the English
language as the worldwide business language. While the knowledge and use of English in business transactions
is not universal, especially in Central Europe where German and Russian are the lingua francas. there is little
doubt that there has been a worldwide trend toward the use of the English language, especially in multinational
companies. The increased use of English allows persons of different native tongues to negotiate a contract without
interpreters. Contracts can either be negotiated over the telephone or in person at lower cost. Drafts of contracts
can be sent by fax or modem in quick order at low cost: or alternatively, one can travel in person more quickly
and inexpensively.
The ease in physically writing out contracts has increased with the use of word processors. Word processing
provides two cost reduction factors. First, one can easily adopt a clause or an entire contract from a contract
which has already been drafted (this involves the use of all or part of the standard form contract discussed in
Chapter 2). Secondly, through word processing a single word, letter or punctuation mark can be changed and "re-
typed" in an instant at virtually no additional cost. Before word processing any changes required a totally new
contract 10 be typed. If mistakes were made in typing, the typist often had to start typing the page with the
mistake again.
While the time in the air makes some difference, when one factors in the travel time to and from the
airport and the ability to work with notebook computers on the airplane, the extra working time tost
making a longer trip is marginal.o
Finally. *e emergence of 'quicksilver capital' allows for caster transfers of funds Instead of relying on hank*
lo provide letters of credits, firms can increasingly transfer funds across borders without needing Id use hanks
to arrange and facilitate transfers. Escro* lunds can be set-up through the use of faxes and telexes. A prompt,
low-cost payment system facilitates trade.
The Cost of MonhoriBft
The cost of monitoring has increased dramatically since Ciuse wrote on Ihc theory of the firm This is tied lo
the changing nature of work In the 1950s, 70 percent of workers in We^jcm Europe and the United Stairs used
their hands at week. Now 70 percent of these workers use their brains."" This percentage n increasing. Nine-
tenths of aU new jobs created during the WHOs m Amenca "went not lo hamburger flipper* (Hit to whtle-collar
workers.'™ As brain power becomes a larger and larger element of work, as witnessed by NHh the grpwttl
of the service sector and the changing nature of the work which people do. ki monitor large numbers of people
has become increasingly difficult.
While one can easily monitor Ihc physical outpul and quality o( work of factory workers, it is more difficult to
monitor service workers. The monitoring of bramwork is subject lo various interpretation* as lo NHh output and
quality. It is simple, for example, to monitor workers in a light bulb factory by physically counting output per
man-hour, and by random sampling for quality To measure productivity, one can count (he numhrt ol light bulbs
produced and easily compare (he number which were produced today and compare the numbci with yesterday
or last year with the same number of workers. Measuring the relative quality of production is also simple. The
quality of the work is to test all or a random sample of Ihc light bulbs produced and see how many work and
compare the percentage with Ihose contained in the log book.
Monitoring of bramwork is difficult for two reasons. First, how does one measure the quantity of bramwork?
Attempts to monitor bramwork by. for example the number of pages which an author wnles will inevitably lead
lo king and rambling discourses and will discourage editing Because ol the flexibility of Ihr l.isi-i pnnlrr, IhM
incentive structure will also lead to the use of page formats which will have the fewest tolerable number of word!
per page. This obviously leads to a perverse incentive structure for bramwork The second reason is because
qualily assessments are subjective While it is casv lo ;igiee whether .1 hghl bulb works or not. Ihc beauty of
brainwork is largely in Ihe eye of Ihc beholder. Brainwork is like art in thai the perceived qualily of brainwork
is subjective: work which some people honestly believe is awful, can honestly be perceived as brilliant by others.
One can observe Ihe consequences of these difficulties in moniloring. Since monitoring is difficult, smaller units
and specialized supervision are often required. The most effeclivc way to do this is lo give proper inccnlives for
individuals lo monitor themselves through establishing a market price for Ihe brainwork. or alternatively lo have
moniloring done by an experienced specialist who knows about the nalurc of Ihe work in addition lo
"management techniques." The experienced specialist will also have lo be monitored. As a result, il is likely that
a high percentage of his pay will be linked lo Ihc profitability of his subordinales (again at a market price). Since
ihe specialist musl gel a high percentage of Ihe profits, one should not be surprised thai an increasing number
of these monitors not only acl like owners, bul are owners. These^problems in monitoring may be a key reason
why we are witnessing "Ihe eclipse of Ihe public corporation. 2<>
tf; C/iangmg Cos/ StrMctwres: fiwp/icafto/js /or Firms
Chapter 4 was concerned with the trade-off between contracting costs and monitoring costs. Let us now fit this
inlo Ihe framework of Ihe radical changes in the cost structures of contracting and monitoring.
2'° Supra note 13 at 8.
227 Supra note I at 86.
22" M.C. Jensen, "The Eclipse of Ihe Public Corporation", 67 Harvard Business Review 61-74
(September/October 1989).84
"Globalizing markets, instantaneous communications, travel at the speed of sound, political
realignments, changing demographics, technological transformations in both products and
production, corporate alliances, flattening organizations - all these and more are changing the
structure of the corporation. The once very rigid and unbridgeable boundaries of business are
fading in the face of change."
Rising Monitoring Costs versus Falling Contracting Costs
When Coasc slated that firms exist because contracting is expensive, he was directly implying that firms will exist
when the cost of contracting is lower than the cost of monitoring. As long as contracting is more expensive than
monitoring, one can expect firms to exist and prosper. At the time Coase published the article in 1937. and indeed
arguably through most of the 1970s, firms tended to became larger because the cost of monitoring was less than
the cost of contracting. Through the firm structure, economies of scale were allegedly achieved.
The advent and the diffusion of the microchip has changed this notion. When one couples the reduction in the
costs associated with the three contract-forming steps with the decreasing ability to monitor the increased amount
of brain work, one must expect that the way in which firms are run has and will continue to change. For many
firms, their entire structure will necessarily have to change when the cost of monitoring exceeds the cost of
contracting.
Decentralization, Firm Sin, Specialization and Employment
Because of this change in cost structure the world is witnessing increased specialization in the work which firms
do. Lower communication and travel costs have allowed markets to become increasingly global. Technology has
altered many traasaclion costs significantly to the point where there is significantly more outsourcing (contracting-
out) and decentralization in companies than a few short years ago. As a result, the number of firms has increased
and the size of firms has decreased. For example, since 1980 there has been a five-fold increase in the number
of American firms with fewer than 10 employees. The average size of firms in America has shrunk by 15 percent
over the same.period/ From 1981-1985, 82 percent of net job creation occurred in firms with less than
20 employees/- Firms are generally growing smaller and have therefore greatly increased in number/-"
One of the reasons why firms are getting smaller is that an increased amount of work is being out-sourced.^
This change in cost structures has also hail an effect on companies which are not shrinking; larger companies
R.M. Kantcr. "The Boundaries of Business". Harvard Business Review 151-164 (May/June 1991) at
151. ~
• National Science Foundation, Research Report (Washington. D.C.: National Science Foundation
November 1990) at 12-15.
*" D.L. Birch. Job Creation in America (New York: Free Press. 1987) at 14.
*** Supra note 2 at 50.
• • Sf£ i.e. I.W. Scngertbcrger and G. Loveman. Smaller Units of Employment: A Synthesis of Research
on Industrial Organisation in Industrial Countries (Geneva: International Institute for Labour Studies
1988).*5
are becoming increasingly decentralized The day of the conglomerate is largely gone,^* because many of
the con advantages associated with hierarchies have largely disappeared.
Many of those firms which have vet to get smaller have smaller and smaller tnlrmal business units These units
are individual "profit centres" which have 10 operate profitably and even comprle tor business from the
firm.-- * If they cannot produce quality work at a competitive price, their services will not he consumed
internally. This process has proliferated because small prulK centres provide (or Ihc monitoring of
manager*.
Tke Automobile Industry
No* only are conglomerates sellmg-off their "non-core industries and business." but the nature of work In con
industries is also changing dramatically. In 1913. Henry Ford opened up what al ihc lime was Ihc world's larfMt
factory in Highland Park. Michigan. In one door went iron ore. sand, petroleum. c»p|>cr and other raw material!.
Out the other door came out an automobile which was completely manulaclured in ihe plant There was no tub-
contracting.~- For a king lime the trend in both government and manufacturing was to increase Ihe scope of
vertical integration. By integrating vertically. I arms could completely control Iheit environment and standardize
quality control through the capitalutD: equivalent of the command system. A funny thing happened along the way.
Automobile manufacturers, led initially by the Japanese, created working relationship', wilh iheii *ub-c<mtrac!art.
They shared vital inlormaiton and called on the sub-contractors lor an increased shore ol the design work for Ac
componenl parts. (Her lime Ihe Japanese contracted out a larger and larger amount ol their component work.
They huned the Americans and would probably have buried the Europeans without severe import restriction. In
several key markets, with the exception of the German automobile manufacturers, Volkswagen. Mercedes-Ben*.
BMW and Porsche all proved lo be a worldwide exception, possibly because their industry worked wilhin what
Michael Porter calls a 'competitive diamond' where a national competition for supremacy emerged "from
pressure, challenge and adversity." This competition
consumers and world-class related and supporting industries
American firms (and French and Italian) were generally initially complacent lo the Japanese I
it IWtHnliU llHIIlJCimu*! HI ntf|Ji vtllMk j vain* |VU uunt
created a pool of skilled workers. viualily-consciouj
ustnes • attributes which Ihe Japanese also created, *
y initially complacent lo the Japanese threat.*
•^ The exceptions lie in such firms described by Jensen as "LBO partnerships." The LBOs are noi run like
conglomerates, as (heir is no real common management. An LBO partnership is a group of separate
companies which are run independcnlly by their own sels of managers. The LBO partnership only
interferes in the business to the extent that they provide each company's managers with strict sets of
financial objectives. Management compensation is highly linked lo increases in cash flow which are
generated by management performance. In this respect, managers must act like owners. For a full
description of Ihe LBO partnership see Jensen, Supra noie 34.
This is also referred lo as "insourcing."
^ For a discussion why well-managed firms do this see T. Peters, Thriving on Chaos: Handbook for a
Management Revolulion (London: Macmillan Press. 1988).
^ D. Halberstam. The Reckoning (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1986) at 78-95.
^•" M.E. Porter. The Competitive Advantage of Nations. (London and Basingsloke: Macmillan Press. 1990)
p. 174. For a somewhat similar analysis see JJ. Roiemberg and G. Saloner. "Competition and Human
Capital Accumulation: A Theory of Interregional Specialization and Trade", NBER Working Paper No.
3228 (1990).
^' For an excellent explanation of why the American automobile industry fell at the time Ihe Japanese
automobile industry rose see David Halberstam. The Reckoning, supra note 43.86
The Japanese found that in many instances, contrary to what was taught in many business schools, the benefits
of sub-contracting out work greatly exceeded the cost of contracting.^ What the Japanese apparently
concluded was that in some cases it was too difficult both to foster innovation and to monitor workers within the
large firm structure. This recognition that lower costs and improved quality would come not from vertical
integration, but through outsourcing and decentralization. ~ made the Japanese automobile
manufacturer the envy of the world. As a result of enlightened Japanese management, so called "Japanese
transplant firms" located in both the United States^ and Europe^** have the highest productivity and
lowest production costs on their respective continents. As a result of this observation, all automobile
manufacturers arc sub-contracting out more and more of Iheir component work to the extent that the
"manufacturers" are largely becoming service industries. The role of these "manufacturers" is becoming
increasingly limited to: (I) (he operation of screwdriver plants which assemble the bought-in parts: (2) design
firms, although designs are also being bought from the outside especially in the area of component parts; (3)
marketing firms which work in conjunction with advertising firms; (4) distributors: and (5) finance
companies.
Computers
Similarly, in 1984, 80 percent of the value of a computer was in ils hardware and 20 percent in its software; by
I WO the opposite was true. This is only half of the equation. The vast majority of the cost of the
hiirdware comes from the provision of services. "The immensely successful IBM personal computer itself
comprises a collection of services - research, design, engineering, sales, service; only 10 percent of its purchase
*^ Kci/.o Nagalani wrote that "The most striking feature of Japan's state capitalism was its anti-neoclassical
character. Virtually everything Japan did defied neoclassical welfare theory * Political Macroeconomics
(Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1989) at 231.
Oul-sourcing can be defined as subcontracting work out to outside suppliers. Yuji Furukawa of Tokyo
Metropolitan University estimates thai outsourcing now accounts for over one-third of Japanese total
manufacturing costs, this is up from less than 20 percent in the 1960s. He estimates that this proportion
will rise in 40 percent by the year 2000. "Manufacturing: The Ins and Outs of Outing". The Economist
(August .11, 1'>9I) at 5X. The Polaroid Corporation is a good example of how prevalent outsourcing has
become. Polaroid spends about one-half of its annual revenue on outsourced products, components and
services. It deals with more than 8,000 suppliers. With these 8,000 parties it has formed 95.000
contracts. Supra note 1 at 99.
2** Reich, supra note I. gives an excellent summary of how decentralization is occurring. Sre generally
chapter 8. "The New Web of Enterprise" at 87-97 and 84-85.
**" M. Dickson. "Transplant Sales are Overtaking Imports", Financial Times World Car Industry Survey
(September II. |9<J1) p. 10.
* K. Rone, "Japanese March to Expand Capacity". Financial Times World Car Industry Survey
(September II. 1991) p. 2.
^ "Death of a Car Salesman," The Economist (August 24. 1991) pp. 51-52.
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*"• Following the American automobile firms, the Japanese are now entering the retail financial services
market on a large scale, Toyota is not only going to finance the purchase of automobiles, but will also
finance homes, issue credit cards and install cash machines in iheir dealerships. It will soon be difficult
for consumers to tell the difference between a hank and an automobile manufacturer. S. Wagstyl.
"Toyota lo F.xpand Into Financial Services Sector". Financial Times (August 29, 1991). p. 1; also see
A.H. Mooradian, "Volkswagen Says It Plans to Broaden German Financial Services Business" Wall
Street Journal Europe (September 13. 1991) p. 17.
*^ Supra mite I at 83.»7
price is (or (he physical manufacture of Che machmc "-•*" Taken together, in I'M) only about 2 percent of
the value of an IBM computer derived front the cost of its physical manufacture. This has ted some commentators
to ask whether 11 is worthwhile for many businesses to he involved m the manufacture o( computers. -
Bask Heavy Indttstrt
Runningalongside outsourcing and decentralization, that has been a shift away from "high volume lo high
value.—'^The steel, plastics, and chemical industries are good cuamples of this Formerly steel, plastics and
chemicals were considered commodities, measured in tonnes, and were produced in huge factories Today sleel.
plastics and chemicals are largely ordered by customers lot specific uses, measured b> value and are increasingly
produced in 'boutique" plants. Steel is dipped, painted .and cut by the steel making companies ami supplied as
an outsourced product fix just in lime delivery* ' Plastic is coloured, cut and made to spocilic
specifications. Specialty chemicals are the ones which have the greatest value. Similarly the laslcst-growing and
most profitable pan of the textiles indusjrYproduces specially coated and timshrd lahncs foe automobiles, office
furniture, rain gear and wall coverings.*'* II okllimc heavy, haste industries, such as automobiles are largely
becoming service firms and steel, plastics, chemicals and textiles are decreasingly produced in bulk, the world
is undergoing a dramatic change.
Servke Finns
Changes are not limited to manufacturing firms. Service firms, like advertising agencies, arc lacing similar
problems. Just like governments, one of the major functions of advertising agencies was lo accumulate
and disseminate information. Modem technology has created several problems for the udvcrtiMng industry, all
of which have allowed advertisers lo focus on more narrowly targeted audiences.
Cheaper, easy to use. and higher quality video and audio equipment has allowed more people lo moke higher
quality video and audio products at greatly reduced prices Desktop publishing and compulehied graphics have
allowed small children lo produce the type of artwork that lormerly only a handful of professionals could
produce. Satellites and cable television have fragmented the market, ending the monopoly position ol large,
(formerly mainly government-run) broadcasters. Desktop publishing has led lo an exponential growth in the
number of specialist publications. The microchip has allowed data bases lo proliferate, thus leading lo alternative
forms of promotion, such as database mass marketing which selects potential customers almost on an individual
basis. As a result of these advances in technology, smaller firms who know iheir market better than some large
advertising agencies can now do the work of a large agency al lower cost, wilh more control and greater
expertise. If the trend away from larger agencies continues, eventually what largely may be left are specialized
Ibid, at 86.
A.S. Rappaport and S. Halevi. "The Computerless Computer Company", 69 Harvard Business Review
69-80 (July-August. 1991). This spawned the debate "Should the U.S. Abandon Computer
Manufacturing?" 69 Harvard Business Review 140-160 (September-October, 1991).
Outsourcing can be carried too far. Many of the non-Japanese firms have primarily used outsourcing
to cut down on their labour costs and overheads. The Japanese use these as secondary considerations.
The Japanese tend to outsource only those activities which add little value to (he firm; activities which
are marginal and hence high-cost: and activities which do not give the firm a competitive edge. Supra
note 47.
"Europe's Steel Industry: Crying Foul". The Economist (September 14. 1991) pp. 87-88.
Supra note 1 at 82-83.
See R.S. Roach. "Services Under Siege - The Restructuring Imperative. 69 Harvard Business Review
82-91 (September-October. 1991): G. de Jonquieres. "Wrong Choice From ihe Menu". Financial Times
(September 6. 1991) p. 9.88
firms who do not create advertising copy, but merely buy advertising space. These types of firms are currently
developing. This type of firm exists because it provides economies of scale. Its costs remain low because this
type of agency generally has few or no creative people and low overheads.^
Secrio/i 7; /mp/ica/zorts /or Gover/imente
The changes outlined above have widespread implications for governments. The theory behind large centralized
governments was, al least in part, founded on the assumption thai a large government could, like large firms, reap
widespread economies of scale. The problem which governments are currently facing is that they are also subject
to similar contraciing and monitoring cosl changes. If competitive pressure have forced businesses lo react to
changing technology and cost structures, one should expect governments to react in somewhat similar ways.
Governments have reacted. Over the past few years we have seen an increasing number of privatizations around
the world. In addition to privatizing industries, more and more governmental responsibilities have been contracted
out. The services being outsourced include garbage collection, jails, road building and maintenance and cleaning
services. • Both outsourcing and privatization illustrate thai the costs of contracting are less than the costs
of monitoring: if this was not true it is unlikely that a/iy of the privatizations would occur, since privatization
often means less political power and less control over the economy and the work force (including the ability to
dole out patronage jobs).
When countries privatize they have two measurable income streams. Often only one is considered.^*
Assuming that the public enterprise makes money, a privatization will be efficient if the sale price is greater than
the nel present value of the expected profits of the enterprise. If the enterprise is bleeding red ink and has no
prospeel of having an income stream with a positive nel present value, selling will always be efficient. The
second income stream is the one which is not often considered. If the enterprise becomes more profitable as a
result of private management, the firm will pay higher profits taxes in the future. Additionally, higher income
tax revenues will be reaped if managers receive higher salaries and bonuses from the new management.
In comparison with firms, one would expect the government lo have an even greater need to out-source work.
While firms can sel up profil centres which reward managers for their performance, few if any civil services
allow performance-based pay. Civil service jobs are largely for life al a set pay scale. Suitable motivation can
seldom be provided for public service jobs within the public sector.
This changing cosl structure has other consequences for government. At the most fundamental level, technology
has reduced and will continue lo reduce some of the justification for government intervention in Ihc economy.
In the past many activities fell on the government simply because Ihey were difficult if not impossible to
accomplish without government intervention. Because of technology in general and modem communications in
. Mayer, Whatever Happened lo Madison Avenue (New York: Little. Brown. 1991).
^" For a review of the growth in worldwide privatization in the 1980s, sec P.E. Fixer. R.B. Poole and L.
Scarlet. Privatization 1989: Third Annual Report on Privatization (Santa Monica. CA: Reason
Foundation, 1989). The types of services which American state and local governments have privatized
include: garbage collection, water and sewer services, child care, data processing, care of the elderly
and the handicapped, vehicle maintenance, housing, recreation, traffic signals and lighting, public
transportation, utilities, vehicle towing, education, fire protection, road development, tax audits, clinics
for spaying and neutering animals, landscaping, janitorial services, hospital care, police protection and
jails. Supra note 2 at 148.
- McKenzie and Lee in their review of the privatization literature, for example, seem to recognize only
(he sale price as governmental income stream. Supra note I al 148-15?.particular, a number of activates wtuch^ formerly fell within the exclusive purview of government are increasingly
being devolved through privatization.
A hurcaucrauc system o( management and large centralized governments might have been needed when data was
difficult and expensive to collect, collate, interpret and disseminate. As long as this was true. 11 was efficient to
have a small group of people along »ith their staffs manage information flows and lake decision* As in the cue
of advertising firms, the day when a bureaucrat, minister or legislator had access H< superior information and was
able to direct state enterprises to efficiently carry out activities is waning Previously information had to be sent
from local sources to a central office The central office compiled and manipulated data, ll was not available to
the general public until the data was typed out. sent to the publisher, proofread and finally published. Raw data
and preliminary information was only available to a small group.
Modem communicauon and computers have changed circumstances dramatically. Today, compulen/ed data base*
eliminate the need for most of these steps. The day when few people could have access to diverse information
is over. The governmental monopoly has been broken The result of this is a decentralization of decision-taking.
This also allows more people and groups lo he involved in the decision-making process Data can he tent to t
data base which anyone in (he world with a modem can access. As access lo information becomes more available,
we should also expect the amount of information available to increase Increased data means that decisions are
more complicated which leads to increased specialization. For the reasons discussed above, increased
specialization should lead lo decentralization. Under this scenario, the strategy for govemmrmv must he lo
decentralize. When decentralization occurs, while getting smaller at the centre, the sue ol thr legixnal
governments can either also decline for the reason given or become larger if more local specialists are required.
By having decisions taken closer lo the people, governments can act more efficiently.
The loss of monopoly and the difficulty of monitoring hrainwork must be considered in the context of the
governmental role of collecting and disseminating information. Instead of having lo wait fot government
publication, results and data bases are continuously updated. Instead of requiring a learn of government nuinhci
crunchers to interpret the data, anyone with access to the data can build his own models and use the raw data
himself. If the interpretation of the data has real market value, one can expect that someone in the private tertot
wiU hire the better number crunchers, thus leaving the lesser (and more risk adverse) people in the civil service
to do the same old job.
This change in the cost structure makes an assertion made by Harold Demsetz outdated. Dcmselz argued that
governments tend lo grow because: "Highly organized groups, because their political power reflects an influence
that extends beyond their numbers, generally prefer more, not less, government involvement in the affairs of
society." When information was more costly lo obtain and distribute and the cost of organizing was
prohibitively high for all but a few groups this might have been Irue. Only parties who wanted to see the size
of government grow had sufficient incentive and money to lobby. Today anyone with a word processor and a
data base has the power to lobby the government. As a result, we have witnessed a large increase in the number
of persons and groups attempting to influence governmental decisions. This has two effects. The first is that there
are now more groups who want to stop or reduce the growth of government. These often act to counter the highly
organized groups which Demscu had in mind. The second is that there are more groups who have become highly
Ibid, at 222-25. The authors point out that technology (i.e. modems and fax machines) is killing off the
post office monopoly, even for letters and small packages: the ability to monitor road usage in ways
similar to the manner in which the telephone company monitors calls might, in lime, make unpriced
public highways obsolete; and technology in "natural monopolies" such as electric companies, rail roads,
telephone wires and natural gas lines, allows different carriers to monitor usage and so allow
competition over the same network. In the case of telephones, mobile telephone technology provides
competition to the telephone wire in the same way that satellite dishes directly compete against cable
television monopolies.
H. Demsetz. Economic. Legal, and Political Dimensions of Competition (Amsterdam: North Holland,
1982) at 99.90
organized. This dilutes Ihe message of all those groups who would like an expansion of government size, services
and control.
The Fall or the Soviet Empire
In retrospect, it is hard to imagine any invention that could have led lo a quicker demise of Ihe Soviet system
of government than the microchip. Totalitarian governments need to control flows of information to perpetually
remain in power. The Soviet government fully realized this. Typewriters, copiers and printing presses were kept
under strict party control. 'Maps and telephone directories were considered slate secrets. Not surprisingly,
Ihe Communist Party delayed the introduction of the computer for non-military use as long as possible. Because
of this delay, all of Eastern Europe fell further and further behind the West. While the West Iraasformed itself
from a manufacturing economy to a service economy, the Soviet Union and its satellites remained tied to their
bureaucratic and totalitarian ways.
Mikhail Gorbachev's failure of leadership sprang from his inability to successfully monitor and motivate workers
ai almost every level. When he came lo power, he was faced with only two real choices: either remain the leader
of a totalitarian empire or lo initiate radical reforms. If the Eastern Bloc was to retain its complete control over
the lives of its citizens, Gorbachev instinctively knew that its relative economic (and military) power would have
lo decline. His first act of control was lo attempt to increase discipline in the economy by talking tough and
rationing alcohol. Because Gorbachev was unwilling to act in a Stalinist manner, these actions had little direct
economic effect other than to slash the considerable government revenue which the sale of vodka provided.
Restricting vodka, one of Ihe few available joys of the average Soviet citizen, brought nothing but hostility from
the vast majority of the populace.
While Pcreslroika can be seen as a partial response lo the West's new challenge, it was also a response of the
fuilure of Gorbachev's initial policies. Whether the decline (vis-4-vis the West) of the East Bloc was absolute
or merely relative makes little difference: as long as the West was going lo become computerized and (he East
was not, the East was going 10 fall further behind. Percstroika was almost a necessary condition for Ihe Soviet
system to introduce computers - what was missing were the types of incentive structures necessary to run a
service-based economy. It is difficult lo conceive successfully running a large, all-encompassing bureaucratic
structure without having proper monitoring tools for workers who provide specialized services. In the end, the
Soviet system could not survive as a major world power because Ihe system and Ihe leadership could not properly
motivate the majority of the population to do the jobs which were assigned to them.
Sec/ion 5: Co/wpeftrive Government
Microchips have the tendency to destroy bureaucracies since they effectively shift information (and power) from
leaders at Ihe lop of organizations to smaller groups and individuals. Governments have, in at least some respects,
lost the power to dictate policies lo the extent that non-governmental employees often have better information
than imy government official or group of governmental officials. If knowledge is power, the end of Ihe
government monopoly on the provision ami dissemination of information ultimately leads lo a lack of control.
For the same reason that percsiroika ultimately led to the end of the grip of communist rule in Eastern Europe
and the former Soviet Union, the microchip and modem telecommunications have led to the loss of governmental
2 co
• In 1982, U.S. President Ronald Reagan reportedly approved a plan in conjunction with Pope John Paul
II lo secretly supply Poland's outlawed Solidarity Movement with fax machines, presses, transmitters,
telephones, video cameras, photocopiers and computers. The two leaders were convinced that if Poland
became a democratic country, other Eastern European countries would follow, causing the Communist
Bloc to collapse. This strategy apparently worked. Solidarity is credited with setting into motion the fall
of Ihe Soviet Empire. It is ironic that the closing battle of the Cold War was fought on the basis of
relatively low-cost information-based technology, not large military expenditures. K. Schneider. "Reagan
Reportedly Ordered Coven Aid to Solidarity to Destabilize East". International Herald Tribune
(February 19. 1992) p. 3.91
control over the (lows of investment capital. Unfortunately lor governments, once the getue is tel out of Ihe
book, governments cannot get K back n.
Finm and individuals recognize this, lrv.rea.snj monthly o( people, communication and information*™ allow
groups, firms and individuals «ho do •** '** * government's pohcics to move k> a jurisdiction which will
provide a more hospitable climate. It is precisely this mobility which makes it necessary lor governments
to compete with each other to provide the best investment and living climate lite microchip and other work)
developments "made capital as slippery and as elusive as quicksilver, and the growing transnational moodily of
capital forced world governments to become competitor, loc the gk*e's expanding capital base hv cutting tax
rates, curbing unnecessary and wasteful expenditures, eliminating inefficient regulations, and renouncing all the
trappings of stale central planning." At the same lime the "knowledge, which economists calj human capital.'
has necessarily become a relatively-more•tmporunl source of economic power and income**''"
As a resutt of this changing cost structure, governments have been loned to lower lax rales, deregulate industries
and privatize industries and services so that inlcrjunsdicuonal productive facilities can remain competitive in a
worldwide market "^ This is even true in ihc third world." Alter all. Ihe pnvaliuifKm u| services i»
exactly the some concept as outsourcing. This internationally compeiilive environment has contributed to a loss
of both fiscal and regulatory control which has led to a large decrease in governments' ability to govern in the
fashion which they have for Ihc last 50 to 75 years While this trend may have been unnoticed by many, one only
has to look in today's newspaper to sec another example of a country i« local or regional government whu h is
under severe budget constraints. This is true in North America. South America. Western Europe, l-jtstcm ami
Central Europe. Africa. Asia. Australia and New Zealand. After a decade of growth, one must ask why
virtually every country has been simultaneously stricken by budgetary insev Despite sonic claims thai
~*" Electronic blips that represent money are extremely important bus ol information.
**' This is nol necessarily for the public good, as ihe Bank of Commerce and Credit International (BCC1)
scandal illustrates.
**2 supra note 2 at 9.
•^ The rationales espoused for lowering subsidies and deregulating differ. One of the more interesting set
of reasons comes from Ihe German Economics Minister, Jiirgen MOllcmann. He contends that cutting
subsidies and reducing regulation should not be done for their own sake; they should be done to stop
hypocrisy. He maintains that the west cannot preach free markets for the east and have protected and
subsidized markets in the west. J.W. Mollemann, "To Rebuild the East, the West Will Have to Change".
International Herald Tribune (September 20. 1991) p. 6. A similar argument is given by J. Flom,
"Double Standards by the US", Financial Times (September 19, 1991) p. 22.
^ From 1986 to 1991, the conventional wisdom that first world countries would deregulate while the Ihird-
world would remain protectionist has been stood on its head. During this time period, among the 102
members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). some 30 developing countries - not
including the former communist block countries - have unilaterally slashed trade barriers, often as a part
of broader market-based economic reforms. The countries deregulating their economies range from
impoverished Bangladesh to the emerging power South Korea. Over the same period, trade
protectionism has increased in the richest countries - notably in the United Stales and in Ihc European
Community. The GATT has counted 284 discriminatory export-restraints imposed by these countries
as a condition for market access. This does nol include the increased use of anti-dumping measures.
"Third-World Trade: Preaching to the Converted". The Economist (September 21, 1991) p. K4.
**' For an interesting report of how this trend is affecting India and Pakistan see S. Coll. "Indian
Subcontinent Tackles Capitalism", International Herald Tribune (September 9, 1991) p. 2.government exaiion^* and regulatory powers* are virtually unlimited, this clearly is not the case. To
Ihe contrary, modem technology seems to he serving as a liberating force easing the institutional constraints on
individual decision-making.
White governments are faced with demands for increased public spending, the amount which Ihey can raise is
certainly limited and higher (axes have significant costs. Countries which lowered tax rates in the 1980s found
thai their revenues did nol suffer and often increased. Al least in some instances the Lalfcr curve, which
#hows thai tower lax rales can lead to higher revenue, has proven to be cornel.
Many of (he bills for Ihe promises made during Ihe post-World War II boom period are coming due. Populations
are living longer. Ttie costs of pension benefits and health care are increasing daily. The numbers of workers
paying into ihe health cafe and social security systems are either declining or are remaining relatively
steady. Countries ai diverse as tfic former Soviet Union. Brazil, China, Italy, the United Stales and the
Netherlands eilher have or are seriously discussing breaking previously made "social contracts" in Ihe light of
changed conditions. The problem which governments arc facing is that with Die emergence of "quicksilver
cupital" (he government's ability to raise additional revenues is clearly limited; if one raises taxes, at least some
capital flight will occur. This docs not mean that additional revenues will not be raised, but il does mean (hat al
least marginal investments will in (he future he made in jurisdictions offering better rales of return on an after-lax
baits. The low of marginal investment will lower economic growth and potential tax revenues.
Wilhin this competitive environment for lax revenues, tax payers will increasingly demand value for money from
their governments as governmental power gels weaker and weaker and Ihe demands on government become
greater and greater. This leaves governments with a limited number of options.
.S'ecrion 9: W/IOJ Governments Can Z)o
The options for government arc indeed limited because, as Michael Porter states: "Governments do not control
national competitive advantage; Ihey can only influence it, Government actions which may positively
influence, national competitive advantage may have the unfortunate consequence of reducing efficiency in the
i.e., G.A. Norton, "The Limitless Federal Taxing Power, in J.D. Gwanney and R.E. Wagner (eds.),
Public Choice and Constitutional Economics (Greenwich, Conn.; Ml Press. 1988) pp. 253-84.
" F. A. Hayek worried that governmental powers could only increase. He worried that, as a result of this,
individuals and nations were on The Road to Serfdom (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1944).
*** Supra mole 9. • .
* France, which das a virtually universal, unfunded slate pension programme, is just one example of a
country which is facing major difficulties. Demographic forecasts predict that by the year 2020 (here
will be more people of pensionable age in France than there will be working to support them. This
threatens lo throw the system into chaos. The obvious solution is to follow the example of countries
such as the Netherlands and Ihe United Kingdom which encourage private pensions, This, however, has
its own circular problem: pension payments for retired workers who contributed to Ihe system still have
to he made, should workers invest in their own private pensions. Workers who pay for a earlier
generation's pensions expect a quid uro quo, namely their own state pensions. A. Rawsthorn. "Super-
B6n£ Lights Pension Touchnaper". Financial Times (January 13, 1992), p, 3.
* " "Many of the lax battles were won in the 1980s. but unfortunately the war isn't over. The drumbeat for
new taxes is continuing on Capital Hill When will Washington Icam? When you tax production and
growlh you get less of both." Ronald Reagan as quoted in "Notable & Quotable". Wall Street Journal
Europe (August 20, 1991) p. tO.
*" Supra note 44 at 617. •••>..•sa^:si./-i "' • V ii,*-. •:•'.•.,v.-.: •>'manner described in Chapter 1. As Pntei goes un 10 say: "The central goal ol government polk) lowanl Ihe
economy is to dc^div it nafloiTj rrjonirfj f/iif« mw/ cu/wiii) »tfA kr,<A onrf rum,* frvW.v <#
^rudwmin Pmductiviiy n ihe root cause ol 3 ration's standard of living. To achieve nmducuvuy irrtwrth. an
economy must he continually upgrading., The propci rale foe government policy toward a nation's industry is
10 simulate such dynamism and upgrading One mamfcstaiion ttf an upgrading cvunomy is the mnvcmrnl irf
leu productive juhs 10 ixhcr nations vu foreign investment and inreign «>urving... As we will sen:, many ol ihc
jctions which governments take to help' industry from Ihe perspective ol 3 narrow static view ol ixwtpeMUve
advantage can actually hurt in the long run The most potent influences ol government in advanced naiions air
often slow and indirect."*
While the number of policies which government* can adopt 10 make irwir etiWtMtiei morr rlluirm in an
international context is limned, there are some Porter lids various (aclore which governments can allfil
posiuvely These include upgrading education, training, science, technology and mlraMnxiuir, pmrtuKinK mi
efficient capital market and a stable currency, providing information to industries, and prnvHtinR dinxi and
uxtoecl subsidies and tan incentives,
Porter concludes from an enhaustivc study on Ihe competitive advantage o( naliuna is 'Government's proper role
is as a pusher and a challenger The proper role lor governments is to enruince. not rrsincl ctimpMilwn.
Restrklmg compeliuon is a short-term solution. Oompelilion create* the ctxmcl inccmivcs and motivitlKm,
Campetiuon also helps the monitoring process.
The question must be asked: can industrial policies wort in this environment? Th» «tmwr il prota^lty BO, to
two related reasons First, industrial policies usually lead to a reduction in conipttMan. In the extreme ctM at
communism as formerly practised by the (ormet Soviet Union, China ami ihcir sitellitts. we teamed thai (o Ihc
extern that governmenB did not compete for resources, bul rather attempted 10 control (hem, Uteit * in/ens IIW
relatively poorer and poorer This largely explains why virtually every country in Ihe world, cmnmuntsl ami
capitalist, is either discussing or actually pnvatmng state-owned mduMncji and derriiuluuiiK mltcrv Ilns liutlin
decreases the governments ability to control Ihe economy Second, indusirul policies luually hurt cnnuiinen as
they rely on subsidies or higher domestic pnecs or both.* •
What then can governments do? The first question is: what stouW governments do? With the fall of communism
one can say with confidence that the type of government which citizens live under matters. According to Robert
Reich, governments must be judged according lo how well their citizens live, both in monetary terms and in
272 Ibid, at 617-19.
Ibid, at 62644. Porter notes elsewhere that direct subsidies to industries arc oflen associated wilh
chronic disasters and attempt (0 save jobs rather than with positive government effects on industry.
See chapters 4-9 at 179481 for examples.
Ibid, at 681. Nagatani discusses differences in national economic styles and compares the roles of the
Japanese and the Canadian policy-makers, "In Canadian politics one does not sense the strong will of
Ihe national policy-makers. Policy debates are ever popular and many ideas are actually tried, but these
attempts are tentative and often ineffectual. One fails to sec any degree of imerternporal consistency in
Canada's national economic policies. New ideas constantly make headlines; royal commissions are set
up one after another on issues of any significance in order to crystallize public opinions into policy
guidelines; and yel a master policy plan is never drawn up. Canadians' small-open-econorny mentality
and their affluence may explain this lack of determination." Supra note 46 at 230.
5 The European Community's attempt to proscribe its standard of high definition television might cost
European consumers as much as ECU 21bn ($24.4bn) according to a report by Coopers & Lybrand
commissioned for two private groups of broadcasters. Essell and VPRt. This was reported by A, Hill.
"EC's new TV Strategy 'Will Cost Consumers ECU 21bn"'. Financial Times (August 30, 1991) p. I.94
terms of quality of life, and whether this standard of living can be maintained or improved upon in the
future. In looking toward (he future, governments must stop thinking in terms of the past. It will be
difficult lo overcome the inertia of centralized government. In business, "company structures have changed as
a result of dowasi/.ings, reorganizations. CEO changes, mergers, acquisitions, and divestitures. Yet hierarchy still
rules the industrial organizations and the split between the upper-level manager and (he work force is as large
as ever. Why? Because companies are reluctant lo embrace the logic of the technology and dismantle the walls
that separate levels of management. If businesses arc slow to adapt, one would expect that government
bureaucracies would be even slower moving dinosaurs.
One g<xx) way lo begin this process is to slop thinking of the nationality of a company solely in terms of where
a company is incorporated or where its top managemem lives. As discussed above, modem communications and
travel have made il increasingly less expensive lo conduct business with virtually any and every part of the globe.
Partially as a result in the change in the cost structure, most larger-sized companies today arc multinational in
both scope and outlook. Many increasingly have operations in several countries over a large area of the world.
Managers have realized thai to remain compelilive. il is imperative for companies to produce and provide goods
and services where they can generate the highest levels of quality and service al the lowest cost. Competitive
companies have become engaged in so many countries that il is difficult lo attribute the corporation to any
particular country. This lo the extent (hat Reich asks two questions: "Who is Us?"^'° and "Who is
Them?" To help clarify these questions. Reich gives the example of two successful corporations with an
American presence.
Corporation A is headquartered in the United Stales, Most of its directors, shareholders and top managers are
American. Most of iis employees are non-American. The company undertakes most of its research and
development, product design and manufacturing outside the United Stales. Within ihe American market, an
increasing amount of the company's product comes out of its non-American based laboratories and factories.
Corporation B is headquartered abroad and all of its directors, shareholders and lop managers are non-Americans,
but most of Corporation B's employees arc American. The Company undertakes mosl of its research and
development, product design and manufacturing in the United Slates. The company exports most of its
production, even hack to Ihc country where Corporation B is headquartered. In a dispute between Ihe two
companies, Reich asks, which is more entitled to governmental support? His answer is thai (he headquarters and
incorporation of Ihe company make little difference. The country's future prosperity is clearly more in the hands
of the "non-American" corporation. The issue should be couched in terms of whal Ihe country can do to attract
investment and skills," So who is us? Management guru Kenichi Ohmac provides the following answer
"II is a Iwenly-lirsi century foci that any institution thai does business and pays taxes within a country is a
legitimate corporate citizen of that country. Il is a full dues-paying participant in the economy, with all the rights
and all the obligations that entails. Where it's headquartered makes no difference. The native language of Ihc
CEO makes no difference. It is a legitimate part of Ihe economy of Ihe host nalion. What is the point of even
irying to distinguish between foreign and indigenous companies? If your goal is to enhance (he well-being of your
citizens and to boost freedom of choice, why do such distinctions matter?"-"' Governments do not like the
*"* Supra note 1 at 244.
J. Jaikumar, "The Boundaries of Business: The Impact of Technology". 69 Harvard Business Review
100-1 (Seplembcr-October 1991) at 11)0.
*"" R.B. Reich, "Who is Us", 68 Harvard Business Review 53-64 (January-February. 1990).
""* R.B. Reich, "Who is Them?" 69 Harvard Business Review 77-88 (March-April. 1991).
280 ibid, and supra note 84. >, . .« :., ,
281
K. Ohmae, "The Boundaries of Business: The Perils of Protectionism". 69 Harvard Business Review
128-30 (July-August 1991) at 130.95
borderless orjanuation - they like lo know who is m charge.**" White glottal competition is not something
thai is new. • the development of the borderless firm demands different thinking and strategies by both
governments"** and fums* since^tfjc new global economy renders the oM lams ol negotiating,
bargaining and keeping score obsolete
The answer lo what a country can do lo improve HS competitiveness lies in the analysis contained in Chapter I:
governments can moke investments which will have a positive net present value. These include expenditures on
both physical capital (infrastructure) and human capital (labour). It is not completely free lo enact regulations
which maximize satisfaction as the country must realize that it must compete with other countries lot a relatively
fixed supply of scarce investment capital. Carlos Menem, the president of the iormerly economically closed
country of Argentina, deftly makes this point when he argues that: There is no Hag on capital. 1 ask myself,
what is national capital? Is it the $50 billion in flight capital that has left the country via Argentine business
executives? Or resources used by multinationals lo produce here?""
In the long run. only governments which adequately educate their work forces al a competitive cost and provide
infrastructure efficiently will attract the type of investment which create* high-paying jobs. Porter mates that
government leaders have a rote lo play in creating and elevating the competitiveness ol the country as an item
on the national agenda. He cites Germany. Japan and Korea as countries which have leaders who have enunciated
the necessity to succeed in an international environment: these countries arc directly contrasted with lite United
Stales and Great Britain. The United Slates and Great Britain are mentioned as two examples of countries which
have rested on their hurels too long and whose leaders who cite untair tomnelititm rather than IIKUS on the
problems to be solved at home as the main source of their relative decline.***
In the context of increasing international competition, illiberal laws and regulations will necessarily l(«c out.
Trade unions will probably call much of this process "social dumping." To the cMenl that currently employed
workers lose out they are nghl. But as history shows, when some ol the trade guilds were hrokeu-up. u loss lor
one segment of society may produce large gains for the rest ol society. II liberalualion is the cost lor a
country, it is a cost well worth paying. The cost ol not liberalizing the labour market will be lewci jobs ami less
growth for future generations. To the extent thai unions respond with disruptive strikes over the loss of
'favourable' benefits, hours and working conditions, the cost to future generations will be increased. Trade unions
and other special interest groups who are engaged in rent seeking' will have trouble not only in extending their
*** Y.L. Doz. "Government Policies and Global Industries", in M.E. Porter (ed.). Competition in Global
Industries (Boslon: Harvard Business School Press, 1986) pp. 225-66 at 232.
-83 See A.D. Chandler, Jr., "The Evolution of Modern Global Competition", in M.E. Porter (ed.).
Competition in Global Industries (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1986) pp. 405-448; and O.E.
Williamson, "The Modem Corporation: Origins. Evolution, Attributes", 19 Journal of Economic
Literature 1537-1568 (1981).
28* DJ, Encamation and L.T. Wells, Jr., "Competitive Strategies in Global Industries: A View from Host
Governments", in M.E. Porter (ed.), Competition in Global Industries (Boston: Harvard Business School
Press, 1986) pp. 267-290.
**S A. Mahini and L.T. Wells, Jr.. "Government Relations in Ihe Global Firm", in M.E. Porter (ed.).
Competition in Global Industries (Boston: Harvard Business School Press, 1986) pp. 291-312.
28° Supra note 85 at 84.
-87 Quoted by R.B. Reich. Ibid, at 85.
*** Supra note 44 at 681.
^ supra note 64 at 108-110.9*
current level.* of 'rent," but also in maintaining iheir privileged positions. Rem comes in the form of wages above
market levels and unsustainable social security benefits and working conditions.
Much of the analysis outlined above should raise some large concerns. The questions asked by trade unions and
others under this condition is: how can we slop international competition? The answer may be harmonization.
For example, the European Commission's attempt at a social charter is largely based on preventing social
dumping in the European Community. The question has to be asked whether this type of multinational coddling
increases national efficiency.' To the extent that it may slow down the deregulation process, the answer in the
short term might well be affirmative. In the longer term the answer is clearer: it will not. The only way
to stop international competition is to close off one's borders to imports. India. Brazil. Rumania. North Korea.
Mongolia, Albania and Myanmar (Burma) have tried to do this. By objective standards none of these countries
was even remotely successful. If Europe was to form a fortress around itself, it could not stop people from
moving to less restrictive countries: the people most likely to move are those with the highest skills and the
greatest entrepreneurial talents.
Perhaps Kenichi Ohmac best sums up what governments can do to efficiently manage Iheir country's affairs in
an international context. "That government is best that governs least, in terms of economic well-being. The more
effective it is, the less it does - at least directly. Yes. it should provide for education. Yes. it should hold
companies to eihical standards of behaviour. Yes. it should protect the natural environment. Bui no. it should not
allow itself to be caught up in the fair-sounding arguments that inevitably lead to a downward spiral. "
.S'ecft'on /0: Conc/us/ow
A reasonable question to ask is whether there is a natural end to this process. One may ask whether man, once
he has obtained great material wealth, will he interested in acquiring more. If the answer is no. we should have
little concern over the economic migration of capital and workers. In 1928. Maynard Kcynes predicted thai within
100 years, the standard of living in Western Europe and the United Stales would be between four and eight limes
as high as in W28r** After sixty years, in 1988. the real GNPs of the U.S.. the EEC and Japan (not adjusted
for higher populations) were between 3W and IK limes as high as in 1928. "• Keynes said that since no one
could sensibly wish to consume four to eight times as much as in 1928. people would come to recognize the
pursuit of money for "what it is. a somewhat disgusting morbidity, one of those semi-criminal, semi-pathological
propensities which one hands over with a shudder to the specialists in mental disease....For the first time since
^ The positions of trade unions and employees may diverge widely. Trade unions may be against
technological improvements which lead to changes in employment patterns. The Japanese factories
which have automated Ihe most are precisely the ones that still offer their workers jobs for life. Supra
note 13 at 15.
^' This is Ihe primary motive behind Great Britain's refusal to sign onto the Social Chapter of The Treaty
of Maastricht. The United Kingdom provides less social prolcction than other northern European
countries, ll has also been Ihe largest host to non-EC based foreign investment. The government feels
that its leading position would be undermined if European social standards were harmonized.
"If a nation and its peoples are lo flourish, industry mast flourish as well. Not much argument here.
But to flourish today means lo participate actively in the global economy of our increasingly borderless
world. No modem country can afford to close itself ofr from the international flow of materials and
technologies. Nor can it afford lo deprive its citizens of Ihe opportunity lo purchase Ihe best products
at the lowest prices, no matter where they come from." Supra note 87 at 128.
-** Supra note 13 at 15.
2" ihi,| at 5.97
his creation, nun will be faced with his real, his permanent problem • how to use his freedom Iron pressing
economic cans, how to occupy ha leisure, which science and compound interest v> ill have won U« him. 10 live
agreeably and wisely and weU." While there ts increasing concern for the environment and the quality of life,
there is little evidence thai man has exhausted his will or his ability to spend more While man generally ha)
much shorter working hours and longer vacations, many would like to work even less. In short, man has mx vet
sated his desires to cam more money and to work less. As long as this is true there will be increased pressures
put on governments to provide efficient (in the terms described m (.turners I and J) taws. regulations and
investment. Is this feasible?
The rest of this hook shall focus on how the changes outlined in this chapter have transformed the itrierminatk*
of efficient law. The inability of governments to stem the outflow of informaiKMi. .uul to a lessci eucnl people,
has marked consequences Supply-side law is discussed in Chapter ft The idea ot supply-side law is thai firms
and individuals have increased freedom to pick the law that sum their needs For example, today almost everyone
knows of at least one person who has taken advantage of abortion, divorce, bank set re* y or recreational and
medicinal drug laws in another jurisdiction. While many of these laws were intended solely for a country'! own
citizens, other laws, such as bank secrecy and divorce laws, have been largely trailed and maintained for the
purpose of attracting international clientele. Along the same lines, people ore today much frcci to pay taxes In
the jurisdiction of their choice. As a result, countries which have higher taxes will lose at least some of their
former taxpayers Therefore countries today have two problems The first is how to retain their current (and
future) lax base: the second is how to attract the quicksilver capital .mil turn it inio local investment and tax
revenue.
As noted at the beginning of this chapter, history shows us that we arc in a period in which strong sovereigns
are out of fashion. The expectations of government and correspondingly government expenditures have grown
immensely over the last wave (see chart below). The role of government has changed as well. Government is
now expected to provide for the citizens, in the past the cm/ens were expected to provide lor the sovereign.
Governments are in the process of being squeezed in (wo distinct directions: both at least due to improved
technology On one hand, governments have created the expectation that they will provide f<» the ink. the
elderly, the handicapped, the young and the unemployed at a reasonably high level. Technology has changed the
nature of work, in that the days when many jobs could be created for low-skilled workers arc past - this
means that governments are expected to provide more and costlier training. While retirement ages have not risen
from those chosen fifty or more years ago. advances in knowledge, diet and medicine have allowed people to
live longer. Longer life spans, coupled with increased terms of education and unemployment, allow many
pensioners to receive larger benefits for substantially longer periods than they have payed into the system.
In addition, advances in medicine cost more than older less sophisticated treatments. On the other hand,
governments are also getting squeezed on the revenue side. Quicksilver capital has generally led to lower
2% »^g .JJ^ experiencing an acceleration of change that makes (he Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries, whose hardships we have read so much about, seem a rather slow process.
Blue-collar work is disappearing faster than farming did two centuries ago." M. Crozier, "The
Boundaries of Business: The Changing Organization", 69 Harvard Business Review 138-140 (July-
August 1991) at 138.
^"' These twin problems arc described by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
as the "demographic time bomb", and by U.S. analysts as the "monumental mismatch between jobs and
the ability of workers to do them." S.A. Hewlett, "The Boundaries of Business: The Human Resource
Deficit," 69 Harvard Business Review 131-133 (July-August 1991) pp. 131. For a description of the
problems facing France's national pension scheme see note 75.
^"* The amount of debt is exploding. In economies that were generally expanding, outstanding central
government and government agency debt in the 15 largest industrial countries rose by 14% in 1990 after
growing 0.7% in 1989 and 7% in 1988. The trend is expected to increase. MR. Sesit, "Major
Countries' Rapid Pace of Borrowing Yields Worrisome Effects. Economists Say". Wall Street Journal
Europe (September 30,1991) pp. 9-11. The figures on the table greatly understate the growth in the size98
tax rales. Advances in family planning and job-saving technologies have reduced the number of contributors to
the social security systems at a dramatic rate. An additional pressure comes from environmentalists.
Environmentalist!) is growing. Many environmentalists ask whether economies cither can or should continue to
grow as the cost to the environment and quality of life are under threat. This puts governments under another
threat. The difficulty in financing current or expanded government transfer payments will almost necessarily
increase. Breaking, or modifying existing social contracts will be painful - but necessary. Some countries,
including Italy. New Zealand- and Brazil."' are already discussing raising the retirement age
and decreasing pensions. As the leader of the Swedish centrist Liberal Party (Folkpartiel) said after the Social
Democrats had been swept out of power for the first lime in 46 years: "it is no longer a question of politicians
running the economy, it's the economy running politics "'
The waves of increasing and decreasing government powers over the centuries should warn us that there is
nothing fixed about government. It would not he surprising if the changes seen above flow on to change the
extent and function of government in ways which cannot now be foreseen. While making predictions is
dangerous, one can foresee a legacy of broken expectations which could lead the wave of history in one of two
extreme directions. It could initially lead to such scepticism of government that the citizens desire as little
government as possible. This emotion could arise if a reading of contemporary history shows that governments
could only make promises which cannot be fulfilled: bigger government cannot help current or future generations.
The second possible direction may come either initially or after the first possibility comes to pass and results in
intolerable anarchy. Under this scenario, cm/.ens would demand stronger govcmmenl, probably from strong
populist or nationalistic leadership. This could happen if people come to the conclusion that it was not the
government system that let them down, hut the inherent weakness of the system and the people who ran it.
Should cither of these scenarios happen, one must remember that man would be merely witnessing the next wave
in a sea of history.
Appendix (See after this chapter)
of government. In 1955. many governments were reducing their high debt levels incurred as a result
of World War II. Today deficit spending is large in most countries.
^ This trend is dramatic. From 1976 to 1986. the number of workers between the ages of 20 and 34 in
the United Slates grew by 5 million. By contrast, the number of similarly aged people entering the work
force between 1986 and 1996 will decline by 5 million. T. Redburn, "America at Work: Fewer New
Jobs But Higher Pay", International Herald Tribune (September 9. 1991) p. 1. The prospects for
America arc somewhat better than the prospects for Western Europe. American birth rates did not fall
as low as European ones. Additionally America has taken in more immigrants relative to the size of the
population. Between 1985 and 21)00 the number of young men entering the work force annually will
drop by I7'S> in Great Britain, 9% in France. 27'f in the Netherlands. 32% in Italy. 18% in Spain, and
.18% in Germany. Supra note 103 at 132.
"^ H. Simonian. "Popular Pessimism is the Driving Force", Financial Time Italy Survey (June 6. 1991)
p. I1I/I.
"' "Roger's Daughter", The Economist (August 3, 1991) p. 54.
302 «gjg Country, Big Constitution", The Economist (September 14, 1991) pp. 55-58.
303 g Westerhcrg as quoted by S.D. Moore, "Swedish Conservative Begins Attempt lo Form Coalition",



























































































































































































Governments are faced with the problem of how to attract
revenue in a world where capital flows at the speed of lighl,
at the flick of a switch. In the past governments have largely
used tax policies and other investment schemes to attract
internationally mobile capital. These inducements amount to
little more than bribery. There is another instrument which in
(he past has been largely neglected: the provision of
favourable or liberal laws. Some supply-side laws are
primarily enacted for the benefit of people who are
constricted in the straight-jacket of local national law and
would like to find a cheap and convenient alternative. This
chapter identifies various kinds of non-tax and supply-side
laws, other than direct investment policies, which countries
have used to augment employment, investment and
government revenues. It also explains the economic motives
for providing this type of law.101
6: Supp/y Sufc /-an*
"New technological developments in 'on-line' systems, electron* communication and
satellite broadcasting, and increased circulation of people in the single market, arc
increasingly challenging the logic and practicality of frontiers drawn between different
national and regional regulations "
"The new global manager's job is to exploit the opportunities created by the high-powered
technologies of worldwide communication and transportation and hy the relaxation of
national controls over cross-border flows o( capital The global manager ctlicicntty deploys
capital all around the world, seeking the highest returns for shareholders IN partners
Competition is intense and growing The glohaJ manager who fails to laic advantage of
global opportunities will lose profits and market share to global managers who do
In a world which has been revohitiomzcd by technological changes, international managers are presented with
increased opportunities to cross borders and to make either financial or physical investment*, and to hire and
locale workers. Managers and individuals can also increasingly search the globe lor optimal laws and lax
policies. All changes, especially dramatic ones, present both challenges and opportunities fur governments.
Responsive governments have taken measures to benefit from the* changing circumstances by coming up
with various laws and schemes designed to attract internationally mobile capital and investment.
New technologies present countries with two problems. The first is how to retain their current (and future)
tax base: the second is how to attract the quicksilver capital and lum u into local investment and uu revenue.
These challenges have led most governments to focus their altrntion on providing tax breaks ami various
types of investment subsidies. There is however another alternative Countries can also use their legal
structure to attract capital hy supplying law The idea of supply-side law is Ihm firms and individually now
have a greater freedom to pick ihe law thai suits their needs. For example, today almost everyone knows of
at least one person who has taken advantage of gambling, abortion, divorce, bank secrecy or recreational and
medicinal drug laws in other jurisdictions. Some supply-side laws can be identified by their "brand names."
Who has not heard of a Las Vegas marriage: a Haitian divorce; Dutch recreational drug laws; Mexican
medicinal drug laws: Liberian tankers; Greek ships; Swiss bank accounts; Luxembourg holding companies;
Delaware corporations; or breaking the bank at Monte Carlo. All are examples of supply-side law as the laws
themselves are magnets for some people to use laws which are not provided by their own national
government.
In Chapter 2. efficient domestic commercial law was defined in terms of simultaneously minimizing risk,
uncertainty and transaction costs while maximizing societal satisfaction by setting minimally acceptable
standards. What was not emphasized was, while domestic laws may be efficient for a country as a whole, it
is unlikely that they will universally satisfy Ihe needs of all individuals and firms. When the world was local
in nature, firms and individuals had little choice regarding the law under which they had to operate. Advances
in technology have lowered the cost and availability of worldwide travel and communications. This has made
it more feasible for firms and individuals to take advantage of laws which belter suit their needs. In a
changing world where borders mean less and less, efficient law in an international arena may be different
from efficient domestic law.
In this context it is possible to think of a country's competitiveness in terms of its legal structure.
Surprisingly, the World Economic Forum on World Competitiveness, which uses several hundred
measurements to gauge a country's competitiveness, pays scant attention to the friendliness of the legal
European Community statement as quoted in C. Goldsmith. "Brussels to Consider EC-Wide Gambling",
international Herald Tribune (October 12. 1991) p. 13.
R.B. Reich. "Who is Them?" 69 Harvard Business Review 77-88 (March-April. 1991) at 78.102
environment when assessing the relative competitiveness of countries.' This is increasingly a mistake.
This chapter will identify a large number of legal policies, not directly related to tax or investment, which
countries have enacted which may make them more competitive' than others. Many of these laws have the
effect of attracting internationally mobile firms and individuals. Certain laws are alluring because more liberal
foreign laws may better suit the needs or desires of (at least some) firms and individuals than domestic law.
Supply-side law can and should be used as an additional measure of a country's competitiveness.
While many of these supply-side laws, such as abortion laws, recreational drug laws and marriage laws may
have been intended solely for national citizens, other laws, such as bank secrecy, holding company laws,
shipping laws, gambling laws and divorce laws have been largely created and maintained for the purpose of
attracting an international clientele. Similarly, as will be discussed in Chapter 7. people and firms today have
a wider discretion to pay taxes in the jurisdiction of their choice. As a result, countries which have higher
taxes will lose at leas! some of their former taxpayers. This presents additional challenges to governments.
Sec/ion /: WAy Z^ws are
Laws are supplied for various reasons. The primary benefits of supplying liberal laws can be either direct or
indirect. First, countries can get direct revenue from the additional fees or taxes that the use of a liberal law may
provide. Additional economic activity directly derived from a liberal law provides an indirect or multiplier effect.
The indirect benefits include the creation of a legal infrastructure which requires educated workers, such as
lawyers, accountants, bankers and their staffs. This highly paid professional work adds substantial value and is
environmentally friendly; it is exactly the kind of work that all nations desire. Because some companies will elect
to maintain small offices (here, real estate prices and land values should increase. Besides producing substantial
taxes and Ices, national revenue is augmented by increased income, property and employment taxes. There is also
Ihc possibility that more business trips would be made to the country. This will benefit the local tourism industry
such as hotels, shops, lams, restaurants and other services.-
Many countries supply laws in order to attract some of the quicksilver capital which is constantly circling the
globe. If supply-side laws bring much needed capital and jobs to the jurisdiction, correspondingly, uncompetilive
laws will tend to send at least some capital and employment away to more accommodating jurisdictions. The
court, registration and filing fees help fund Ihc legal system and the use of the laws provides work and
employment to both lawyers and the rest of the legal infrastructure. Moreover this extra money and work mostly
comes Iron) sources who normally would not even think of doing any business in the jurisdiction; besides tourists
who go to the beaches when there is relative political stability, who else is queuing up to go to Haiti and to do
business there?
•"* The attractiveness of bankruptcy laws is. however, assessed. The World Competitiveness Report 1991.
Eleventh edition, (Lausanne: 1MD, 1991).
307 -r^j Bahamas are an excellent example of a country which has used supply-side laws to its advantage.
In 1988, there were 380 licensed banks and trust companies in the country, compared with 300 in 1979.
By the end of 1987, total deposits were $170 billion and growing. The country's tax-haven status and
strict banking secrecy laws have been fundamental in its banks' attraction of business. Moreover, it is
easy for offshore institutions to establish a presence, once entry requirements are met. There are no
statutory reserve or liquidity requirements and a minimum of regulation, and qualified banks can operate
through a number of different vehicles. The Bahamas has developed a sophisticated infrastructure to
support offshore operations. Leading international accountants, lawyers, investment advisers, and
stockbrokers arc represented in Nassau, and the country has excellent communications and computer
facilities in addition to access to the SWIFT network for international payments. Not surprisingly the
Bahamas are the richest country in the Caribbean. N. Peagam, "The Bahamas: Banking Moves into a
New Era", Euroinonev Bahamas Supplement (December 1987) pp. 7-12.103
Srrft'on 2: -Supp/v .S'u/f tain-/or /mft'vutaafc
Supply-side law can generally be divided into laws fur individual use and laws for firm use S«nio supply-side
la*, such as bank secrecy law. is used by both firms and individuals
There is an old saying that "you can't legislate morality " This saying it wrong; countries can and do legislate
morality most countries have at least some laws restricting abortion in at least some i uvunistarucs the sale and
use of alcohol and drugs, prostitution and gambling. Governments, however cannot in most instances make it
impossiMe for ciluens to use the less restrictive laws of other countries, hy prohibiting communication or travel
to those countries.
Avoiding the consequences of local laws is more common than one might rtnevt Cross-hordei shopping, both
physically and through the post (mail-order), is the most commonly used example ol supply \ulc- l.iv, While
differences in tax rales are the most common reason for cross-border shopping, ihcy are not the only reason.
More liberal operating hours for shops increase cross-border spending: longer hours ami weekend shopping for
shops and bier closing hours and lower drinking ages for bars and night clubs bring customer!! to border areas.
One of the most unpleasant experiences that I ever had was linked to legislative morality and cross-border
avoidance of local laws. In Finland, not only is alcohol heavily taxed, the sale of alcohol is prohibited on
Sundays. At least as far hack as 1982. the former Soviet Union was desperate to obtain hard currency, » It
issued border visas for Finns, having good reason to suspect that the reason lor the tnp was to take advantage
of the Soviet Union's alcohol laws As a result, a large number of Finns planned Saturday mad trips to Estonia
in order to he able to dnnk both Saturday night and all day Sunday On a Saturday night in Tallin the streets
were inundated with staggering and vomiting Finns Some were begging for money lo pay for more drink The
nest morning, the benches and pan of the ground in the park, which was across from my hotel, were token up
by people who were either sleeping or passed out.
A. Abortion Laws
Abortion laws are another example of legislative morality. Certain jurisdictions either ban abortions entirely or
make it very difficult to obtain one. Other jurisdictions permit abortions. This has been the source of at least
some friction.- So western Germans, Irish women and Americans from states with strict abortion laws often
go to other countries and states (like China. Great Britain, east German Under, the Netherlands.
Massachusetts or California) to terminate their pregnancy. The country or state which bans abortions can do little
about it/"
One of the few major sticking points of German reunification was overcoming differences between the
east's liberal abortion law and the west's restrictive one. The east received a transitional time when
abortions were allowed. One of the most difficult negotiations involved slopping "Wessies" going east.
K. Campbell. "A Break With the Past". Financial Times Survey (June 19. 1990) p. HI/1. The differences
in abortion laws have become a major source of contention, long after monetary, fiscal and social
matters have been at least partially resolved. "Abortion Debate Splits Kohl's Forces", International
Herald Tribune (September 17, 1991) p. 2.
China has the world's largest abortion market. About 25 million abortions are conducted annually. A.
Rozeboom. "De Grootste Abortusklinick ter Wereld". Intermediair (October 11, 1991) pp. 22-25
• M. van Look. "Abortus Provocatus, Juridische Status Quastionis en Perspectieves". Tiidschrift voor
Privaatrecht (1974) pp. 419-472.
''' The European Court, reacting to a complaint from the Society for the Prevention of Unborn Children,
tried to prevent Irish students from distributing information on how Irishwomen could obtain abortions
abroad. The Court ruled that the Irish students are not permitted to distribute information since the
students were acting as brokers for foreign abortion clinics. While (he students were slopped, in the104
Advances in medicine may make the debate over abortion almost moot. A group of French scientists have
developed a pill that induces a miscarriage - this would make surgical abortions unnecessary. Even if
governments try to ban the drug, there is no reason to expect that they will have any practical success in
prohibiting its use. Unlike recreational drugs and steroids, which are almost universally condemned, yet still
available, the so called 'abortion pill' would have support from at least a sizable minority of most populations,
and a cross-border trade would almost certainly develop. '*
K. Gambling
Gambling is a huge and growing business. Various countries and American states have a large array of laws
covering gambling. The total amount of money changing hands in legal and illegal gambling in 1989 in the
United Stales was a staggering $252 billion, an increase of 67% from 1982. The main reason for this explosive
growth in gambling in America has been the proliferation of state-sponsored lotteries. In Europe, about
$50 billion was legally bcl in 1989. This makes gambling one of the world's biggest services, with the lowest
costs and the highest level of profit potential. While demonstrating concern for the hardships which excessive
gambling can produce, governments covet the large revenues which gambling can furnish. While many of the
laws are geared toward nationals, there is still a large supply-side element (20% of all casino gamblers in EC
countries are foreigners).
I. Europe
European gambling laws vary widely and attracts a large cross-border trade. Casinos are an interesting case in
point. In France, for example, casinos were legalized in 1907. but only in resort cities (outside a 60 kilometre
radius of Paris). Denmark is the latest country to legalize casino gambling, licensing its first casino in December,
1990. Denmark took this action to discourage gamblers from travelling to Germany and other places to bet.
Currently, the only place where casinos arc not found in Europe is in Ireland. While casinos are technically illegal
in Belgium, they do exist and arc policed by the Finance Ministry. In the Netherlands, all casinos are supposed
In be slate-owned, yet the slate-owned casinos find themselves competing against illegal operations which are
tolerated by Ihe stale.
Bingo is available in Spain. Portugal and the United Kingdom, but not elsewhere. The United Kingdom, with
Europe's most extensive network of betting shops, is the only EC country not to have a lottery or toto (it does,
however, have a huge football-pool). Horse racing is big business in France and the UK. The systems are run
differently. In the UK, Ihe belting shops are privately run; in France they arc run by the state.- The French
horse racing system attracts a large number of Kalian, Belgian and German punters.
ruling, the Court ruled that abortions constituted a 'service.' This opens up the real possibility that
European clinics will now be able to advertise their services in Ireland and the rest of the European
Community, since a restriction of advertising would be in conflict with the concept of a Common
Market. "Anti-Abortion Group Gets Mixed Victor)' in EC Court". International Herald Tribune (October
5. 1991) p. 2. A few months after this ruling, the Irish authorities initially blocked a 14 year-old Irish
girl who was pregnant as a result of rape from going to England for an abortion. The Irish Supreme
Court overturned a high-court injunction which barred her from travelling abroad. The case is a
noteworthy demonstration of supply-side laws at work. J. Foolc. "Ireland and Abortion: An Ethical
Bind". Newsweek (March 16, 1992) p. 24.
J. Carey, "Can the "Abortion Pill" Save Lives?" Business Week (December 17, 1990) pp. 56-58.
D. Cordlz. "Betting the Country". 159 Financial World (February 20. 1990) pp. 22-26.
M. Spain, The Odds Against Harmony". 46 International Management (October 1991) pp. 89-91.
The Pari-Mutuel Urhain has the third largest turnover of any French company. France has been accused
by the British of subsidizing the shops. The EC is currently investigating. Ibid.I OS
Germany. Ireland and Austria all ran large lotteries which attract hellers from other countries and advertise
internationally. Spam has a private tottery run by and tor the benefit of the Mind The foundation «hk.h runs the
lottery has become one of the largest conglomerates in Spain. The countries »uh the biggest tumoven> Inmi lotto
and toco - Germany ($5.5 billion). Spain ($5 billion) and France (S.VS billion) • also receive the most revenue.
The amount paid to the winners vanes amongst the various kitten games from a low of 24% in the British pooti
to 70* in the Netherlands. In 1993 a Eurotouo is scheduled to Stan.
Gaming machines, which have long been popular in Las Vegas and Monie Carlo, are a relatively new phewomtm
in Western Europe. They have become legal in Spain (since 1981). Germany (since 1985). the Netherlands (ajan
1986). France (since 1990) and Luxembourg (since 1990)."*
2. The failed Slates
Traditionally the only state to have legalized gambling was Nevada. In the 1980s, many cities and states became
desperate for additional revenues Politically, legalising gambling was often mirr uitractivc tx politicians than
raising taxes. In 1981, the stale of New Jersey licensed casino gambling in Atlantic City. AU.UHK City hod ova
the years become a large slum. It was expected that gambling woukl bring punters Irom the New York.
Philadelphia, Baltimore and Washington, D.C. areas and revitalize the old resort town. Initially, the casinos wen
like a licence to print money. Donald Trump was Ihe largest owner of casino properties and was later listed at
one of the richest men m the United Slates. Not surprisingly other areas wanted to grab a piece of the pie. '
Iowa. North Dakota and Mississippi now have I milled casino gambling. " Voters of IVnoii and Miami,
however, have raected legalized gambling through referendum* It is still under consideration in Pennsylvania
and Wyoming/ Some Indian reservations with ihcir own jurisdiction became run oilcnitg hmgo, I.ixtcrte*
are now operated in 28 states, and more are on the way. The popularity ol state-run lotteries grew rapidly in the
1980s. Now lotteries ore America's second largest form of gambling and are approaching Ihc lake of the Atlantic
I Sri hillum for
revenue*.
Slate tottery profits are typically equal to 40% of revenues/
uma. i»uw •vnaKHava wi. j~t(iiv*si«i :» an^vinnj itaig^M mini in ^HiimHiy tutu tuc u|i*i>MkMiHg tin, wai in im /"
City and Nevada casinos. Tola! 1988 sales came In SI 5.6 billion, with net income al '7% c« annul Sri hill
Mate governments. In its first year, the Kentucky lottery brought in more than S25O million in re<
^Intf* WKI^rv nmftlc n** IMWsllu JVMIAI In JiML iij i»unHM4 ^*'
C. Drug Laws
Supply-side drug laws can be divided into recreational drug laws and medicinal drug laws. Dutch recreational
drug laws are not that different from the laws of other neighbouring countries: the major difference is that the
possession of small quantities of "soft" drugs is tolerated. Selling drugs remains illegal and Dutch authorities tend
not to enforce laws against selling small quantities of drugs. While the non-enforcement of Ihc law is done
primarily for domestic reasons, it has the added consequence of attracting drug tourists and addicts from across
Europe. Drug tourism was also the attraction of Nepal in the 1960s and 1970s. In addition lo the Himalayas.
316 ibid.
"' C. Welles, "America's Gambling Fever". Business Week (April 24, 1989) pp. 112-120.
•"" "American Survey: Rien Ne Va Plus". The Economist (December 15, 1990) at 23-24.
3" K. Hannon, "Long Shot", Forbes (April 16, 1990) pp. 92-93.
3*° J. Coot "Lottomania". Forbes (March 6, 1989) pp. 92-96.
321 E. Calonius, "The Big Payoff from Lotteries", Fortune (March 25, 1991) pp. 109-114.
• For some interesting perspectives about Dutch drug laws see L.G.S. Wever, "Drugsbeleid; Paradoxaal
en Een Dubbele Moraal". Delikt en Delinkwent (May 1986). pp. 436-440; R.M.A. Guldenmond.
"Europa 1993 en het Beleid van Juslitie", NJCM Bulletin (June 1989) pp. 414-424: L.A.RJ. de
Beaufort, "Herionehandel bij Wijze van EC Delict". Trema (June 1982) pp. 125-127. Dutch drug policy
may come under attack in a single European Market. Sec L. Raun. "The Netherlands", Europe106
one of the main altraclions of Nepal was die lack of drag laws. As a resull hippies from across Ihe world were
drawn to Katmandu - pertiaps lo become as high as the neighbouring mountains.
Medicinal drug laws are enacted to prevent consumers from using untested, unsafe or ineffective drugs.
Nevertheless, as indicated above when discussing Ihe abortion pill, governmental (in)action does not keep
individuals from wanting certain medicinal drugs which are unavailable in their country. The laws of other
countries may be more accommodating. As a resull, being a pharmacist or chemist in border towns like Tijuana,
Mexico is a lucrative profession, since Mexican medicinal drug laws are decidedly more lax than American
I). Laws Involving Marriage
In some jurisdictions it is difficult or time consuming to gel married: in others it is difficult to get
divorced.^ In the Netherlands, for example, one must get an appointment with Ihe local registrar in order
lo get married. The wailing list varies from city to city, but some people must wait up to two months. As a result
some couples go to Belgium where marriage is easier. Dutch authorities will recognize the Belgian marriage
certificate. Some American stales, such as Nevada, have few requirements to get married. Others require going
lo Ihe courthouse and getting blood tests. There is a street in Las Vegas where one can go 24 hours a day to get
married - cither by a preacher or by an Elvis impersonator who sings "Love Me Tender" exactly like the king.
One of Ihe reasons why the Nevada law is so liberal is that it attracts tourists lo Ihe slate.'
Divorce is a little bit different. Traditionally, some jurisdictions have, for public policy or religious reasons,
iiltcmptcd lo make divorce difficult. Luckily for some bickering couples, other countries, such as Ihe
Dominican Republic, Haiti, and Ouyana have made getting a divorce easy. One only has lo look in the classified
section of international newspapers, like the International Herald Tribune, lo find lawyers who advertise their
services. As long us the parlies can agree lo a settlement, getting a divorce is easy. One needs only to fill in
certain forms and wail two weeks by the mail box to receive a divorce which is recognized in most jurisdictions.
Mail-order divorces arc the type of supply-side law which are the focus of the rest of this chapter; laws which
are almost entirely adopted in order lo attract non-residents to use local laws and institutions.
K. Pension Trusts
International executives often have a problem with their pensions if they move from country to country. As
pensions arc normally, after one's home, the second most important asset of an international executive, they are
matters of importance. Even as the 1992 programme nears completion, Ihe European Community Member States
have not been able lo agree lo common rules or tax provisions for multinational pension funding for persons who
(July/August 1990) pp. 34-38.
•^' For an interesting article on the supply of medicinal drugs see A.M. Parkman. "Simultaneous Legal and
Illegal Demand for Prescription Drugs", 17 Nebraska Journal of Economics and Business 21-30
(Summer 1«78).
•^ SS£ i.e. J.M. Molto Darner, "U Divorce en Droit International Prive EsnagnoT, N.T.I.R. (1974). pp.
171-182.
•^ Along the same lines, Nevada is the only American stale where prostitution is legal. Prostitution is far
more regulated in Nevada lhan marriage is. For an interesting discussion over ihe advantages of
legalized abortions sec "Street Cleaning: AIDS has Strengthened the Case for Legalising Brothels", The
Economist (September 7. 1991) pp. 50-51.
'•* Sec R. Van Rooy, "Welgeving Internationale Echtscheidingen", Ars Aeuui (September 1981) pp- 420-
439,107
work outside die country where they are citizens.' * It is not always possible for expatriates to keep on
contributing 10 their home countries' national pension programmes. One ot the ways around this prohlem is for
the expatrm to set up an offshore pension trusi. Vanous locations have horn developed to accomplish this "The
choice of idea) location for an offshore trust is frequently most influenced by national prttcrcntc. OK Americans
like Bermuda and trie Caribbean: the British favour Ihc CtonncI Islands: and the Germans. I uicmbour|i or
Liechtenstein...ITlhc Duich invariably adopt Curacao.' Over cenain member states' uhjcvtiora. the
European Commission has promaed lo supply law which will have onshore advantages which the oltshorc centres
do not offer.'**
F. Ajtct Prottrtioa Tram
Doctors, accountants, lawyers, property investors, entrepreneurs and rtch people contemplating marrutge all have
a common fear: a ruinous law suit. Many such people, especially in litigious America, are responding by
protecting their money from patterns, clienis. creditors, spouses, tax collectors, lawyers and judge* in asset
protection trusts located in such unlikely plates as Ihc Cook Islands
One of the reasons for professional people doing this is ihe way in which American tort law operates and
insurance policies are written. Most insurance policies do not cover punitive damages, which in A mm* a arc often
several tunes Ihc amount of actual and compensatory damages. Insurance rales for doctors aie olten so high that
some operate without insurance cover. This loo is risky as one claim could wipe out a doctor with substantial
assets. Before asset protection trusts were developed. Ihc choice of a doctor in ihis position was limned to
transferring his wealth lo his friend, relative or spouse. If a divorce or a 'misunderstanding' were lo occur,
custody of Ihe assets would go lo Ihe spouse, relative or 'friend' as the assets were legally tilled in their name.
An asset protection trust is generally constructed in the following manner. First a type of special limited
partnership is formed: 99% of Ihe partnership is owned by ihc offshore Irust and Ihc other I* by the donor. The
II partnership holding allows Ihc donor to control Ihc assets ol the trust as if Ihey were his (legally the oueti
are owned by the trust which u legally a separate entity apart Irom the donor) None ol the assets arc physically
moved offshore. While all of the donees assets cannot be put into Ihe trust, the only limitation on how much
money and other assets can go into the trust is lhat Ihe donor must remain solvent after the gift.
The trusts are relatively inexpensive to set up and maintain, costing $15,000 lo set up and $1,000 per year to
maintain (including legal fees). Asset protection trusts were first developed by a Denver. Colorado law firm and
set up in the Isle of Man. Once this was done, other offshore financial centres, including the Bahamas and the
Cayman Islands went into direct competition with the Isle of Man and queued up to offer asset protection trusts.
The Cook Islands became the most friendly location of all - not surprisingly because the Denver law firm which
D. Harrison, "EC Blow to 'Mobile' Pensions", Financial Times (August 24. 1991) p. 10.
G. Clare. "Expatriates' Pensions and the Offshore Trust". Watsons Eurocomment (September I991)pp.
13-14 at 14.
The New Europension Directive", Watsons Eurocomment (September 1991) pp. 15-16. George Clare,
who writes extensively on the subject, stales that he will only believe that the benefits of a European
onshore pension trust will exceed those benefits found offshore when the measure is passed and
implemented. Ibid, at 13.108
initiated the concept drafted the legislation. This has to be the ultimate supply-side law as it was created
by and for the benefit of the law's best potential customer.
Secfion 3: 5i(pp(y Side Laws /or Firms
In addition to various types of supply-side laws for individuals, there are supply-side laws for firms. The types
of laws provided can be grouped into those which facilitate transportation, financial services, financial markets
and incorporations. This section will explain the importance of these laws for firms which operate in the
international arena.
A. Internationally Mobile Assets - Transportation
Some supply-side laws are primarily enacted for the benefit of people who are constricted by the straight-jacket
of national laws and would like to find a cheap and convenient alternative. As slated above, certain types of laws
arc primarily aimed at internationally mobile capital and international firms. Before the advent of
telecommunications, the only objects which were both internationally mobile and which had no obvious
nationality were ships. - ' It should then come as little surprise that international ship registration became the
first type of global supply-side law. As early as the 16th Century, English owned ships sailed under the Spanish
flag. Sailing under the Spanish flag brought fees to the Spanish Crown and allowed the English to profit from
West Indies trade, where the Spanish maintained a monopoly. The global nature of shipping brought about
not only Liberian tankers and Greek- and Panamanian ship registries, but an international shipping
exchange where suppliers and customers of shipping services could meet: the Baltic Exchange is located in
London. Recently, a futures market for shipping services has also been initiated in London. This market is already
•^ The trusts have so far held up well to judicial scrutiny. The Denver law firm has defended 24 cases.
All were settled out of court for about 15% of the original claim. It is contended that the trusts must
be in existence for at least 5 years before the assets will be deemed fully out of the reach of creditors.
Some contend that asset protection trusts arc the ultimate pre-nuptial agreement - the assets never were
part of the marriage, the putative spouse never has any direct access to the assets and a signature is not
necessary for the pre-nuplial agreement to become valid. "Salting it Away", The Economist (October
5. 1991) p. 54.
" Unlike today where money moves through telephone wires, money (in the form of precious metals) was
both expensive and dangerous to transport. Therefore it was not inherently highly mobile. Besides,
money was not necessarily immediately acceptable. Foreign coins had to be weighed and checked for
purity.
" Other notable past and present flags of convenience include: Greece, Panama. Liberia. Lebanon. Malta,
Honduras. Cyprus. Somalia. Singapore. South Africa and the Channel Islands. For an interesting
historical perspective of this phenomenon see B.A. Boczek, Flags of Convenience (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1962).
'" For an interesting article of how Liberia became a world shipping centre see R. Carlisle, "The
'American Century' Implemented: Sleltinius and the Liberian Flag of Convenience". 54 Business
History Review 175-91 (1980).
• ** The Greek-owned fleet accounts for 14% of the world's total merchant tonnage - the largest single
portion. J. Carr, "The Business Guide: Athens: Sea Lords". Business (May 1989) pp. 145-154 at 147.
For an interesting discussion of how Greece became a worldwide shipping nation see M. Serafetinidis,
"The Development of Greek Shipping Capital and Its Implications for the Political Economy of Greece",
5 Cambridge Journal of Economics 289-310 (1981).109
accepted as the bea and only indicator of future dry cargo freight rales.''* Besides ships, airplanes are
increasingly fkm n under flags of convenience. If the trend continues and the importance of national flag earners
are diminished, a free trade in both airlines and an transport should eventually develop. In this instance,
proportionally as many airplanes will fly undo a flag of convenience as do ships sail.
1. Skipping lafrajttnKiwrt
Supply-side shipping laws can he divided into supply-side backgrounds law (which include U*> and procedtaet
for chartering ships, insuring die ships and the cargo and a payment system, and shipping infrastructure) and ship
registration laws. While there are a few large ships still registered under the British flag. London remains the
major work) centre of world shipping. It supplies everything that world shipptng industry needs: a good
worldwide communication infrastructure, efficient background laws, a court system which is competent and
consistent, as staled above, u has an efficient market which coordinates the supply and demand fir shipping
services, and it has a competitive and efficient marine insurance market.'™
2. Flags of CoaveaitBct
If a ship owner registers his ship in a country with favourable supply-side laws and the owner has no natml
relationship with that country, it is said that the ship is registered under "a (lag ol convenience " Airplanes also
can be. and often are. registered under flags of convenience There arr three Kasic reasons why flags of
convenience are used: (1) to avoid taxation; (2) to minimuce registration fees; and O) to avoid labour and safety
regulations. For currently registered ships, the market can be divided into two distinct sectors - the established
flag sector and the flag of convenience sector. If a ship is ~flagged-out." the vessels registry is changed from
its national flag to a flag of convenience. Through flagging out. the owners may he able to cut crew corns,
management costs and lax liabilities while increasing labour quality. ' Some countries remain uncompeulivc
in shipping because of their domestic legislation. For example, existing maritime policies have played a role in
preventing US flag vessel operators from adopting technology modern enough to make its fleet commercially
competitive. ""
The competition to provide these service is intense. In 1980. one-lhird of the world's tonnage was under
European flags. Today only about 15% is. Different countries have responded in different ways to the availability
•"' S.Laurie, "Trade Finance, Volatility Ahoy!" 139 Banker (June 1989) pp. 99-101. Futures markets have
traditionally been either conducted on physical goods or financial instruments. The Baltic International
Freight Futures Exchange marks the beginning of a futures market for services. Subsequently, in 1991,
a financial futures market for real estate was established on the London Futures and Options Exchange
(FOX). Also in 1991, the FOX merged with the Baltic Futures Exchange. Other contemplated (although
not necessarily feasible) futures markets are those for: casualty insurance, air transportation, medical
care, commercial advertising, data processing and child care. P.M. Johnson, "Next Growth Area: Futures
on Services", 16 Futures: The Magazine of Commodities & Options (June 1987) pp. 12-14. Amid
problems and scandals, the financial futures market for real estate was soon suspended because of
allegations of financial improprieties. It is unclear whelher the market will reopen in the future. Sec D.
Barchard, "Statement Expected on Resignation from FOX". Financial Times (October 7, 1991) p. 17;
R. Waters, "FOX Gave Brokers Indemnities", Financial Times (October 8, 1991) p. 21; "Trading Inquiry
Clouds London Futures Market", International Herald Tribune (October 9, 1991) p. 11.
See Lord Chorley of Kendal and C.T. Bailhache. British Shipping Laws: The Law of Marine Insurance
and Average (London: Stevens & Sons, 1961).
Labour quality may alter because some countries require the use of a crew with local citizenship. See
G.N. Yannopoulos. "The Economics of "Flagging Out'", 22 Journal of Transport Economics & Policy
197-207 (1988).
C.B. Donn, "Foreign Competition. Technological Change, and the Decline in U.S. Maritime
Employment". 27 Transportation Journal 31-41 (Summer 1988).110
of flags of convenience. In 1991, Luxembourg, which is over 250 kilometres from the nearest coast, began its
assault against other flags of convenience. It did this to preempt the European Community's attempt at the
creation of a single European flag. Like its competitors. Luxembourg ships will pay minimal taxes. Unlike some
other (lags of convenience, the Luxembourg law requires (he payment of a minimum wage to sailors.
Luxembourg hopes to diversify its economy and to make money from registering the ships. Meanwhile.
Malta has decided to become a full-fledged supplier of flags of convenience and as a result, the Island ranks as
an increasingly important locale for ship registration Additionally, in 1988. Malta's government enacted
legislation to turn Malta into an offshore centre. Norway, on the other hand, has decided to try to
differentiate its product. In 1987 the government established the Norwegian International Shipping Register, which
provided a Norwegian alternative lo low-cost ship registers and a framework for revival. As a result, more than
9(1% of Norway's shipping services are exported. This means that most Norwegian' merchant vessels handle
cross-trading for foreign customers worldwide.
B. Financial Services
As money becomes more mobile and its origin cannot be traced, certain countries have set themselves up to
attract international investors by providing laws which facilitate financial service. The types of financial services
which arc offered include offshore banking, bank secrecy," and insurance services. Pension and trust
services have already been discussed: these are other types of financial services.
An increasing number of islands, mini-states, and developing countries are promoting themselves as providers
of financial services. Nowhere is the competition more intense or the field more crowded than in the Caribbean
and in the English offshore islands. Together these offshore financial centres have garnered a substantial slice
of the global, multi-billion dollar, financial services business. The only reason why these sleepy outposts have
been able lo become rclalive financial services giants is that they have enacted favourable supply-side laws which
con be used to break free of restrictive and slowly developing national ones.
1. Offshore Banking
Various countries, including Guernsey and the Isle of Man. which are established offshore centres, have long
promoted their managed banks that require no physical presence." The various Caribbean offshore banks
have bank deposits totalling well over $61)0 billion. The Caribbean is so attractive becaase of its proximity to
the US, ils location between the US and Latin America, and the fact that the inhabitants speak English."
Some think that specialization may be emerging in different centres, along with stratification, as the more
developed centres become increasingly selective. Centres arc revising regulations, introducing greater supervision,
and seeking to upgrade their image. Also, hanks throughout the region have lightened their rules on accepting
cash deposits from strangers. With the fall of the Bank of Credit and Commerce International, which was
registered in the Grand Cayman Islands and Luxembourg and headquartered in London, worldwide bank
'" "The Old Red. White and Blue". The Economist (January 12, 1991) p. 70.
'*" P. Sington and B. Davics. "Malta: Sailing into the Grand Harbour". Euromonev Supplement (December
1988) p. 23,
• D. Rudnick, "Norway. Shipping Steams Ahead". Euromonev Norway Supplement (June 1990) pp.
23-25.
™* Offshore banks exist because they provide bank secrecy.
•"• L. Holstrom, "Offshore Centres: The Name of the Game Is Tax Efficiency". Euromonev Supplement
(December 1988) pp. 2-4,
N. Pcagam, "Nine Centres Worth Finding on the Map", Euromonev Treasure Islands Supplement (May
1989) pp. 4-12.Ill
regulators have found virtually non-existent hank regulation to he a compfctt failure, both economically and
politically. As a result, n is doubtful thai operating a hank which is licensed offshore will he pcrmMed in very
many countries in the future,
2. Kaatk Secrecy
Governments have varying degrees of authority lo learn about Ihc financial all am. of the clients of ktcal hanks
and their customers. Since certain firms and individuals prefer higher levels oi hank distTCUon, dittiirni countries
have enacted higher standard bank secrecy laws in order to attract an inlemalional clientele. IV traditional rule
model of supply-tide hank secrecy law was Switzerland.
In 1934. Switzerland passed its firs! federal honk secrecy law. Not surprisingly its first major group ofcuskvmcn
were German Jews attempting m shield Iheir wealth and property from the Nazis • Banking became a tug
industry in Switzerland, hanking accounts for 41 of Swiss Gross National Product. There is now a trend
against hank secrecy in Switzerland Complete banking secrecy was maintained in Switzerland until I*MI,
when a law against money laundering was passed. Bank secrecy came under I under scrutiny in IW1
when, in order lo further fight money laundering, another clement of hunk secrecy was eliminated, Ihc ability of
a lawyer lo open an account for a client without divulging his name.
The Swiss have k«l clients for their supply Mile law over lime hecause they did not adjust their policies in i
period when competitors were springing up throughout the world. Luxembourg and other olfshore icnlrcs have
jumped mm the breach and prospered. In the early 1970s. Swiss investors, considering the IV* withholding tax
levied on interest from Swiss accounts excessive, transferred iheu private money lo Luxembourg, which levied
no withholding taxes. The big 3 Swiss hanks. United Bank of Switzerland. Credit SUIMC. and Swiss Banking
Corporation, reacted by setting up Luxembourg subsidiaries to manage their clients' money. In IWI, in
order lo expand upon the three Swiss banks' activities, Luxembourg passed a honk secrecy law. Because »l these
two supply-side laws, hank secrecy and no withholding lax. banking became the nation's main moneymaker
within seven years. Today, Luxembourg is said to be the smaller investor's Switzerland. It specializes in investors
with between $500,000 and $2 million. Its fees are much lower than those of Swiss banks/'" From 1986
to 1988, there was a dramatic 50% annual increase in investment capital inflows lo Luxembourg. Not
surprisingly, an influx of foreign banks soon followed. The benefits of this strategy for Luxembourg can be seen
in the following statistics. The environmentally friendly and highly paid banking industry has replaced steel and
agriculture as Luxembourg's main industry and accounts for 15% of the total gross national product, 20% of
government revenues. and employs almost 10% of Luxembourg's total workforce. Obviously
• P.W. Bartelings, "Het Bankgeheim Staat of Valt Bij dc Wet; Enkcle Opmerkingen over het Bankgeheim
in Nederland, Zwitserland en Luxembourg", TVVS (March 1991) pp. 57-62 al 60-61.
•^ "Private Banking Survey", Economist Survey (June 24. 1989) p. 25.
• ' J. Carr, "The Discreet Charm of the Swiss Lawyer". 5 Inlemalional Financial Law Review 7-10
(November 1986).
•*•** W. Dullforce, "Squalls in a Safe Haven". Financial Times (December 13. 1990) p. HI/1.
" These accounts were known as "formula B" accounts. W. Dullforce, "Critics See Ambiguity over Client
Privacy". Financial Times (December 13. 1990) p. III/7.
"0 G. Humphreys, "Luxembourg: Bigger Fish in a Smaller Pond", Euromonev (July 1987) pp. 83-92.
"Spotlight on Luxembourg: The Little Switzerland with a Different Philosophy", 12 Asian Finance
(August 1986) pp. 79-82; D. Benn, "Luxembourg's Star Role". The International (June 1991) pp. 45-48.
•1CT
-'-" D, Holdcn. "The Grand Duchy Makes a Comeback". 99 United States Banker (April 1988) p. 61.112
growth could not continue forever. By 1991. 185 banks were operating in Luxembourg, up from 122 banks in
1986. Not surprisingly, staff costs have grown and profltabilily in the banking industry has decreased over the
last two years.
Liechtenstein also decided to compete with Switzerland head on. Il enjoys a common customs and monetary
union with Switzerland, hut the two countries' taxation laws differ. Liechtenstein has lower taxes, and its financial
institutions are still forbidden by law to disclose any information in connection with tax offenses that breach
foreign laws. Foreign funds account for more than 70% of all deposits in the country's three banks. ^
In the future. Luxembourg (and to a lesser extent Liechtenstein) will face increasing competition from an
emergent united Germany and a greater Europe. Luxembourg has the difficult task of overcoming its reputation
as a haven for lax cheats and money laundercrs. The grand duchy's banks want to prove that, while secrecy is
essential, il is not an absolute principle. In the past. Luxembourg has proved adept at changing with the limes
and has become attractive for reasons other than low taxes and secrecy. In order to remain competitive, some
further changes are needed, such as the redrafting of outdated legislation covering supervision of the slock
exchange.-*^
One can compare the bank secrecy policies of Switzerland. Liechtenstein and Luxembourg with other Western
European countries which have adopted different approaches toward secrecy. The United Kingdom law waives
bank secrecy whenever Ihcre is a court order, there is a public duty, it is in the interest of the bank, or the client
gives permission. France permits the dissemination of information to legal and hank supervisory authorities, when
the client consents. In Finland, information may he provided to legal and police authorities investigating a crime
and lo lax authorities. Belgium and the Netherlands do not recognize banking secrecy apart from the terms of
the contract. In Italy, banking secrecy may be implied from various other laws. Most of the countries recognize
only civil liability, but criminal sanctions may be imposed in Luxembourg, Norway. Finland, and
Switzerland. • ' Monaco also has a high level of hanking secrecy and other favourable fiscal incentives for
banking/™
3. Insurance
While London has long been and remains the leading insurance centre in Europe, it has been under strong
competitive pressure from other countries. For example, in 1990. Luxembourg had 113 captive reinsurance
brokers, up from I(X) in 1989.- •'* During the same period, gross premiums in Luxembourg rose 133% to
about $2 billion. Ireland has over the past few years made an aggressive attempt to make Dublin a worldwide
financial centre. Il has the European Commission's approval lo charge a 10% corporate tax rate for insurance and
"' E.A. Finn, Jr. and T. Pouschine, "Luxembourg: Color It Green", 139 Forbes (April 20.1987) pp. 42-45.
•"* "Not so Grand in the Duchy". The Economist (August 31. 1991) pp. 72-73; A. Hill "Is the Golden Age
Over?" Financial Times (October 2. 1991) p. 27.
' • J. Arbose, "The Bulging Coffers of Liechtenstein's Secretive Banks". 42 International Management 28-
30 (February 1987).
^** M. Blanden, "Luxembourg: Nimble Footwork Needed". 140 Banker (September 1990) pp. 20-22.
• " T. Salminen. "Banking Secrecy Legislation in Western Europe". 11 Issues in Bank Regulation 30-32
(Spring 1988).
••"• P. Sington and B. Davies, "Monaco: For Cash, the Cache with Cachet". Euromonev Supplement
(December 1988) pp. 26-28.
• • Reinsurance is the insurers" way to share out risks. Reinsurance occurs when the primary insurer (or
underwriter) pays other insurers to take all or part of their risk. R. Pennanl-Rea and B. Emmoii. Pocket
Economist. Second Edition (London: Basil Bbckwell, 1983) p. 200.1)3
moo other rypes of <•"**>•>> service companies Luxembourg is currently introducing a change in its insurance
lu jyaern n response ™" Swiss insurcri manage about SI80 billion in assets About fiCWt- itl then premiums
co«ne from abroad.*" The Dwch are one of the largest users of offshore reinsurance companies/*"
Competitive pressure on countnes lo pass supply-tide insurance laws is almost certain to ctmtinue in Ihe
future.
Roughly half of ail the worlds captive insurance companies arr in the Caribbean, Ihe larjesi host country being
Barbados Singapore and Guernsey have recently made active attempts to become regional insurance centres.
Singapore began licensing captives in 1983 with some success Singapore hows to become an Asian centre for
insurance and reinsurance and a domicile for captive insurance companies. Guernsey, one ol the Channel
Islands, is the largest offshore captive insurance haven in Europe Its oMOO residents rnjo> virtually full
employment. About SO banks are represented (here, and 200 captive insurance companies are domiciled in
Guernsey. It offers advantages such as close proximity to London insurance markets, modestly priced
accommodation, stability, and a well-developed infrastructure However, there are some disadvantages to doing
business in Guernsey. For example, it can get fogged in. preventing airplanes from arriving ami drpartmg. there
is a critical staff shortage adversely affecting many businesses, and companies allowed lo operate there must
demonstrate they can contribute to the islands revenue. Although some believe that a 20* tax on insurers' profits
is a disadvantage.Others say the lax laws could he a drawing card now that the British corporate tax rale ha« been
lowered to .13*.•*'
Barbados was so successful as an insurance centre that, in 1989. the United Slates cancelled a foreign exchange
tax concession that was a major pillar of Barbados' fledgling offshore finance industry Barbados' tuccca
stemmed from two agreements it made with the United Stales in the mid- 1980s. » tax information agreement and
a double tax treaty, which overrode domestic bank secrecy laws and allowed Ihe American Internal Revenue
Service lo obtain taxpayer information from Barbados, including bank records and other confidential documents,
regardless of the subjects nationality In return. Ihe United Stales declared Barbados a lax deductible site for
conventions and made it eligible lo receive funds from Puerto Rico. The United Stales also approved Hnrnadoa
as an oflshorc domicile for sales corporations and declared the premiums paid from Ihe United States lo insurance
companies on the island exempt from American federal excise tax. Barbados' main attraction has been its double
tax treaties with the United Slates. Canada. Germany and the United Kingdom. At present, other insurance centres
in the region hope to benefit from an exodus of captive insurance companies from Barbados,-"*
The Cayman Islands are the second most popular captive insurance domicile in the world, with 17% of Ihe
world's 2.300 captive insurance companies established there. In recent years. Ihe Grand Caymans have suffered
a slow-down in the formation of new captives, due to: (1) a slow down in the insurance market which has
S. Shapiro. "Luxembourg Captive Growth Continues". 24 Business Insurance (April 30, 1990) pp. 84-
85.
W. Dullforce. "Turning Point as Tax Haven Loses Charms", Financial Times (June 10, 1991) p. III/4.
^ "Approaching the Single Market". 4 ReActions 28-30 (April 1988),
• • A.M. Baker. "Liberalization of Trade in Services-The World Insurance Industry", in O. Gianni (ed.).
The Emerging Service Economy (Oxford and New York: Pergamon Press, 1987) pp. 193-211.
K J. Mclntyre, "Singapore Aiming to Be Insurance Centre", 20 Business Insurance (November 24 1986)
pp. 63-64.
S. Shapiro. "Guernsey Touts Its Advantages for Captives". 20 Business Insurance (October 20, 1986)
p. 108. The article contends that Guernsey surpasses all offshore domiciles, including Bermuda and
Gibraltar, for cost and efficiency.
N. Peagam. "The US Hits Barbados as a Captive Insurance Centre", Euromonev Treasure Islands
Supplement (May 1989) pp. 31-34.114
lessened the need for alternative insurance mechanisms; (2) increased competition from offshore domiciles, such
as Bermuda, and onshore American domiciles, particularly Vermont, have been encouraged by favorable state
regulations; and (3) favorable tax treaties that Barbados and Bermuda have had with the United States. Many of
the insurance policies written by Cayman Islands insurance companies are for liability coverage, including
products liability and medical malpractice. The expertise and experience already developed in the medical
malpractice field in Cayman is unsurpassed. Some of the positive characteristics of the island include political
stability, good communications, a nonbureaucratic environment, and reasonable solvency: all attributes of an
efficient market.-'"'
C. Financial Markets
Most of the world's capital markets started out serving one big borrower the government. Today's capital
markets have transcended far beyond such mundane origins. New securities and financial instruments are
constantly being developed. Even though the importance of government debt has diminished, government debt
issues remain the world's most abundant tradable securities. They provide the benchmark for other interest rates,
as well as for futures and options on many commodities, including money. Since at least the 16th Century,
governments have solicited funds from international investors. Since governments have an incentive to pay the
lowest 'W?,resl rale possible, not all government debt has historically been traded on national capital
markets. While most capitalistic countries have capital markets, certain financial centres have
become more successful than others.
Most financial exchanges were similar until large mainframe computers began being used in the 1960s to store
information on the institution's accounts. The first computer dealing system began in London. With the system,
merchant banking and insurance organizations advised each other of securities they wished to buy or sell and
agreed on a price. The internationalization of the markets and 24-hour trading has had three results: (1) securities
markets have become increasingly similar in structure and methods of working: (2) trading floors have become
largely obsolete; and (.1) banks ami large securities houses have become the main brokers and dealers.
Not all financial markets have kept pace and therefore are not created equal. The success of any financial market
will be judged on three factors: transparency.'" liquidity-™ and costs."'* Some countries have shot
**' P. Samson, "Conducting a Cayman Captive; Features of Cayman". 1 ReActions 25-27 (August 1990).
368 -The World Bond Bazaar", The Economist (September 21. 1991) p. 97.
•^ P. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York Random House, 1987) pp. 76-86. For
an interesting overview of the emergence and development of an international financial market see J.C.
Riley. International Government Finance and the Amsterdam Capital Market 1740-1815 (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1980).
• '' Even third-world countries are opening up to competition on this front. Sec S.E. Katz. "Financial
Service: A Rare GATT Success". Wall Street Journal Europe (October 11. 1991) p. 8.
•*•" J. Revcll. "Technology and Capital Markets", 7 World of Banking 14-19 (March/April 1988).
• * Frankfurt, New York. London. Paris and Tokyo have all recently had financial scandals. The difference
is that New York, London and to a slightly lesser degree Paris are seen to be fundamentally open and
honest; Tokyo and Frankfurt are not. "German Insider Trading: Behind the Times,: The Economist (July
13. 1991) p. 86. S.M. Lukow. "Survey Reveals Outsiders' Doubts about Tokyo Stock Exchange, 58
Tokyo Business Today 50-51 (March 1990). This survey was taken before a series of financial scandals
rocked Japan, lowering confidence further. See "The Rot in Japan." The Economist (July 13. 1991) p.
17-18. France also has its problems. S<£ J. Sasscen. "Can Paris Clean Up the Bourse?" 44 International
Management 16-22 (January 1989).us
themselves m the foot by passing laws which raise costs ' - or atemairvety by having utsuflicieni reguhwon
which has (he effect of lowering transparency
A trend toward financial deregulation began in 1975 when the United Stales abolished ihc payment of fixed
commissions lo broken for securities transactions. This change, coupled with I IK- increased use ot computers
fundamentally changed Wall Street by forcing brokerage firms 10 become competitive. Kleven year* later.
Great Bnlam dtd much the same thing and began lo actively compete with Wall Street.' The reforms were
called the 'Big Bang " The purpose behind the changes was to give London the opportunity lo compete with New
York and Tokyo on equal terms in the increasingly 24-hour-a-day global trading. The Big Bang brought
growth and development for international tutures and options exchanges. London expanded its market shore and
product line by introducing, for example Japanese bond futures. Pans. Amsterdam. Zurich. Barcelona, Stockholm,
Toronto. Singapore. Hong Kong. Sydney. Auckland, and Sao Paulo (now the world's Nggest opwn exchange) . Sydney. Au
all became international competitors.' The competition is fierce and getting fiercer. In IW2,
"• In 1991. the Milan bourse, after a stock scandal, was beset by labour problems Reform iv on lhe
agenda for January I. 1992. These problems led to 3 lack of liquidity when volumes more than halved.
G. Collins. "Milan Traders Set lo Strike Over Reforms". Wall Street Journal Hurooc (October 11. i>W|)
p 11 As part of the reforms all share trading has to he done through the bourse, beforr hanks often
matched buy and sell orders. This further reduced liquidity and transparency in the market.
^* Securities transactions, in theory, can he costly. These costs are a combination of communion*, taxes,
and market impact. In die 1990s, the control of costs will become increasingly important. C.
SinclairPouhon. "Culling Pension Fund Costs • A Direct Approach", 19 Benefit! A Comrjcnsatton
Internal tonal 11-13 (March 1990).
375 Regulated commissions, stamp or turnover taxes and non-screen based trading arc all examples of
measures which raise costs.
™ B. de Caires (ed.). The GT Guide to World Equity Markets 1987. (London: Euromoney, 1987) p. 500.
•^ G. Plan, "Big Board and Big Bang", 4 inlerMarket 7-12 (February 1987). The ways in which Great
Britain seeks to compete with America arc interesting. In the UK. the freedom from exchange controls
and the tax advantages that exist for those domiciled abroad have attracted rich foreigners in search of
ways to protect their money from the political turbulence of their native lands. These supply-side laws
have attracted a large number of rich Indians. Iranians. Lebanese, Greeks, Iraqis, Egyptians. Sudanese,
and other Africans. One great advantage the UK has over the US is the taxation rules, which are based
on domicile. An individual who has a non-UK domicile status can be resident in the UK without paying
UK tax on non-UK income and capital gains unless they are transferred lo the UK. The trick for these
people is to keep their assets offshore, perhaps in the Channel Islands, then only bring the capital into
the UK and use (hat lo provide living expenses. Such capital escapes tax as long as these residents do
not bring in income from abroad. M. Bose, "The Inscrutables: Foreign Financiers in the UK", 42
Director 54-57 (May 1989).
On October 27,1986. the UK securities industry introduced a series of rule changes commonly referred
to as the "Big Bang.' Elements of the Big Bang included: (I) the elimination of the schedule of
minimum commissions for each type and size of trade; (2) the removal of distinctions between
stockbrokers and jobbers; (3) permission for companies outside the stock exchange to become corporate
members, and (4) the introduction of SEAQ. a quote system based on the US National Association of
Securities Dealers' automated quotation service, to which SEAQ will he linked by satellite. W. Kay.
"Thunder on Throgmorton Street: The Big Bang Will Bring Explosive Change lo the City", Barren's
(September 29, 1986) pp. 13, 44-47.
K, Pierog, J. Stewart, S. Schoenfeld and R. Alpe. "International Trading Scene Booming", Futures; The
Magazine of Commodities & Options (September 1987) pp. 56-59. 88.116
Brussels. Milan, Helsinki and Vienna were set to become new competitors.-'*" Not surprisingly London, by
taking the most dramatic liberalization measures, started to lake a significant amount of business away from other
European exchanges. The European exchanges soon after began to reform by having their own "bangs"
with different levels of noise.-'" Changes may be loo late. Responses to these changes will be discussed in
Chapter 8.
I). Dispute Resolution
The massive expansion of global contacts in the 20lh Century has required the creation of dispute resolution
mechanisms for international business conflicts. The three most important international conventions on
international dispute resolution are the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, The Hague Convention of Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents, and
the Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in CivU and Commercial Matters.^ In addition,
these conventions compete with the International Chamber of Commerce's Rules on Arbitration.^'
Since panics have some latitude to do a certain amount of forum shopping, not surprisingly governments are
competing to offer the site for the arbitration hearings.-""' The countries must compete on three bases:
transparency, consistency of rulings, and costs. While arbitration institutions are found in many countries, there
are four major institutions: (1) the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris; (2) the American Arbitration
Association m New York; (3) the World Bank in Washington; and (4) the London Court of International
Arbitration.^ ' Other lesser international competitors include the Stockholm and Geneva Chambers of
Commerce. The International Chamber of Commerce's Court of Arbitration in Paris is still the largest
tribunal, hewing about .150 cases annually.-"" London, which had established a private arbitration institution,
the London Court of Arbitration, as far hack as 1892.™ again became a major competitor when the British
government passed Ihc UK Arbitration Act of 1979 and the London Court of Arbitration issued its New
-ion
• "" "Matif Is Braced for New Competition". Wall Street journal Europe (October 7. 1991) p. 11.
• " "European Futures and Options: Derivative Diplomacy". The Economist (September 21. 1991) pp. 98-
See generally, 1. Walter, Global Competition in Financial Services; Market Structure, Protection, and
Trade Lihcraliyation (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger. 1988).
"European Capital Markets - Alter the Big Bang, a Whole New Ball Game in the City". 12 Asian
Finance (September 15, 1986) pp. 102-104.
S.R. Swanson. "Comity, International Dispute Resolution Agreements, and the Supreme Court", 21 Law
& Policy in International Business 333-365 (1990) at 335.
• *• C.R. Seppala and D. Gogek. "Multi-Party Arbitration Under ICC Rules". 8 International Financial Law
Review 32-34 (November, 1989).
M. Bishop and G. Came, "EC Suffering From Ignorance of Market for Legal Services", Financial Times
(November 5, 1990) p. 16.
3R7
For an interesting article on the competitive process of nations with regard to arbitration «e M. Rowe.
"Arbitration - Getting the Best Deal", 7 International Financial Law Review 26-31 (March 1988).
R. Folsom, M.W. Gordon and J.A. Spanogle, Jr., International Business Transactions. Second Edition
(St. Paul: West Publishing, 1988) p. 467.
B. Thompson. "Resolving Business Conflict". 95 Canadian Banker 42-46 (May/June 1988) at 44.
-W Supra note 85 at 461.117
Arbitration Rules m 1981. The courts have suhscuuciuiv ruled that court coses arc to be waived if the decision
of the arbitration is brought n the U.K. courts.
E. Hokfcaf CoapaaJes
Holding companies are used for two reasons. First, a company has an identity separate tram us shim-holders.
Second, since shareholders and companies are usually taxed in dillerent ways, opportunities lo» ia\ planning
develop. In most countries the tax rales on companies and individuals vary. If individual taxation is high and an
investment is placed in a low tax country Ihe investor has a Urge incentive to delay dividend luyments or
repatriating profits. The holding company creates possibilities lor legitimate lax minimization h»ih in terms o(
deferral and in lams of tax avoidance Offshore areas with their low taxes, las exemptions and in some cases
zero lax status, have a vital role in international lax avoidance. A growing numbet of countries and lemkinci
have nude themselves available for the setting up of various types of holding companies and oftshore trusts
These include: Andorra. AnguilU. Antigua. Bahamas. Bahrain, Barbados. Bermuda, Ihe British Virgin Islands,
Campione. Channel Islands. Ihe Cook Islands. Cyprus. Gibraltar. The Grand Cayman Islands, Hong Kong.
Ireland, the Isle of Man. Liberia. Liechtenstein. Luxembourg, Madeira, Malta. Monaco, the Netherlands, the
Dutch Antilles. Ncvi.y Panama. Switzerland, the Turks and Caicos Islands. Ihe United Kingdom, the I Initrd StBiea
(in the state of Delaware) and Uruguay
International groups have increasingly made use of holding companies established in loreign counlnes in order
to optimize the lax costs of the group. This goal is principally achieved by using the holding company to reduce
foreign withholding taxes on capital flows from operating subsidiaries abroad lo the parent company and n
equalize Ihe income of subsidiaries established in the same country.
F. Coaapany Law
As will be seen in the next chapter, the trend throughout Ihe world u to tax capital less and leu. This u at lead
panially in response \o Ihe advenl of quicksilver capital and partly because ol the laws ol the W jurisdictions
listed above, which supply law which offers Ihe opportunity to minimize or avoid taxation. In Ihe remainder of
this chapter, company law as a supply side law shall be discussed. As discussed at the end of the previous
chapter, as firms carry out their operations on an increasingly international scale, the nationality' of many
companies becomes more and more unclear. This fact, taken in conjunction with lower and lower capital taxation
and higher and higher incentives lo attract inward investment, will lead to a blurring of the distinction between
holding companies and incorporations; firms will incorporale in countries which offer them an optimal
combination of low tax and low regulation. This place will, in short, be the country which supplies them with
the most efficient law.
A.L. Marriott. "Arbitrating International Commercial Disputes in Ihe United Kingdom", 44 Arbitration
Journal 3-13 (September 1989).
The countries listed have been compiled from brochures of various commercial enterprises who sell off-
the-shelf pre-regislered companies and other tax advice. These companies regularly advertise in the
classified sections of international newspapers and financial and business magazines. One company.
OCRA, whose business address is a post office box in the Isle of Man. states that they act "for a wide
range of clients from large multinational companies lo family businessmen lo private individuals.
OCRA's clients are engaged in their own country or internationally in many areas of activity such as:
The Arts, Agriculture, Banking, Brokerage. Chemicals, Construction. Distribution. Electronics,
Exporting, Energy, Engineering, Fund management. Film Production, Hotels, Importing. Insurance,
Investment Advice, Manufacturing, Natural Resources, Oil and Gas, The Professions, Property. Project
Financing, Retailing. Shipping, Show Business, Textiles, Trading. Unit Trusts." Also mentioned in this
brochure are Patents. Technical Know-How Licences, Franchises, Factoring and Confidential Invoice
Discounting.
• K. Simon, "Foreign Holding Companies and the Luxembourg Rule: Sweden", 44 Bulletin for
International Fiscal Documentation 395-99 (August/September 1990).118
In Europe (and the rest of the world), it is not inconceivable that one country will completely eliminate profits
tax and liberalize its company laws solely to attract the chartering fees and other benefits which could be
derived from attracting European incorporations. ' Other than for sentimental or historical reasons there is
no reason for companies to retain their perceived present national identities. Today a large portion of many
companies' operations, sales and perhaps more important, their shareholders lie outside of the national boundaries
of many companies' countries of incorporation. There is an old saying that money holds no emotions. It is
unlikely that shareholders will allow a company to offer them less control over management, pay more taxes and
incur greater expenses than it needs to forever. This will be the focus of Chapter 8.
Change is in (he wind. In search of efficient law and efficient outcomes, a great deal of paper shuffling and travel
has and will continue lo take place in (he future. Moreover, there is little that governments can do about using
supply-side laws, short of unanimous harmonization. The purpose of this chapter was to illustrate some of the
areas in which countries have competed against each other in order to create jobs and attract revenue. In doing
so. certain countries have created more efficient law for many cross-border users. While the purpose of KJI/IJ;
many of the above mentioned supply-side laws is to minimize or avoid taxation, the primary purpose for
ju/7>/ymx these laws is in order to create employment and lo collect licensing fees and indirect lax revenues.
This chapter concludes with a caveat: nationally efficient law and internationally efficient law are different. In
some cases there is a trade-off. Competition for liberality cannot be a good thing if industry is under-regulated
to the extent that minimum social standards arc abrogated, fraud can be pervasive or that resources are
undcrpriccd. The BCCI scandal demonstrates that liberality can be used to undermine legitimate national
authority. Minimal social standiirds and asset underpricing occurred in the 1970s, when Mexico, Romania
mi
As indicated above, the other benefits which accrue lo the country with the most liberal company laws
include increasing the size of its capital market and the amount of employment for educated workers
such us lawyers, accountants, investment bankers and their staffs. Because some companies will elect
to maintain small offices there, real estate prices would increase. Besides producing substantial
chartering fees, national revenues would be augmented by increased income, property and employment
taxes. Finally, there is also the possibility that the number of shareholders' meetings and business trips
would increase. This would increase the revenue and employment associated with the travel industry.
•JQC
• • It should be clearly understood that when discussing attracting corporate charters, this is not meant to
imply thill any manufacturing or management jobs would necessarily move in the process of changing
the company's country of incorporation.
• Some concents in the area of lax company law come from W.L. Carey, "Federalism and Corporate
Law: Reflections on Delaware". 88 Yale Law Journal 663-682 (1974): D. Schwartz. "A Case for
Federal Chartering of Corporations". 31 Business Lawyer 1125-1138 (1976): K.E. Scott. "The Dual
Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation". 30 Stanford Law Review 1-24 (1977): R.K.
Winter. Jr. "State Law. Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation". 6 Journal of Legal
Studies 251-292 (1977); and P. Dodd and R. Lcftwich. "The Market for Corporate Charters: 'Unhealthy
Competition' vs. 'Federal Regulation.'" 53 Journal of Business 266-283 (1980). Some praise for
competition in corporate regulation comes from S. Fischel, "The 'Race lo the Bottom' Revisited:
Reflections on Recent Developments in Delaware's Corporation Law". 76 Northwestern University Law
Review 913-934 (1982): B.D. Baysinger and H.N. Butler. "'Race to the Bottom' vs. 'Climb to the Top:'
The ALI Project and Uniformity in Corporate Law", 10 Journal of Corporation Law 431-462 (1985);
and R. Romano, "The State Competition Debate in Corporate Law", 8 Cardozo Law Review 709-757
(1985).
This has led to an international concern for financial regulation. "Group of Seven Stress Need To
Combat Recent Scandals in World Financial Markets". International Herald Tribune (October 14, 1991)
p. 1.119
and tone African countries supplied environmental regulations m order to attract pollution creating
industnes.-"* These types of law. however "liberal." cannot he called efficient since they do not lower kmg-
cuon or agency costs and they destroy trust, government legitimacy and surely of outcome.
The cent of development and creating or preserving wealth can be high. In pan. each country will have to decide
for itself if it wants to provide efficient domestic law or efficient intemaliorul law. The existence of efficient
international law does however change the national equation. It does this because countries have to take into
greater account the desires of marginal users of their law Know ing that there arc marginal users, countries must
decide if they want to retain marginal users hy liberalizing law or let them go and tighten the taw. One might
find that there is a small country-big country (or rich and poor) divide in supply-side laws.
It is notable that small countries tend to be the largest suppliers of supply side la*. One can speculate that this
too may be efficient In small countries fewer people, all things being equal, tend to use the laws. This means
that passing laws is more expensive in smaller countries relative to larger ones. Attracting more wen amorutei
the cost of the laws over a larger base. In large countries, unless there is a large exodus, less consideration has
to be paid toward marginal users of (he laws.
For example, as a result of deliberately laxer environmental laws, many American companies moved
their factories to Mexico to make asbestos textiles and to Romania to make benzidine dyes. Parts of
Africa were used as a toxic waste dump. F. Caimcross. "Cleaning Up", Economist Survey (September




Efficient tax policies must take into account modem reality:
Within a world where money flows at the speed of light, capital
is difficult to lax. Moreover, we now live in a world where
workers can (elccommutc to an office located anywhere in the
world. This makes labour significantly more mobile. The days
when money and skilled people were tightly bound to a country
are gone. To highlight the implications of these changes, this
chapter discusses the aim of the European 1992 programme,
which is to provide a legal and business climate which offers
linns equal opportunities throughout the European Economic
Community, and compares it lo what the countries are actually
doing: becoming tax havens from their partner countries by
supplying favourable tax laws and inward investment policies.
Country by country variations in tax rules and rales provide
firms wilh a menu of new choices and cause them to alter their
mode of operation by offering an arbitrage situation wilh (both
intended and unintended) economic and financial incentives.
This chapter offers a market analysis of how country to country
variations in lax and investment laws redirects investment
patterns and shows how individuals, companies and countries
may benefit from exploiting these areas. The chapter concludes
by asking whether it makes much sense to tax capital under
these circumstances and discusses the implications of the
changing world for public finance.121
7: 5«pp/y 5i</e Tor
"Land is a subject which cannot be removed. »hercas stock easily ma>. The propnctoi of land
is necessarily a cilucn of the particular country in which Ihc c-Oatc lies The prupnctin ol the
slock is properly a citizen of the world, and not necessarily attached in any particular country.
He would be apt to abandon the country in which he was exposed to a vexatious inquisition,
in order lo be awcaMcd lo a burdensome tax. and would remove his stock to some other country
when he could either carry on his business, or enjoy his fortune at his COM.-. By removing his
stock he would put an end to all the industry which il had maintained in the country he left.
Slock cultivates land, stock employs labour. A tax which tended lo drive away stock Irom any
particular country, would so fai tend to dry up every source ol revenue, both lo the sovereign
and lo the society.
In a world in which money and people arc increasingly mobile, lax revenues arc hardci lo obtain and main. In
this context il is useful lo outline how in traditional theory governments arc supposed lo operate under a dilferenl
set of constraints than firms. In 1961. Ronald Ctase wrote Ihat: "The government is. in a sense, a super-firm (bul
of a very special kind) since it is able lo influence the use of Ihc factors of production by administrative decision.
Bul the ordinary firm is subject lo checks in its operations because of Ihc competition of other firms which might
administer the same activities at lower cost, and also because there is Ihc alternative ol market iransaclKNU
against organization within the firm if ihc administrative costs become lo great. The govemmem is able, il il
wishes, to avoid the market altogether, which a firm can never do. Coasc was right in theory, but his
theory of the power of government, like his theory of (he firm has been outdated by technology.
Avoiding the market in the modern world has become increasingly dilUull and expensive A> lung as
information flows freely through written sources, satellites, radio waves, television signals, and telephone wires,
the govemmenrs ability lo avoid the rigors of a free markel are extremely limned, as the lormcr leaders ul
former east bloc countries. Rumania. Albania, and Mongolia, and the monolithic leadership of Xcibia. Cuba,
North Korea and Myanmar (Burma) will certainly attest to. Because markets cannot reasonably be avoided, and
labour and capital are (at least partially) mobile, governments must lo some extent compete with each other for
investment capital and precious tax revenues. This chapter will explore the global and inier-governmenlal
competition (with a special emphasis on the European Community) for personal and corporate income lax
revenues.
5eciio/i /; Tares and fne European C0mmiiKif)>
The aim of the 1992 programme is to allow European businesses lo opcraic freely anywhere wilhin the European
Community without constraints. The intent is lo create a common market where companies operale under similar
business conditions throughout the Communily. Since European companies have lo face both national and
international competition, it is important that they should be able to do so on the broadest possible terms of
equality and neutrality. Large variations in member stales" tax laws make this goal impossible. Bul the 1992
programme does not address the harmonization of most aspects of personal and corporate lax law. The most
visible and best understood business tax is the corporate tax rale. The corporate lax rale wilhin Ihc European
Community currently ranges from 10 per cent in Ireland for some types of investment to 56 per cent in some
Lander in Germany. Under these lax rate differences, an investment in Germany must eam almost twice the pre-
tax return to be equivalent lo an investment in Ireland. Since most financing decisions are dependant on
5QO
• * A. Smith, An Inquiry into ihe Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations (1776) Reprinl (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1976) at 800.
*** R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost" (1961). Reprinted in The Law, the Market and the Firm.
(Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press. 1988) p. 117.
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the proposed project's Lax impact, investors will continue to use the laws of various countries against each other
on a wide-scale basis.
As indicated in the preceding chapter, companies have considerable latitude to choose from the menu of the
various national laws found around the world. Most investors are responding to this freedom by trying to profit
from globally available differences in tax and investment treatment. Most countries have some element of being
a "tax haven" since a tax haven is defined as "a jurisdiction: (a) where there are no relevant taxes; (b) where
taxes are levied only on internal taxable events, but not at all. or at low rate, on profits from foreign sources; or
(c) where special tax privileges are granted to certain types of taxable persons or events."^ In Europe, while
no countries fall under the first definition, most countries fall under either the second or the third definition.
Perhaps even more importantly, even within the EC. various member states are supplying laws in order to make
themselves tax havens from their European Community partners. 3
Investors have naturally exploited regime difference to take advantage of variations in intra-country lax laws. To
do this they have spent a lot of time and money to hire accountants, consultants and tax lawyers to look for
loopholes, do comparative investment shopping and change their legal and operating structures to minimize their
tax bills. Countries feel as if they have lost much needed tax revenue to cut-throat competitors and have reacted
by entering into a competitive Ndding process for investment and corporate and other tax revenues.
In Europe, this competitive process must he compared with the European Commission's stated intention to create
a common market where companies operate under similar business conditions throughout the European
Community. The Treaty of Rome, which created the European Community effective January 1. 1958. aims at
the formation of a common market in which goods, persons, services, and capital can move freely. A fundamental
premise that underlies the creation of the EC is that, by strengthening the whole, belter safeguards can be created
for preserving the integrity of the constituent parts. It was assumed that no contribution would be made to the
Community's welfare if the inequitable and distorlivc tax structures of some members were imposed on other
members.
Background
The wide array of company, investment, tax and labour laws in Europe gives latitude and provides both incentives
and disincentives to businesses when they select the location for their companies' main incorporation, the site
of (heir production activities and to a certain extent the countries in which to pay certain taxes. -" This
^ B. Spit/.. International Tax Planning. Second Edition. (London: Bulterworths, 1983) at 31-52.
**" With varying degrees of effectiveness. Belgium has its coordination centres; Denmark has holding
companies; France has incentives for headquarter operations; Great Britain, Ireland and the Netherlands
allow consolidated balance sheets under certain conditions; Greece has special provisions for shipping
companies and offshore branches; Ireland has a 10 percent corporate tax and export sales relief for
certain activities; Luxembourg has special provisions for holding companies, financial holding
companies, bank holding companies, investment advisory companies, milliardaire holding companies,
investment funds, unit tnists, variable capital share investment funds, fixed capital share investment
funds and investment advisory companies; the Netherlands has special provisions for investment
companies and groups of companies; Portugal has provisions for groups of companies, holding
companies, leasing companies and investment companies: and West Germany has provisions for groups
of companies and the GmbH & Co. KG. which if structured correctly is practically exempt from
German corporate tax. Only Italy and Spain lack of these types of provisions.
S. Cnossen, "The Case for Tax Diversity in the European Community". 34 European Economic Review
471-479(1990!.
*"* As a result of new competition. European companies will intensify their battle for competitiveness. With
none of the existing non-tariff obstacles, increasing attention will be focused on labour costs. The
mobility of labour will be stimulated by investment opportunities, career opportunities, and multinational123
amounts 10 an arbitrage situation 1M companies. Given this freedom u is unlikely irui companies will choose k>
remain primarily organized and incorporaied in countries where they have to pay higher ttxes. give NharertoUiers
less control and workers more rights, arc subject to unfriendly takeovers or have less access hi cheaper financing
than they have lo.
Companies use differences m company, tax and other laws for their own advantage. This has been going tin for
hundreds of years. Countries that wish lo retain companies in their current forms will he forced to compete
with their neighbouring countries which are eager to attract investment and employment within then borders by
providing companies with a more favourable business environment. The limitation of a government's freedom
to act in an environment with compebUve neighbouring jurisdictions is illustrated b> the following example. TV
Four Seasons Hotel chain wanted lo build in Beverly Hills. California. Beverly Hills did not want the additional
traffic that would come by having an additional hotel, so they denied it a building permit. So neighbouring Uw
Angeles issued a building permit for a sue just across the street, on us side ol the boundary In Ihr future, Los
Angeles will enjoy the additional sales tax revenues and Beverly HUls will gel the unwarned trailic
Beverly HUls must ask itself whether it may have won the bottle, but lost the war. Other governmental action*
have similar effects. Hard as they may try. governments generally cannot stop entrepreneurial activity; usually
the best thai they can do is to send the (unable) activity elsewhere.
Markets for lnve.stnwol
In a world where investors have a wide-ranging choice on where lo invest, countries are falling over Ihcnudvet
to create an attractive business climate. The easiest way is lo lower corporate tax rales and grant lax concenkMU
and other investment incentives.
There are various interrelated markets for investment. As companies invest and duinvest they are faced with •
tradeoff between lax regimes, corporate structures, access lo capital markets, various types ol government
inducements and deterrents, available infrastructures, transportation and communications, and the quantity. ijuality
and the cost of the labour market and professional services. When looking al this lisl one thing is clear: the least
important item on the list by a wide margin is the tax regime. Of paramount importance is the ability to produce
products and services (including financial services) in an efficient and profitable manner. Corporate structures,
infrastructure and (he available work force are integral parts in this calculation. No amount of tax concessions
can make up for shortcomings in these areas. In order lo pay corporate taxes a business must be profitable in the
first place. From this perspective, the tax rate and (he place where taxes will he paid will always be of secondary
importance once an entry decision has been made.
The 1992 programme aims to promote increased cross-border trade within the community and decrease the need
for companies lo have complete independent operations in every country. As barriers lo cross-border trade fall
and pan-European product standards are introduced, and it becomes easier lo supply national markets from
abroad, tax consideraliores are likely to become more important. Rather than having duplicate functions in various
countries, companies arc increasingly creating Community-wide operations with single manufacturing, marketing
education programs. G. Bccher. "EC Social Policy and the Financial/Trade Barriers". 18 Benefits &
Compensation International (March 1989) pp. 18-20.
See R.B. Ekelund. Jr. and R.D. Tollison. "Mercantilist Origins of the Corporation". 11 Bell Journal of
Economics 715-720 (1980).
"California: Think Middling". The Economist (August 10, 1991) p. 34.
Obviously the amount of taxes to be paid is an important part of the decision whether to enter a market
or not. Higher tax rates affect the riskiness of the proposed endeavour. The higher the lax rate the lower
the expected after lax return. The downside risk remains primarily with the investor, profits arc shared
with the tax man.124
and distribution operations. These operations will not necessarily be in the same country. The tax systems provide
some incentives lo place these groups in separate countries.
Sec/io/i 2: 7ax Po/ic/es -4/fec/i/tg Companies
There is a wide array of tax policies affecting companies which distort inveslment patterns. These include
personal lax rates, the ability to consolidate balance sheets, value added taxes, excise taxes, withholding taxes,
transfer pricing policies, debt versus equity policies and corporate tax rates The fact that there are some
significant differences in tax rales and tax policies means thai more strategic tax planning will take place in a
post-1992 Europe. Additionally, the EC struggle lo harmonize indirect taxes (value added, excise and
withholding taxes) is likely to fade into the background in the coming years. When this happens, the important
battleground is likely to shift to variations in corporate and personal taxes.
Consolldultd Balance Sheets
When choosing where to locate, a parent corporation does not relish the possibility of paying corporate taxes on
profits which were previously taxed in the country where the profits were realized. These "soak-up taxes" can
occur when the profils of a foreign subsidiary corporation are repatriated to the parent corporation and the
corporate lax rale in the country of the parent is greater lhan the corporate tax rate in the host country of the
foreign subsidiary. In Europe, at present only the Neiherlands and Denmark universally allow a wide range
of companies to consolidate their balance sheets. Upon receiving permission from Ihe Minister of Finance. French
companies may also consolidate Iheir balance sheets. This can help eliminate "soak-up taxes" by allowing the
parent corporation lo consolidate the world-wide profils from all its subsidiary companies. Consolidation allows
profils derived from both higher and lower lax countries lo offset each other at least to some extent. The other
European member stales partially soak-up dividends repatriated from lower tax countries, as they arc not off-set
by the lax credits which are otherwise obtained from the dividends repatriated from higher tax countries. This
is Ihe worst of all possible worlds.
To compensate for this type of lax treatment, companies carefully repatriate dividends from higher to lower tax
countries in order to pay less or no taxes and are generally able lo allocate their resources in manners which
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^^ Alter two decades of deliberation on this topic, the EC adopted three measures to decrease fiscal
impediments lo market integration: (1) a directive lhat will defer the taxation of capital gains from share
exchanges in cross-border, intra-EC mergers and acquisitions; (2) a directive lhat will eliminate multiple
luxation of profils dislributcd from a subsidiary in one member stale to its parent in another: and (3)
a convention designed lo ensure thai profit adjustments made lo sales between related companies in
different member states will not result in double taxation. Although proposals for tax consolidation and
for the harmonization of corporale lax rates arc under consideration, these three measures represent
substantially the entire framework for Ihe EC's corporale taxation law. See D.C. Donald, "Taxation for
a Single Market: European Community Legislation on Mergers. Distributed Profits, and Inlracompany
Sales", 22 Law A Policy in International Business 37-73 (1991); and J. Fox. "European Community Tax
Directives". International Tax Journal (Spring 1991) pp. 45-50,
" For example, X corporation is located in country A. Y corporation is X corporation's 100% owned
subsidiary and is located in country B. The corporate lax rate in country A is 50%. The corporate tax
rate in country B is 40%. When ihe profits of Y corporation are seni lo X corporation, country A
"soaks-up" ihe 10% lax rale differential. Another somewhat related situation occurs when "phantom lax
credits" are not recognized under a double taxation treaty. A "phantom tax credit" is a credit for taxes
that would have been owed but for some type of tax forgiveness or investment tax credit. In this
example. Y corporation was given a lax incentive that precluded it from paying the entire 40% lax on
its profitable operation which would have been otherwise due in country B. Since there is no agreement
between the two countries, country A is happy lo lax the entire repatriated dividend at its 50% corporate
tax rate.123
avod this bom happening. This process is inefficient smce il cm prevent companies from allocating money
within (heir worldwide organization to its best economic use.
Transfer Pricag
Today much of what is actually 'traded' across borders are inungihle services - research, enginernng. design,
financial, management, marketing, and sales - transferred wiihm global corporations trom one location to
another"*'* The increasingly global nature of the firm makes matters more difficult for the tax man To
illustrate, ku try to follow the specific monetary flows of one product: Genera! Motors' Pontiac If Mans
automobile. 'Of the $20.(100 paid to GM. about $6,000 goes to South Korea for routine labour ami assembly
operations. $3,500 10 Japan for advanced components (engines, trtnaxles. and electronics). SI.MX) to Wm
Germany for styling and design engineering. $80() lo Taiwan. Singapore, and Japan lor small components. $500
to Britain for advertising and marketing services, and about $1(10 to Ireland and Harhadoti tor data processing.
The rest - less than $8,000 - goes to strategists in Detroit, lawyers and hankers in New Yuri, lobbyists in
Washington, insurance and health care workers all over the country, and General Motors shareholders • miwl of
whom live in the United Stales, but an increasing number of whom are foreign nalionalv ' Now assuming
that GM used its own fully-owned subsidiaries to develop the Le Mans (an unreasonable assumption (in reason*
given in chapter 3). GM must now apportion us profits throughout its worldwide web of subsidiaries.
When locating various functions of businesses in various countries, businesses must constantly ask themselvc*
how to split the profits of their enure operation between Us parts. Companies have obvious incentive* lo report
as great a profit as possible in lower lax countries and as little as possible in higher tax countries. National lax
laws require that goods and services be internally priced when moving Inrni one subsidiary lo another This
process is called "transfer pricing."*'* Tax authorities need a 'transfer price lo assess the profitability of the
national operations. *
As the amount of world trade and intra-firm trade increases this issue takes on increased importance. " Tax
problems arising from international and inter-company transactions have increased as multinational organizations
*'' Various examples of this can be found in the articles cited in the next section.
*'2 R.B. Reich. "Who is Them?" 69 Harvard Business Review 77-88 (March-April. 1991) at 84.
4'3 R.B. Reich, The Work of Nations (New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1991) p. 113.
""^ Transfer pricing can be defined as the exchange of goods or services within a company at a
market-determined price. D.P. Keegan and P.D. Howard, "Making Transfer Pricing Work for Services",
165 Journal of Accountancy 96-103 (1988).
*" The concept of transfer pricing is that, within a manufacturing firm, one department, on transferring its
output to another department, should regard this transfer as a sale. There are four alternative transfer
pricing policies: (1) cost price: (2) cost plus a profit; (3) market price; and (4) dual pricing. In cost
pricing, the disclosure and isolation of adverse variances at the transfer point will provide an incentive
to the transferor to improve or maintain efficiency, benefiting both transferee and transferor. The cost
plus a profit method is similar to cost price, but the transferor department will obtain a profit on
transfers at total or standard cost and recover some or all of its fixed costs. When the market price
method is adopted, the transferor department is in direct competition with outside suppliers. With a dual
pricing policy, the transferor department can be allowed to sell al a high transfer price while the
transferee is allowed a lower price. Difficulties arise as there is rarely a single transfer price to meet
every need. A. Galway. Transfer Pricing - Choice". Management Decisions (March 1990) pp. 18-21.
*'^ Moreover, an analysis of the real implications of the tax-saving motivation behind intra-firm trade
shows that, if the transfer price does not lie within loo narrow a range, the intra-firm export of final
goods will always be perverse. C. Kant, "Perverse Intra-Firm Trade". 56 Southern Economic Journal
233-235 (1989).126
and their volume of business have grown. Problems arise when prices charged by one member of a multinational
enterprise group to another do not necessarily represent the result of the free play of market forces. Not
surprisingly. "Transfer pricing is emerging as the issue of the 1990s.
Opportunities for (ax planning become available because there is no one correct transfer price. Businesses can
choose from a wide range of commercially justifiable transfer prices." While allocating internal Dricing is
a fairly complex process for tangible items, the questions which arise over intangible items such as
research and development, patents and copyrights, marketing, distribution, goodwill and the new debate
over brand-name accounting make transfer pricing even more difficult. This complicated situalion arguably gives
companies expanded powers for picking the transfer prices with the greatest tax advantages. As a result,
companies place the minimum "commercially justifiable" profit in higher tax countries.
One can conclude thai businesses should locate valuable intangible property in low tax areas. This makes the
location of the manufacturing operations relatively less significant than a generation ago, since today one can
reasonably argue that the manufacturing process itself adds little to a company's profits. To businesses this
pricing policy is seen as an important opportunity for tax planning: to the tax collector this process is seen as a
form of lax evasion. There is little that the tax collector can do as long as pricing policies are consistent
and the pricing is documented and commercially justifiable.
One should remember that with the advent of the microchip and modern communications systems, numbers
representing money can be transferred by managers to almost anywhere in the world at the speed of light. This
ability to transmit money across national boundaries can lead to shifting physical capital stock to multiple
locations around the world. It also reduces the tax man's ability to monitor both money and profits. This in turn
is forcing legislators and regulators to carefully rethink how, why and whether they can or should impose
economic, regulatory and political constraints on investors.
H.M. Liebman and P. De Bocck. "The International Transfer Pricing of Services". Tax Management
International (July 8. 1988) pp. 291-99.
M. Burge, R.M. Hammer and M.F. Urse, "Transfer Pricing: Part 1: New York Seminar Discusses
Disclosure, Penalties and Control", 17 International Tax Review 1-8 (1991) at 1.
J. Ronen and K.R. Balnchandran. "An Approach to Transfer Pricing Under Uncertainty". 165 Journal
of Accounting 300-14 (1988).
See R.F. Reilly. "The Valuation of Intangible Assets and Intellectual Properties", Buyouts &
Acquisitions (January-February 1988) pp. 24-30.
Owning a company no longer means what it once did. Accountants use the term goodwill to signify the
difference in the "net worth" of the shareholder's equity and the value of the capital assets of the firm.
Thus becomes increasingly important as a firm's intellectual capital becomes more important than its
physical capital. An illustration of the importance of goodwill can be shown by General Electric's (a
United States registered company, mi relation with the British registered company with the same name)
"acquisition" of the investment banking firm Kidder. Pcabody. Upon acquiring Kidder. Peabody's assets,
GE attempted to exert its control by imposing stricter reporting requirements, reducing commissions and
tightening cost accounting. As a result, many of Kidder Peabody's most talented personnel departed for
more congenial surroundings. Supra note 15 at 103.
Germany, for example, is questioning the amount of business which German banks are filtering through
Dublin with its flat 10% corporate profits tax because the profits do not get further taxed in Germany.
S. Laurie, "Keeping Dublin Clean". The International (September 1991) pp. 69-72 at 70.127
Debt Ve
Closely related to ihc transfer pricing issue is Ihc question erf how lo finance a multinational company. Companies
have a wide amount of discretion to place varying amounts ol debt and equity in then various subsidiaries. Since
interest payments are deductible against current income in every country, companies have an incentive lo place
as much debt as possible in higher in countries and as much equity as possible in low la* countries. Tax
authorities are aware of companies loading debt onto subsidiaries in high la* countries These "Ihmlv capitalized"
companies have been attacked and poroorts of the interest payments have been disallowed American and
Japanese authorities generally attack subsidiaries with more than three parts debt to one part equity "
European authorities have yet to devise hard and fast rules Great Britain's Inland Revenue has sought out views
on the subject and the Germans have issued discussion papers German lax law provides one way around the thin
capitalization problem. Banks in Germany receive tax relief on then investments in preference shares This tax
benefit can be passed on to the companies which issue the shares. This reduces a company's COM of financing
The detn-to-equify ratio is lowered under this scheme since preference shares count as equity. •*
Corporate Tax Rales
The reduction of |lhe personal and corporalel income la» rate is probably the mmi dramatic manifestation of
the wave, of tax reform that swept the world in the 1980s, as well as perhaps the moil important." * Under
the current international system, higher corporate ta* rales induce companies to "source their income in lower la*
countries This has become apparent to European corporate la* planners (see Table 1 below) Germany. Belgium.
France, and Denmark have recently cited competition as the reason for lowering their corporate Uu rates. •*
Tabk I (See Appendi* I)
The American treasury is so concerned ahoul over-leveraged corporations thai in the beginning of 1992
it began publicly discussing the elimination of the tax differential between debt and equity. Additionally
it is also discussing the elimination of the double-taxation of corporate profits and the dividends paid
to shareholders. This would neutralize the decision between retaining earnings or paying dividends.
"This Week in Business", The Economist. (January 11, 1992) p. 53.
R. Waters. "Chaos More Likely Than Harmony." Financial Times (March 13. 1989) p. 28.
C.E. McLure. Jr.. "Appraising Tax Reform", in MJ. Boston and C.E. McLure. Jr. (eds.). World Tax
Reform. (San Francisco: ICS Press 1990) pp. 279-88 at 282.
See T. Dickson. "Belgium Pleads with IMF over Tax Competition", Financial Times (May 15, 1990)
p. 2; D. Buchan, "Belgian Coalition Tries lo Hold the Line on Spending." Financial Times (July 28.
1989) p. 2; : C. Parkes. "Mollemann pledges to cut Corporate Tax", Financial Times (September 6.
1991) p. 16: and "France Drafts Budget Designed to Spur Growth", International Herald Tribune
(September 12. 1991) p. 5.128
There is an obvious downward spiral in corporate lax rates. Perhaps an equilibrium point will be reached, but
it is impossible lo see - short of zero - how low this point may be. This downward spiral may eventually
convince governments of their need to harmonize corporate tax rates.^"
There is little chance that the European Community will end this downward pressure in the near future through
rale harmonization. Tax tales at between 45-55 per cent, is already hopelessly outdated and unrealistic.
In addition, one should note that tax rales alone mean little without a basis of comparison on how much tax is
due This is an important question since no two corporate lax regimes are consistent. Both accounting rales and
the basis on which taxes arc calculated differ on a country by country basis. This ensures that companies in
different countries, with similar levels of sales and costs, will have the same level of "profits." This is why there
seems to be little correlation between the lax rate (see Table 1) and the amount of corporate tax collected (see
Tables 2 and 3).
Supply Side Economics
The country which has the lowest corporate tax rates has a lot to cajn. Companies will attempt lo source as much
income in the lowest tax country as commeaially justifiable. " At the very least, companies could source
intangible ilems which are not generally directly associated with real economic activities in countries with the
lowest tax rales since one can commeaially justify that a portion of the profits are attributable to Ihese legal
papers and accounting ilems. These intangible items include: patents, goodwill and brand names. Additionally,
some profits could probably be attributed lo the country of the parent company's incorporation. At this point
supply-side laws and supply-side taxes make a winning combination. Il would make sense for a country with the
most liberal company laws lo also have the lowest corporate tax rale. Moreover, supply-side countries would
almost certainly obtain a large windfall since companies would happily volunteer lo pay the taxes owed, with
little collection cost or lax monitoring. This process proves to be one of the better cases for supply-side
In 1992. eight European countries have their rales bunched in the 33-39 percent range. Sweden, which
has already applied for European Community membership, has announced thai it will slash its corporate
tax rale lo 25 percent in 1993, R. Taylor. "Sweden Takes Sharp Centre-Righi Turn", Financial Times
(November 13, 1991) p. 2. This is less than one-half of the 1990 r.ile of 52 percent. I. Hansson and C.
Stuart, "Sweden: Tax Reform in a High-Tax Environment", in MJ. Boskin and C.E. McLure. Jr. (eds.).
World Tax Reform (San Francisco: 1CS Press 1990) pp. 127-148 at 147.
The 1986 U.S. tax reform could be characterized as the initial aggressive shot which started a war of
international lax competition. Il introduced substantial reductions in U.S. statutory corporate and
personal income tax rates which created a lax rate differential lo which other countries had lo respond.
Tax reform also inlnxluccd significant structural changes into the taxation of foreign source income of
U.S. taxpayers, which increased the importance of international differences in tax rates. Other
governments have rapidly introduced similar reforms. Peggy Musgrave, for example, recommends lhat
Ihixse nations thai have economies linked by trade and factor flows should work toward an international
lax order to align or neutralize those taxes most apt to affect international resource allocation. The
corporation tax in the international arena should he recognized as a means of claiming a tax share of
income accruing to investors from abroad. See J. Bossons and P.B. Musgrave, "International Tax
Competition: The Foreign Government Response in Canada and Other Countries: Comments in Session
on "Foreign Reactions lo U.S. Tax Reform". National Tax Journal (September 1988) pp. 347-355.
365-366 and J.G. Hcimann. "Global Harmonization Required to Prevent Regulatory Arbitrage",
Financier (May 1988) pp. 29-33. ,.,• ... • -> . . , •• , ...
**" D. Waller, "Corporate Taxation Escapes ECs Single Market Net". Financial Times (January 15.1990)
p. 2.
*•" C. Kant, "Multinational Finns and Government Revenues". 42 Journal of Public Economics 135-147
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economics: decreasing tax rates to the lowest me will greatly iixreasc the revenue received hy the supply-side
country
Conversely, this process should greatly lower ihc amounts ol corporate tames collected in hmher tax countries.
As long as the coa of "moving" to another country is less than the net present value ol the taxes that could he
saved, companies that operate in high lax countries will lind it beneficial to open some kind ol structure which
includes a second low tax country simply for tax nunimuauon purposes. This will level the playing held to some
client with competitors who pay lets tax.
Witakoidi*! Taxes aad tk* Taxation of lavesnarat Uroat
The existence of withholding taxes can also influence investment Rows. In IW. the tvuropMM I
proposed a 15% withholding ux on interest and dividend payments. So iar it has mat
resistance. Withholding taxes are inhibitions to a truly single market since they arc an indiscrete attempt
to lax foreigners. If interest, dividends and royally payments are made to domestic companies, withholding un
are generally not due. If these same payments are made to foreign companies, including companies from other
Community member stales, withholding taxes ore generally due.
Countries which use the residence pnnciple for cross-border interest income do not tax dividends in the country
where the interest was earned, but let the tax aulhonlics of the place of residence try to collect taxes. The
residence pnnciple lends to equalize interest rales across countries dcspiie dilfcrenl capital income lax rota. One
problem with this principle is that it does not work well if investors are dishonest, as they can almost alwayi
more easily conceal Ihcv foreign interest income than their domestic intcresl income.*
The lack of agreement over withholding taxes and differences in lax systems is an incentive to own invcatmenM
outside the country of one's residence. Investors who wish to avoid tax payments will increase their demand for
shares and bonds in non-withholding lax countries. This has the positive effect of driving up security phcei and
lowering a company's cost of issuing debt and equity. In this respect, securities not subject to withholding (axes
might be analyzed as a type of lax free security. Tax free securities benefii different investors in different ways.
Some investors (those who avoid paying the mosl tax on the income) stand to benefit more than others.
Investment Subsidies and Incentives
Almost every government in the world is eager lo attract local investment and the money and jobs which
investment brings. Not surprisingly, governments compete actively for inward investment.
Table II (See appendix II after this chapter)
Where enacted in Europe, withholding tax rates range from 10 percent in Portugal to 3.1 percent in
Ireland. In the EC, there is a nine-three country split on the withholding lax issue. The three no votes
are Luxembourg, Great Britain and The Netherlands. Finance Minister Jacques Poos, articulated
Luxembourg's opposition to withholding taxes by suiting: "My country is not ready lo play policeman
and lax collector for its partners." D. Buchan, "Plan for EC Minimum Savings Tax Gels Rough
Ministerial Ride." Financial Times (February 14. 1989) p. 1. It is unlikely thai Ihc necessary unanimous
vote in the Council of Ministers can be obtained in the near future. In 1989. Germany briefly enacted
a 10% withholding tax on interest income. It lasted only four months because il proved widely
unpopular and it sent capital abroad. This capital flight weakened Ihc mark which led lo its quick repeal.
"West Germany Scraps its Withholding Tax". Inlemalional Herald Tribune (April 28, 1989) p. 19. Al
the end of 1991 Germany reintroduced a wilhholding tax which was well received by the financial
markets as it had an adequate number of exemptions.
H.W. Sinn, "Tax Harmonization and Tax Competition in Europe". 34 European Economic Review
489-504 (1990). .. ,.^ ... . . „130
It is not only prestige which is at slake. In addition to the prospect of collecting corporate taxes, many other
benefits accrue to municipal, county, state, regional and national governments. In fact, the other sources of taxes
are much more attractive.
Of foremost importance are the taxes which are associated wiUi employment. These (axes include personal income
taxes and social security contributions of various types. Increased income generally stimulates consumption and
augments value added and consumption taxes. Land values are generally increased and property lax collections
are augmented. The increased use of public utilities helps create economies of scale, which decreases marginal
and average costs and increases public utility profils. In fact, over the past 35 years, governments have received
a decreasing amount of their tax revenue from corporate sources (see Table 2 above).
As governments derive a windfall from investments, not surprisingly the competition for this windfall is often
fierce and a form of bribery occurs. Investors know thai their investment brings wealth, prosperily and prestige
and Ihey naturally ask for a kickback. These kickbacks are perfectly legal. They come in the form of subsidies
and investment incentives such as tax incentives and holidays, staff training, free land, free buildings, free
infrastructure, guaranteed local contracts, etc.
Economic incentives have been used to attract businesses for many years. The current debate on the merits of
economic incentives has arisen because of the meteoric rise in (he amounts offered. For example, Toyota
was looking for a location in the United Stales for an $800 million plant which would employ 3,000 workers.
Many stales offered Toyota generous investment incentives in ihe hope that these would induce the firm to select
their stale. Kentucky won Ihe competition, but Ihe price was high - the present value of the direct payments
exceeded $125 million ($41,666 per job created).'*™
This lypc ol incentive is not limited to Ihe United States. To see what is currently on offer, one can consult any
bank or large accounting or law firm to get advice. In addition to these (rent-seeking) sources, there are at least
two glossy magazines wholly devoted to what is on offer in Europe and internationally.^'
Table 3 (See appendix III after this chapter)
Should Corporations Be Taxed?
The problem with incentives and subsidies is that ihey are not fixed or transparent - often everything is
negotiable. Because Ihey arc not iransparenl some firms lend to do beller man others. As a result, success can
he derived from being a better negotiator, nol a belter businessman. What is certain is that transparency is all but
absent from many governmental activities to altract investment.
As long as govemmenLs are spending a vast amount of money to attract capital and investments, capital flows
are distorted from the location which offers the greatest economic return to the place which offers Ihe greatest
financial return. Since economic efficiency is necessarily lost in the process, this leads to the question of whether
Ihe benefit of having a corporate tax which yields limited corporate tax revenues outweighs the considerable costs
which ii imposes.
• • A. Kolcsar, "Can Slate and Local Tax Incentives and Other Contributions Stimulate Economic
Development". 44 Tax Lawyer 285-311 (1990).
*** D.A. Black and W.H. Hoyt, "Bidding for Firms", 79 American Economic Review 1249-1256 (1989).
•' These magazines are Corporate Location Europe and Corporate Location International.
•™ The costs include inefficient resource allocation, a lack of transparency, the costs of the subsidies and
investment incentives, the cost of hiring and maintaining government investment "pimps' in locations
around the work!, the cost of maintaining corporate tax inspectors, the cost of corporate tax compliance,
and the dead-weight loss of tax lawyers and accountants.m
Many governments are engaged in kwtnnj tax mes because they have decided that high marginal rales are
couiterpioductive. discouraging investment and harvJ wtirk. while encouraging legal lax avoidance and illegal la*
ev»s»on. There is a growing dacncluMmenl with investment incentives because they distort the allocation of
resources and are not transparent,'*"' Corporate taxation has been demonstrated lo produce an
inefficient distribution of public good outputs across regions, accompanied by an ineflicieni pailem ol
trade. "
If one looks at Table 3 above, one may be impressed now stable the amount ol civrponue taxes colteclnl has been
in OECD countries over the last two generations This is a distortion To sec Ihe decreasing importance ol
corporate taxation, one must consider various countries on their own menu
In TaNe 4 below, after eliminating Japan where corporate savings and profitability „,„ mushnmmed. seven
country groupings arc left One can see thai the United Kingdoms and Norway s (Oil Money) corporate lax
receipts go up and down with ihe oil price. Luxembourg and Switzerland (Bank Havens) have increased corporals
lax collection largely due lo their supply side banking laws Southern Europe has seen relatively more
corporations, more corporate activity and increased corporate profitability over this 35 year pemxt, so one would
expect corporate revenues to increase. Bah the South Pacific countries of New Zealand and Australia and Ihe
North American countries of the United Stales and Canada have witnessed rapidly decreasing corporate lux
revenues. One should note that this revenue is considerably higher than in Northern Europe One of ihe rcasom
for this is that these countries arc mineral and oil nch. which makes (heir figures higher lhan if they did m«
benefit from their natural resources. This leaves Ihe Northern European countres.^" Here Ihe amounl
collected is low (under five percent), and Ihe trend t> downward.
Table 4 (See appendix IV after this chapter)
All and all in a world of quicksilver capital, lowering tax rates must he considered much more minx, live for mot I
countries lhan continuing and augmenting the subsidy and inveslmenl incentive war. As a mull corporate lax
rales wilj continue lo trend downward for a considerable lime lo come.
Personal Income Taxes
Personal income taxes will have an increasingly greater effect on where companies will place certain operations.
As the world increasingly becomes interconnected through inlcrnalional communications and travel, corporations
have increased latitude to locale employees engaged in non-cusiomer relaled services anywhere in the world.
Divisions of companies lhal are particularly people intensive, such as head offices, research and development,
distribution and marketing departments arc quite sensitive to differences in personal income (axes. Since many
employees are primarily interested in their after lax salaries, placing these types of opcralions in countries which
have low personal income taxes should be the wave of the future. Sending an employee to a higher lax counlry
without an offsetting rise in salary amounts to a pay cul.
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D.R. Francis, "As Nations Vie to Cut Tax Rates, US is Envied Leader", Financier (January 1987) pp.
10-13. . - **
One of the most important tax policy questions today is Ihe extent lo which large taxpayers have greater
ability to avoid tax than the smaller taxpayers. D. Dixon and M. Soutler. "The Corporate Tax Breaks;
The Burden of Corporate Tax". Australian Accountant (June 1988) pp. 33-37.
• J.D. Wilson. Trade, Capital Mobility, and Tax Competition", 95 Journal of Political Economy 835-856
(August 1987).
The Netherlands could easily fit into either ihe category of Oil Money or Northern European countries
without distorting either category greatly. .-.-..-132
As previously slated, in the 1950s, 70 percent of workers in Western Europe and the United States used their
hands at work. Now 70 percent of these workers use their brains/***' People who use their brains are very
mobile, They can be in contact with their office, clients and customers through telecommunication, satellites, and
lower cost international travel. The race lo lower personal tax rates is coming because well paid jobs are
increasingly going to people who have the highest mobility. The best paid jobs are going to individuals who
create or process pieces of information. They include people involved in advertising, banking, consulting, finance,
publishing, engineering, architecture, entertainment which does not involve personal appearances, investments,
biochemistry, religion, the law, iasurance, entertainment, education, sales, research, and computer software.**
The brain drain is a real threat. As a result of freer movement of people. Ireland and Greece are today
losing some of their brightest graduates and students, who are seeking job prospects elsewhere. Spain and
Portugal may also become vulnerable to the same problem as their economics develop within the European
Economic Community. Meanwhile, policy makers in Ireland and Greece have to face the fact that the people with
the most marketable skills arc those who have the most choices, and inevitably, they are the ones who leave the
fastest. Worse, these are the very people needed to develop the lagging economies of these two countries.
According a recent study. 40% of Ireland's electronic engineering graduates and 26% of its computer science
graduates from the class of 1986 had already left the country. The U.S. alone has an estimated 4,000 Greek
research scientists, compared with just 5.000 residing in Greece i***
The most entrepreneurial of these workers will be particularly inclined to move to tax havens. In the prophetic
words of Norman Macrae: "Areas which vote lo have high taxes will be residually inhabited mainly by dummies:
people who vole to have tax money spent on themselves, without actually earning enough money to be
taxed. • This is not merely conjecture. One only has to look at East Germany before reunification and
Hong Kong as IW7 nears; the best and the brightest will flee in large numbers to countries which offer them
heller opportunities. In contrast lo the relatively high skilled persons from East Germany and Hong Kong, there
are the Cubans, Haitians, Tamils. Vietnamese and Albanians who have made sometimes heroic attempts to flee
toward Ihc United Slates. Canada, Hong Kong. Italy and other places only to be sent home. If these workers were
perceived as having high skills, they would not have been sent packing so easily.
Closely related to the personal income tax rales issue is the question of social security and health care financing.
Countries with Ihc lowest employer-paid social security benefits and a taxpayer financed national health service
will tend to attract people-intensive operations. Japanese factories are flocking to Great Britain partly because
the British laxpayer-financcd national health service means thai employers in Great Britain do not need to bear
Iho cost of medical insurance.
**' N. Macrae, "The Next Ages of Man", Economist Survey. December 24. 1988. p. 8.
* In this context, countries which have high telephone charges will be at a great competitive disadvantage.
Restrictions and higher cost roads, rails, harbours and airports, put nations at a competitive
disadvantage. This change in the nature of worker mobility and international competition will also have
a great effect on the work place. Companies which do not take care of their employees will not be able
to keep the good ones: those companies which place their operations in expensive locations will not be
able to remain competitive. ,
**•* C. Kennedy. "When Assets Walk Away". Director (May 1989) pp. 129-132. „ -.,,,
*** D. Manasian. "The Exodus of the Elite", International Management (February 1988) pp. 54-56.
**' Supra note 43 at 8-10.
*** N. Macrae. "Now the Bad News About 1992". Business Month, (September 1989) pp. 20-22.1)3
i>Vcrio« J: Conc/iuioii
An array erf different jets c»f worldwide supply-side company and lax bws can provide great savings and greater
control for companies which locale their incorporation in the country which provide.'! the possibility far the mott
efficient operating structure and allows overall tax minimization. Companies can funher minimise their taxes by
placing as much debt as possible in high corporate lax countries, smce interest payment's are deductible against
current income. Transfer prices should he nunipuUtcd to put as much profit as commercially nistiliable in the
lowest tax countries. Service operations (staff positions) should be directed to lower personal tax rale tompaniev
Finally, shareholder equity should be directed to lower corporate tax countries, preferably in those countries
without withholding taxes.
Many countries have designed tax incentive schemes to annul iniermiiionallt nn*ilc businesses There are
various inducements designed to further encourage companies to move their operation structures in order to save
significantly on taxes Some countries, such as Great Britain, arc willing ID negotiate on an individual basis iSc£
footnote 5). Ireland has a 10 per cent tax on manufacturing and financial operations and Belgium has "co-
ordination centre' inducements for locating a company's head office to Belgium.*" This provides liinhcr
incentives for firms to navigate, negotiate and renegotiate on a continuing basis in the "European Single Market"
and elsewhere.
It is quite likely that the problems caused by non-harmonired nalional lax rates ami bases will mean thai the
European Community will still have some type of internal economic borders lor some time to come, in spue ol
the aim to completely eliminate them by IW. lntra-European trade will be coNfcfcraMy Irecr uml mtr«-kuro|iejin
competition much keener as a result of ihe initiative This will he especially true in the area ol Imam ml markets
and financial services. The 1992 initiative should he considered a process, and Hi "deadline" basically a device
to force the member stales along the evolutionary path toward a Europe without borders This pn*e.« will
increase uncertainly for firms. For outsiders, the process will most likely be liberalizing, extent m agriculture.
Despite the strong protectionist pressure* within Europe, there seems to be a genuine commitment among EC
officials to enhanced competition. ™
This competition should make life much more difficult for politicians and finance ministers in countries with the
highest social welfare costs. It is obvious thai there is a correlation between the amount of tax revenues required
and Ihe scope and cost of the social welfare system. With value added tax rates and excise duties in Europe
converging with the coming of a pan-European customs union, countries must rely on their social welfare
contributions and taxes on incomes and profits lo fund governmental activities.**' Financial problems for
higher social benefit countries will persist and magnify in the foreseeable future. This will happen since Ihe
*" R. Waters. "Chaos More Likely Than Harmony". Financial Times (March 13. 1989) p. 28.
**® R.N. Cooper. "Europe Without Borders". 2 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 325-340 (1989).
This problem becomes clearer when one considers that in 1983. taxes consisted of 47.5 per ccnl of the
Netherlands' GDP, while in Spain the figure was less than 28 per cent. R. Leonard. Pocket Guide to
the European Community (London: Basil Blackwcll. 1988). This reflects some of the wide differences
in social security provided in the two countries. Since this time the Netherlands has made some
adjustments, some of them owing to the competitive pressures from their European partners. In the past
few years, the Netherlands has lowered both VAT rales and corporate lax rales. It has also reformed
its personal income tax structure in a manner that has also decreased revenues. Welfare benefits have
been reduced lo some extent. It is relying on economic growth and deficits to make up for the shortfall
of revenues.134
countries which have higher corporate and personal tax rates will lose some of their activities (or at least have
their profits redirected) to lower tax countries.
As capital becomes more mobile, governments will increasingly try to tax less mobile capital, property and
people. Richard McKenzie and Dwighl Lee suggest that as this happens, "owners of immobile capital will not
'play dead' and just take the greater burden imposed on them. They will do what they can to become morf
mobile. They might, for example:
Downsize their firms and plants, making themselves more "mobile and hostile".
Contract out the production of many of their needed intermediate parts and the provision of business
services, facilitating the shift of more of their work to firms in other governmental jurisdictions.
Reduce the 'payout period' (or time over which the original investment is returned) on their plants.
which will enable them to redeploy their investments more quickly and move out from under adverse
governmental policies.
Rely more extensively on equipment (other than plant) in their production processes, which can be more
easily moved to, or repurchased in. a new location.
Establish more production facilities in different governmental units so that production can be moved in
response to changes in governmental policies. •
This process will make monetary, investment and human capital more like quicksilver" (difficult to hold, shape,
and contain). As this happens, even more pressure is placed on beleaguered governments. To attract investment
capital and create jobs, governments will have to go down the competitive negative spiral of reduced tax rates
or increased subsidies or investment incentives. Eventually this path will look unattractive to many countries. As
this happens, the neutral investment attraction policy of not even attempting to tax profits on capital will become
increasingly attractive.
The taxation of capital: (1) distorts world investment flows (investment is not always placed in the location where
economic profits can be maximized): (2) may make operating through certain organizational forms (i.e. general
and limited partnerships, sole proprietorships and trusts) more attractive than others (i.e. non-incorporated
businesses and corporations); (3) is often not transparent; (4) is increasingly difficult to collect; and (5) has begun
lo cost governments more to obtain than it brings in (because of the intergovernmental competition to attract
investment). For these reasons, investment taxation will probably eventually have to be abandoned. Governments
which continue to tax capital at a rate higher than the market will bear will see money, investment and many of
its most productive residents flee to the lands of supply-side tax policies.
Tax harmonization would not help countries with higher social welfare expenditures as a percentage of
GNP since there would be some kind of relation between tax revenue obtained from harmonized tax
rates and the size of the economy. • ' " '""•• • '

























Source: 7** EI'OIUMUM (March 23. 1991) p. 45 and FIIUMTKI/ 7im« (December 6, 1991) p. 2136
TABLE 2; TOTAL CORPORATE TAX REVENUES AS A PERCENTAGE OF ALL TAX






















































































































































































Source; Revenue Statistics of OECD Member Countries 1965-1990. (Pans: OECD, 1991).137
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Source: Revenue Slatistics of OECD Member Countries 1965-1990, (Pans; OECD, l<»!)138


















































(a) United Stales and Canada
(h) Australia and New Zealand
(c) Austria, Denmark. Finland, France, Germany. Iceland, Ireland. Netherlands and Sweden
(d) Belgium, Greece. Italy, Spain and Turkey
(c) Luxembourg and Switzerland
(0 Norway and the United Kingdom
Source: Revenue Statistics of OECD Member Countries 1965-1990. (Paris: OECD, 1991).Proper Source o/
Cowmercia/ Law
i/i a/i //iternario/ia/ E/iviro/ime/if:
Company Law anrf Capi'/a/
Ahstracl
In a world where individuals and firms have a choice of picking
Ihe laws under which they operate, greater thought must he
given to the pruper source of efficient law. Law which 11
efficKrK in this context must he based on the subsidiarity
principle laws should he fussed at Ihe lowest level where
practicable. The proper source and lorm ot efficient laws will
depend on the law's purpose and the nature ol the market
which is meant to he regulated. Toward this end. this chapter
will go into some detail regarding the future of laws regulating
capital markets, currencies and Ihe operations of companies. In
the past, all were formerly regulated at the national, regional or
local levels, but there is an increasing shift to the international
or pan-national level. This chapter asks, at a time when money,
capital markets and the structures of firms are increasingly
becoming international in nature, which of these should be
regulated by national, by regional and by international laws. It
is argued that the international level is appropriate for capital
markets, that currencies are best regulated at the point where
economies become integrated, and that the national level is
more appropriate for company laws. This is because the capital
markets, in which capital seeks the highest rale of return for a
given level of risk, are international. Company law. on the other
hand, seeks to regulate the relationships of people and groups
by either suggesting or imposing governance structures. The
appropriateness of any given operating structure is determined
by the working relationships, level of trust and national
economic style of a company's stakeholders.140
Chapter #: 77i£ Proper Source o,
Law I/I a/i /nternario/ii
Company Law ana" Capita/
"The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred by it by this Treaty and all of the objectives
assigned to it therein. In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community shall take
action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the purposes of
an action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or
effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. Any action by the community shall not go
beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty."^'^
In the current international marketplace for commercial laws, there are three considerations to keep in mind when
determining which types of commercial laws arc efficient. First, as indicated in Chapter 6, certain areas of the
law. most notably laws pertaining to financial markets, are becoming international in scope. Second, as indicated
in Chapters 2 and 4. national, regional and local laws should be based and supplied on the principles of reducing
transaction costs and increasing trust and certainty of outcome. Finally, as indicated in Chapter 6, there are
supply-side laws which arc a type of hybrid between efficient national laws and efficient international laws.
Supply-side laws arc laws which arc passed by certain countries to attract internationally-minded firms and
individuals. They arc attractive because certain national commercial laws, while best addressing the needs of the
majority of resident firms and individuals, cannot adequately address the needs of even' firm or individual. As
described in Chapter 5. technology has made the use of supply-side laws increasingly feasible. Some firms and
individuals may require the rigidity of national company law, while other firms may well need less stringency
(or in some cases more stringency) and will opt for a company law supplied by another jurisdiction.
Perhaps the critical reason why capital market laws and company laws arc going in different directions, at a time
when both capital and firms are increasingly international, is the decreasing importance of capital taxation. Over
the past 20 years, computers have made money more mobile. Countries with stamp or turnover taxes or higher
levels of capital regulation or taxation found that transactions were shifted to countries which offered lower costs
(and more transparency and liquidity). Their only reaction to the loss of their capital market was to compete. As
a result taxes have become lower and market laws have become more similar and less restrictive over the past
decade."*
Inloiin.iMoii regarding investing outside one's borders was also more difficult to find before the onset of the
information revolution. When capital was less mobile it was more easily taxed. Since the end of World War II,
trade barriers have progressively been decreasing (as a result of the success of the GATT and regional free trade
agreements) and there has been an explosion in world trade. Increased trade provides companies with greater
choice in the place where they invest and provide employment. In this atmosphere, capital became less tied to
(he country where the wealth was produced. Since capital became less captive, countries were forced to become
more internationally competitive in order to attract internationally mobile investment. The attraction of investment
is of paramount importance since investment means taxable economic activity, skills, wealth and employment.
In the golden age of government, an epoch in which many are already nostalgic, capital mobility was limited.
Limited capital mobility is almost a necessary condition for a wide variation in tax regimes. During this era. "an
efficient operating structure" of a firm was based almost entirely on tax-efficiency (tax minimizing) reasons. In
the age of mobile capital, capital taxation is decreasing in importance. As a result, lawyers, financiers, economists
and governments increasingly have to think of "an efficient operating structure" in terms of minimizing economic
risk and transaction and agency costs. This chapter analyzes what are efficient capital market bws and efficient
company laws in light of this historic change.
Treaty on European Union. Article 3b, as reported in Europe Documents (February 7, 1992) pp. 2-4.
•"' I. Swary and B. Topi. Global Financial Deregulation. (London: Blackwell. 1991).141
/; Capita/ AfarJrrte
The purpose of this hook has been to describe what efficient commercial la* should accomplish Money (in its
various forms) has increasingly become a commodity over the past decade While money is still denominated
in names like "dollars." "yen." "pounds," "francs," "marts," "lira," "guilders," "pesos" ami "pesetas," it has been
increasingly traded in its various forms (which include commodities or services)"* on intcroalitvuil markets
where mvestors seek to find its highest return at a given level of risk With modem computers ami software,
money flows internationally through fibre optic cables and is traded in its various forms »•»« various market*.
Because the marginal cos) of making an additional trade is almost insignificant, orbuniging has become
increasingly difficult In this international search, the names of the currencies do nut matter very much; only the
value of the "currency" is important. The name is important because the name attached provides different level*
of perceived and actual nsks. As the nature of money becomes less and less lied to any particular country, the
rules needed to regulate money become more international. In this respect, form is truly following function.
Efficient bw for capital markets are those which make markets transparent, increase liquidity and lower costs.
In this competitive market, it should come as no surprise that improvements in the legal KHtmgs of various
markets are quickly copied by legislators and regulators in other countries
Many people presume that only the forces of deregulation have been at work in the various capital markets over
the past decade This is not true. The results have been bifurcated. While deregulation measures have hcen
introduced to take vested power away from entrenched stockbrokers, other regulations have been introduced to
increase the transparency of markets. The important capital markets outside of the United Stales, i.e., Germany.
France. Japan. Spain, Italy and the Netherlands have all taken steps against insider trading. The Unitnl Stale*
and Great Britain have sent some of the richest, most well-known and most powerful abuscrs of its capital
markets to jail, all in the name of protecting the transparency of they markets. Lower cost and more
transparency are the key elements to increased liquidity
These actions are not without sound economic objectives. Increased liquidity often means valuable increased
economic activity. The increased activity represented by flows of capital usually means thai there will be more
well-paid jobs in the financial sector, more work for support staff, lawyers and accountants, and more business
meetings creating employment in the hotel, communications, restaurant and catering sectors. This activity can
bring both wealth and valuable lax revenues lo a jurisdiction. Additionally, as government debt levels increase,
governments have the greatest incentive to raise money in the capital markets as inexpensively as possible. If a
government inefficiently regulates capital markets, the markets will be beset by a combination of high costs, non-
transparency, and low liquidity: aU of which mean (hat the government will have lo pay more to borrow money.
1. The Cost of Not Competing
In the modem world, there is no reason why currency, shares or bonds have to he traded in the local currency.
The currency itself is merely a unit of account. Moreover, there is no reason why trading has lo be done cither
on the local market, or on any "market" at all. Since the mid-1980s there has been a strong (rend away from
floor-based trading toward computer screen-based trading. Screen-based trading can be done without lite cosl and
unreliability associated with a large number of floor traders or back office workers who need lo match ordcri
Commodities include oil. metals, textiles, and foodstuffs. Services include futures and options, interest
rates, market indices, shipping, and insurance. For an indication of what types of services might be
considered types of money se« P.M. Johnson. "Next Growth Area: Futures on Services". Futures; Tfig
Magazine of Commodities & Options (June 1987) pp. 12-14.
In addition to the arrests and convictions of many high powered investment banker*, the United States
government sent federal agents to investigate market manipulation on the floors of Ihe Chicago
exchanges. The British government has exposed market manipulation by the executives of the struggling
London Futures and Options Exchange, N. Bray. "London's FOX Struggles to Adapt to a Changing
Market", Wall Street Journal Europe (October 23. 1991) p. 13,142
and fill out forms. Because the market is not lied to people who need to eat, sleep, or take holidays, ihe markets
will in the future be open twenty-four hours a day. 365 days a year.
Companies have traditionally been listed on iheir local or national bourse. In an internationally competitive
environment, companies have to raise (equity) capital as cheaply as possible. One way to ensure this is to list
on more than one bourse. This has become easier lo do. The New York and American stock exchanges list 175
non-American based companies. Additionally. X38 non-American companies have their shares traded in ihe form
of American Depository Receipts (ADRs). •" Each ADR represents a certain number of a company's
common shares. All of the transactions are carried out in dollars. The London Stock Exchange's automated
Ouolron system is an electronic marketplace of all major shares which trade in Great Britain, as well as more
than 600 other non-British companies.'*" Going even further, Ihe Chicago Board of Trade, the Chicago
Mercantile Exchange and a publicly owned British company, Reuters Holdings PLC, have developed a screen-
based futures and options exchange called Globcx for after-hours trading. After-hours trading adds liquidity to
the market and reduces risk. So far the Paris exchange has already signed up and negotiations arc going forward
with Ihe London, Sydney. Singapore. Frankfurt and Osaka options and futures markets. Another exchange system
is being developed by Ihe Chicago Board of Oplions Exchange. Ihe American Slock Exchange and the Cincinnati
Stock Exchange and Reuters- There is no real reason why any slock exchange will have to exist in the
future: computers might well be able lo match buy and sell orders fasler. cheaper and more skilfully than floor-
based traders. This is one of me reasons why we have seen so many redundancies in Ihe financial markets over
the past few years. There is no reason (o suppose (hat this trend will not continue.
Wilh better and more powerful computers and applications looming on the horizon, the costs of not having
compclilivc markcl rules will be devastating. The exchanges cither have to be competitive now or the future will
pass them by in favour of other locations. The costs of not being competitive will be borne by firms seeking lo
raise capital and governments themselves. Firms operating in a compclitive international market need lo have
access In operating capital in Ihe form nl eilher dcbl or equity at internationally competitive rales. Governments
which arc the largest issuers of debt instruments need lo borrow money al the cheapest rale possible or face the
wralh of increasingly hostile taxpayers. Governments also risk losing a lax base. The increased cosl of
government actions will not be borne by international investors: they have choices where to invest money and
will generally only invest in the market and in the securities which offer them the highest rates of return at a
given level of risk on an affrr-/<u or a/ffr-roj) (ncl) basis. The cosl of not competing is to send the potential
investors and borrowers to other markets. One only has lo look lo Europe lo see examples of (formerly) non-
comprlilive markets which are scrambling lo modernize.
Germany, for instance, is an industrial and economic giant but a slock market pygmy. While the market
capitalization of Ihe London slock markcl is 83% of the gross domestic product, Ihe market capitalization of the
Frankfurt exchange is only 21% of the German GDP. Until recently. German slock exchanges were a
typical example of provincialism. Under pressure of world markets, there have been some attempts to change
'*'* L. Malkin. "ADR Market Matures in Line wilh Globalization". International Herald Tribune (November.
30, 1991) p. 16.
' C. dc Acnllc. "ADRs Aid Ihe World's Traders'. Global Banking and Finance Special Report -
International Herald Tribune (October 16. 1991) pp. 11-12.
*'"' M. Baker, "Globex System Plugs Gaps in Futures and Oplions". Global Banking and Finance Special
Report - International Herald Tribune (October 16. 1991) p, 12.
*" M. Bose. "Angst and Pygmies in Paris and Frankfurt". 43 Director (January 1990) pp. 38-42.143
ihts.***^ Even with its recent modemuanon. not everyone is convinced thai the German stock exchanges CM
change stfTicKMly (or Germany to become a financial centre.'*''
The companies on Ihe Pans Bourse represent just 2d* of French GDP. The French linancial officials are haunted
by Ihe feaj thai they may fall behind London, New York, and Tokyo and have nude some significant
reforms.^ Even so. aboul 30% of Pans' main slocks are now traded in London. This has led l>ans lo again
modernise us trading rules - a move which has taken place onl> ihree short years at lei huts' version of the hi»
If a national exchange is not competitive, shares can trade elsewhere. The value ol shares traded i
is large and growing. London a Ihe largest source ol foreign equity turnover In l*J<Ji, ahoul $250 HlttM of
foreign equities were traded theft As a hases of companson. all eighlGcrman bourses turned over about $10
billion, while less than half Ihe German amount was traded in Pans. One third ol the trading m blue chip
German shares currently takes place in London.•*"" German attempts to merge us eight regional bourses into
a single Deutsche Borsc' have so far been opposed by ihe Lander In l"»l. Germany luialU decided lo
compete on more equal terms by dropping its dealing lees. London is about to drop us fees and Pans will
probably halve its fees in the near future.
The most recent proposals may be the most fat-reaching A comprehensive ptan to dispel the
widespread scent of scandal was proposed at the beginning of l<»2 by German Finance Minister Thco
Waigel. He hopes to make German markets more competitive by reducing transaction costs, and
increasing market transparency, liquidity and security. Under the plan, insider trading would he an
offence punishable by up to two yeans' imprisonment, make listed companies treatment compatible with
international rules of conduct and promp* a merger of Germany's eight exchange* The regional
exchanges and Ihe Bundesbank have expressed reservations over ihe Waigel plan. C Paries. "Germany
PUns Shake-up of Slock Markcls", Financial Times (January 17. 1992) p I and D Waller. "Dispelling
German Scent of Scandal". Financial Times (January 17. 1992) p. 2. One day after the Waigel plan was
released, the Frankfurt slock exchange announced that il was seriously considering moving to .screen-
based trading. D. Waller. "Frankfurt Considers Electronic Trading", Financial Times (January IK. 1992)
p. 22.
In November. 1991, the German Finance Ministry announced that it was going lo reimpose a 25%
withholding tax on interest income effective January 1. 1993. Even though Ihe rale of the withholding
tax is considerably higher than Germany's ill-fated 1989 attempt lo impose a 10% withholding tax. Ihe
current proposal was seen by the market to be a vast improvement. It is an improvement because it
exempts all non-German residents from the tax, provides a 4,000 mark deduction for single individuals
and 10,000 mark exemption for married couples, il is less bureaucratic and upholds German bank
secrecy. T. Roth, "Bonn to Unveil Basic Points of New Tax". Wall Street Journal Europe (November
12. 1991) pp. 11. 13. How large a share of the market will shift lo Luxembourg this lime is yel lo be
seen.
Supra note 8.
Fiance's turnover tax provided the treasury with aboul $350 million in 1990. W. Dawkins, "Prance
Presses on with Liberalization". Financial Times (September 26. 1991) p. 27.
"Setting Europe's Stock Markets Free", The Economist (September 7. 1991) p. 18.
"Sweeping Out the Stables*. The Economist (August 31. 1991) p. 13.
> K. Campbell. "European Bourse Reform: Plans lo Centralize Provoke Old Squabbles". Financial Times
(October 11. 1991) p. 24.
"European Futures and Options: Derivative Diplomacy". The Economist (September 21, 1991) pp. 98-
99.144
In 1988, the European Commission reckoned that the cost of financial services would fall belween 7% and 26%
if the market for these services was truly competitive.'™ Even though a stalemate on an European
Community-wide Directive on Investment Services has iasured that the end of 1992 deadline for creating a single
European market will be breached. the increased internationalization of markets should eventually lower
this differential to zero, with or without government action.
2. In* Empires Strike Back
Many of these changes in European exchange rules were brought about lo strike back at the Americans who were
the forerunners and are regarded as the leaders of market deregulation. The increased competitiveness of the
world's bourses has brought results. The American exchanges' share of the global futures market fell from 70%
in I9K9 to 67% in 1990. and their share in options dropped from 66% lo 59%. The European exchanges further
expanded in 1991. Deregulation and changing lax regimes will allow more institutions lo make greater use of
futures and options.
In addition lo fighting against Ihe United Stales, continental slock exchanges obviously want to win back some
(il the mlcmalionul Inide in European shares from London. However, many European exchanges are not yet sure
whether lo compete with each other or cooperate. Increased cooperation and a unified system would enhance
liquidity, provide economies of scale, and counter Ihe pressures of screen-based trading systems. But the different
visions of the exchanges and the separate settlement systems in each domestic European market are hurdles.
While European exchanges are wonVing towards linked settlement systems, private-sec lor clearing houses are
already approaching this goal. This provides another problem for the exchanges; their own members have a large
incentive lo find cheaper and simpler solutions lo avoid paying fees lo use an expensive and cumbersome bourse.
Not surprisingly, other international linkages are being planned.'''"
Currrcntly, European bourse chiefs are discussing a pan-European slock market,*^* and London's automated
anil paperless International Slock Exchange could play a leading role in its creation. In the first quarter of 1990.
daily average trading volume in international stocks in London reached $2.5 billion; nearly 2/3 of that
iiucrnalional volume was in European blue chip slocks, and 50% of thai was in German equities. Share volumes
in London in iy9() were more than three limes as big as Ihe turnover in either Frankfurt or Paris.
However, the heads of Ihe continental exchanges resent Ihe London exchange as a threat to their own supremacy
in trading domestic slocks. The London exchanges' dilemma is whether lo cooperate with its continental rivals
or, building on its own strong base, bid on its own lo become the future Eurobourse.'*^ London still has lo
compete with New York and Tokyo. For example, competition from futures markets in New York has prompted
°° "Struggling Through Ihe Wire". The Economist (August 3, 1991) p. 65.
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*"* "Europe's Futures and Options", The Economist (March 16. 1991) p. 79.
*" "Plugging into a Pan-European Stock Market". The Economist (March 10. 1990) pp. 81-82.
Better established markets have been taking measures to slop this from happening and Denmark.
Luxembourg and Ireland suspect that the more established markets are insisting on lighter controls to
prevent the relative newcomers from attracling business through their looser regimes. C. Moir. "Markets
Short on Accord", International Management (September 1991) pp. 64-66.
*" Ibid at 66.
*'* C. Makin, "London: Bickering Over a Eurobourse*. 24 Institutional Investor (July 1990) pp. 190-193.143
changes in the way London's futures markets (or soft commodities - cocoa, coffee, and sugar • do
business. • London's exchanges are facing competition from Pans, the londtvi based intrrniUHwal arm of
the US over-the-counter National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotes, and the Federation of
German Slock Exchanges. Efforts lo buttress London's position place a high pnoniy on sorting out its settlement
system. ° At this lime it is not clear whether London will remain the centre for international
Continental bourses arc reforming and automating, and. as more efficient exchanges develop overseas. London's
screen-based system may lose some ol its appeal. '
There is some question whether the battles between organized slock markets will make much difference As much
as 43% of equity trading in Europe does not take place on a stock market at all • it lakes place on computer
screens. This has led all bourses to become mm efficient and competitive While attempts lo create a pan-
European exchange arc continuing, the planned joint venture between various national bourses, liimiquole. was
scrapped because ol fundamental disagreements regarding its purpose and a tear that London would dominate
European equity trading under this system.
a. Paris aad Frankfurt
Unless and until a pan-European exchange is established, competition will remain fierce The Paris financial
futures exchange is battling the London exchange lor domination of European lutures trading. Both arr bunching
new products and services. London enjoys the support of active currency markets and London'* inicni.inoiial
financial presence, but it has recently lost business to Chicago's after-hours exchange In addition, 1 omlon was
forced lo cancel its ten-year British debt contract because of a lack of supply, and l-'rankfurt is threatening to lake
away the futures trading in British debt contracts. In order lo compete with the American bourws, l-omlon
lengthened us trading day by introducing an after-hours automated trading system in October IWJ. Pans has so
far attracted fewer participants than it hoped, but plans to broaden us appeal by moving into non-franc producli
and participating in a Chicago-based after-hours electronic trading system. Ohscrven worry Ihal the growing
competition will reduce liquidity. Both London and Pans grew at a staggering pare in the 1180s. The two
rivals competed directly lor the first time in I9H9 in the launch of a three-month Euro-mark future. The next ana
of competition will be in European currency unit (ECU) interest rale fulures and Italian government debt, "^
Because of the thinness of the ECU market, the two exchanges will issue contracts of different maturities and
have agreed to discuss any future plans with each other and to set up cross-listing und cross-clearing
arrangements. The London market will become the first major futures market lo introduce an after-hourj
screen-trading system, while Paris has agreed lo list its products on Chicago's similar system. Competitive
pressures may hit London harder than Paris because, a coming German exchange will doubtless cul into lite
mark-denominated contract business - on which London relics heavily.
It is possible thai, in the foreseeable future, the German futures and options exchange, and the Pans exchange
will catch up with and perhaps even overtake London. Germany has both I tie key European currency and the
" The system, which electronically matches buy and sell orders, is inexpensive and has pulled trade from
the Paris market. The FOX introduced automation lo several other contracts in 1989. in order lo
encourage overseas traders to use the London based market. "London Could FOX Them AH". The
Economist (December 3, 1988) p. 87.
*'* N. Jordan, "The Emperors New Clothes'", Banker (May 1990) pp. 16-21.
*" S. Brady, "Some Joy in Euro-Equities at Last", Eoromoney (May 1989) pp. 123-131.
*™ R. Waters. "Bourses Build up Defences". Financial Times (September 24. 1991) p. 25.
*" J. Lewis. "The Euro-Futures War", Institutional Investor (March 1990) pp. 129-135.
**° "Malif in Italian Contract Move", Financial Times (October 11. 1991) p. 24.
**' N. Wilson, "Capital Markets: Situation Fluid". Banker (December 1989) pp. 22-25.146
strongest economy. In addition to the high financing power of Germany's universal bank system, numerous
factors have seen Frankfurt emerge as Germany's leading financial centre. Frankfurt hosts more than 400 credit
institutions employing in excess of 42.000 people, one-third of them in the securities business. About 70 foreign
banks are registered members of the Frankfurt Slock Exchange. In a wider context, Germany's high standing
within the international financial community should be considered. Overall, if Germany adheres to its current
pension provision system, Frankfurt could become the financial centre for fixed-income instruments and London
could retain its status as the most important financial centfe for equities/"" Paris is already the top financial
centre in Europe for a number of financial instruments. •
b. Copenhagen and Stockholm
In Denmark, a campaign has been undertaken to tum Copenhagen into an international financial centre. To
accomplish this goal, the Copenhagen Stock Exchange was reformed by adding day-long decentralized trading
with computerized price changes and paperless shares. •"
In I'WO. 45 per cent of turnover in Swedish equities was conducted outside of Sweden. The first act of Sweden's
non-socialist government was to abolish the one per cent turnover tax on share trading. Sweden, which enacted
a 1% turnover tax in 1984. and doubled i( in 1986. found that turnover increased 25% when it reduced the
turnover tax at the beginning of 1991. In 1990, 45% of all trading in Swedish shares was done outside Sweden.
In October, 1991, the newly elected Conservative government abolished the tax entirely and expects market
volume to increase by a further 25% to 50%/"" Other beneficial tax changes are expected including the
diminution of double taxation of profits and dividends and an abolition of capital gains on shares. Restrictions
on foreign share ownership arc also expected to be eliminated. The Stockholm bourse was automated in 1989.
A rule against insider trading and other measures have been adopted to make the markets more transparent.
Finally, the Stockholm Bourse will lose its monopoly and be privatized in 1992. These measures are expected
to decrease the cost of capital of Swedish companies.
c. Amsterdam
The Dutch capital market has been funher deregulated with the introduction of a reform package designed to
enhance Amsterdam's competitiveness as an international financial centre/"^ The change in the operations
of the Amsterdam Bourse has been dramatic. It had to be if Amsterdam was to continue to have any interest for
either domestic or international investors. In 1989. more than one-half of all Dutch government bonds were traded
in London. In reaction to this outflow, the Dutch stamp tax was abolished and the brokerage rules were changed.
By 1991. over one-half of the listings and one-half of the volume were conducted for the benefit of foreign
investors and institutions. But in part, this action was the equivalent of closing the bam door after the horses were
gone: in 1991 about one-quarter or the share trading of the 20 largest Dutch companies still took place in London.
Further reforms are being contemplated. °
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d. Lux
Luxembourg's international importance is shown by its participation in puMu Euro-issues and ihc importance
of its slock exchange. Luxembourg ts also noted for its clearing organization which provides safekeeptajj.
administration, and settlement of primary and secondary market transactions in international securities
Luxembourg has begun capitalizing on us advantages with the arrival ol a large number ol new mutual hinds
(unit trusts) and the extraordinary growth of the Luxembourg Iranc bond matin A lucrative private-placement
bond market exists as well, but its dominance by several large Luxembourg hanks is hems challenged by a
syndicate of smaller tanks'*™ The Luxembourg bourse was the first to actively list ami seek ECU
denominated bonds. By 1986. because of Ms hank secrecy provision*. go% of ECU denominated bonds were
issued in Luxembourg
e. Other Coatiacatal Etiropeaa Exchanges
In 1992. the Milan bourse. Italy's largest, will finally permit the creation of firms that combine storkhroking,
fund management, and financial-consultancy functions By allowing Italian hanks and foreign institutions to buy
or set up such hybrid outfits, the bourse hopes to kill off the cosy cartel run by the 12(1 sUxkhntkcrc Ihnl work
on the exchange. At present, international investors have little hi choose lrom There are Mill only about 200
companies listed on the bourse. To make mailers worse, five tightly held industrial empires account for more than
two-thirds of the market's capitalization. * Trading in the 21 Italian shares listed on London's screen-baled
system amounted to almost N» of that in Milan. The Italian government has recently announced thai it
will refund Us 12.5* withholding lax."***
In one fell swoop Switzerland eliminated its transaction taxes, launched a long awaited futures contract md • MV
government bond designed to increase liquidity in the fixed-income market. It passed these measura tMCWM II
was thought that without reform. Switzerland would cease to be an iniemaiion.il banking centre und most trading
in Swiss shares would shift to London. " Over the past few years Amsterdam. Madnd and Milan have all
improved theu competitiveness by removing taxes and investment restrictions. Belgium has lowered its
withholding tax from 25% to 10% and has seen a great deal of capital repatriated. At least for the near future,
Switzerland's 30% withholding tax will remain.'"" Changes may be financially difficult. As late u 1988,
**' M. Blanden. "Europe: Fortress Luxembourg", Banker (November 1987) pp. 33-35.
*^ M. Barrett. "Feather-Footed Shuffle in the Grand Duchy", Euromoney (July 1988) pp. 91-94.
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3 H. Simonian. "European Bourse Reform: Counting the Cost of Technological Change". Financial Timet
(October 9. 1991) p. 20.
S. Webb, "Italian Bonds Jump as Bank Refunds Withholding Tax". Financial Times (September 24,
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*'* In Seaq's first 18 months of operation, it is reckoned that 14% of all transactions in the 17 largest Swiss
shares and 11% of all trading in Swiss shares was already transacted in London. "Swiss Stamp Duty:
Laughing. But For How Long?" The Economist (October 5. 1991) pp. 100-101.
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the stamp tax contributed 8% of the Swiss federal government revenues. Noi surprisingly, Swiss socialists are
agaiast the abolition of this tax and have forced a referendum on the issue. ^
In 1991, Belgium reformed its market by undertaking its own "Little Bang." Stockbrokers lost their monopoly
on exchange business; commissions were reduced by an average of 30 per cent; its settlement procedure was
modernized; and a futures and options exchange is planned.'*" On the other hand, the exchange has raised
its fees to listed companies.
Spain had a major reform of its markets in 1989. Competition was intensified. Fixed commissions were abolished.
A fast, centralized settlements system was introduced. A strict regulatory regime was instituted: market overseers
levied over $4 million worth of fines against brokers in their first two years of operation. As a result, the markets
undoubtedly became more transparent. Spain does, however charge a type of turnover tax which is larger for
international investors than for Spanish ones. In 1991. both foreign and domestic investors were charged a 0.25
per cent brokerage fee on transactions, while foreigners were charged an additional 0.3% settlement fee. payable
to the tanks. The size of the brokerage fee is expected to come under pressure, while the settlement fee is
expected to disappear altogether. This will significantly decrease the cost of doing business on a Spanish
exchange • and increase liquidity.
Switzerland has been active in reforming its markets, although it still remains considerably behind other European
stock exchanges. Measures have been taken to split Swiss shares which often sell for very high amounts relative
to shares on other exchanges: to minimize restrictions on foreign share ownership; make the market more
transparent; and to lower costs. Still 20 per cent of Swiss blue chip shares arc traded in London - and the
percentage is increasing.
r. Dublin
With the permission of the European Community. Ireland has set up an onshore international financial capital
in Dublin. The big lures for financial firms are low wages and a 10% corporate profits tax until 2005. a ten year
exemption from property taxes or a double deduction of rental costs if the property is leased, and full deduction
for capital costs. Investors who filter their investments through Dublin pay no withholding taxes or capital gains,
Life insurance and pension trusts also benefit from these tax breaks. So far over 170 companies, who are
committed to hiring at least 2.700 people by 1994. have applied for licences. Most of these companies are
involved in fund management and administration, life assurance, asset financing and captive reinsurance. No firms
arc licensed unless they commit themselves to employing a minimum of 10 persons; this is to prevent firms from
using Ireland simply to receive tax advantages.""
Supra note <M at 21.
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S. Laurie, "Keeping Dublin Clean". The International (September 1991) pp. 69-72. As an OECD
country, Ireland offers special advantages for the Japanese which offshore financial centres cannot. The
Japanese are prevented by their Ministry of Finance from investing in non-OECD countries. As a result,
most of the largest Japanese financial companies and conglomerates have already set up operations in
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With all these tax advantages, one might think that Dublin a just another lax haven. This wouM be *
mistake.^" Dublin has many competitive advantages which would lend to make it a financial centre modern
legislation-'**' and infrastructure, rigorous supervision and pleiwlul skilled labour These are Ihe exact
qualities needed to compete in the brave new wtwkl of international finance I'nhke Luxembourg, Irelsuid docs
not offer bank secrecy. One should look at Ireland as a progrcvsive modern IKUIKI.II centre: its ta» itdvanlagei
and mceneves signify thai Ireland is ai the leading edge of the spiral towards lower capital taxation. It u the
combination of signiTicanlly lower taxes, adequate regulation, kw rents, lower labour and transaction costs, and
attractive supply-side law which will accelerate Dublin toward becoming an international finami.il centre.*""
London is taking this revamped competition seriously. Fating competition (rom Amsterdam. Pans. Chicago and
Frankfurt, its market lor financial futures has merged with its options market, l-roni Us beginnings in W78. the
market was handicapped by its undcr-capiialitalion and high stamp taxes. Along with Iho merger ol ihe
exchanges, the British government announced that the resulting exchange would be exempt Iron* both stamp duly
and the sump duty reserve tax. In addition, the advantages ol some of the largest market makers will be diluted,
thus making the markets more transparent. At first UK exchange will be floor-based, but provisions have been
made to turn Ihe exchange into a screen-based one.
h. The Uakcd Stales
Increased competition from Europe has led to increased competition in the American markeM. Co«l
considerations, technological advances, vast industry changes, and a decline in industry pnrfilabtlity have created
new rivals for New York's position as the world's leading financial centre. New York City is concerned thtu bolh
Tokyo and Londcm are contesting New York's international dominance. Los Angeles and Chicago have emerged
as domestic financial power centre*. A New York City Task Korc* has recommended that New York pin with
The Germans are very concerned that Dublin should not be used as an onshore tax haven. The German
government has been told that it could lose up to I£25O million in potential lax revenues from German
companies' esiablishing operations in Dublin. Even Ihough Dublin's tax advantages were approved by
ihe European Commission, and there is a German-Irish double tax treaty, Germany has threatened a law
to tax all German companies on the results of their overseas subsidiaries, regardless of Iheir location
or purpose. J. Maher. "On Borrowed Time". Financial Times (November 1. 1991) p. 18. As will be
discussed below, most "German companies" would try to avoid being "German Companies" if this law
were to take effect.
For example. Ireland was the first country to implement the European Community Directive on IK'ITS
(Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable Securities), in 19X9. This provides for mutual
funds (unit trusts) to be marketed freely throughout the European Community. Ireland's former law on
the subject barred funds from holding more than half of their securities in non-Irish companies.
Currently only Luxembourg and Gibraltar offer UCITS. D. Turner, "Opportunity Knock* for the Rock".
The International (June 1991) pp. 25-30.
It is estimated that the cost of doing business in Dublin is half the price of doing business in London.
Not only are rents much lower, salaries are more than 20% lower. "Baring All". The International
(September 1991) pp. 72-74.
" The Isle of Man. for example has lowered its tax rate for fund management from 20% to 5% effective
April. 1992. This compares with 20% for the islands of Jersey and Guernsey. Future drops in tax rale*
are anticipated. S. Stuart. "Isle of Man Seeks to Become European Leader". Financial Times (October
1, 1991) p. 12.
T. Comgan. "Liffe Merger Improves Outlook for Equity Options". Financial Times (October 29.1991)
p. 27: N. Behrmann. "Liffe. LTOM Plan lo Merge In 3 Months". Wall Street Journal Europe (October
29. 1991) p. 13.ISO
Ihe private sector 10 (1) build a long-term program lo educate the city workforce of the future and to provide
child care facilities; (2) constantly improve the telecommunications infrastructure: and (3) develop a more
equitable system of taxation. The quality of entry-level workers must be improved and the tax burden must be
decreased. It also recommends that tax provisions that discriminate against service industries should be
eliminated, business taxes be reduced, and city and stale lax administration be simplified and rationalized.^
In short they are asking for modern taxation and efficient government: low capital taxation, efficient background
laws and a good infrastructure.
Secft'on 2; Com/uny L«M>
In Chapter 6, two of the types of supply-side laws outlined were holding companies and company laws. As
governments' ability lo lax capital is reduced and the rates of capital taxation become lower and lower, the need
10 operate under a holding company will lessen. As this happens the distinction between a holding company and
an "ordinary" parent company will blur. When this is taken in conjunction with the problems of figuring out what
the -nationality' of many companies is?'" companies will have to go back and determine what efficient law
is now that lax minimization is a less important corporate decision. Without tax considerations, the advantages
and disadvantages of various company laws will become transparent and less distorted. The choice of a corporate
operating structure will increasingly centre on finding a coastilulion which provides sufficient safeguards for all
interested parties, minimizes transaction and agency costs, and provides surely of outcome. Because of divergent
national economic styles, no one type of holding company law will suffice.
1, Why Company Laws arc Supplied
As slated in Chapter 2, the general goal of company law is lo find suitably efficient organizational forms for all
types of economic activity, There are two strong incentives for firms to organize within an efficient company law
structure. First, entrepreneurs have a strong financial incentive lo organize their firms in ways which optimize
resource allocation. Second, in a competitive market, firms operating under a less efficient organizational form
will he nut at a competitive disadvantage, making them less likely to have large scale success and more likely
to fail."
11 is in the strongest interest of governments to provide efficient forms in order to promote efficient resource
allocation and to discourage bankruptcies and dislocation. Efficient resource allocation promotes economic activity
and will lead to increased economic development and employment. With this incentive, governments have few
SOS
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1989) pp. 29-33.
British authorities arc asking many of the same questions as the New York City Task Force. A panel
of prominent bankers and legal authorities was set up in 1991 was assembled to come up with specific
proposals on how to maintain a system with minimal legal uncertainty while at the same time avoiding
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Thai Beset The City". Wall Street )oumal Europe (February 17, 1992) pp. 11, 24.
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reasons no< to provide rebuvely efficient corpora* forms. Beyond promoting eventual bankruptcy.*'*
inefficient company laws may have odver strongly adverse consequences.
In a world in which international capital markets air increasingly more efficient, the national interest cannot truly
he served by having an inefficient set of company laws In the absence of capital controls, investment will he
made in the place where u will make the grealest return, all risks being equal Knowing that investment flows
across harden seeking the highest return, mosi governments take various actions to provide an attractive dunalc
for both foreign and domestic investment. Inefficient organizational forms will necessarily create a has against
local investment. The only way m which resource allocation, economic development and employment can
possibly be maximized is through the provision of efficient company laws.
All company laws try to reconcile the interests of the shareholders, the creditors and sometimes the employes*
and the general public. Because of differences in national economic styles, each country balances these competing
interests in different ways. The diversity of company laws is generally not the result of ideological c^n|iicl.
except in the cases of worker participation and the question of representing the "puhlu interest "• As
discussed in Chapter I. an 'efficient* balancing of these interests will occur when the total amount ol utility
found in society is maximized. This is precisely why company laws are hetlei passed at a national ot slate level
instead of at an international or pan-national level: differences in national prelercnces would almost certainly
mean that a universal company law would not maximize satislactiun in most counlnes. Thus, a harmonized
company law would be inefficient.
The provision of company laws has become of major importance in a world where it becomes increasingly
difficult to determine the 'nationality' of any given multinational firm. Firms are established in the legal structure
that most closely meets the enterprises' control and economic objectives. II that form is not available in one
jurisdiction and a suitable form is only available elsewhere, using supply-side law. many firms will move as long
as the business will not be negatively affected and the benefits of such a move outweigh its costs Chapter 5
showed that contracting costs fall as technology advances. This is equally true lor the cost of gelling mlonnation
about and forming companies, so Ihal the cost of a move lo another jurisdiction (the "exit cost") goes down.
There is an historical parallel in the freedom of American companies lo establish and incorporate in any stale.
In the United States, a majority of the larger public companies have elected lo utilize the company laws of the
small, otherwise insignificant stale of Delaware. While this was partially done lor corporate and individual lax
reasons, this is not the only reason. As firms are given the freedom to establish freely in any European
Community Member Slate and to operate (relatively) throughout the Community, it is likely Ihal one or more
couniries will compete lo supply European incorporations. The winning counlnes will provide companies wiUi
the lowest taxation, the most efficient background law, access lo a modem and efficient capiuil market and Ihe
best protection for Ihe company, and its entrepreneurs and capital owners.
2. History and Background
Given this context it is useful lo look at Ihe current provision of company laws in the United Slates and Europe.
Relatively inefficient firms may not go out of business for considerable periods of time, if ever. 5j£
R. Nelson & S. Winter. An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (Cambridge: Belknap Pre«i,
1982). This does not change the equation that firms operating under an inefficient company law arc
more likely to go bankrupt than firms operating under an efficient sel of laws.
There is some conflict as to whether the addition of codelerminatKm and public interest provisions lo
company law statutes is ideologically based. Clearly these provisions were initially not the outcome of
broad-based economic thought. The idea that these (primarily codelerminalion) provisions result in an
economically efficient firm structure is a separate issue. See J Backhaus. "Workers Participation
Stimulated by the Economic Failure of Traditional Organization: An Analysis of Some Recent
Developments", in H.G. Nut/jnger A J. Backhaus (eds). Co-Peterminauon: A Discussion of Different
Approaches (Heidelberg, New York: Springer. 1989) pp. 229-68.152
a. Europe
The large scaJe development of company law began with the growth of the large European trading companies
of (he seventeenth century. At this time the companies began to demonstrate the characteristics by which they
arc Mill identifiable today.
These characteristics include:
(1) Economic activity as a legal or actual goal of the company;
(2) The execution of this economic activity through the accumulation of capital from many sources;
(3) Engagement in businesses which, by virtue of their high risk and large capital requirements, could not
have been undertaken by lone individuals;
(4) A variety of forms of company organizations; and
(5) The need of passive investors for a mechanism through which they could safely entrust their capital to
either investor-managers or professional managers.
By the seventeenth century a close relationship between the political structure in the home country and the
enterprise can be found.- Often these enterprises were owned and operated by the state. Governments often
granted privileges to various enterprises in order to promote both the enterprises" interests and the interests of
the state by giving the company a separate legal identity and declaring the company a "legal person". This was
necessary because only "persons" could avail themselves to a country's legal system. Conversely, it was important
lor the country, because only "persons" were subject to certain forms of taxation. The state often granted non-
stale enterprises a legal monopoly for their commercial activities. These governmental grants were the forerunners
of modern company law.- '• Their major shortcomings were that there were no strict legal requirements for
receiving the grants and it was an expensive process with no guarantee of eventual success.
The development of national company laws began in the nineteenth century. The rapid industrialization of the
first half of the century let! to the development of new company structures. By the second half of the nineteenth
century the economy of Ihe Western world had been transformed. The company laws of the time contained few
of the organizational norms which arc familiar today. Industrialization made economies of scale possible which
led to Ihe formation of large companies. This was particularly iruc in ihc German Reich and in the United States,
and to a lesser extent in France and Great Britain.
The national governments of Europe, beginning wilh France in 1807,"'"' encouraged this process by freeing
the corporate structures from their historical rcslriclions. General provisions and normative provisions gradually
replaced Ihe case by case legislative approach. Under this new system any firm meeting the organizational
conditions of the enabling statutes had a right to be constituted as a company. The states no longer retained
investment supervision over companies, either by placing restrictions on a company's objectives for the protection
of investors or for the purpose of generally controlling the company's economic power.
Despite the general structural uniformity of European Companies there are considerable differences in how
various countries implemented their enabling statutes. Dissimilarities arose as countries reformed their statutes
by adopting various protection mechanisms. This differentiation can be seen today in areas which include: statutes
on the adequacy of staled capital versus fixed capital; provisions for raising and maintaining capital; provisions
For a history of company law in Europe, see generally R.M. Buxbaum and K. Hoot, Legal
Harmonization and Ihe Business Enterprise (Berlin: Springer, 1988).
• • The Netherlands, unlike other European countries, retains one of the pre-enabiing statute restrictions.
The Dutch Burgerlijk Wctboek. Book 2. Article 68 stales that a certificate of government approval is
necessary to form a corporation. This is an exception in form only, since Ihe issuance of the certificate
has become a mere formality.
'"" This step was followed by Spain in 1821. ihe Netherlands in 1838 and Prussia in 1843. Greater
liberalization was unleashed by the English Companies Act of 1862.IS3
regarding the contribution of nonmoneory capital: issuance of nonvonng shares; limitations on the validity of
unequal voting shares: limitations on the company's rcaci)uisiiion of its shares; requirements fnr capital increases
and reductions: minimum contents lo be contained in company charters; provisions tur controlling the company;
and definitions n the duly to observe these regulations
Devekuxncnts in company law facilitated growth hy sanctioning external expansion ami promoting capital
concentration. In Common Law countries the development of organizational law was UatlilitHtally in the
hands of the courts Even though France is a Civil IJW country the courts played a similar role there since
France's initial organization law was kit unamended tor many years The German legislature, on the other
hand, monitored us company law and made reforms during this period The German law was primarily intended
lo serve the capilal interests of shareholders as it concerned itself with controlling the management hy making
it accountable to the shareholders.
The problems of management control were seen as fundamental everywhere, hut only a few legal gymm
developed a truly independent supervisory body or board of directors. Various countries adopted different
management structures. This will be further discussed below.
To understand the legal framework, it is helpful lo consider the economic thought under which the* Uwi wen
developed. The Adam Smith concept of an invisible hand, that automatically makes economic cwrecttoni (or the
maximum benefit for all. is not an idea which has had a great influence on continental Europe. Instead,
continental Europe has been greatly influenced by Marxism and socialism on the one hand ami hy corpontiwt
on the other.
Roman Catholic social thought has emphasized corporate md cooperative social fob and has condemned III*
purely materialistic values of the market place. This outlook dominated poMww Christian Democratic movements
in the Netherlands. West Germany. Prance and Italy. The Chnslian Democrau in him were the most important
jingle movement which influenced the development of the European Economic Community A secular
corporatism was also part of fascist thought of the 1920s and 1930s. The great stale corporations of modem Italy
were established under Ihe fascists. Spain and Portugal were greally influenced by Catholic and fascist
corporatism as well as by Marxism and anarchism
Europe itself, as a community, can be viewed as a corporate undertaking Jean Monnet'i postwar plan lo put the
French and West German coal and steel industry under a common public authority was Ihe foundation for what
has turned out lo be the European Economic Community. *"
b. The United Suits
Company law commenced in a similar manner in Ihe United Suites. Bui. unlike continental Europe, American
economic thought was nol later greatly influenced by Marxism, Catholicism, fascism or corporatism.
Supra note 63 at 176.
The old concession system of company law was abolished in England in 1844. in France in 1867. and
in 1870 in Germany. See England (1844). Joint Stock Companies Act 1844.7 & 8 Vict.c. 110: France
(1867), Loi No. 15.328 sur les Societes. du 24 juillct 1867. arts. 21 & 47. Bull, des Lou. No. 1513.
Tome 30. p. 95 (1866-1870): Germany (1870). Gesett betr. die Kommanditgcsellschafl aul Aklien u.
die Aktiengesellschaften vom 11.6.1870. BGBI. Norddeutscher Bund 1870. 375.
J. Paillusseau. La Societe Anonyme. Technique de [/Organisation de L'Entrcprise (Paris: Moreille.
1967) p. 153.
W. Pfaff. "A Cross-Channel Joust With Overblown Words*. International Herald Tribune (October 25.
1988) p. 6. One could also view the formation of the EEC as an outgrowth of the Benelux Treaty.154
Notwithstanding the invasive growth of regulation by the federal government through the federal security laws
in this century, company law is still exclusively the domain of Ihe states. While no two stale company laws are
identical, they are substantially similar. Innovations in one stale's company law are generally quickly adopted
in other slates.' The revision process is analogous to market competition, in which states compete with each
other to provide a product, corporate charters, in order to obtain tax and franchise revenues.
During the late eighteenth and Ihe early nineteenth centuries, when a company in the United States wanted to be
incorporated it had to go to the stale law-making process. Incorporations were granted on a case by case basis
through independent acts passed by state legislatures and signed by the state's governor. The first departure from
legislative chartering of corporations came from a 1811 New York Statute.^ The advantage of this type
of law is effectively laid out in the following contemporary analysis:
There is nothing of an exclusive nature in this statute; but the benefits from associating and
becoming incorporated, for the purposes held out in this act. are offered to all who will
conform to its requisitions. There .ire no franchises or privileges which are not common to the
whole community. In this respect, incorporations under the statute differ from corporations, to
whom some exclusive or particular privileges are granted. The only advantages of an
incorporation under the statute over partnerships... Idcrives from) a capacity to manage the
affairs ol Ihe institution, by a few select agents, and by an exoneration from responsibility
beyond the amount of the individual subscriptions. •
Unfortunately this ground-breaking statute was ineffectual because it was not exclusive and did not provide
sufficient flexibilily in terms of duration, purpose or capitalization to be useful. As a result, most corporations
continued to be formed by special legislative charter in New York.^
Over the next M years, there were various improvements devised by various states. But a truly detailed modem
enabling act was not passed until 187.*). when New Jersey actively decided to compete for the businesses that
were prospering, yet hampered by the laws in nearby New York. New Jersey's bid was largely successful.
Over time further modernization occurred and now virtually every state has adopted the New Jersey type of law.
The New Jersey approach has been adopted in the Model Business Corporation Act.'^
•"' See R. Romano. "Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle", 1 Journal of Law.
Economics and Organization 225-53 (1985); and D. Shughart and R.D. Tollison, "Corporate Chartering:
An Exploration in the Economics of Legal Change". 2.1 Economic Inquiry 585-603 (1985).
"^ 1811 N.Y. Laws 67.
'" sice v. Bloom. 19 Johns. Cas. 456, 473-74.
' S, Livemtore. The History of Early American Land Companies - Their Influence on Corporate
Development (New York: New York University Press 1939) at 270-71. In commenting on the
ineffectiveness of Ihe early incorporation statutes, at 260-61, Livermore wrote that "...corporation
primacy was threatened by the growing tendency by state legislators to impose disabilities on the
corporation even while they continued to grant those particular legal advantages which set it apan from
the association....That the leading legislatures should have embarked on this restrictive policy after 1800
seems to have been due fundamentally to a recurrence of familiar 18lh Century fear of the corporation's
monopoly position".
^ J. Cadman. The Corporation in New Jersey (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949) pp. 174-80.
While New Jersey provided the first modem incorporation statute, it should be noted that 24 states
beginning with Connecticut in 1837 had previously passed general incorporation laws. Of these 24
slates. 13 had to amend their slate's constitution to do so.
•"" ABA Committee on Corporate Laws. Model Business Corporation Act Annotated. Third Edition. (SL
Paul: West Publishing, 1986).I5S
Delaware became hone 10 ovtr half of America's largest corporations as a result of supplying laws in which Us
coins have regularly handed down decisions that affirmed the actions ol corporate boards as long as the devt.sion$
were made in good failh (this baas of these decisions is now called the "business-judgement rule"). Beginning
in 1913. New jersey lost its preeminence due to Governor Woodrow Wilson's shortsightedness Al this time.
Wilson began to lax companies that were incorporated but not legally based in his stale. New Jersey neve*
recovered its preeminence.
Delaware's preeminent position came under pressure in 198J, as a result of several lower courts overturning the
business-judgement rule. Unlike New Jersey, this pressure proved to be temporary, since (he stale Supreme Court
quickly reversed the lower courts' decisions, thus preserving Delaware as the America's incorporation site of
choice.'
Probably the best reason for close approximation of the various SUM'S incorporation laws is the (act that as long
as a corporation can choose Us governing law by selecting its stale of incorporation, attempts at stringent control
are in vain. The U.S. experience contains an important lesson for posl-19«J2 Europe: as long as people. gi**ls.
services and businesses can operate relatively freely, they will gravitate 10 Ihc place ih.n impost's the fewest
restrictions, taxes and costs on their activities.
3. The Future of Kurope i* Light of America's Experience
Like post-1992 Europe, the United Stales is a common market where goods arc Irccly traded Ironi stale lo slate.
Each stale has wide latitude to pass the company laws and state tan laws of its choosing While there is a more
important common national corporate lax structure with higher corporate lax rales, the suites have .separate
corporate lax policies. Although Ihc federal government arguably has the capacity to pass national company lawi,
it has only chosen to take jurisdiction over a few elements of company law. such as securities regulation.
To economists it cannot he surprising that slates have entered into competition lo attract corporate charter*, jobs
and lax revenues. One of the obvious winners, with the corporate charters of over hall of the largest companies
and many smaller companies, is the otherwise insignificant stale of Delaware. Debwarc won the rate for
corporate charters for three distinct reasons: a liberal set of company laws, liberal corporate lax laws, and a I ml
mover advantage.
"The Delaware Court". Corporate Growth (May/June 1989) pp. 42-43. For a more in depth look at the
incorporation history of Delaware and New Jersey see C. Grandy, "New Jersey Corporate
Chartermongering. 1875-1929", 49 Journal of Economic History 677-92 (1989): H.G. Mannc.
"Intellectual Styles and the Evolution of American Corporation Law", in G. Radnitzky and P. Bemholz
(eds.). Economic Imperialism: The Economic Approach Applied Outside the Field of Economics (New
York: Paragon House, 1987) pp. 219-41: C.W. McCurdy, "The Knight Sugar Decision of I895 and the
Modernization of American Corporation Law. 1869-1903". 53 Business History Review 304-42 (1979).
Al 677-79, Grandy also notes that New Jersey adopted a liberal company law in order to attract
incorporations from the stale of New York. The New Jersey legislature considered its supply-side law
to be an exchange of a liberal incorporation law for incorporation fees and franchise taxes.
Those who strive to slay ahead of a curve are said to have a "first mover advantage". American
companies take Delaware's first mover strategy seriously. Delaware is often the first to innovate, but
even when it is not first, it often quickly adopts advantageous changes which competing stales make.
Companies have a reasonable assurance that, if they choose to incorporate in Delaware, the slate will
retain its advantageous tax and company laws. Any innovation made by a stale without a first mover
advantage will have little real impact on (he market. The first mover advantage lakes on a upccial
significance in the European context. Should the European Community choose or find it necessary lo
harmonize its company and lax laws, companies that wish lo remain European' will be 'frozen* in the
places where they were incorporated at the tune of the harmonization. They will be frozen because
internal EC retneorporauon will not pose any benefits, but will involve an exit COS.156
Delaware has the most liberal and continually innovative company law policy. Activities which occur outside the
stale are not taxed. Companies are attracted by Delaware's reputation and commitment to remain an innovative,
low tax state. Delaware caters to a corporation's need to make business transactions flow efficiently, quickly and
with maximum protection for officers and directors. Delaware has long recognized that the adoption of a
comprehensive anti-takeover plan is beneficial and appropriate in many circumstances, and the state has
established comprehensive guidance on what is permissable. Delaware law allows for the elimination of
preemptive rights and cumulative voting rights. Delaware also offers advantages in restructuring, simplicity, and
flexibility."* As a result. Delaware receives about 17 per cent of its state revenue from incorporation fees.
The average for the other 49 slates is 1.5 per cent. "
4. The Delawarizatton of Europe?
In light of the income which Delaware receives from its incorporation law. it would not be surprising if a small
European country which has designs on becoming a major financial centre, such as Luxembourg or Ireland, tries
to become "The Delaware of Europe".
Like the federal government of the United States, the European Economic Community has the power to pass
uniform tax and company laws and indeed has made some progress in making certain aspects of European
company laws uniform.- The main objective of 1992'- is to achieve a common market for companies
by establishing similar guarantees for stockholders, creditors and employees.
• * S.A. Huggins, "Advantages of Incorporating in Delaware", ABA Banking Journal (October 1986) pp.
120-122.
•' Supra Romano, note 70. For further information regarding the fiscal effects of supply-side incorporation
law and services for Delaware w, E.D. Craig. "State Finances: Delaware as a Case Study". 6 Public
Finance Quarterly 513-24 (1978); M.R. Brams. "The Delaware Corporation Franchise Tax: An
Undercxploiled Quasi-Tax", 14 Marquetle Business Review 24-47 (1970).
There have been some coasiderable. if limited successes in this area. With a few holdouts on laws
regarding accounting procedures (the Fourth Directive) and disclosure requirements (the Seventh
Directive), all of the EEC countries have adopted uniform rules for company registration (the First
Directive); basic standards for capital formation and maintenance of public companies (the Second
Directive); procedures for mergers of public companies (the Third Directive); procedures for the
divisions of public companies (the Sixth Directive): and uniform standards for auditor qualifications (the
Eighth Directive). This so-called harmonization can be vague, The Fourth Company Law Directive.
78/doO/EEC. leaves "No less than 41 options open to the Member Stales in addition to the 33 options
left to the members themselves". Supra note 63 at 235. ..•..«.-
^ Completing the Internal Market (Com(85) 310). • •• !•••.•• ' ••> *•"•IS7
Under the Treaty of Rome, firms are allowed 10 freely establish and move throughout the Community. *
With (he advent of 1992. the European Court should take this plain language o) the treaty at us face value.
Whether companies will be totally free to move throughout thr Community' as long as they arc incorporated in
at least one member state has been a source of «me controversy.- Assuming that firms .uv truly able to
operate anywhere in the Community regardless of the place of the incorporation, the 'winning' country will
supply the company law which minimizes Community-wide taxation, imposes the fewest legal restrictions and
affords the highest protection and control of management and shareholder interests. In short, the country will
supply a company law which will make it the "Delaware of Europe."
5. The European Debate
Legislation concerning corporate forms is a core aspect of both legal and economic policy, corporate i
determine the legal environment of production and exchange and thus crucially .illeci where capital is tnv
and the performance of the economy as a whole Thr national government of Ihe United Stairs is not engaged
in legislating corporate forms. The stale-enacted corporation and partnership statutes, although similar to
philosophy, vary from stale to stale. While the federal government is concerned with whether atmntwtei an
incorporated in the United States, it cares little about where a company ix located as Ions as u is located
somewhere in its jurisdiction so that it is not deprived of its national corporate tax revenue. In Europe the
statutes are exclusively at Ihe national level. But like individual American states. European countries should can
if corporate forum shopping is done in another EC country. As discussed above, this should become increattn|ly
likely in the context of I992.*™
'• • Articles 52-58 of the Treaty of Rome deal with the right of companies to establish freely and move
across internal EC borders. More broadly. Article 2 of the EEC Treaty stairs that three objectives
should he binding on Ihe Community. Initially, a Common Market was to he established ami the
economic policies of Ihe Member Slates were to be incrementally approximated. This was expected to
bring about the ultimate objectives of the EEC: harmonious development of economic activities
throughout the community; a continuous and balanced economic expansion of Ihe Community; an
increase in economic stability within the Community; an accelerated rise in Ihe standard of living; and
closer relations between the states. Article 3 summarizes the specific activities designed to achieve the
goals of Article 2. The most important for our purposes are Article 3(c) which calls for "the abolition,
as between Member States, of obstacles to freedom of movement for persons, services and capital." and
Article 3(h) which provides for "the approximation of Ihe Laws of Member States lo Ihe extent required
for the proper functioning of the common market." In 19X7. Article 8A. which calls for the
establishment of the internal market by 1992 was added to the Treaty of Rome.
• See B. Wachter. K. van Hulle. W. Landau, J. Schaafsma and M. Raaijmakers, Harmmi?jtion of
Company Law and Securities Law (Tilburg: Tilburg University Press. 1989); SJ. Berwin and Co..
Company Law and Competition (London: Mercury Books. 1989); J. Dine. "The Harmonization of
Company Law in Ihe European Community", in A. Barav and D.A. Wyatt (eds.) Yearbook of European
Law 1989. (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1990) pp. 93-119.
This divergence has led to a situation where a majority of Ihe Fortune 500 compame* have been
incorporated in the small State of Delaware, Few of the Delaware corporation!! have either major office*
or factories, let alone their corporate headquarters located in the Slate of Delaware. This amounts lo a
legal quasi-ficlion where a company's place of incorporation bears little or no resemblance lo any
meaningful economic activity.
This should be true notwithstanding that on September 27. 1988 Ihe European Court of Justice ruled
that the British Company. Daily Mail and General Trust PLC. could not transfer its central management
and control lo Ihe Netherlands without winding-up and settling its tax bill as required by British law.
The primary motive for the reincorporation was lo sell a significant part of Us nonpermancm assets and
to use the proceeds lo buy its own shares without having to pay British capital gains taxes. The Court
ruled that Community Law Articles 52 and 58 of Ihe Treaty of Rome and Council Directive 73/148 of
21 May 1973 do not confer an absolute right on a company incorporated under the laws of one member138
In Europe, however, company law harmonization is a difficult issue for a number of reasons. European
governments must contemplate what the implications of both current and harmonized company laws will be for
their individual stales after the 1992 project of "Europe Without Borders" becomes a reality. In this context, a
vital question for managers of multi-national companies and their lawyers is: now that our company can produce
goods in any EC country (hopefully with uniform standards) and can transfer capital freely, does our company
want to be incorporated in Europe, and if so. where and in which form. ^ which country supplies us with
the most efficient company law taking into consideration the goals of the firm?
If European company law u not harmonized and companies can freely operate anywhere in Europe within a
single structure, a situation similar to what has occurred in America is likely to occur. In America, the small and
relalivcly insignificant slate of Delaware has largely replaced New Jersey as the home of a large majority of
America's largest companies. Without a uniformity of company laws wiihin the European Economic Community,
a "Delawarization of Europe" is likely to occur.
One way in which to attract firms and their capital to a jurisdiction would be to maintain low minimal standards
of capital, minimal regulation, ineffective labour laws, and more importantly low taxation, while at Ihc same time
supplying high degrees of protection to capital owners from worker represcnlation and managers from corporate
raiders. The benefit lo Europe's "Delaware." would come from filing fees, the employment of lawyers,
accountants and secretaries and perhaps, for a small country, even some additional lax revenue. The drawback
for Ihc "winner" would be a loss of some naiional control over corporations, and a loss of tax revenue if Europe's
Delaware was a larger counlry. While Ireland. Denmark and Portugal are candidalcs. Luxembourg would be the
winner, li is by far Ihe smallest of the EC countries. II is centrally located. It has a strong capital market. And
it has a long, well deserved reputation for being a lax haven wilh strong bank secrecy laws. Luxembourg has
preserved its bank secrecy laws, despite EC pressure lo reform, because il is well aware of the economic benefits
thai il derives from being a lax haven. These arc benefits similar lo those that Luxembourg would derive from
becoming Europe's Delaware.
While there have already been some major, but limited and relative, successes in company law harmonization
in Europe, Ihc govemmenls have not yet agreed lo enact European Commission proposals which strike at the
heart of corporalc life and its management's freedoms: directives which mandate a harmonization of corporate
board structures and worker participation (Ihc Fifth Directive), and group level legal responsibility (the Ninth
Directive).- These directives are undeniably social in origin, hul, if adopted, will have a major economic
effect. There may he good reason why they have not been adopted: they may not be efficient in either a national
or international context.
The program of European company law harmonization has been a two-tracked approach based on a trade-off from
Ihc start. The main objective is lo achieve a common market for companies by establishing similar guarantees
stale and having ils registered office in thai counlry lo Iransfer its central management and control to
another member stale. Whether this ruling absolulely stops companies from rcincorporating in other
countries wilhoul Ihc consent of Ihe countries or whether it is intended merely to stop blatant attempts
at tax evasion is unclear. The Court docs, however, stress that all of Ihe stales permit ihe winding-up
of a company and its reincorporation. This would support Ihe later view.
• • ' Companies, incorporated in the EC have, since Ihe end of Ihe transitional period in 1970, been free to
establish across the Community's borders wilh limited exceptions. Article 58 of the Treaty of Rome
stales thai: "Companies or firms formed in accordance with Ihe law of a member state and having a
registered office, central administration or principal place of business wiihin Ihe Community shall .„
be treated in Ihe same way as natural persons who are nationals of member states."
• • ° The EC's Council of Ministers have adopted seven of the ten Directives submitted to them by the
European Commission. A directive orders each EC country's legislature lo adopt enabling legislation
thai conforms lo the orders of Ihe directive. These measures, particularly those setting out common rules
and requirements for financial reporting, have had a direel impact on companies operating in the
Community and on Ihe professions, especially lawyers and accountants, who service them.(or aockhoJden. creditors and employees. The trade-off a a loss of market freedom for companies through
mandating measures which ensure equivalent economic and social protection in the Community's member stales.
The problem lies in the fact that the goals ol a free market for companies ami harmoni/cd protection lor investors
and workers are incompatible. Some governments, led by Great Bntain. arc unequivocally fot a trpc market ft*
companies, while others, led by Germany and the Netherlands, are anxious that incorporation statutes should
contain certain social elements. At this point the economic position of the Untied States becomes
intertwined with the position of Ihe 'free market" group.
Nowhere is this conflict more apparent than in negotiations over the Fifth Directive The Fifth Directive was first
proposed in 1972 and then re submitted to the council in amended form in 198 V It has two main aims. A two-tier
board structure and worker participation in companies with more than 1000 employees.
A two-tier board system has a supervisory and a management board. This legally imposed structure dates hack,
in France, lo 1856. ' Under a compulsory two-tier governance structure, the management board manage*
the company on its own responsibility and represents the company in relations with thin) parties It is not ducclly
subject to the instruction of the shareholders, but is influenced to a certain degree by resolutions of the
supervisory board. The supervisory board determines the policy of the company. It supervises the management
board and appoints its members. The supervisory board may not lake part in Ihe active management of the firm
and may only represent the company in transactions with Ihe members ol the management hoard No person can
serve on both the supervisory and management boards simultaneously.
Worker participation in the firm is a more fundamental innovation in company law. It can lake one of four forms
under the current 1989 EC Draft Directive: (I) the election of employee representatives to ihe supervisory board
of a two-tier corporation or. in a single-tier system to Ihe unitary board (in a non-executive capacity); (2) Ihe co-
option of employee representatives to the supervisory board or (in a non-executive capacity) lo the unitary board;
(3) worker participation through a body made up solely of worker representatives; or (4) worker participation
through collective bargaining which in effect LS equivalent to one of the first (hrce Currently, (irrman company
law mandates the first option (in companies with over 2.WX1 employees)- . Danish company law mandate*
These positions have been frequently articulated by European leaders while presenting their vision of
a "United Europe." On September 20. 1988. Ihe then British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, in (he
opening ceremony of the 39th academic year of the College of Europe in Bruges staled: "We have not
successfully rolled back the frontiers of Ihe stale in Britain, only to see them reimposed at a European
level, with a super-state exercising new dominance from Brussels....Our aim should not be more and
more detailed regulation from the centre; it should be to deregulate, to remove restraints on trade and
lo open up....Wc emphatically do not need new regulations which raise Ihe cost of employment and
make Europe's labour market less flexible and less competitive with overseas suppliers ' D. Marsh,
"Thatcher Rails Against Europe", Financial Times (September 21. 1988) p. 2. German Chancellor
Helmut Kohl responded on October 18. 1988 while sneaking at a Catholic conference in Brussels. He
reminded the audience that the goal of 1992 was social as well as economic. "Europe cannot take shape
unless its citizens identify with it. That is why. for me. the social dialogue is a vital part of the living
Europe of citizens'." S. Avery, "Kohl Reacts lo PM". The Independent (October 19. 1988) p. 1.
The current draft, which began floating around on October 16. 1989 but was not published, eliminate*
Ihe requirement for a two-lier structure.
In Rrance, a share partnership, in contrast to a corporation, had long been available without government
permission. Through lime it had become an instrument for serious abuse. France responded by enacting
a mandatory two-tier company in 1856. but only for limited-share partnerships. M. Viander. La Soctelf
en Commandile Entre son Pass* el son Avenir. (Paris: Etudes du Centre de Recherche sur les Droiu)
des Affairs. 1983) at 50-53.
See MitbestG 1976. The western German model is based on equal represemalion of capital and labour,
and places a final tie-breaking vote with capital in the hands of the capital appointed chairman.160
the second (in companies with over 35 employees)^ and Dutch company law mandates the third (in
companies with more than 100 employees)^.
The notion of a single-tier company, with worker representatives in a non-executive capacity, is a compromise
that has already been worked out. Under this proposal, the functions of management and supervision would be
clearly defined and allocated within the board. No compromise has been reached on worker participation.
Interestingly, while the British government opposes worker participation on the grounds that it is required by a
legally imposed framework'''-'. Germany is opposed on diametrically opposite grounds. Western Germany
had a post-war legislative commitment to worker representation, on which the original EC proposals were largely
based. All German political parties view their legally imposed two-tier companies with mandatory worker
participation on the supervisory board as being central to the balance and success of Western Germany's social
market economy. Germany views the current proposals as being too weak to pass as real worker participation
*" £ee Aktieselskabsloven 1984.
Work Councils are mandatory for companies with as few as 10 employees. They, unlike companies with
over 100 employees, arc not given the right to veto nominees to the management board. See Law of
22nd May 1981. Staalsblad No 416, which mandates Works Councils, and Works Council Law 1971
for the right afforded Works Councils of various sizes. The Dutch worker participation law was
introduced in 1973. Under this model, the managerial board of directors, the central works council and
the shareholder's general assembly each make proposals for appointments to vacant supervisory posts:
the supervisory board chooses one of these three nominees.
**' It is also interesting to note that the British Trade Unions have traditionally opposed the concept of
worker representation because it would largely lake away the "us versus them" class issue from which
they foci that their traditional strength arises.Ul
and ts afnid that the current form may eventually erode Ms own well proven models***". It is difficult (o find
an area of compromise against this selling.
Unlike other issues of company bw. decisions over worker naiuctpalton have not been baaed on technical istuM
of corporate organization, hut involve fundamental questions about economic systems, which ore ulicn decided
on the bass of emotion and ideology. ' Because of the argument linking efficient law with national
economic styles made in Chapter 4. this is exactly why such issues air hetirr settled at the national level, rather
than at a pan-national level. The addition of workers' rights to company statutes considerably increawt
employers' obligations and potentially adds greatly k) a company's bureaucracy and costs, to an extent dependant
Germany also feels that without company and social law harmonization it will lose a significant amount
of investment to EC countries thai do not have two-tier governance systems, worker representation and
strict labour legislation. This indicates that Germans fear that, il German companies were Iree of
mandatory codeterminauon. at least some would abolish it. Il also demonstrates that Germans regard
codetermination as efficient background law. Codeterminalion is clearly a trndc-olf. The Chun below
demonstrates that on average, the largest German firms, all with mandatory- codetermtnalion ;trc less
profitable than other large EC industrial firms. German employees also take a much higher proportion
of the value added to the firm than other European workers. Value added by the firm is dclinol as wage
costs plus profits before interest and depreciation. One would e»pect that over the limger term,
international investors would be reluctant ID invest in large German companies.


































































The rest of the added value is accounted for by interest, tax and retained profit.
Greece and Portugal have been omitted since none of the largest 500 industrial firms are located there,
Luxembourg is excluded since its sample size is only one firm.
Source "EC Heavyweights " By Tom Llovd in April 1991 edition of /n(«7uwi«n<j/ Ma(ia*«rw«/
**' This does not imply that legislation enacted to further social values will necessarily be inefficient *ince
social values often embody a society's experience and thereby preserve optimal arrangements Ihal have
been arrived at through the course of history by trial and error. §ee G. Schmoller. "The Idea of Justice
in Political Economy", in Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science IV (Berlin:
Springer. 1894) at 697-737.162
on (he form in which Ihe workers rights are imposed. It is an open question whether the benefits of worker
participation: building trust between social partners, greater company disclosure in the interest of the workers and
the public, more careful decisions on basic company matters and greater social justice, outweigh its drawbacks:
creation of conflicts of interest for worker representatives on company bodies, threats lo business secrecy, delays
in decision making and non-market influences on decisions. There is even greater uncertainty regarding the
consequences of tfansferring a model that works in one society to a different culture with a different social and
legal framework.*''"
It is interesting to note that both opponents and proponents of worker participation argue their case on the basis
of economic efficiency and its effects on European integration. The opponents fear that worker participation will
reduce the efficiency of the organization in general and in particular that national worker representatives on a
board would block closures of factories in their country and Ihe transfer of production to other Member States.
Supporters argue that worker participation will promote economic efficiency by producing a less tense social
climate and reducing strikes.
The implication of Ihe previous discussion is far away from Ihe original intent of those who first argued for a
uniform European company law: to easily facilitate cross-border partnerships between businesses,
A. Implications (if this Debute for Europe
Jusl as when New York companies moved Iheir site of incorporation lo New Jersey 100 years ago, some
companies which are facing inefficient legal restrictions will "move" Iheir charter lo countries which offer a more
hospitable law. This "move." in the short run, may only mean holding shareholders vole and filing an application
for incorporation in a different country. As taxes become a less important determination of where a company
should be incorporated, companies will increasing look for corporate forms which lower iheir costs and add to
Iheir profitability. In an international capital market investors will increasingly demand the highest returns
IKissiblc. One can expect that sleepy managements will have difficulty slaying in power if they pay a premium
for being an underachicver in the marketplace.
Economists like lo construct theories that contain logical conclusions that hold true under equal conditions. No
exception will be made here. The theorem of efficient law slates that businesses attempt lo act in ways that will
lead lo increased profits and conlrol over their ability to operate and, all other things being equal,- the
capital interest of companies will attempt lo incorporate in places where they have the lowest taxes (and therefore
' " Important differences may be contained in Ihe labour law. labour conflict, worker attitudes, and trade
union behaviour and influence. Supra note 6? at 262.
'*' The condition of "all other things being equal" is an important one. Some companies lobby governments
in quest of favours which are of economic benefit lo (hem. In economics this process is commonly
known as rent-seeking. Companies which receive enough governmenlal favours have an incentive to
slay in the country where the favours are granted. These favours may include tax breaks, trade
proleclion and preferential treatment in the granting of governmental contracts. Should these advantages
disappear upon reincorporation in another country and the total value of this "economic rent" surpass
Ihe sum of the tola! value of the inducement for moving plus Ihe cosls expended to receive the
governmental favours, a company will remain in whal is an otherwise uneconomic place lo be
incorporated in. These inducements cost eilher ihe laxpayers or consumers money. In a Delawarized
Europe this could amount to government officials "bribing" a company to stay. This would most likely
be done at the request of Ihe company. Bribery is usually thought IO go in ihe other direction. This
process will have few economic benefits for Ihe country and should be distinguished from the case
where a country offers incentives to a company not to move oul its actual operations. In this case it is
possible that Ihe value of the favour lo the company will be less than the amount of tax revenue which
continues (o be earned from the employees that remain employed, unemployment taxes collected and
expenditures saved and property taxes.the greatest net profits) and the least outside interference in their operations • •* Unlike roost ctonomic
theones. the theory of efficiem law is constantly bemg tested in the real world. The goal of the European
Community is to make all relevant individual circumstances equal. If the staled goal of the IW programme is
ever fully accomplished and the goal of a harmonued company law in the EC" is not achieved, then it is relatively
safe to predict mat many companies within Europe will change cither the place of Ihe lurm in which they are
incorporated. If true economic and political harmoniMuon fails, as tang as goods and services can Ireely pus
through European rational borders, firms will find it advantageous to incorporate in "Europe's Delaware" and
base their European operations in the countries »ith the lowest costs of production, wages and benefits, and taxes
and weakest unions and government regulations, unless there is a compelling reason to do otherwise. All oi these
conditions may not be present in one country. The greatest advantage tor a company may lie in being
incorporated in one country, having its major offices in a second country and its production in a third
country."'
To many Europeans, the implications of a Delawariied Europe arc hard to imagine. Consider the shock in
Germany, for example, if such well known companies as Siemens, Daimlcr-Bciw. Bayer. Oeutsihe Hank and
many other currently 'German' companies were to begin operating under the laws of Luxembourg (m whatever
country offers the "best" business climate). More than a psychological loss is at slake lor the affected
governments. From Ihc standpoint of Ihc government, there is a question of the loss of tax revenues which were
formerly paid to the treasury from various types of accounting prolits There is also ihe paramount question of
where people will be employed and pay theu taxes. Without harmoniuiion. countries must cither lower their tax
rates and the amount ol inefficient legally imposed control over companies or face losing "their" companies.
Some of the effects of laws that impose inefficient worker participation either through works council*, which
operate at the plant level, or co-determination, which operates at the company k-vel. will he weakened if the
companies relocate their incorporations. For example. The Netherlands and Germany arc Ihc only two countries
that mandate a two-tier board structure for large enterprises. Under this structure, the employees have some, bul
not the ultimate, power to either appoint, or block nominations for membership on. Ihe management hoard. It
the company relocates to a country which allows single-tier companies, and single-tier companies arc presumed
by Ihe shareholders to be more efficient, the management board would be formally disbanded and the power
which the workers formerly held has been eliminated.
The trade unions have categorized this process as "social dumping" and they are clearly worried about it. They
arc naturally concerned that employers might try to undercut existing social obligations by threatening to move
production to areas with lower standards. But what Ihe trade union leaders neglect to mention is that companies
have always held this option and whether or not one agrees with this practice, it is a smart and effective
bargaining tool. Trade unions generally only cave into this ultimatum if they feel that Ihe company is *enou» and
ready to pack up and leave. With changes in technology this is even more feasible.
A much cheaper alternative for a company attempting to remain in an EC country and to evade unwanted social
legislation would be to leave Ihe factories in place and to change some of Ihe legal conditions under which it
operated. In a "Delawarized" Europe, the use of supply-side company law would mean thai a simple change in
Transaction costs guru Oliver Williamson noted that Transaction-Cost Economics "emphasizes ex Host
costs. These include ...the set up and running costs associated with the governance structures".
"Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance". 18 Journal of Finance 567-86 (1988) at 572. The
transaction cost approach leads firms to both Ihe cheapest locations and most efficient operating
structures.
Today, it is possible to contemplate an "Italian company" with German shareholders raising its capital
in London, getting its raw materials from Australia and ils component parts from Japan, having
production facilities in Spain and exporting its products to America. It is also not unthinkable to splil
the "Italian company" by placing its parent incorporation in Luxembourg and retaining its management
(head office) in Italy. This scenario is the final possible frontier to the complete internationalization of
companies. For some specific examples of this process see R.B. Reich. The Work of Nation* fNew
York: Alfred A. Knopf) at 110-118.164
the place of the parent company's incorporation could eliminate some types of social legislation without the need
to negotiate with any affected worker and at little cost. The company would, of course, retain the right to
negotiate cost reductions, and in the absence of a sufficient level of cost reductions, to take the step of moving
the place of manufacture.
The concept of organizations evading legally imposed burdens is not a new idea. We have seen it happen in
Europe. In Germany, in contrast to most countries including Great Britain and France, the corporate company
structure has steadily lost importance, over the last two decades. The number of public companies, as well as the
number quoted on the stock exchange, has fallen considerably." At the end of 1990, only 545 of Germany's
2,682 public companies had shares listed on any of the eight German bourses. The capital stock of all German
corporations was DM 149 billion of which only DM 62.8 billion was listed. This compares to 433.731 private
companies which cannot be listed on a bourse." Implementation of economic and social policy through
company law has placed greater burdens on public companies in areas such as disclosure requirements, tax
burdens, and labour and worker participation laws. As a result, other less onerous forms of company structures
have been adopted.
Two forms of organization have met the demand for a less burdensome corporate form in Germany: the regular
private company (called a GmbH in Germany) has steadily gained ground, as has the limited partnership, the
GmbH and Co. A GmbH and Co. is either a partnership, or more usually a limited partnership, in which the
GmbH and its individual members arc partners. If the partnership is limited, the GmbH is the general partner,
with unlimited liability for the partnership debt, while its individual members are limited partners who are only
liable to the extent of their agreed contributions. Since the GmbH itself has limited liability, in practice the whole
partnership enjoys limited liability. There is also a tax advantage to this form of company since only incorporated
companies pay corporate tax. By ensuring in the articles that only a small part of the profits is paid to the general
partner, the GmbH, with I he balance going to the individual limited partners, the burden of corporate tax is
minimized. It is also free from the burden of publicly disclosing its accounts.
One can sec a similar development in The Netherlands. The Dutch BV. which is a private or closed company
wilh limited liability, was intnxluced into Dutch company law in 1971. It has proved to be quite popular and over
45,(XX) previously incorporated small and medium sized public companies or NVs have been converted into BVs.
Now there are over 25 BVs for every NV. ' For tax purposes the NV and the BV are treated identically.
The law governing the BV is largely based on the laws governing the NV. The same criteria and total and partial
exemptions governing the appointment, composition and functions of the supervisory board are applicable to both
large BVs and large NVs. One aspect of the BV can largely explain its widespread popularity. The adoption of
the EC's First Directive on Company Law obligates all NVs but only a few BVs to disclose annual accounts.
It is interesting to note that, despite (he presence of alternative operating structures, incorporation is the exception
in Germany, while in the Netherlands incorporation has become the rule.
"^ Today there are only some 100 genuine publicly held companies in West Germany. This compares with
some 10,000 in the United States. Supra note 63 at 172.
553 "Creating a Competitive and Integrated Financial Center". Special Section Germany • Wall Street
Journal Europe (October, 1991) p. 6.
'•^ In May, 1986 the EC Commission attempted to halt some of this evasion by presenting a draft proposal
which would extend the Fourth Company Law Directive on corporate disclosure requirements and the
Seventh Company Directive on group accounts to GmbH & Cos. This in turn has led to unusually
strong protests from the German Government and businesses. As long as majority rule is not practised
in the EEC, (here is little chance that this directive will be accepted.
'" P.M. Storm and MJ. Ellis. "The Netherlands", in MJ. Ellis and P.M. Storm (eds.). Business Law in
Europe (Deventer: Kluwer, 1982) at 444-445.
"* S. Cnossen. "The Case For Tax Diversity", 34 European Economic Review 471-479 (1990) at 474.163
7. TW Future of Coapaay Law is Kuropt
Worker participation measure) require unanimous approval in the European Community's Council of Ministers.
This probably makes the adoption of a single company model virtually impossible The status uuo of a multitude
of governance structures is the more likely scenario in the near future. If transaction costs are lowered and
satisfaction is maximized by this cornucopia of laws, then this is an efficient outcome. The F.C Commission has
ruled out complete lax harmonization, and for the reasons given in Chapter 7. it is inevitable that some companies
will move towards countries imposing lower uu burdens.
Section J: Conr/MMon
We live in a work) of multinational companies and increasingly global markets. Both companies and financial
markets have to be regulated. Does the concept of efficient law entail that both be regulated by laws enacted nl
the same governmental level? The answer is no Capital markets are becoming increasingly global in nature. Most
are going through the process of deregulation, cost reduction, and increasing transparency. As this continues in
occur, national laws will make less sense, and international rules will have to replace national ones.
Companies, on the other hand, are searching for a set of background laws which allo* foe smoother and less
inexpensive operations. Which laws will prove to be smoother and less expensive will depend »n the nature of
the business, the expectations of employees, and the type of control structure which the sharrhoklers require In
an inlemauonally competitive environment, it is possible that certain firms will require extremely liberal sets of
rules to provide the greatest flexibility for their operations. For this purpose supply-side laws will always exist
Extremely liberal laws, however, do not fulfil the requirement for efficient backgriRiml laws set out in Chapter
2: namely a fixed .set of laws which simultaneously facilitate smoother operations, increase surety of outcome
and minimize transaction and agency costs. In a world without national economic styles all transaction ami
agency costs would be the same. But. as discussed in Chapters ' and 4, different countries do have different
national economic styles; it is these differences in national economic styles which may lead to a need for different
sons of national or regional background laws.
By advocating different types of efficient laws and describing different types of laws which should be propagated
at various levels, the principle of subsidiarity is recommended. The primary question when trying to decide on
which is Ihe appropriate level for the provision of efficient laws should be the nature of the market to he
regulated. Certain types of travel, transportation, communications, financial instruments, and some types of taxes,
weapons and pollution all have international consequences and are therefore prime candidates for regulation at
an international level. Certain types of pollution and economic activity (including immigration) have regional
implications and might best he regulated at a regional level. Finally issues involving people and individual
choices, including most taxation and market regulation issues, are better left to national or more local solutions.
In this context it seems to me that European Commission President Jacques Dekws correctly analyzes the
distonive effects of high-cost social legislation when he states that: "If we |lhc EC] were to have opting out (for
laws| on social conditions it would erect a dangerous precedent and create a distortion of competition. It would
make one country [Great Britain] a paradise for foreign investment, such as Japanese investment, and then Spain
might ask for an opt-out on environmental rules." What he neglects to point out is that what is an efficient trade-
off to him. a lower level of investment and economic activity in exchange for a higher level of social security
legislation and environmental standards, may not be efficient for Great Britain or Spain."' Oily the people
of Great Britain and Spain (and not Jacques Dclors. the French. Ihe Germans, the Russians, the Chinese or the
United Nations), can answer the question of whether the benefits of legislation out-weigh its costs.
One should note that in the second part of this book, technological changes have been constantly referred to.
Technological changes have ted to dramatic changes in areas such as travel, transportation, communications,
financial instruments, taxes, weapons and pollution. These technological changes have changed the subsidiarily
C. Goldsmith, "Aid Issue Threatens Summit. Delors Says", International Herald Tribune (December 6.
1991) p. 2.166
calculation over time. Formerly the appropriate level for these areas of law was not international, but a more
local, national or regional level. In a world which is changing rapidly and in which supply-side law is rampant,
continued thought has to be given to the appropriate levels of law making.
This book has sought to provide a sensible basis for governments, lawyers, businessmen and economists to think
about the interrelationship between laws and markets. Over time, technology has broken much of government's
former power over taxation, capital, people, and the restriction of information. This loss of power puts serious
constraints on governments that do not act efficiently or pass efficient laws. A new challenge emerges to the
governments of the world at every level: repent and act efficiently or else capital, investment and ultimately your
most competitive people will move to the Utopian lands of efficient law.1*7
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Summary
Laws, markets and efficiency should he considered simultaneously, as (here Is a natural reciprocal relationship
between them. Rules and their enforcement will determine ho* markets operate Markets will and do wort. When
markets are said to be "failing" or working "badly" 11 is no< because the markets themselves "fail" or are "had:"
negative results occur when the set of rules under which [he markets operate ore either inherently inadequate,
property rights are unclear or the rules may be adequate but improperly enforced For law ami economics and
public choice purposes, efficiency is defined as the use of available resources in ways which bring aboutlhe
maximum overall satisfaction possible, given the available technology The only legitimate goal of public policy
is n create efficient markets Efficient commercial laws are those which fulfil certain necessary conditions
namely: transaction and agency costs minimization, surety of outcome and aggregate satisfaction maximi/alion.
Countries have a strong economic incentive lo pass the most efficient organizational forms possible The fail that
all countries have not adopted the same types of legal structures tends to indicate thai various countries' national
economic styles impose different transaction, agency, contracting and monitoring costs. The notion of what is
efficient taw has been almost revolutionized with the advent and diffusion of the mienx'hip. fibre oplic cable,
satellite communication, the fax machine and better and cheaper international transport and communications, The
advent of Ihe microchip has destroyed bureaucracies. Bureaucracies were necessary whe information was difficult
lo cotlecl. collate, interpret and disseminate. Raw data is now fed onto a database. Anyone who knows how lo
interpret the data can directly and immediately obtain and interpret the necessary information flows without Ihe
help of middle management. In fact, in this process, middle managers who were once indispensable are now an
absolute hindrance. This, along with a few other related factors, is the cause of constant corporate reslrucluringt
and massive while-collar job losses in private industry and privatizations by governments. Counlnes enact supply-
side laws lo at trail people and businesses who arc constricted in the straight-jacket of local national law and
would like lo find a cheap and convenient alternative.
Some countries arc now .spending more money to attract investment lo thctr borders than is yielded by corporate
income lax. Abolishing the corporate income tax would he more efficient than continuing lo tax profitable
businesses to cross-subsidize less profitable businesses The Treaty of Maastricht will lead lo f'.uropean Disunion.180
Recht, markt en efficienlie dienen nicl las van elkaar gezien le worden, aangezien daartussen een natuurlijke
wcdcrkerige relatie bcslaal. Regcls en de handhaving daarvan hepalen hei functioneren van de markt. Wanneer
wordl gcsteld dat markten "faJen" of "slechl" funclioneren dan is dil nict omdai de marki op zichzclf "faall" of
"slcchl" is. NegaUeve uitkomsten ool.staan als hel samenstel van rcgels. waaronder de markt functioneert.
inadequaal is, de eigendomsrechtcn onduidelijk /.ijn of wanneer de handhaving van adequate regels gebrekkig is.
Vanuil het pcrspccticf van dc rcchiseconomic en de economische theorie van de polilieke besluitvorming diem
effieienlic gefomuleerd le worden als de aanwending van de beschikbare middelen op zodanige wijze dat de
totale bchocflcnbevrediging gemaximaliseerd wordl. gcgcvcn de stand van de technologic Vanuil deze optiek
is het cnige legilieme doel van hel overheidsbeleid zorg te dragen voor efficienlc markten.
Landen hebben er groat cconomisch belang bij zo efficient mogelijkc organisatievormen te bezilten. Uit het feit
dat niel allc landen over idcrmckc juridische suueturen beschikken, blijkl dal nationale economische stijlen
uitccnlopendc transaclic-, agentschaps-, contract- en behecrskosten tot gevolg hebben. Voor een efficient
handclsrecht /.ijn dc volgcnde voorwaarden noodzakelijk: minimalisatie van de transaclie- en agentschapskosten,
zekcrheid over dc uitkomsten en maximalisatie van de totalc behoeftenbevrediging.
Dc inhoud van hel begrip efficient recht is nagenoeg verandcrd door de komst en de versprciding van de
microprocessor, vczel-oplische kabels. communicatie per satelliet, de faxmachinc en betere en goedkopere
transport- en communkaticmogclijkhcden. De komst van de micro-processor hecft bureaucraiieen vemietigd.
Hurtiiucralicen warcn noodzakelijk loen het mocilijk was informalie te verzamelen. samen te voegen, te
intcrprclcren en tc vcrspreiden. Tegcnwoordig wordt informalie verzamcld in een data-bank. Iedereen die de
indxmanc kan inlerpreleren kan direct en onmiddclijk dczc informalicstromen verkrijgen en interpreteren, zonder
dc hulp van middenkadcr. In dit proces vortnt het eens zo onmisbarc middenkader een belemmering. Tesamen
met enkcle andcrc vcrwanle facloren is dit proces dc oorzaak van voortdurende bedrijfsreorganisaties. het massale
verlies aan "witte-bcord'-banen in hel bedrijfsleven en privaliscnngen van overheidsinstellingcn.
Uuiden inlroduccren welten berustend op een aanbod-cconomie om personcn en ondememingen aan te Irekken,
die /.ich in het kcurslijf bevinden van hun nalionalc wctgeving en die op zoek zijn naar een goedkoop en geschikt
alternatief.
Sommigc landen bcsleden legenwoordig meer geld aan het aantrekken van investeringen dan de
vermiK)lschapsbclasling opbrengl. Afschaffing van dc vcnnoolschapsbelasting zou efficienler zijn dan door te gaan
mel hel belasten van winstgevende bedrijven en uit de opbrengst daarvan subsidies te verstrekken aan minder
winstgevende ondememingen.Ill
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